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ABSTRACT 
Study context 
For decades electricity has been a critical source of energy for all major 
industries, nationally and internationally. In 2002 the Australian electricity 
supply industry had assets in excess of $86 billion and accounted for more than 
1.4 percent of gross domestic product. It is a major t>mployer with more than 
33,000 people serving more than 8 million customers. 
'J'.his study explores the impact of corporatisation and management 
reform on the role and working life of managers within the broader context of 
this industry. It is an industry identified by academics, commentators and the 
business media over the past two decades as one of poor management 
performance and inefficiencies - often seen as significant contributors to 
historically high electricity costs to consumers in Australia. As a result, 
electricity utility reform has been high on the agenda of national and state 
governments &om the early I980's and throughout the 1990's. Macro and micro 
economic reforms driven by significant government sponsored reports were 
considered central to Australia's efforts to improve its economic position. 
Underpinning this orthodoxy was the call for managerial responsibilities and 
incentives for managers of public utilities to be redefined in accord with the 
government's objectives. Managerialism became the ideological driver for 
management reform and corporatisation. This in tum became the major change 
process employed by state governments seeking micro (agency level) economic 
reforms. TI1ese economic reforms incorporated efficiency, productivity and 
con testability considerations in line with National Competition Policy. 
The theoretical context for this study arises from the debate on micro 
economic reform which engendered an important shift in policy making debate 
from public administration to public management. It introduced managerialism, 
described as a flexible, market-based form of public management emphasising 
goal setting. planning and the measurement of results. Widespread adoption of 
managerialist policies in state government agencies is used as the broad context 
for changes to the roles, practices and working lives of managers within 
Australia's corporatised electricity supply utilities. 
Case selection 
The s'udy employs a single ca~e study approach premised on an in-depth 
rather than an industry-wide investigation of the impact of cmporatisation on 
the role of the manager. It focuses on the changes experienced by managers 
within Western Australia's public electricity utility, Western Power. This choice 
is both methodologically defensible and practical. Western Power is the third 
largest Australian utility in customer tenns and covers the largest geographical 
area. It is typical of the other state utilities and amongst the last to be 
corporatised following precedents established by its Eastern states counterparts. 
The choi.~e of Western Power as the case study organisation related to access, 
time, distance and cost. The researcher has worked for the study organisation 
f,,r more than 30 years and was able to carry out participant obsetvation, 
intetview staff and access relevant organisational and industry data. 
Significance of the study 
This study is both 1mique and significant in terms of its contribution t~, 
public management tl1eo1y ana ?•.;.ctice. It combines an etlmographicai',, 
" 
' qualitative and a quantitative approach with interpretist elements witl1in a'.'. 
iv 
,, 
,, 
ii 
' 
triangulated case study methodology. 
0
',',The shldy findings address the gaps in 
the literature on managerial experience~ and practices in an essential industry -
power generation and distribution. It identifies a wide variety of literature on 
corporatisation, conceptions of which were found to vary in accordance with 
party political doctrines on the form, scope and benefits of marketisation within 
the public sector at state and national level. These were closely linked to 
deregulation, competition and cost efficit,ncy, or similar approaches to moving 
key sectors of state and national bureaucracies on to a more commerdal footing. 
The Australian and international literature presented reports on 
management reform, and changes to managers' roles as a result of 
corporatisation and similar commercialisation processes. It also recounts the 
broad academic, government, and business media views of corporatisation and 
associated change management processes drawing on interviews and :;urveys 
covering managers in different agencies, including power utJ1ities. However, 
there is very limited discussion of how operational managers experienced 
change through corporatisation over an extended time period. Equally, few of 
these studies offer boil, a macro and micro level perspective on the 
corporatisation process. 
This study aims to close this gap in the. literature by providing broad 
practical insights into 130 managers' views of change of management practices 
over a seven-year period. Specifically, it captures their voices, opinions and 
w1derstandings of corporatisation and management reform as it presented to 
them. Those changes which are effective and beneficial to managers, the 
organisation and key stakeholders are identified through the exploration of the 
experiences of those people given the task of impl,~menting and embedding 
change. Their experience of far reaching, longitudinal changes and reported 
impacts on their roles and working lives provide valuable insights and lessons 
which can be used to inform future public policy and management practice. 
Key findings 
The study provides empirical data which contributes to the body of 
knowledge in public management policy and practice. Managers' roles have 
changed significantly since corporatisation, but they gained only few of tl1e 
benefits that had been reported for their counterparts in other utilities and 
industries both in Australia and overseas. Differences between the dominant 
ideas in tl1e literature and the findings reported for tl1is study can be partly 
attributed to a methodology heavily focused on investigating managers' 
perceptions of corporatisation and management reform as experienced in a day 
to day operational sense. Other studies reviewed concentrated primarily on 
senior and executive management levels and give the general impression tl1at 
managers at all levels have benefited in many respects from corporatisation and 
are better off as result of it. However, senior managers and executive tiers were 
identified in this study as gaining tl1e most from corporatisation tluough the 
productivity and efficiency improvements delivered by the operational 
managers below tl1em. There were fewer benefits for operational managers, 
apart from new skills, often acquired through personal initiatives to remain 
relevant or effective witl1in an increasingly demanding role. Benefits such as 
improved remuneration from negotiated ..:ontracts and performance agreements 
were obtained largely at the discretion of senior management. What benefits the 
managers did get came at a cost to tl1em in tenns of increased workload, 
working hours and stress and, decreased job security and leisure time. 
The study also found , that although managers' motivation and job 
' 
satisfaction had increased since ·;;:orporatisation, there were indications that since 
the year 2000 management empowerment had decreased and roles had become 
blurred. For example, managers were now less empowered, less motivated and 
more confused over their roles because of imposed limits and the enforcement of 
procedures which they considered were restrictive and bureaucratic. These were 
vi 
often viewed as an instrument to apply further cost controls and performance 
improvements. These findings are contrary to the rhetoric of managerialism 
which promotes a move away from management controls and bureaucratic 
procedures, rules and standards. 
Implications of the study for the electricity industry and management 
policy and practice include: Recognition within public policy and management 
discussion of the contradiction of an observed shift toward ceni:ralised 
authoritarian management structures and reduced empowerment of line 
managers whilst local accountability and empowered decision-making remain as 
cornerstones of managerialism and new public management; The need for an 
increased focus on human resource management initiatives to put in place 
adequate professional development structures, supportive to ongoing 
acquisition of new skills necessary to meet the demands of changing 
management roles and performance criteria; Recognition of the need for 
increased role clarity in an increasingly fluid and complex working environment; 
The promotion of top down and bottom-up communication of change within the 
public sector reform proce:;s; And, direct involvement of all management levels 
in the strategic planning and performance management processes on an ongoing 
cyclical basis. 
Recommendations from the study for Western Power include: The identification 
and reduction of gaps in managers' understandings of their role and 
accountabilities through a process of annual reviews incorporating dialogue 
between senior managers, line managers and key stakeholders; And, further 
investigation into the impact of increased leadership accountabilities within 
managers' roles; in tenns of workloads, working hours and responsibilities. 
In addition to specific recommendations for Western Power, the study 
also provides recommendations for all Australian electricity supply utilities and 
vii 
industry in general. These include: Further investigation of the trend toward 
authoritarian management which includes reduced empowerment for line 
managers and increased bureaucracy from senior management; And, further 
shldies to determine if there is an emerging trend toward a decline in managers' 
morale, motivation and organisational Joyalt)> as a result of increased 
bureaucracy, work.load, and roles and responsibilities 
,, 
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter One outlines the background to the research and inlToduces the 
problem under investigution. The justification for the research is presented, 
other relevant research reviewed and the research objectives formalised. It also 
outlines the research methodology, describes tlte research boundaries and 
defines key terms. 
Chapter Two provides an overview of tl1e AuslTalian eleclTicity supply 
industry and describes the case organisation, Western Power, before and after 
corporatisation. Prior research relative to the current research context and 
objectives is also reviewed. The analytical framework used for this study is also 
described in this chapter. 
Chapter Three provides the literature review undertaken to investigate 
the theoretical, social and ideological considerations underpinning the reform 
agendas of Australia's state governments when restructuring and corporatising 
their electricity utilities. It embodies broad domains sur:h as economics, public 
policy, managerialism, business management and change management in order 
to build a analytical base for a practical understanding of the phenomenon of 
corporatisation and management reform in the AuslTalian eleclTicity supply 
industry generally, and the impact on the role and working life of managers 
specifically. 
Chapter Four describes the research methodology, research procedures 
and limitations. It establishes a research framework, develops tl1e research 
questions and outlines the method by which the research data will be gathered. 
Chapter five presents the results and the analysis of the preliminary 
interviews conducted as part of stage one of tlte research schema. 
Chapter six presents the results and the analysis of the quantitative 
component of the research, stage two. 
Chapter seven presents the results and analysis of the focused follow-up 
interviews, stage three of the research schema. 
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Chapter eight triangulates, synthesises and discusses the research 
findings of chapters five, six and seven with reference to the analytical 
framework, theory and literature ptesented in chapters two and three. 
Chapter nine presents the study implications for the electricity industry 
and management policy and practice, and recommendations for future resea!'ch. 
Definitions of key concepts used in this thesis are included in appendix 1. 
All references reviewed for this research are cited in the text and included 
in a table of references at the end of the thesis. 
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CHAYfERONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1,1 ABOUT THE STUDY 
Titis thesis examines the relationship between the broad corporatisation 
and management reform agenda for Australia's electricity supply utilities and 
the changes to managers' roles and WOJking life. In particular, it focuse., on 
impacts of corporatisation and management reform on the role and perceptions 
of managers within Western Australia's public electricity utility. Some writers 
make a distinction between 'change' and 'reform' (Caiden, 1988; Spann, 1979), 
where change refers to any alteration or shift in administration that occurs 
automatically, while reform implies administrative change that is deliberately 
designed and induced. This study follows Reynoldson (1999) aud other writers 
who use the term interchangeably. This chapter intruduces the research context, 
rationale and objectives of the study. Research questions are outlined and an 
ovetview of the study is presented to guide the reader through subsequent 
chapters. 
For decades electricily has been a critical source of energy for all major 
industries, nationally and intemationaJly. In 2002 the Australian electricity 
supply industry had assets in excess of $86 billion and iiccounted for more than 
1.4 percent of gross domestic product. The sector is also a major employer with 
more than 33,000 people setving more than 8 million customers (Australian 
Bureau of Statistb;, 2002, 5). In a similar manner to that which occurred in the 
UK, Europe, Canada, New Zealand and the United States the performance of all 
of Australia's public electricily utilities was a matter of strong public and 
political debate from the late 1980's to the mid 1990's. The discourse generated a 
growing awareness by government, the business media, academics and 
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professionals that the industry had to change. The debate was particularly 
strong around issues of size, structure and ownership. More specifically, 
questions were asked as to how should an industry of such size and importance 
to the economy be managed to satisfy both government and commercial 
objectives. Managerialism became the ideology for management reform and 
corporatisation, the platform from which the state governments introduced 
major economic reform driven by the efficiency, produ,:tivity and contestability 
considerations of the National Competition Policy (Hilmer, 1993). 
The reported economic benefits of macro-level reform featuring 
corporatisation and in some instances the sale of Australia's state public utilities 
are well documented in the literature, (Hyman, 1995; Maddock, 1993; Quiggin & 
Spoehr, 1998; Walker & Walker, 2000). Similar benefits from public utility 
reform have been reported in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United 
States, and elsewhere (Alkhafaji, 1993; Boston, 1987; Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1996; Duncan & Bollard, 1992). Absent from the literature for all countries, 
however, are the opinions, feelings and concerns of the managers responsible for 
implementing and embedding the broad organisational and management system 
changes introduced at the executive level of the organisation. 
This study examines the micro-level aspects and impact of the 
corporatisation and management reform of an Australian public electricity utility 
from the perspectives of senior, middle and business unit managers. It reports 
the managers' perceptions and responses to the significant structural changes 
through a triangulated study analysis drawing on qualitative and quantitative 
data. The approach is ethnographical, quantitative and multidisciplinary and 
brings together elements of economics, public policy and management theory to 
present a composite 'insiders' perspective on the significance of the electricity 
supply industry in the economy, and more importantly, its inter-relationship 
between the government (ro owner) and the manager (as agent). Specifically, the 
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study investigates the impact of corporatisalion and management reform on the 
roles and working life of managers in Western Australia's electricity supply 
utility over the period 1994 to 2002. 
Use of the term 'manager' 
Managers are conventionally defined for the purposes of this 
investigation as those agents who plan, organise, direct and control an 
organisation, branch or business unit on the owner's behalf (Beer, Eisenstat, & 
Spector, 1994.). The term 'manager' is used throughout this study to include all 
senior managers, middle managers and senior section heads who are responsible 
for the performance of either a br;mch or business unit within the electricity 
supply industry. 'General Managers' in the study site are responsible for a 
division. They are also referred to as senior. managers in this study, which is the 
general terminology used in the literature. All the general managers and the 
managing director form the executive. 'Branch Managers' in the study site are 
responsible for a branch within a division. They are generally referred to as 
middle managers in the literature. Finally, 'Senior Section Heads' in the study 
site are responsible for a business unit They are also referred to as 'Business 
Unit', or 'Front-Line', managers in the literature. 
1.2 STUDY CONTEXT: CORPORATISION AND MANAGJillAENT 
REFORM 1994 - 2002 
From the early 1980's and throughout the 1990's the recognition that 
Australian industry has to operate in a global market place has fuelled a demand 
by industry and commerce, supported by national and state governments, for 
Australian public electricity utility reform. Ever present in the rhetoric for 
reform has been the demand for greater state and federal government efficiency 
and effectiv,"11ess in managing their electricity utilities. Macro and micro 
economic reforms driven by significant government sponsored reports rroduced 
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by Hilmer (1993), Carnegie (1993) and McCarrey (1993) were considered central 
to Australia's efforts to improve its economic position. Underpinning this 
orthodoxy, was strong debate from the 1980's and throughout the 1990's by 
academics and practitioners, including Butlin, Barnard & Pincus (1982), Painter 
(1988), Maddock (1993), Hilmer (1993), Carnegie (1993), McCarrey (1993) and 
Shirley (1999) who were strongly in favour of modelling the electricity supply 
utilities along private sector lines in order to improve their effectiveness and 
efficiency. Central ID this i'\j'gument was the tenet that managerial 
responsibilities and incentives for managers of public utilities should be 
redE-fined, so that they are in accord with the government's objectives. 
The ensuing debate engendered an important shift in discourse from 
public administration to public management. It introduced managerialism, as a 
form of management reform argued by Considine (1988, 6) and Yeabnan (1990, 
13) to be a new generation of scientific management drawing on models and 
approaches from the private sector. They, and others, describe managerialism as 
a flexible, market-based form of public management that emphasises goal 
setting, planning and the measurement of re.iults (Bradley & Parker, 2001; 
" Considllle & Painter, 1997; Kearney, Hays, & St-:ven, 1998; Reynoldson, 1999). 
Considine (1988) has written a critique on the corporate management framework 
in which he postulates that managerialism, as an ideology, elevates economic 
rationality to primary status in the public sector and is committed to four key 
management concepts: the product format, autocratic instrumentalism, systems 
integration, and purposive action (p.7). Considine & Painter (1997) were later to 
study the concept of managerialism in greater detail and reported it heralded a 
revolution in the way public sector organisations within Australia were to be 
managed (p.2). 
Reynoldson (1999) conducted an extensive study of managerialism as an 
ideology and its application in the public sector. He found that it encompasses 
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most if not all the changes that characterise public sector refonn in the late 1980s 
and throughout 1990's. He argues that even in cases where there is some doubt 
about its appropriateness, such as with its applicability to market-style reforms, 
there is substantial overlap and linkage; accordingly managerialism remains the 
term that best describes the content of change in the public s-~tor and is the focal 
point in discussions of reform (Reynoldson, 1999, 35). Reynoldson's broad view 
of managerialism is adopted in this study. The concept of managerialism as an 
ideological argument for reform and change in public utilities is discussed in 
detail in chapter three and appendix 1. 
However, it is important to note that this study is not a detailed pursuit of 
the theories and principles of managerialism, but more on the product of 
managerialism and management reform and the impact it has on the roles and 
working life of managers. This study uses mainstream managerialism as defined 
by Considine (1988), Considine and Painter (1997) and Reynoldson (1999) as an 
explanation for management reform and what has happened to the roles of 
managers within Australia's corporatised electricity supply utilities. 
Managerialism or the corporate style of management was adopted as a 
means of improving public sector effectiveness and efficiency and wru1 presented 
as management refonn to Australia's electricity supply industry in the mid to 
late eighties through a process known as corporatisation (Simmons & Bramble, 
1996; Wood & Jones, 1993). Shirley (1999) defines corporatisation as an effort to 
make state owned enterprises (SOE's) operate as if they are private firms facing a 
competitive market. With corporatisation, individual state governments retain 
ownership of their enterprises and operate them under the companies code with 
a board of directors appointed by the government to make policy decisions. 
Where monopolies exist, regulation is introduced to remove barriers to the entry 
of competition, subsidies and special privileges. Driven by a reform agenda 
based on managerialist principles, corporatisation was introduced to the whole 
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electricity supply industry in AustTalia in the early 1990's as 'management 
reform' or 'corporate management' (Considine & Painter, 1997, 212). 
Reynoldson (1999) considers the term 'management reform' to be an umbrella 
term that encompasses managerialist techniques such as, strategic planning, 
budgeting, devolved management and performance measurement. 
For most Australian public electricity supply utilities, and particularly in 
Western Australia, corporatisation and management reform has been the driving 
force overcoming the inertia of years of public sector style management. since 
the initial corporatisation and management reform push, organisational and 
management change has progressed unabated throughout the 1990's, and 
continues into the twenty first cenhlry (Booth, 2000; Eiszele, 1999; Walker & 
Walker, 2000). Increasingly, managers are becoming more accountable for 
managing their business units effectively and efficiently, for paying increasing 
attention to tighter financial accountability, for planning. and for conforming to 
legislative requirements (Dunford, Bramble, & Littler, 1998). Corporatisation as 
an ideology and driver for reform and change in the public utilities is discussed 
further in chapter three and appendix 1. 
It is claimed by business writers and academics that deregulation, 
competition and commercialisation, critical components of the corporatisation 
and management reform agenda, have compelled managers to restructure their 
business units. They are required to place a greater emphasis on staff 
development, effective task assignment, training and the devolution of 
responsibility. Additionally, they must provide for the greater use of contractors 
and the contracting out of key services to bring them into line with the owner's 
(government's) requirements and commercially acceptable practice (Dunford et 
al., 1998; Walker & Walker, 2000). An outcome of this sees managers given the 
responsibility for introducing and implementing broad organisational and 
management system changes, which were previously unfamiliar to the electricity 
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utilities and to the managers. This change manifesto .includes business and 
labour rationalisation, customer focus, strategic planning.. financial 
accountability, and new performance measures and reporting processes. 
Corrunercialisation, a key component of the broader reform prdi:ess, was also 
introduced. This is defined by Dixon and Kouzmin (1994) as .. .tire /evyillg of user 
cliarges, reflecting to varying degrees the economic cost of praviding goods rmd seruices 
(p.58). Prowse (1989) views commercialisation and corporatisation as being 
inexb:icably linked, and particularly applicable to publicly owned entities which 
operate in an environment where there is some kind of market for their product. 
He considers that in these cases the focus would be on the performance of 
business unit managers in relation to meeting objectives and resources (p.117). 
Although linked through their application Hannan (1993) contends that 
commercialisation is often confused in public debate with corporatisation. He 
claims that 
Commerdalisation is tile process of setting clear commercial objectives for 
public enterprise and at the same time e11s11ri11g tlmt it is not iu a privileged 
position relative to its private sector competitors far tlie achievement of its 
commerdal perfarnmnce imlicators (Hannan, 1993a, 9). 
Commerci.ilisaticin is defined in appendix 1 and discussed further in chapter 
three. 
The corporatisat:ion and management reform of Australia's electricity 
utilities .in the 1990's was notable because the changes represent a significant 
paradigm shift for the engineering-led bureaucratic, vertically integrated 
management structure, whose main focus was technical excellence with little 
consideration of cost. Corporat:isation also represented a substantial break from 
the production driven culture that, according to Simmons and Bramble (1996), 
•• .led to gold-plating a11d over engineering (p.220). Corporatisation was arguably 
the most momentous reform of Australia's electricity utilities since their 
inception in the early to mid-twentieth century (Eiszele, 1999; King & Maddock, 
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1996). The continuous nature of this reform process has been highlighted by 
David Eiszele, managing director of Western Power, who states that, ... as we 11ear 
tlie e11d of tlle 199D's a11d i11deed the end of the first electric ceutunJ, t/Jis massive 
progmmme of dumge re111ai11s work-ill-progress (Eiszele, 1999). 
Finally, this study focuses on the period 1994 to 2002. It spans those 
turbulent years of corporatisation and management reform underpinned by the 
frttroduction of new management systems and organisational and culture 
adjusbnent and readjushnent; a period that has seen significant downsizing of 
the workforce in the electricity supply industry and continuing calls for further 
disaggregation and privatisation 
'\ 1.3 CASE SELECTION: WESTERN POWE~ 1~2 
' This study is an in-depth rather than an industry-wide study and focuses 
only on managers within Western Australia's public electricity utility, Western 
Power. The rationale behind the choice of Western Power as a researc.h site was 
both methodological and practical. Western Power is the third largest state 
utility of six in customer terms and covers the largest geographical area 
(Electricity Supply Association of Australia, 2002). Walker & Walker (2000) 
report that prior to corporalisation in January 1995 Western Power was typical of 
the other Australian state utilities, which McCarrey (1993) and Booth (2000) 
claim were all vertically integrated government agencies run along public-sector 
lines with very similar enabling legislation and organisational and reporting 
structures. Harris (1991) describes Western Power as ... a very good representative 
of Australia's electric supply utilities iii tire early nineties (p.52) and contends that it 
was among the last of Australia's public electricity supply utilities to be 
corporatised with the process informed to some degree through precedents 
established by its Eastern states counterparts. 
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Western Power is situated on the West coast of Australia and is quite 
remote from its counterparts on the Eastern seaboard. The practical rationale for 
using Western Power was access, time, distance and cost. The researcher has 
worked for the study organisation for more than 30 years and was able to carry 
out participant observation, interview staff and access data, e.g., internal 
documentation, with approval from the managing director, who expressed an 
interest in the research. The researcher's role within the organisation also 
ensured the preservation of the confidentiality of the participants, who included 
all general managers, branch managers and senior section heads. 
Keen & Sease (1998) in their study of the impact of management reform 
and new managerial roles in UK government agencies contend that given the 
research limitations of time, distance and cost, research sites that are remote, but 
similar in organisational configuration and undergo similar change through a 
similar time period would present an ... as favourable as possible organisation for 
examining tire complex socio-political processes, wllic/1 c/mracferise behaviour in those 
org1111isatio11s (p.171). They further content that research of like organisations 
represents an authority that presents ... 11 best possible c/mnce fur studying 
11mnageri11I clmuges, ill tlmt if clm11ges did uot occur i11 the study org11nisatio11, tlteu tlw; 
were 1111Iike1y to be occz1rri11g ta a significa111 degree elsewhere (Keen & Sease, 1998, 
171). 
,., STUDY OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis aims to present a new perspective on senior, middle and 
·.,, business unit managers in the Australian electricity industry through the study 
>.-pf one major electricity utility. It focuses on the roles and quality or working life 
of managers, and particularly the impact of structural and system changes 
resulting from the electricity utility refonn agenda of corporatisation and 
management reform, which includes commercialisation and the broader 
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philosophy of managerialism. The research explores the associated skills, 
competencies and behaviours required of managers as a consequence of 
management reform. The study also contributes to a new emerging orthodoxy 
that queries the rationale of corporatisation and management reform (Considine 
& Painter, 1997; McKenna, 1999; Shirley, 1999; Vigoda, 2002; Walker & Walker, 
2000; Wise, 2002). It does this from the perspective of the managers, that is it 
explores the managers' understanding of the rationale for corporatisation, the 
benefits arising from it and the impact it has on their roles and working life. 
TI1e study, consisting of qualitative and quantitative data focuses 
specifically on 130 managers' experience in Western Australia's electricity utility 
through the period 1994-2002. Significant restructuring and introduction of new 
management systems have occurred to support management reform within this 
utility and are ongoing. Many managers' roles have changed, shifting from 
'administration' to 'management' and 'leadership', that is moving from a focus 
on maintenance of ongoing operations and the administration of rules or 
regulations to a broader role of managing capital resources and leading human 
resources to achieve defined and measured performance outcomes (Brehony, 
2002; Gardner, 2001; McCarrey, 1993). 
TI1e research process investigates four lines of enquiry that will expand 
the body of knowledge relating to corporatisation and management reform with 
a major focus on the benefits and consequences of corporatisation and 
management reform within a significant representative sample of Australia's 
electricity supply utilities. The research questions which are the focus of this 
study are: 
1 What are managers' understandings of the rationale for the 
corporatisation ofWestem Australia's public electricity supply utility? 
2 What are the significant changes to managers' roles and how have those 
changes impacted on their roles within Western Australia's electricity 
supply industry as a result of corporatisation and management reform? 
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3 What ;ue managers' perceptions of the benefits of corporatisation for 
themselves, for the organisation, and for key Western Power 
stakeholde:s.? 
4 What are managers' perceptions of the impact of corporatisation and 
management reform on the quality of their working life? 
The methodology for obtaining the research data to answer these 
questions is described in the next section. Any questions of significance beyond 
the scope of this study will be addressed in chapter nine as limitations ani:1. issues 
for future research. 
1.4.1 Study Methodology 
The methodology used for this research is described in detail in chapter 
four, but is reviewed here to give the reader an insight into the structure of the 
research and how the data has been gathered. 
This study used an ethnographical qualitative (Ticehurst & Veale, 1999, 
104) and a quantitative approach to data gathering which featured multiple 
sources of information gathered over three stages in order to triangulate the 
data. While technically not a longitudinal study (Ticehurst & Veale, 1999, 49) 
some aspects of this research explored the managers' perceptions of changes that 
had occurred prior to corporatisation in 1995 and over the years to 2002. 
Interviews and surveys combined with existing corporate documentation and 
the researcher's personal knowledge of and experience within the study 
organisation were used for this study. Interviews and surveys as a primary data 
source enable participants to demonstTate their perceptions and beliefs, and 
facilitate the clarification of any key issues that may emerge (Geletkanycz, 1997; 
Keen & Sease, 1998; Punch, 1998). Ticehurst & Veale argue that different 
approaches to evidence gathering enable holistic triangulation, which allows for 
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the phenomena to be examined from multiple perspectives thereby allowing 
new and deeper dimensions to emerge. Furthermore, the ethnographic style of 
research seeks to see the situation as it appears through the eyes of those being 
researched and allows for them lo speak for themselves, often through the use of 
direct quotations (Ticehurst & Veale, 1999, 104). Triangulation also offers 
flexibility and an in-depth approach that is not always available with more 
simple designs using either qualitative or quantitative data alone (Brewer & 
Hunter, 1990). Others view the [Tiangulation methodological approach to social 
research as assigning either, or both, qualitative or quantitative values, such as 
text or numbers, to the social phenomena being studied (Breitmayer, Ayres, & 
Knafl, 1993; Creswell, 1994; Morse, 1991). 
The data collection for this study consisted of a three-stage approach. The 
first stage was multi-faceted and consisted of a combination of secondary and 
primary data in the form of an in-depth review of corporate documentation and 
preliminary interviews. TI1e literature reviewed in chapter two, as part of the 
secondary data, related to AuslTalia's electricity supply industry at the macro-
level and sh·uctural changes and new management systems introduced as 
management reform at the micro level during the period 1994 to 2002. The 
literature on macro-level change was extensive, but with considerably fewer 
sources linking this to the micro-level aspects of the corporatisation and 
marnigement reform process. TI1erefore, in order to identify new issues and any 
concents that managers may have, preliminary interviews were carried out prior 
to the development and administration of a questionnaire survey. The 
preliminary open.ended interviews provided primary data for stage one of the 
study and involved twenty managers from the target population of 130. The 
important issues, themes and concepts that emerged from the preliminary open-
ended interviews were discussed in chapter five and used to inform the 
questionnaire survey for stage two. 
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The second stage of data gathering was divided into two part5: the first 
being a pilot survey, to verify the final survey design. The second part of stage 
two consisted of the main questionnaire survey which was administered to the 
whole target population and yielded a 85.4% response. The findings from stage 
two were discussed in chapter six. 
The third stage of data gathering consisted of follow-up focused 
interviews with sixteen managers from across the organisation. These 
inte1views enabled the validation of findings from stages one and two and 
enabled further exploration and analysis of important themes and issues that 
had emerged. The findings from stage three were discussed in chapter seven. 
TI1e study methodology is described in more detail in chapter four. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There are several significant reasons for focusing on corporatisation and 
management reform within the electricity supply industry. Of primary 
importance is the size and influence the industry represent5 within the 
Australian economy. With assets in excess of $86 billion it accounts for more 
than 1.4 percent of gross domestic product, employs over 33,000 people and 
supplies electricity to more than 8 million customers (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2002, 5). In Western Australia, the state-owned electricity utility is 
valued at nearly $6 billion (Western Power Annual Report, 2003, 7) and like its 
corporatised counterparts in New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania is an 
ir.1portant source of revenue for government. For example, cash payments to the 
WA state government have exceeded $1.04 billion since corporatisation (Western 
Power Annual Report, 2003, 7). However, the electricity supply indushy has 
been plagued by accusations of poor management performance and industry-
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wide inefficiencies resulting in a disproportionately high cost of electricity 
believed by government, business, academics and professionals to be largely 
responsible for the lack of competitiveness of Australian industry (Maddock, 
1993;Simmons & Bramble, 1996). 
Further significance of this research is the important contribution it will 
make to the study of corporatisation and management reform. Previous work in 
the area has generally focused on financia~ social and political aspects, see 
Prowse (1989), Sly & Weigall (1992), Dixon & Kouzmin (1994), Watts (1996), 
Deveson (1997) and Quiggin & Spoehr (1998) for the Australian content, and 
Wiltshire (1987), Deane (1989), Duncan & Bollard (1992), Lee (1994) and Lewis 
(1996) for overseas research. However, there has been very little debate, both in 
Australia and overseas, relating to the practical impact of corporatisation and 
management reform on managers in such an economically and strategically 
important industry as electricity supply. There is a need for a study which 
documents in detail and over an extended period of time the perceptions of 
those charged with implementing corporatisation as a reform agenda within 
their organisations. Managers have not been heard. There is a need to provide a 
true insight into the nature and impacts of managerialism and corporatisation, 
but going beyond the cost benefit and agency view of economics and political 
perspectives offered in public policy and political economy literature. 
This study is unique in that it brings in the voice and concerns of the 
manager. It focuses on managers within an industry of high national 
significance for the economy, essential service delivery and the community in 
order to provide insights into their acceptance and perceptions of change as the 
industry experienced unprecedented reform. The study captures their voices 
and their understanding about the process of corporatisation and management 
reform. Those changes which are effective and beneficial to managers and to the 
organisation can be identified by exploring the experiences of the people given 
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the task of implementing and promoting change. Moreover, in this case change 
was required from a set of verticaliy integrated bureaucracies to a competitive 
customer focussed corporation. Successful change on the scale required for state 
electricity supply utilities requires a plan, ownership of that plan and 
responsibility for implementing it. Although most significant change manifests 
from the top-down, it is the managers who are the agents of its implementation 
and promotion. They are ultimately responsible for the success or fai!u1-e of 
change within their organisation. Finally, these work experiences and the impact 
they have on the roles and working life of managers will provide valuable 
insights and lessons to inform future public policy and practice. From an 
Australian perspective, these issues are only partially addressed through 
research by Jones (1998), Stace & Dunphy (1997), Simmons & Bramble (1996). 
Overseas research has included Akuamoah-Boateng (1989), Ernst (1993), Hales 
and Mustapha (2000),Worrall & Cooper (2000, 2001). These studies are reviewed 
in more detail in chapters two and three. 
1.6 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
Because of the practical considerations of time, distance and cost this is an 
in-depth study that focuses primarily on one state utility, rather than an 
industry-wide study. However, this weakness is reduced in importance through 
the representativeness of the site which was similar to other state electricity 
supply utilities throughout Australia at the time they were corporatised. Apart 
from physical size all were state-owned, similarly slrnctured and subjected to the 
same pressures for change in the lead up to corporatisation (Booth, 2000; Harris, 
1991; McCarrey, 1993;Walker & Walker, 2000). 
A further limitation may arise because of the limited literature about 
managers' personal experiences and perceptions of corporatisation and 
management reform in the electricity supply industry as it impacts on them. 
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Much of the available literature addresses these matters from a general and 
'anns length' perspective which makes comparisons difficult. However, the 
limited studies in this area may also be viewed positively by others as an 
opportunity for future research which further addresses the gaps in the literature 
and adds to the information on public management and public policy. For that 
renson, this study is not a detailed study of the theories and principles of 
managerialism which have been well reported in the literature, but more on the 
pl'actical application of managerialism to corporatisation and management 
reform within the electricity supply industry as defined by Considine (1988), 
Considine and Painter (1997) and Reynoldson (1999). To avoid any weakness 
from this approach, the study will acknowledge important contributions of the 
managerialist debate which are relative to the aims of this study. These are 
covered in detail in chapter three, used in the data synthesis and discussion in 
chapter eight and study implications in chapter nine. 
1.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Electricity is a critical source of energy for all major industries and the 
recognition of the need for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the 
management of Australia's electricity supply utilities was the driving force for a 
far-reaching corporatisation and management reform agenda. Corporatisation 
and management reform within Australia's electricity supply industry was 
underpinned by a managerialist refonn agenda with the main focus on 
deregulation, competition and commercialisation. Managers play a critical part 
in the implementation of change, but there has been very little debate, both in 
Australia and overseas, relating to the practical impact of corporatisation and 
management reform on the managers in such an economically and strategically 
important indushy as electricity supply. Therefore, in order to address the gap 
in the literature rmd to inform future research and management practice this 
study will examine managers' understandings of the rationale for 
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corporatisation; the changes that have occurred to their roles and how those 
changes have impacted on their roles; their perceptions of the benefits of those 
changes for themselves, the organisation, and key stakeholders; and their 
perceptions of the impact of corporatisation and management reform on the 
quality of their working life. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the Australian electricity supply 
industry in the context of :he research objectives and describes in greater detail 
the case organisation, Western Power, before and after corporatisation. Prior 
Australian and overseas studies which have relevance for this study are also 
reviewed and the analytical framework used for this study is presented. 
[; 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A PROFILE OF THE AUSTRALIAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
INDUSTRY, 1990- 2003 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
Chapter one outlined the study context and the justification for the 
research. It also introduced the research site and identified four study questions. 
This chapter builds on the study context and justification for the research in 
terms of the unprecedented organisational changes and the evolution of 
management practices within public utilities. It focuses on managers within one 
of Australia's state electricity supply utilities, premised on the similarities of 
each state jn terms of organisational structure, management practices and refonn 
agenda prior to corporatisation. It introduces the macro level changes that have 
occurred within each of Australia's State and Territory utilities during the period 
1990 to 2003 and gives an overview of the structure and ownership status of each 
and demonstrates the similarities of the changes which each utility underwent; 
but at different times. These similarities are well documented in the literature by 
Harris (1991), Hilmer (1993), Hyman (1995), Quiggin & Spoehr (1998), and 
others. 
This chapter shows that the major objectives of each of Australia's state 
governments for the corporatisation of their electricity utilities in the 1990's was 
not dissimilar to the approach taken overseas, e.g., UK and New Zealand, during 
the 1980's. The objectives were principally to improve organisational 
productivity and efficiency through a policy of restructuring and management 
reform based on managerialist principles and practices. B:owever, much of the 
available research literature on electricity utility reform, both in Australia and 
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overseas, has been concerned with the financial, social and political aspects of 
corporatisation and privatisation. Nevertheless, an examination of the sparse 
literarure pertaining to studies relevant to managers within the industry shows 
that their roles and working lives have changed significantly over the past 
decade. 
The macro and micro-level changes that have occurred within the study 
organisation, Western Power are dealt with in greater detail in this chapter. It 
provides a confluence of important secondary data drawn from Western Power 
documentation and the researcher's personal experiences and observations from 
both within the study organisation and the electricity supply industry in general. 
It introduces the reader to the system changes that managers found themselves 
responsible for, and the industry jargon and terminology used in subsequent 
chaprers. As described in chapter one, the term 'Manager' is used throughout 
this srudy to include all 'Senior Managers', 'Middle Managers' and 'Senior 
Section Heads' within the case organisation who are responsible for the 
performance of either a branch or business unit within the elect:kity supply 
industry. 
Finally, the chapter introduces the analytical framework in section 2.5 
which is used in this shldy to help understand the implications of 
corporatisation and management reform on the role of the manager. The 
analytical framework identifies key lines of inquiry which translate into the 
research questions described in chapter one (section 1.4). It also defines the 
boundaries of the literature search in chapter three in terms of the relationship 
between the theory driving the publk: electricity supply industry reform agenda 
and the consequential changes to the managers' roles and working life. The 
analytical framework also informs the research approach elaborated on in 
chapter four, the preliminary interview questions in chapter five and provides a 
focus for the data analysis and synthesis in later chapters. 
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22 KEY DRIVERS FOR REFORM 
The performance of AustTalia's six state and two territory public 
electTidty supply utilities have been a matter of stTong public debate in 
managerial and financial sectors since the 1980's. At the national level, the 
Federal Government recognised that the electricity supply industry had to 
operate in the context of a world market, facing increasingly aggressive 
international competition. The pressures for changing the way the industry was 
structured and, more importantly, the way it was managed intensified through a 
growing awareness by each state and territory government of soaring costs 
attributed to poor management practices. The debate was stTengthened by 
support from the managerial and financial sectors for Australia's electricity 
supply utilities to be managed along private sector lines in order to improve 
their effectiveness and efficiency (Borthwick, 1991; Carnegie, 1993; Harman, 
1993a; Maddock, 1993; Pitkethly, 1992). Central to this debate has been the tenet 
that managerial responsibilities and incentives should be redefined to accord 
with the government's objectives. As a result, the corporatisation of Australia's 
public utilities was given legislative sanction in all Australian states and 
territories and introduced in the early 1990's as 'management reform' or 
'corporate management'. The corporatisation reforms included managerialist 
techniques such as strategic planning.. budgeting.. devolved management and 
performance measurement (Considine & Painter, 1997, 212). Other key features 
of the corporatisation reform agenda included the introduction of deregulation 
and competition into a predominantly monopoly-orientated market, typical of 
Australia's electricity utilities at the time. To further each states' commitment to 
national competition, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) was 
formed in 1994 with a policy that allowed each state government to determine 
their own reform agenda. Options included privatisation, corporatisation, 
deregulation and contracting out of services previously done internally (Walker, 
1994, 282). 
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Since this initial corporatisation and management reform push, 
organisational and management change has forced managers to become 
increasingly more accountable for the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
business units while paying increasing attention to tighter financial 
accountability, planning and legislative requirements (Dunford et al., 1998). The 
pace of organisational restructuring and management reform in Australia's 
electricity supply indusby, which has progressed unabated throughout the 
1990's and continues today, has been particularly rapid in Victoria and to a lesser 
extent South Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002; Booth, 2000; Eiszele, 
2001; Harvey, 2003; Walker & Walker, 2000). 
The rest of this section describes the broad macro level changes which 
have occurred to the electricity supply industry within Australia's sL... state and 
two territories and in doing so demonstrates the similarities which existed 
~tween them prior to corporatisation. 
2,2,1 New South Wales 
Up to 1990 the Electricity Commission of New South Wales (ELCOM) 
controlled the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in that 
state. The changes in 1990 saw ELCOM restructured into separate generation 
and transmission busines3 units and corporatised under the new name of Pacific 
Power. In February 1995, the transmission function of Pacific Power was 
separated off to form the Electricity Transmission Authority, trading as 
Transgrid. Transgrid was to develop and operate the NSW electricity market. 
By May 1995, the New South Wales government endorsed the restructuring of 
the generation and distribution sectors of the electricity industry which saw the 
introduction of an interim wholesale market and the development of a retail 
competition policy for retail competition. 
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The release of the Carr Labor government's review of the electricity 
generation and distribution systems in December 1995 resulted in Pacific Power 
being divided into two further state owned generation companies - First State 
Power and Macquarie Generation. Further division of the NSW electricity 
industry occurred in early 1996. From March 1_996 there were four generation, 
one transmission and six distribution businesses, all corporatised and state 
owned. Although it was reported that this restructuring was a prelude to 
privatisation, up until June 1997 the Carr government had asserted that it had no 
mandate for the privatisation of any part of its electricity industry (Cargill & 
Koenig. 1997, 24). However, in 1998, Michael Egan, the Treasurer and Minister 
for Energy, with support from Bob Carr, the Premier of NSW, released a 
discussion paper outlining plans to sell off all government owned electricity 
businesses (Skuliey, 1998, 6). 
By February 1999, with an impending election and strong public 
opposition to privatisation, the NSW Premier announced that privatisation of the 
State's power business was off the agenda but refused to role out part-
privatisation if the party was re-elected at the March 27 poll. The subsequent re-
election of the Carr government was followed by a commitment from the 
Premier that electricity privatisation was off the agenda for another four years 
(Electricity Supply Newsletter, 1999; Petroleum Economist, 2000). Titls was still 
the case in 2003 (Electricity Supply Association of Australia, 2003). 
2.2.2 Victoria 
Victoria commenced reforming and corporatising its electricity industry 
in October 1993 with the release of the Victorian Government's Office of State 
Owned Enterprises, Department of Treasury report titled "The Electricity Supply 
Industry in Victoria: A Competitive Future - Electricity". This report confirmed 
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the government's intention to separate the industry into a nwnber of generators, 
retailers, regional distributors and an independent transmission grid. It also 
planned to create a wholesale electricity market for generators, retailers and 
large customers. All electricity was to be traded through a power pool, using 
both spot sales and capacity contracts. Privatisation was to be deferred until 
after the new electricity supply industry had been settled (Cargill & Koenig, 
1997). 
By O:tober 1994, five regulated regionally based distribution businesses 
had been established, comprising the eighteen business units of the former 
Electricity Services Victoria and the eleven Municipal Electricity Undertakings. 
Each regional distribution business had a competitive retail arm with the retail 
and distribution functions ring fenced (commercially separated) within each 
business. By June 1995 the Victorian government announced a reduction in the 
number of distribution companies, through mergers, such that there were four 
rural and two metropolitan distributors, each with a 'wires' and retail supply 
business. Further refonns from late 1995 resulted in all of these becoming 
privately owned (Electricity Supply Association of Australia, 2002). 
The Victorian government made similar changes to the generation side of 
its electricity supply industry and by January 1995, Generation Victoria, the main 
generator of electricity in '.:hat state, was disaggregated into five corporatised 
regionally based generation comparJes (power stations). By July 1995 the 
privatise.lion of the five generation companies commenced. The transmission 
network in Victoria was one of the last parts of the Victorian electricity industry 
to be privatised (Cargill & Koenig, 1997, 29; Electricity Supply Association of 
Australia, 2002; Skulley, 1998, 6). This was still the case in 2003 (Elecbicity 
Supply Association of Australia, 2003). 
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2.2.3 South Australia 
The Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA) was a fully government 
owned state monopoly until 1 July 1995 when it was corporatised with four 
subsidiaries: ETSA Transmission, ETSA Gmeration, ETSA Power (distribution 
and retail} and ETSA Energy (trading in fuels, new sources of energy and energy 
services). Early 1998, the Premier of South Australia, John Olsen, announced 
plans for the privatisation of the State's electricity industry. This was contrary to 
a previous commitment by his government and provoked much discussion and 
concern which resulted in rejection of the privatisation proposals (Quiggin & 
Spoehr, 1998, 4). 
More recent attempts at privatisation were reported in April 1999 when 
the Legislative Council initially rejected the South Australian Government's Bill 
to sell or lease the state's electricity business (Electricity Supply Newsletter, 1999, 
3). The Bill was fina!ly successful in December 1999 and it was announced that 
Hong Kong Electric had leased the state's power stations and transmission and 
distribution businesses for 200 years (Power Industry News, 1999, 2). A 
subsequent redistribution of leasing arrangements has seen South Australia's 
transmission nehvork controlled by ElectraNet which is an international 
consortium. Generation, transmission, distribution and retail are now controlled 
by eight different organisations all leased from the South Auslralian 
Government (Electricity Supply Association of Australia, 2003). 
2.2.4 Queensland 
In January 1995, the vertically integrated Queensland Electricity 
Commission (QEC) was split up into two new corporations: Queensland 
Generation, trading as AUSfA Electric and, Queensland Transmission and 
Supply Corporation (QTSC). QTSC is a holding company for eight subsidiary 
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corporations - seven regional distribution corporations and the Queensland 
Electricity Transmission Corporation, trading as Powerlink Queensland. The 
transmission system was to provide service on a non-discriminatory basis to all 
participants. In addition, there was to be the development of a competitive 
electricity market linked with NSW, Victoria and SA. In February 1999, the 
Queensland government announced that its electricity supply industry was to 
undergo its third substantial restructuring of the 1990's. Although the industry 
would remain firmly in the state government's hands, it was to be structured 
into one transmission, one distribution and tv,ro generation businesses. In 
addition to numerous proposals for the introduction of independent power 
generation projects (competition), many of Queensland's reforms were timed to 
coincide with the completion Jf the electricity interconnection link with New 
South Wales in 2001. This is aimed at increasing competition between 
Queensland and other state electricity markets (Electricity Supply Newsletter, 
1999, 3; Petroleum &onomist, 2000). By 2003 further changes have left the 
Queensland government as owner of five generation businesses, two distribution 
and retail businesses and two transmission businesses (Electricity Supply 
Association of Australia, 2003). 
2.2.5 Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory electricity supply utility is a vertically integrated 
corporation controlled by the Power and Water Authority (PAWA), which is a 
government owned. The government has, like the states, dgned the 
Competition Principles Agreement committing itself to the introduction of 
competition in the electricity industry. However, as the Northern Territory 
market is very small, there are no large-scale changes occurring and in 2003 the 
NT government was still the sole owner of PAWA (Electricity Supply 
Association of Australia, 2003). 
2.2.6 Australian Capital Territory 
The Australian Capital Territory Electricity and Water Corporation 
(ACfEW) was formed in 1995 through the amalgamation of the electricity and 
water authorities. l11e ACI'EW is Australia's largest combined energy and water 
utility and has responsibility for the distribution and retailing of all the 
electricity and water needs of the Australian Capital Territory (ACI). The ACT 
had no generation capacity of its own and purchased all its electricity from New 
South Wales and the Snowy Mountains hydro-electric scheme. l11e Snowy 
Mountains hydro electric scheme was managed by the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Authority, which was owned by the Federal government but 
jointly run and maintained by the New South Wales and Victorian governments. 
l11e Snovry Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority was commercialised in July 
1994 and corporatised in July 1997. The new corporation was known as Snowy 
Hydro Limited with the Federal government retaining an eighteen percent share 
(Booth, 2000; Cargill & Koenig, 1997, 25-26; Electricity Supply Newsletter, 1999; 
Skulley, 1998, 6). However by 2003 the distribution and retail of electrical energy 
and water in the ACT was controlled by a new company ActewAGL, with the 
ACT government and AGL (Australian Gas & Light Company) having equal 
shares. Another company owned by AGL also provides for the generation 
distribution and retail of electrical energy in the ACT (Electricity Supply 
Association of Australia, 2003). 
2.2.7 Tasmania 
Electricity supply in Tasmania was controlled by the Hydro-Electric 
Corporation (HEC), but legislation passed by the Tasmanian Parliament in 1995 
required it to become more commercially orientated. In order to achieve this a 
decision was made to link Tasmania with the mainland and the National 
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EleclTicily Market (NEM). The Premier at the time, Tony Rundle, committed his 
government, with private sector involvement, to the conslTuction of a 
transmission link across Bass Strait, to be known as Basslink and is expected to 
be completed by 2005 (Electricity Supply Newsletter, 1998, 3). Tasmania's 
eleclTicity supply is still owned by the state government with Aurora Energy 
responsible for distribution and retail, Hydro Tasmania re£ponsible for 
generation and Transend responsible for transmission (Electricity Supply 
Association of Australia, 2003). 
2,2.8 Western Australia 
Western Australia's electricity supply industry is still owned by the State. 
Conunencing business in 1948 as the State Electricity Commission (SEQ it was 
restructured 1975 when it was combined with the state Fuel and Power 
Commission to become the State Energy Commission of Western Australia 
(SEC\1\/ A). By the early 1990s SECW A's slTuchlre and method of operation was 
similar to that of electricity utilities in other states of Australia (Harris, 1991; 
Hilmer, 1993; Hyman, 1995). Like its Eastern states counterparts it underv:ent 
significant structural and cultural change from the late 1980s through to the mid 
1990s as a result of the Federal government's micro-economic reform agenda to 
improve industry efficiency and living standards. SECW A was split on January 
1, 1995 and a new gas business, Alinta Gas Corporation was formed along with a 
new electricity business, Western Power Corporation. Western Power still 
remains a vertically integrated electricity supply utility incorporating generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail. It is still fully owned by the WA State 
Government (Western Power Armual Report, 2003). The restructuring and 
changes that Western Power has undergone since the mid 1990's are discussed in 
more detail in the review of secondary data, section 2.4. 
The industry overview shows that from the late 1980's all of Australia's 
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State and Territory electricity supply utilities have undergone significant 
structural change and corporatisation, and, in some instances pr:vatisalion. To 
comprehend the impact of such change on the managers respon.sible for the day-
to-day running of those organisations and their responses to corporalisation and 
management reform, it is appropriate not only to review literature pertaining to 
such effects, but also literature generic to the electricity supply industry and 
other government agencies. 
2.3 CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: 
PRECEDENTS AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
2.3.1 Overview 
TI1e previous sections of this chapter demonstrate the significant changes 
which have occurred to Australia's electricity utilities over the past decade. 
Chapter one also showed that much of the research on the electricity supply 
industry in Australia and overseas has been mainly concerned with the financial, 
social and political aspects pertaining to corporatisation and privatisation. A 
few studies have dealt specifically with change processes and outcomes in terms 
of organisational size and structure, and economic and productive efficiency. 
Even fewer have dealt with the concerns of managers as a result of micro-level 
changes and management reform. TI1e latter are reviewed in this section which 
first reports the Australian studies and then the international studies which are 
relevant to this research. 
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23.2 Australian studies of micro level change and its impact on the manager 
Australian studies which report the changing roles of managers as a result 
of corporatisation, restructuring and management reform within state utilities 
are reviewed in this section. While the available literature does not specifically 
report the managers' perspectives of such change, it nevertheless makes an 
important contribution to this shldy because of the insights it provides into the 
changes which have occurred to their roles and working life within state utilities. 
The literature also provides further evidence that the changes which occurred as 
a result of corporatisation and management reform were conunon throughout all 
of Australia's state electricity supply utilities and, in many instances, within 
other public agencies. 
Jones (1998) conducted a case study of Sydney Electricity, which was 
conunercialised in 1991 and later corporatised in 1993. Her study analysed the 
strategic change agenda and the process of transforming a traditionally inward 
looking organisation which had strongly resisted change into one with a 
business culture and a customer focus. The study revealed that the change 
process included structural reorganisation involving decentralisation, cutting 
staff numbers and the reduction of thirteen levels of management to five. 
According to Jones the reform process was driven by the adoption of a Total 
Quality Management (fQM) philosophy, but with the TQM acronym reduced to 
Total Quality (TQ) in order to stress that quality was everybody's business and 
not just that of management (p.12). She argues that the method by which an 
organisation communicates its intentions for restructuring and change is 
important if managers are to take ownership of those initiatives and ensure they 
are implemented within the workplace. Her research also compares the 
commercialisation initiatives introduced into Sydney Electricity with those 
introduced into New South Wales Railways and other statMwned enterprises of 
38 
the early to mid 1990's and found that in all of them communication took the 
form of a top-down network of team briefings and a corporate newsletters. She 
also observed that ongoing decentralisation meant regional management had to 
be commercially accountable for their own budgets, profits and customer 
satisfaction. Furthermore, their remuneration was linked to individual 
performance contracts and agreements aligned to the co, ,:'.>rate plan. 
Dysfunctional consequences of organisational change were also identified such 
as resistance to change and high stress levels among employees due to cultural 
readjustments and job insecurity in the face of staff reductions. In summary, the 
study dealt with the change process and outcomes of corporatisation for the 
organisation which further strengthens the assertions of many academics and 
business writers such as Ha·,".fis (1991), Hilmer (1993) and Hyman (1995) that the 
corporatisation of state utilities was undertaken in a similar manner across 
Australia. 
Although not a study of an electricity utility, Spriggs's (1997) research of 
the recently corporatised New South Wales Railways has many parallels with 
the electricity supply industry. In a similar manner to Jones (1998), Spriggs 
focused on productivity factors and economic performance results stemming 
from the corporatisalion and associated restructuring of a public enterprise. 
Significant organisational changes and management reforms identified by 
Spriggs were down sizing, multi...skilling, salary level broad-banding and job 
restructuring, financial accountability and customer focus. These were 
supported by training and a process of culture change and identity building. 
The changes reported by Spriggs which were in line with a managerialist 
philosophy and underpinned by TQM bear strong similarities to what befell 
each of Australia's state electricity utilities when they underwent restructuring 
and corporatisalion. The study also found that although corporatisation turned 
around the financial performance of the government business enterprise, there 
were still tensions about the relationship between semi-autonomous business 
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units and cenrraliscd corporate management. Finally, Spriggs reported that 
tensions exist between corporate business objectives and the powers and 
responsibilities of government (Spriggs, 1997). These tensions are also reported 
to have also been experienced by managers within the electricity supply industry 
within Australia (Reid, 1994; Walker, 1994) and overseas (Devine & Trayner, 
1996; Duncan & Bollard, 1992). 
Lehmann (1997} conducted unpublished research into corporate culture 
and change management within Western Australia's electricity supply utility 
during the period 1994 to 1997. The study involved a sutvey of a representative 
sample of employees from all levels across the organisation in order to explore 
the strategic changes that the organisation underwent and the impact the 
emerging culture was having on individuals in terms of their job role. The study 
compared their perceptions of the new organisational culture with results from 
previous in-house employee opinion sutveys on organisational culture 
conducted by consultants on behalf of the utility. Some of those findings are 
drawn upon as part of the review of secondary data in section :t4. The research 
by Lelunann (1997} provides useful insights into the change processes prior to 
and accompanying corporatisation, and the methods by which they were 
introduced. However, it did not explore the perceptions and concerns of those 
charged with introducing and embedding the change, their understanding of the 
reasons for change, and the impact of change on their role and quality of 
working life within the organisation. 
Stace and Dunphy (1997) conducted a case study of the former Electricity 
Commission of New South Wales (ELCOM), renamed Pacific Power when 
corporatised in 1992. They reported that the corporatisation of ELCOM was 
followed by a period of significant organisational restructuring and cultural 
change, which was driven by the philosophy of Total Quality Management 
(TQM). Stace & Dunphy compared their findings with those reported in the 
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literature about other Australian state utilities of the time, which included 
SECW A, SEQ EB, ETSA and SECV. They described ELCOM as ... 1111 e11gi11ee,ring 
orgm1is11liou witli little commercial Jorns •.• it was II classic case of e11gi11eeri11g-led 
mmmgement rather t/11111 1111111ngeme11t-led e11gi11cering 1111d came 1111der inteuse polilica/ 
and public scn1li11y (p.113). Of significance for this study were the findings by 
Stace and Dunphy that the corporatisation and reform program that emerged for 
ELCOM was similar to those applied to electricity utilities in other Australian 
states. For all of these utilities, the main emphasis was on organisational 
restructuring, tight financial controls and continuous improvement underpinned 
by a managerialist philosophy of improvement and accountability (Stace & 
Dunphy, 1997). 
The productivity and performance of seven corporatised electricity 
distribution business units within the South-East Queensland Electricity Board 
(SEQ EB) was researched by Watts (1996). He describes a range of measures used 
by the business units to report financial and non-financial information, market 
research and total factor productivity. The emphasis of this research was to 
produce a model for analysing productivity and performance in quantifiable 
terms that could be used in engineering management decisions. However, it also 
provides useful insights into the reasons for corporatisation, the approaches 
taken to achieve it and the changes which occurred as a result. The study also 
makes comparisons with organisational changes that have occurred within other 
Australian utilities and are very similar to those reported by Walker (1994), 
Simmons & Bramble (1996) and Walker & Walker (2000). 
A case study of the South East Queensland Electricity Board (SEQEB) 
which covered the period 1984 to 1994 was conducted by Simmons and Bramble 
(1996). They reported the effects of workplace reform in the con!:ext of public 
sector reform and total quality management (TQM) on the blue-collar employees 
of the electricity supply industiy in Queensland. Simmons & Bramble found 
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that the work place reform required a change from a culture driven by engineers 
and production, to one focused on customers and marketing.. and driven by the 
philosophies of TQM (p.213). They also reported that similar reforms had 
occurred within the electricity supply industry in NSW, VIC, SA and WA 
(p.218). They further reported that although several programs of workplace 
reform were adopted for SEQEB, they were not applied in a systematic fashion 
and this shortcoming was blamed on the traditional non-parti,cioative culture 
that had become entrenched in the organisation. Many of the findings reported 
by Simmons and Bramble have parallels with this study. For example they 
found that TQM delivered certain benefits in terms of increasing productivity 
and quality of senrice, but the 'team' program also lacked clear direction and 
was wasteful of resources. Moreover, they found that a lack of commitment 
from top management meant that many recommendations from lower levels of 
U1e organisation were largely ignored. Furthermore, middle managers paid only 
lip service to the participation programs while retaining majority control over all 
decision-making processes. They conclude that much of the efficiency gains 
within Queensland's electricity supply industry may simply represent 
downsizing and the intensification of labour usage (Simmons & Bramble, 1996, 
231). 
Johnson and Rix (1991) conducted a national multi-discipline study of 
Australia's electricity supply industry in which they surveyed and reported the 
changes taking place in the energy kctor of Australia's economy and society in 
terms of rapid technological change, environmental· concerns, and 
microeconomic and public sector refonn. They reviewed the changes taking 
place and reported at length on government and union involvement in the 
reform process. Significantly, they claim one of the major issues confronting the 
electricity supply industry in Australia is .. .its lnck111stre 111a11age111ent pr:rfomumce 
{p.xiii) and tl1at corporatisation and privatisation aloue are unlikely to improve 
this situation. Furthermore, the levels of managerial accountability and 
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openness accompanying these changes will actually reduce due to a lack of 
preparedness and skills by managers for their new role. This in tum will impact 
on management efficiency and responsiveness in Australia's largest publicly 
owned stock ofcapital They further contend that the electricity supply industry 
needs to improve production, distribution and end-use efficiency, and build a 
new set of relationships ~ith its workforce, customers and the community. In 
terms of working life issues, their research found that there are significant 
employment opportunities available in the industry, but that it requires 
significant organisational reorientation of workforce skills, gender, location and 
training and development opportunities to realise these Oohnson & Rix, 1991, 
xiv). 
The Australian studies described above were found to contribute to the 
understanding that all of Australia's state electricity supply utilities were 
corporatised for similar reasons and have undergone similar management 
reforms since the late 1980's. However, they only partly address the objectives of 
this study and highlight the gaps in the Australian literature on the impact of 
corporatisation and management reform on the roles and working life of 
managers. Overseas studies in this area are examined in the next section. 
2.3.3 International studies of micro level change and its impact on the 
manager 
There is an abundance of research from overseas which deals with the 
issues of macro level change and corporate performance within state owned-
electricity utilities. However, in common with the Australian studies only a few 
deal with the micro level aspects of change and even fewer deal with the 
concerns of managers, the exception being two recent empirical studies into the 
roles and working lives of managers in the United Kingdom. These studies by of 
Worrall and Cooper (2000, 2001) and Worrall, Cooper and Campbell-Jamison 
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(2000) were found to be the most relevant to this shidy of all the available 
literahire and are reviewed in this section. They are also examined in more 
detail in chapter three and used for comparative purposes in chapter eight. 
Other literature thought relevant to this srudy is also reviewed in this section. 
Worrall and Cooper (2000, 2001) conducted a five-year tracking srudy, 
which annually monitored the quality of working life of managers in corporate 
Britain between 1997 and 2001. Their srudy examines the changing quality of 
working life by examining the impact of organisational change on the 
perceptions and experiences of managers in the public sector, the private sector 
and the former public utilities. The research objectives we!'e to produce a 
complete view of the impact of recent business and economic trends; to develop 
a better understanding of the processes and factors which influence the quality 
of working life; to develop a set of attirudinal measures for comparison with 
business and economic indicators; and to understand better the relationship 
between organisational change and its effect on the workforce in order to inform 
more sensitive human resource management policies. Worrall & Cooper found 
that significant organisational change included employee issues such as 
redundancy, downsizing. right sizing. delayering. culhire change and other 
change initiatives. However, of importance for this study is the finding that the 
underlying driver of organisational change since 1997, and probably earlier, has 
been the organisational imperative to reduce costs at all levels of across the 
organisation. Additionally, their research indicates that managers are concerned 
about information overload. For example, the introduction of e-mail and mobile 
phones meallS they are contactable at all hours and this has had a negative 
impact on thei: home and social life. Many managers, therefore are working 
l1arder and for longer hours, leading to adve!'se effects on their well-being. 
health and leisure time. Managers were also unsure of the skills they required to 
continue to do their job and had concerns that the traditional authority struchires 
had been eroded. Finally, Worrall & Cooper question the sustainability of, what 
they term, .. .tlte loug llo11rs c11Uure aud productivihJ of people workiug 11p to 60 hours 
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per week (Worrall & Cooper, 2000, 2001). 
Worrall, Cooper and Campbell-Jamison (2000) conducted furllier 
quantitative research on llie work done by Worrall & Cooper (2000, 2001). They 
measured the extent of organisational change between private and public sector 
managers and llie impact of llie change 0n those managers. They found lliat 
since llie early 1990's the public sector in the UK has undergone extensive 
change in structure, styles of governance and organisational culhtre and has 
been subjected to unparalleled management reform presented as managerialism, 
with an axiomatic call for managers to improve skills, competencies and 
behaviour. These changes had redefined managers' working lives and had 
significantly changed llieir career structures. Significantly, lliey found lliat 
restructuring had left many public utilities with depleted skills and experience at 
management levels as a result of staff reductions and increased use of 
contractors and contracting out of work nonnally done within llie organisation. 
They also found that restructuring has lowered morale, loyalty, motivation and 
llie managers' sense of job security. It has also impacted on their opportunities 
for training and skills acquisition within the organisation. Finally, their research 
contributes to llie debate about the effectiveness of the management of human 
resources in the UK in terms of hQW well they are being managed and 
developed, and whether they are being worn 011! (Worrall, Cooper, & Campbell-
Jamison, 2000). 
The economic aspects of privatisation in llie electricity supply industry in 
the United Kingdom have been investigated. by Lewis (1996). His study 
examined the industry both before and after significant restructuring and final 
sell-off, and highlighted the reform process that the UK's electricity utilities 
underwent in Ute 1980s. The main study focus was on the level of domestic, 
commercial and industrial retail prices and the cost of supplying electricity to 
consumets in real pounds, and the cost structures of llie organisation before and 
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after privatisation. Lewis concluded that competition, brought about by 
industry-wide privatisation, had significantly reduced the price of electricity to 
the domestic, co111Illercial, and industrial consumer and in most cases the stated 
government objectives for deregulation of the electricity S'.lpply industry had 
been met. While Lewis's research primarily concentrated on macro refonns 
some impcrtant parallels can be drawn between it and this study in tenns of the 
rationale for government reform, e.g., deregulation and competition, the 
importance of the electricity supply industry to the national economy and the 
significance of Guch a socio-political reform process (Lewis, 1996). 
Lee (1994) focused research on the electricity supply industry in Taiwan 
and examined the concept of the privatisation of Taiwan's state-owned utilities. 
His research provides useful insights which have commonalities with the 
ideology driving the reform of Australia's electricity supply utilities, and which 
are applicable to this study. He found that most of the privatisation of 
government agencies tended to be instructed by economic efficiency and a free 
competitive market, ignoring whether the privatisation of corporate enterprises 
would actually improve performance. Lee carried out a case analysis to verify 
privatisation theories. He argues that, like corporatisatlon the concept of 
privatisation varies with different theories and market driven ideologies, such as 
deregulation, competition and efficiency. These are underpinned by various 
factors such as size and structure; technology; economies of scale and scope; 
system security and stability; regulation and managerial behaviour, as well as 
ownership (Lee, 1994). 
Akuamoah·Boa.teng (1989) researched the benefits of privatisation to 
employees and their management in terms of job satisfaction, work attitude, 
ownership and organisational commitment in the United Kingdom's electricity 
supply industry after it was privatised in the early 1980's. Included in this 
quantitative research was a comparative study between managers in private and 
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public organisations that had recently been privatised. He found managers of 
the recently privatised agencies to be significantly different from thoGe in the 
private sector in terms of job satisfaction, organisational commibnent, 
participation in decision making and attitude to privatisation. He concluded 
tl1at tl1e perceived differences were due to certain restructuring processes going 
on in these organisations and the degree to which managers' were involved in 
the change (Akunmoah-Boateng. 1989). Although not directly addressing the 
aims of this study his research provides useful insights into the link between 
organisational restructuring and the involvement of managers in that process. It 
also provides for an understanding of organisational commitment, job 
satisfaction and empowerment as it applies to managers of public corporatio~'s 
that were privatised. 
Wiltshire (1987) conducted qualitative research into the concepts, origins 
and objectives of the privatisation of government owned corporate 
instrumentalities including electricity utilities in the United Kingdom. Although 
not directly concerning the aims of this study, Wiltshire provides valuable 
insights into the deregulation and reform process that has occurred in the public 
sector in the UK which addresses government objectives that are similar to those 
facing stale governments in Australia. TI1ese include increased organisational 
efficiency, strengthened competition, greater use of contractors and con.tracting 
out of services, and social responsibilities such as environmental and community 
service obligations. Wiltshire a!so explored the impact of the privatisation of 
state owned enterprises on important stakeholders such as managers, 
employees, tl1e public and trade unions (Wiltshire, 1987). 
In conclusion, through reporting the studies which address the concerns 
of managers over micro level changes and management reform this section has 
helped to identify Uie gaps in the literature and dcmonslrnte the importance of 
U1e current study in addressing those gaps. FurU1ermore, the insights gained 
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from the prior research are used to inform the analytical framework in section 
2.5, the purpose of which is to inform the literature review and justify the 
research aims. The next section discusses the study organisation in greater detail 
and provides useful information into the organisation's background and the 
change processes that it underwent during the period 1994 to 2002. 
2.4 WESTERN POWER 1994 - 2003 
2.4.1 Overview 
This section was developed with three important functions in mind. First, 
it discusses U1e study organisation in greater detail in order to further 
demonstrate the similarities between it and other utilities which are reported in 
this chapter to have undergone corporatisation and management reform. In so 
doing, it supports the methodological and practical rationale for the study being 
an in-depth rather than an industry-wide study which focuses only on managers 
within Western Australia's public electricity utility, Western Power (section 1.3). 
Second, it provides a confluence of important secondary data from documents 
pertaining to inte,nal processes and procedures from within the organisation, 
and the researcher's own personal experience and observations, both within U1e 
study organisation and the e!ectridly supply industry in general. Findings from 
an unp1:0lished study by the researcher into corporate culture and change 
management within Western Australia's electricity supply utility are also 
included in the review of secondary data as U1ey provide useful information into 
the organisation's background and the change processes that it underv,,ent in the 
years leading up to and immediately fo!lowing corporatisation. Important 
themes and issues identified from this, and previous sections were used to 
inform the development of the analytical framework and research questions in 
section 2.5. The analytical framework informed the preliminary interview 
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questions in chapter five which in tum p~ovided the survey questions in chapter 
six. The secondary data was .ilso used in the detailed analysis of research 
evidence in chapter eight. Finally, the third important function of this section is 
to introduce the re.ider to the research site, Western Power, in the le.id up to, 
during and post corporatisation, and the organis.itional and management system 
ch.inges that managers found themselves responsible for. 
2.4.2 Background 
Although still owned by the State, Western Australia's electricity supply 
utility has undergone several significant name changes and restructuring since 
formation of the original State Electricity Commission (SEC) in 1946. The strong 
post-war growU1 in demand for electricity saw U,e WA power system exp;;t11d 
rapidly, on average the instaJled capacity of the South West grid doubled every 
eight years (Boylen & Mcilwraith, 1994, 56). 
By U1e late 1980's, the energy market in Western Australia was 
geographically segmented into three m.iin electricity consuming groups: U,e 
SouU1 West corner, where the majority of the population lives, the Pilbara region, 
and the electrically isolated towns throughout the rest of the state. Although Lhe 
growU1 was exceptional, the high cost of generating electricity in Western 
Australia was still a handicap to attracting large industries to U,e state. As a 
consequence the State Energy Commission of Western Australia (SECWA) was 
established on JuJy 1, 1975, with the amalgamation of the Fuel and Power 
Commission and the Stale Electricity Commission. The Commission was a 
policy advice body brought in to counter the total dominance of the SEC in 
advice to the Tonkin Government. Many organisational changes occmTed as a 
result, the objective of which was to provide U1e state with competitive fuel 
sources for power generation in order to lower electricity priced (Industry 
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Commission, 1990, 110). 
SECWA undenvent further restructuring and management reform 
throughout the mid to late eighties and was corporatised and split into separate 
gas and electricity businesses in January 1995. Western Power Corporation 
emerged with a monopoly on the sale of electricity to consumers, but a 
significant number of consumers, mainly in the mining sector, also generated 
power for their own use. 
2.4.3 Slruchtral arrangements pre-1995 
This section reviews the structural arrangement of SECW A prior to 
corporatisation on January 1, 1995 and discusses a number of restructuring 
initiatives such as the Functional and Organisational Review (FOR) and 
performance management which the organisation addressed in the late 1980's 
and early 1990's. 
SECWA was formed in 1975 through the amalgamation of The Fuel and 
Power Commission and the State Electricity Commission. It was a vertically 
integrated structure that dominated the energy industry as a joint gas and 
electricity utility and was the largest government-owned trading enterprise in 
Western Australia (figures 2.1 and 2.2). By 1993 its annual revenue was around 
$1.7 billion, but had debts in the order of $4 billion, about forty pen:ent of the 
State's total debt of $10.2 billion (State Energy Commission of Western Australia 
-Annual Report, 1993). 
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Figure 2.1 
State Energy Commission of Western Australia· 1993. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the twu principal roles of SECW A in 1993. The organisation 
was responsible for electricity generation, transmission, distribution and retail. 
The majority of power generation was from coal fired power stations with some 
oil and gas usage. The gas business within SECWA was responsible for the 
purchase of gas from the north-west shelf and its transmission by pipeline to the 
south west the state for distribution to gas customers. 
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Figure 2.2 
State Energy Commission of WA organisational structure. 1993. 
Figure 22 illustrates the management structure of SECWA around 1993. The 
day-to-day running of the organisation was the responsibility of a General 
Manager who reported direct to the state government. The executive team 
consisted of senior managers from each of the nine branches and the GM. Each 
branch was further divided into sections headed by managers at different levels. 
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Throughout the mid to fote eighties most of SECWA's 5,800 employees 
were members of a state or national labour union. Wage rates and other 
conditions were determined by Commonwealth or State Industrial Tribunals 
(State Energy Commission of Westem Australia, 1985). As part of its report, the 
Energy Board of Review (1993), under the chairmanship of Sir Roderick 
Carnegie, found that SECW A had a histmy of management and union deals 
which had perpetuated high staff numbers and adverse work practices. Also, 
the large number of unions and st.ate and federal awards resulted in lines of 
demarcation that were generally more rigid and inefficient than those of any of 
the internationally competitive private sector organisations of 1993 (Carnegie, 
1993, 18). The Energy Board of Review further reported that in order for 
SECWA to succeed in the energy industry it had to convince unions and 
employees alike that changes were necessary for the future of the organisation. 
Further, if the organisation were to adopt world's best practice, then changes in 
work practices and an increased use of contractors would be needed for 
productivity to increase and for labour costs to decrease (Carnegie, 1993, 18). 
This view was supported by Hannan (1992) who reported: 
There was 110 doubt tlint botll SECWA 's ow11 opernH011s ... needed reform, b11t tile 
political will 1!'115 abse11I ... SECWA's own operaHous were 01,erstnffed, nrul 
mmmgemeut nnd wark practices co11trib11/ed to bot/! /iigll /11bo11r costs a11d low 
avnilnbilitlJ levels for poll'er slntions (Harman, 1992, 4). 
Hannan also claimed: 
Attempts al refor111i11g work practices mid tire use of contract /abo11r for 
111ai11/e11n11ce were always fmstrntr:d by the ability of Ille u11io11s to make direcl 
appeals to tile relevant minister, wlio would geuernlly give in to tlie 11uio11s for fear 
of politically 1111pop11/nr industrial disputes in the pourr:r i,1d11stn; (Harman, 1992, 
4). 
From the mid eighties SECWA began to feel the pressure of low 
productivity and inefficiency that had plagued it throughout lhe decade and 
senior management knew that it was only a matter of time before change would 
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be forced on the organisation (State Energy Commission of Western Australia, 
1985). Desperate to shed public perceptions that it was a bureaucratic, 
monopolistic, non-accoun~-able government utility, it embarked on significant 
organisational restructuring from 1985 which involved a number of strategic 
initiatives, including the loss of approximately 1,300 jobs from a total of 5,000. 
The initiatives were designed to change the prevailing culture from an inflexible, 
bureaucratic, rule driven organisation that showed no incentive to compete with 
private enterprise nor improve its productivity, to an empowered, efficient, 
productive, competitive market-driven organisation (State Energy Commission 
of Western Australia, 1985). Some of the initiatives which were to have a 
significant impact on the roles and working life of managers were: 
• A performance agreement between SECW A and the government which 
defined strategic objectives and outlined senior managers' responsibilities for 
their achievement, 
• the establishment of decentralised business units with responsibility and 
accountability for their own areas of operations, 
• the introduction of a performance management scheme to improve 
productivity, 
• the introduction of broad banding to encourage greater productivity, 
efficiency and flexibility among SECW A's salaried officers, and 
• the greater use of contractors for a variety of tasks related to SECWA's 
operations, serving to reduce costs through competition (State Energy 
Commission of Western Australia, 1985). 
Titese changes, however, were too late to prevent the strong commercial 
lobby pressuring the State Government to do more. By the early 1990's, state 
governments on the Eastern seaboard were already moving to corporatise their 
monopolies {Review Committee on Power Options for WA, 1990). 
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2.4.4 Functional and Organisational Review (FOR) 
In late 1988 and early 1989, SECW A undertook a major Functional and 
Organisational Review (FOR) of all salaried positions with particular emphasis 
on reducing levels of management and decentralising decision making. The 
main goal of the review was significant restructuring of the organisation to 
improve efficiency and productivity and in doing so create an organisation that 
was more responsive to the needs of customers, employees and stakeholders 
alike. The new leaner, flatter, decentralised management structure was designed 
to give managers a greater degree of responsibility and accountability for their 
own areas. Branch managers (figure 2.2) were to have the independence, within 
corporate guidelines, to operate in a manner they considered to be the most 
efficient and effective (State Energy Commission of Western Australia, 1989). 
Functional and Organisational Review process 
Early in 1989, employees were asked to complete a survey about their 
working activities and the percentage of time they spent doing them. Evidence 
from documentation and interviews within the organisation showed that a 
common view shared by many managers and employees who took part in the 
smvey was that they were not given enough information or direction in how to 
complete the smvey. Although a functional activity Lexicon (glossary of role 
descriptions and job definitions) was provided with the survey form, to assist 
employees with its completion, many claimed to have had insufficient 
instruction in the use of the Lexicon and as such answered the survey questions 
in the hope of improving their classification, rather than thinking about what 
they were really doing in their current job. This lack of effective communication 
highlights the poor state of internal communications and consultation that 
prevailed at the time. The information provided by the survey was used to 
inform the FOR which subsequently saw significant restructuring and down-
sizing in many sections of the organisation. It is of interest to note that lower 
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levels of management and employees were given no feed back about how they 
scored in the survey or what senior management's perceptions were of their job 
function or future in the organisation. This led to anxiety and unnecessary 
worry for the many who heard rumours of section closures and job cuts, but 
nothing of substance from their senior management. 
Outcomes of the Functional and Organisational Review 
The evidence suggests that the method used to gain infonnation for the 
FOR from employees left many believing that th-e information had been gained 
by stealth, that is, capitalising on the prevailing culture of good rapport and trust 
that employees had with their line managers and supervisors at the time. For 
many front-line employees, supervisors and middle managers, this marked the 
beginning of a long period of distrust of senior management (Lehmann, 1997). 
Many believed that while the FOR did review functions and dictate how 
the business should be restructured, it did not look at individuals and their 
needs. A common belief among employees at all levels, was that the prime 
reason for the FOR was to weaken the power that engineers, as senior, middle 
and front-line managers, had over the operations of SECWA. For example, prior 
to the FOR, seven out of the nine senior branch managers and most middle and 
front line managers were engineers and nearly all supervisor positions were 
filled by people with technical backgrounds. As a result of the FOR a significant 
number of managers and salaried officers lost their positions which for some 
represented a long struggle up the career ladder. Some had undertaken part-
time studies at universities and technical colleges to achieve specialist 
qualifications for positions that no longer existed. Some were re-deployed into 
areas where they had little expertise and even less enthusiasm. For others, age, 
low self esteem and low morale would be barriers to significant re-training or re-
deployment. For many it was a long wait to see if they would be offered a job, 
and when they were, they had to apply for it. Often an application would be for 
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the same position they were ·forced out of some weeks previously. For others, 
redundancy was the only option (Lehmann, 1997). Hannan (1992} reported that, 
although redundancies were offered in SECWA, there appears not to have been a 
plan for deciding who could go and who was of strategic importance to the 
organisation (p.4). Hannan claims that in its efforts to reduce numbers, the 
organisation lost much valuable knowledge and expertise. Many key 
employees, particularly in the design areas, left the organisation, causing the 
organisation to place an increased reliance on contractors in some key areas. 
Golian (1997), in the context of organisational restructuring in general, refers to 
this uncoordinated approach to staff reductions as a s/as/1 and brtni mentality 
which can result in corporate amnesia, whereby ... dow11-sizi11g compau{es threw 
mV11y tire experieuce uehuork aud knowledge of wlmt 11111de their company tick (Golian, 
1997,4). 
Many SECW A employees believed that even though the old bureaucratic, 
process-orientated, authoritarian management style had failed in the past to 
produce lasting change, senior managers still persisted with the paradigm of 
preserving the status quo, that is continue with their outdated and inappropriate 
style of management. This is <I classic example of ordiu11n1 111a,mgeme11t {Stacey, 
1996, 71), where the paradigm of preserving the status quo is paradoxically 
linked with the paradigm of changing the structure of the organisation. A 
review of SECWA's intenial documentation (State Energy Commission of 
Western Australia - Annual Report, 1990) shows that that most managers were 
recycled back into the positions they had occupied prior to the FOR. Some came 
Out of the review with increased staff numbers, due to the amalgamation of some 
sections and redeployment from other branches, but with little or no increase in 
corporate responsibilities. The decentralisation of management functions and 
some rationalisation of the organisational structure as a result of the FOR 
reduced SECWA's workforce by 236 people. However, Harman (1992) states 
there was significant loss of morale in the process, due in part to the drawn out 
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nature of the review and the finalisation of SECWA's structure (p.4). 
WaH the Functional and Organisational Review a success? 
In terms of success, discussions and documents from within the 
organisation suggest that it is doubtful if all the stated goals for the FOR were 
actually achieved. These included restructuring to improve productivity and 
efficiency. Externally it would appear that SECWA had taken positive steps 
towards restructuring, and hence made progress towards the improvement of 
productivity and perfonnance. Indeed, some rationalisation of the 
administrative structure was achieved in the period 1988-1989, and SECWA's' 
work force was reduced marginally and ifs administrative structure improved. 
Internally however, it was obvious that the rule-driven bureaucratic 
management style which required approval from a hierarchical management 
structure for even simple decisions within the organisation, had survived the 
review virtually unscathed. The common tenet among many managers after the 
FOR was that the organisation had undergone restructuring because it was the 
current fad and once they had gone through the motions things would get back 
to normal. In fact, one manager claimed that senior management had succeeded 
in fending off the govenunent and critics by 'rearra11gi11g the deck c/mirs 011 the 
Titmiic' rmd tlrrowing a faw sacrifidal Jambs out of the orga11isntio11. Significantly, 
however, senior management (refer figure 2.2) had failed to address the real 
drivers for change, that is, the issues of low productivity, overstaffing and 
inefficiency. These were the areas where changr1 should have been made, but 
were not, due mainly to union and political pressures. Not all blame for this 
should be apportioned to senior management however, as few could have 
predicted the intensity of the union influence on the State Government and the 
open and reported willingness of government ministers to interfere in the day to 
day running of SECWA (Municipal Officers Association, 1990; State Energy 
Commission of Western Australia. Internal HR Memorandum, 1990). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some senior and middle managers were fearful of their 
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positio11S if they went against senior executive and government ministers' 
thinl<lng. 
The evidence further suggests· that a lack of effective communication 
during the FOR process led to mioinformation, misinterpretation and a general 
mistrust of senior management and the executive by managers and staff and 
lower levels within the organisation (Municipal Officers Association, 1990). 
Throughout the FOR, communication within the organisation, both up and 
down, were very poor, resulting fr•. some !ine managers passing on speculation 
rather than fact; accrediting i,.r6 senior management. Senior management, for 
their part, appeared to be deaf to the discontent from line management and 
individuals. Due to the infrequency of communication and a reported lack of 
credibility in the content, when senior management did speak, few listened to or 
believed what was said. In fact, it was suggested that ... tire real casualttj of tile 
fimcticmal mrd arganisntio1111l review was tnist a11d illtegrity home about by tire secreciJ 
and stealth of its i11trod11ctio11 (Municipal Officers Association, 1990). Employees 
and managers alike openly expressed a distrust of senior manageme~t and the 
executive, this legacy was to endure for another five years, up to !:he split up of 
SECWA and the formation of Western Power in 1995. Even after, a few 
managers indicated they still do not trust senior management and view all 
communications {Tom the executive with a degree of cynicism (Lehmann, 1997). 
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2.4.5 Performance management 
Performance management was initially introduced into SECWA in 1990 
and was to be applied to managers and employees at all levels within the 
organisation. Its main objectives were to ensure that; 
• managers and staff worked towards defined goals consistent with divisional 
objectives, 
• employees received regular feedback on their performance, 
• employees were assisted in identifying the attitudes, knowledge and skills 
required to perform their jobs effectively, and 
• reviews were performed properly and reflected a fair evaluation of the 
employee's performance upon which training and development decisions 
could be based. 
Changes were made to the performance management process in 1992 
which saw the abandonment of the performance rating system, whereby an 
employee's performance was rated using a scale of one to five, in favour of a 
narrative description of performance ver.1us task in which managers would write 
a brief summary of an employee's performance, relative to the allocated tasks, on 
the report form. Also, factors that were considered beyond an individual's 
control and which could adversely affect the expected performance, such as 
human resource, equipment and skill shortages, were n,quired to be entered 
onto the performance management form. The manager setting the performance 
management targets was expected to address these factors and take appropriate 
action. These changes, however, were unsuccessful in winning support for 
performance management and the process was abandoned in May 1994. Further 
attempts were made in 1995, 1998 and 1999 to successfully embed performance 
management into the organisation. On each occasion it was introduced with 
new enhancements, however, it was subsequently abandoned due to lack of 
support from unions, and middle and front-line managers. 
The version of performance mru1agement introduced in 1995 was to be 
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closely linked to the strategic planning process. In the first instance, the 
executive determined the strategies required to achieve corporate and 
organisational goals. The managing director and general managers then detailed 
the strategic result areas (SRAs) appropriate to each division and agreed on key 
performance indicators (KP!s) for each of the general managers. Each general 
man.iger allended a performance management system training course for 
approxim.itely four hours. TI1is was to en.ible them to cascade the performance 
management system process throughout the organisational structure, from the 
lop-down, with each new level .ittending training .is appropriate. Anecdotal 
evidence and observation from within the org.inisation, suggests however that 
there was lack of motivation and commitment shown by many middle and line 
man<1gers. For example, few managers attended the training, claiming they were 
loo busy and didn't need performance management in order to run their 
business. Some even discouraged their employees from attending training. 
Also, as the process filtered down through the organisation, the KPis became 
increasingly less appropriate, especially in engineering and technical sections. 
There were various reasons for the lack of support for performance 
management, however, the main reason appears to originate from the prevailing 
culture at the time which embedded a distrust of senior management and the 
executive and a rejection of any form of accountability for personal performance 
and ta~k efficiency (Lehmann, 1997). 
2.4.6 Case for corporatisation 
In the late 1980's the Federal government put Australia on a path of 
microc,:::onomic reform with the aim of improving industry efficiency and living 
r,tandards. A report by the Australian Industry Commission (May 1991) ca!Ied 
for state-owned clech·icity utilities lo be corporatiscd, a growing worldwide 
trend inspired by concepts of competition, productivity and efficiency which 
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was being advanced as U1e genesis for new policies, restructuring and industrial 
reform (Deveson, 1997). In response, the Western Australian Government set up 
its own Energy Board of Review in February, 1992, under the chairmanship of 
Sir Roderick Carnegie. The Bonrd was to make recommendations on U1e op~mal 
structure for the electricity and gas industries in Western Australia. The Board 
reported Umt, employees must bi• realistic, ... I/icy luwe 1w choice 11bo11/ change, which 
will be ... fl clmlk11ging aud ougoi11g task; U1ey will ... lmi'I.' lime to adjust lo 
compeliti1,e l'ressure; .. .if tlicy do 1wt adjust, tlicy 11•ill be left /ie/iiud (Carnegie, 1993, 
92). 
The Energy Board of Review had also recognised that cultural change 
within SECVv' A needed to involve a management-driven initiative lo change 
traditional ways of thinking in an attempt to socialise employees into accepting 
management-defined values, goals and objectives. Carnegie (1993) as chairman 
of the Energy Board of Review claimed that a key factor in U1e success or failure 
of the soon to be corporatised electricity utility would be securing the 
commitment of the executive, all levels of management and employees to the 
industry restructure. He reported U1at man.v individuals within U1e organisation 
will have built their careers in the electricity and gas industries and some will 
feel threatened as new ,md unfamiliar structures are created and as more 
competitive industries emerge (p.92). He also found that employees in the o!d 
organisation had, over many years, 1;Ct up informal networks and associated sub-
cultures aligned with the public SL'rvice way of doing business, which appemed 
to be geared towards maintaining U1e status quo both within and outside the 
organisation. They had exhibited little want or willingness to improve labour 
productivity, to improve generating plant utilisation, to contain capital 
expenditure and to introduce competition Within the industry (Carnegie, 1993, 
82). 
Anecdotal evidence and documentation such as union notices (Australian 
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Services Union, 1992) and individual branch managers' instructions placed on 
notice boards within the organisation support Carnegie's findings. Also, from 
his position within the organisation, Lehmann (1997) observed that many 
employees had constructed their own reality of customs and beliefs that they 
were comfortable with and could accept. Some openly rejected change as they 
were not convinced it was necessary and they did not believe that organis.ational 
restructuring and competition would bring any improvements to their position 
within the organisation. Indeed, there was a general feeling among most 
employees that change would bring with it more work and responsibility, for no 
increase in salary and the possibility of job losses (Lehmann, 1997}. 
On January 1, 199j, acting on the Board's recommendations, the state 
government split the State Energy Commission (SECWA) into separate state-
owned gas and electricity businesses; Alinta Gas Corporation and Western 
Power Corporation. Many employees saw the emergence of Western Power as 
an opportunity to share in the rewards that only a competitive and commercially 
orientated organisation could offer. Others, saw corporatisation as a saviour for 
the vertically integrated, bureaucratic s!.Tucture, free from the feared government 
break-up and privatisation, for the time being {Eisr.ele, 1995). 
2.4.7 New responsibilities 
Under the Electricity Corporation Act 1994, a board of directors is the 
governing body of Western Power with authority to determine the corporation's 
policies and to control its affairs according to prudent commercial principles. 
The board is responsible to the Western Australian Minister for Energy and 
consults the minister on major initiatives (Electricity Corporation Act, 1994). TI1e 
managing director is responsible to the board for the day-to-day operations of 
the corporation and acts in consultation with the executive committee which is 
comprised of the heads of the eleven divisions (See Figure 2.3). The managing 
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director in consultation with the executive committee was also responsible for 
the introduction of new management initiatives, such as performance 
management, corporate key performance indicators, financial control and HR 
functions. 
Western Power is the principal generator, transmitter and distributor of 
electricity in Western Australia, serving more than 847,000 customers in an area 
larger than New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania combined. 
O,.vned by the Western Australian government, as sole shareholder, Western 
Power is a commercial organisation with fixed assets in excess of $5 billion and a 
workforce of 2,588 employees. Dividends paid to the state government since 
1995 have exceeded $1.046 billion (Western Power Annual Report, 2003). 
Even with the new corporate structure, Western Power remained a 
vertically integrated organisation with a top-down information flow and 
centralist'd management structure (Figure 2.3). Corporatisation brought new 
responsibilities for managers. Stakeholders now had a significant influence on 
those responsible for running the business {Cullum, 1997; Dunphy & Stace, 1994; 
Stace & Dunphy, 1997; Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997}. Examples of internal and 
external stakeholders who influence decision-making within Western Power in 
terms of corporate responsibility and business imperatives are shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.3 illustrates the management structure of Western Power around 2000. The day-to-day running of the organisation was 
the responsibility of the managing director who reported to a Board which in tum reported to the state government. The 
executive team consisted of general managers from each of the eleven divisions. Each division was further divided into 
branches and sections headed by managers and section heads at different levels. 
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This figure illustrates the internal and external stakeholders who influence decision-making within Western Power in terms of 
corporate responsibility and business imperatives. 
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Western Power· the new culture 
With the help of a consultant from North Amerka, Focused Change 
International, the Western Power executive put together management teams to 
analyse every department and determine how to implement the recommended 
changes. From January 1995 a series of 'FOCU5'1 workshops commenced, 
aimed at convincing all employees from senior management down of the need 
for change in the way the organisation was managed and operated. This was to 
also include deparbnental restructuring lo reduce the levels of management in 
some areas (Eiszele, 1995). 
In July 1995, the blueprint for corporate performance and accountability 
the government and the executive expected of Western Power was released in 
an inaugural strategic plan. Under the banner of Breakthrough'98, the strategic 
plan was promoted by the Western Power executive as a framework for a new, 
competitive organisation that would use cultural change and strategic planning 
to its best advantage. The three stages of the strategic planning process were: 
• Identification of a corporate mission statement and the underlying values 
for the organisation; 
• translation of the corporate mission and values into integrated strntegic 
plans for individual work units at the divisional and branch level; and, 
• development of a culture across the organisation which embraces the values 
and works towards achieving the mission (Western Power Internal 
Publication, 1995). 
Employees allending FOCUS workshops were told that, Excel/emled 
c/Jnnge is tlie process of t1m1i11g i>isioirs inlo demonstrated realities at au extrnordimin; 
/Jace (Widdis & Davis-Goff, 1995, 5). This was part of the case for cultural 
change presented to over sixty percent of all employees or approximately 2,200 
people who attended the FOCUS workshops betwL>en January 1995 and May 
1 FOCUS was an ,,cmnym for Focus on Orgon!sa~on.1l Change UI\Jeri;tnndlng and Skills, """ al"' 
app<.•ruU. 1. 
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1997. The main thrust of the change programme was to establish in Western 
Power a high performing culture and a sense of urgency among employees of 
the need for immediate change. The organisation was to achieve this by 
sending as many employees as possible, in the shortest time frame, on three and 
five day workshops or 'simulations' as they were otherwise known. The 
workshops started with the executive, then general managers, branch and 
business unit managers and senior section heads, working down the hierarchy 
to the front line workers (Western Power Annual Report, 1997). 
The cultural change strategies adopted by Western Power would change 
the role and working life of employees at all levels of the organisation. The 
strategies were primarily aimed at productivity and efficiency improvements 
and included business-unit restructuring in order to reduce costs and make the 
organisation more competitive. The change strategies were designed to make 
employees aware of their new role in the organisation's future and empowered 
employees were to be responsible for their own actions and decisions and to be 
innovative and challenge the way things were done whenever they saw 
opportunity for productivity and efficiency improvements. The stratl"gies also 
emphasised the need for greater financial accountability, strategic planning at 
all levels of management, business unit and employee performance 
management, the adoption of new technology in order to achieve new business 
targets and a greater focus on customers and the value of their long term loyalty 
to the organisation. 
Reaction to the new initiatives 
For some employees, the use of independent consultants in the change 
process immediately brought recollections of the turmoil caused by the 
a~mpts at change within the organisation in 1989 through the Functional and 
Organisational Review (FOR) (refer section 2.11.4). TI1ere was generally a 
profound distrust of consultants especially from overseas and U1e message that 
68 
they carried. There was also concern that ideas and stTategies that had possibly 
failed elsewhere would be adopted by Western Power. Further, a strong 
distrust of senior management and their motives still prevailed, especially in 
light of the number of jobs lost as a result of the FOR. Some employees 
expressed concern that little had been done to tum that feeling around 
(Australian Services Union, 1995). 
Earlier research by Lehmann (1997) into the effects of culture change on 
employees in Western Power found that the majority of employees at all levels 
within the organisation saw the FOCUS strategies as a way of increasing 
productivity, reducing bureaucracy and achieving a greater level of control 
over their role and factors that influence their working life such as performance 
management, remuneration, training and career opportunities. However, not 
all were enthusiastic about the change strategies associated with FOCUS, with 
Lite strongest concerns !Tom business unit managers and section heads. Many 
claimed FOCUS was developed and implemented with little or no consultation 
with them or their representative unions. Further, they saw the delayering of 
management levels brought about as part of the FOCUS changes as a threat to 
their status within the organisation. There wa~ also a reluctance by some 
managers and section heads to accept change due to a number of issues which 
included demands by 'empowered' employees for greater fTeedom in decision-
making and task assignment. Concern was also expressed by some managers 
over Lhe creation by senior management of specialist teams, or 'Z-teams' as they 
were known, to conduct inter-departmental investigations into the 
recommendations for improvement and other strategic issues arising from the 
FOCUS workshops. They believed that the Z-teams unnecessarily interfered in 
their areas of responsibility (Lehmann, 1997). 
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Leadership - the new culture 
In the latter hall of 2000 Western Power introduced a new culro:re change 
program, the Managerial Leadership Initiative (MLI). The MLI was a 
leadership development program aimed at improving the comf,any's 
performance by changing the mru1.\gement culro:re from one of command and 
control to one of people leadership. The Western Power executive promoted 
the MLI as a major change program that would require considerable 
commihnent and effort from all formal leaders over a long period of time 
(Western Power Statement of Corporate Intent, 2000). The MLI objectives 
included: 
• Strengthened managerial leadership and enhanced relationships 
between each employee and their formal leader. 
• The introduction of a management framework that brings together 
individual and organisational capabilities (Harvey, 2001). 
The MU was aimed at improving the leadership capabilities of formal 
leaders with particular focus on Western Power's business priorities which 
included: business acumen, capacity to deliver, change leadership and 
management, people management, personal leadership, technological 
adeptness, working collaboratively and customer and stakeholder focus 
(Harvey, 2001). The ML! also included new people systems and changes to 
existing systems to improve the way work is done in Western Power. Examples 
include the Fair Treabnent System, which is a combination of llie Diversity and 
Equal Opportunity policies within the organisation, and another attempt to 
gain employee acceptance of The Employee Achievement Measure (TEAM) 
(performance management). 
By July 2001 stage one of the MU program had been presented to the 
executive, managers and section heads. The program was then rolled out to all 
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employees. By early 2003 more than 1800 employees had successfully 
completed the program. The second stage of the MLI program was scheduled 
for implementation in late 2003. However, further internal restructuring and 
moves by the Western Australian State Government during 2003 to introduce 
legislation to split Western Power into four separate corporations has caused 
this program to be shelved for the time being. 
24.8 Sumnrary 
This section explored the important elements of organisational and 
managerial change which were driven by the Western Australian government's 
desire to improve the performance and efficiency of its electricity supply utility. 
The commentary included the significant structural and management system 
changes that the organisation undenvent in the reform process leading up to 
and beyond corporatisation. It showed that senior, branch and business unit 
managers are now required to be leaders as well as organisers. They must 
implement organisational restructuring, strategic plarntlng and contracting. 
deal decisively with business unit and individual employee performance, and 
be financially accountable. Finally, further reductions in the workforce will see 
the need for managers at all levels to gain additional skills, not only to cope 
with the increase and diversity of work, but to also enable them to network and 
participate in strategic alliances, both internal and external to the organisation. 
Important themes and issues identified in this and previous sections are 
used to inform the analytical framework developed in the next section. 
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2.5 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Ticehurst and Veale (1999) view analytical frameworks as diagrammatic 
displays of the conceptual status of the theory, phenomena and variables that 
underpin important research questions. Punch (1998) agrees with this view and 
adds that the development of research questions using a framework often 
brings into focus implicit thinking about the topic, which in tum gives direction 
to the sampling decisions (p.39). 
The analytical framework described below and illustrated in figure 2.5 
aims to support a clear understanding of corporatisation and management 
reform on the role of the manager within the case organisation. The framework 
was developed from key elements of important social, ideological and 
theoretical considerations for change described in chapter one and explored in 
the earlier sections of this chapter. It brings into focus the practical elements of 
management reform agenda and issues of importance for managers identified 
as being applicable to the corporatisation and management reform of all 
Australia's state public clectridty utilities. Such a fram2work enables a 
structured examination of the interacting features of government reform and 
the instruments of change used to achieve the reform objectives. Importantly, it 
identifies key lines of inquiry for this shldy which translate into the research 
questions described in chapter one (section 1.4). The framework is also used for 
this srody to define the key themes and boundaries of the literahlre search in 
chapter three. This includes the relationship between the theory driving the 
public electricity supply industry reform agenda and the consequential changes 
to the managers' roles a11d working life. It also informs the research approach 
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elaborated on in chapter four, the preliminary interview questions in chapter 
five and provides a focus for the data analysis and synthesis in later chapters. 
2.5,2 Social and ideological considerations 
The social and ideological considerations for reforming Australia's 
public electricity utilities are examined in so far as they impact on the 
government's reform agenda and the day-to-day operations of managers. 
Issues such as size and importance of electricity supply industry, ownership, 
competition and performance improvements, commercialisation, 
corporatisation, managerialism and deregulation of the electricity supply 
industry have all been identified as important issues driving management 
reform and change within Australia's public electricity supply industry. 
2.5.3 Management reform agenda 
Management refonn within Australia's public electricity supply industry 
is examined in terms of ownership and management performance, government 
and managers as utility maximlsers, social responsibility, stakeholder 
influences, outsourcing and contracting out, financial perfonnance, strategic 
planning. customer focus, and culture change. These are underpinned by 
dominant theories identified in the analytical framework (fig 2.5). The theories 
include prcperty rights which is part of the traditional theoretical framework 
used to analyse the relationship between ownership and managerial 
perfonnance of public sector enterprises (Sanchis, 1997). Agency theory views 
social and political life as a series of contracts or agreed relationships between 
the owner (the principal) and manager (as agent) in which the manager does 
tasks on behali of the owner and is rewarded in a mutually acceptable way. 
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However agency theory views managers as self interested utility maximisers 
and sees their interests in conflict with those of the owner (McKenna, 1999, 73). 
Agency theory plays an important role in developing the policy framework that 
underpin corporatisation programs (Boston, Martin, Pallot, & W$h, 1997, 27). 
Public choice theory, or the economics of politics, sees pu/iic managers, 
bureaucrats and politicians as utility maximisers who pursue their own self-
interest rather than the public interest or the will of the population at large 
(Sanchis, 1997, 4). However, public choice theory strongly influences public 
policy and public administration, the latter of which became the driving force 
for new public management or managerialism in the 1980's (McKenna, 1999, 
58). Finally, stakeholder theory has been linked to agency theory and is viewed 
as part of the social responsibility of organisations to enter into contractual 
relationships with other stakeholders. While, it is argued t!Jat managers are the 
only group with direct control over the organisation's decision-making process, 
other stakeholders can influence the decisions (McKenna, 1999, 73). Finally, 
how the government addresses the issues for management reform and supports 
or hinders ::heir implementation will impact significantly on the delivery of the 
corporatisation and management reform agenda. 
2.5.4 t<:sues of importance for managers 
This element of the framework identifies key lines of inquiry that can 
advance the corporatisation and managerialist debate wid expand the body of 
knowledge relating to the impact of a managerialist ideology on the roles and 
working life of mwiagers within Australia's electricity utilities. Here, the focus 
is on the managers who are responsible for implementing the reform agenda, 
which brings with it a shift from 'administration' to 'management' and 
'leadership' where managers are no longer viewed as administrators focusing 
only on the maintenance of ongoing operations through the administration of 
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rules or regulations, but as business unit managers with new responsibilities 
such as strategic planning, on-going structural refonn, productivity 
improvements, performance monitoring and review, customer focus, 
competition, fimmcial account:1bility and leadership. 
Arising from the development of the clements above, are a number of 
key themL'S and issm'S are idl'ntified as having signific,mt potential to cause 
concem for m<111agers in the dectricity supply industry <1nd impact on tl1l'iT 
ability to c.irry out their duties in the maimer expc,.ied of them. They ,,re: 
U11dersta11dillg of thr raUouafr for corpomtisatlou. In on.!er to evaluate 
the managers' perceptions of the changes to their roles which have occurred as 
a result of corpor.itis.ition .iml management reform within Australi.i's public 
elL>ctricity utilities it is illl!)Ortant to first confim1 their understanding of the 
r,1tiona]e for corporatisation. 
Clumgiug rolr of llltlllagers. As part of the broad reform agenda the role 
of managers has undoubtedly changed. Managers become change leaders, to 
implement and overscl' organisational am\ cullura! changes. l11ey must also 
introduce ,md .support new management systems ,is p<1rt of th!' management 
reform process. t,.-lan,1gers are held account.1b!e for their business unit 
performance v,:hich is measured .igainst predetermined indicators set by senior 
man.igeml'nt 01· executive. Man.igers arc r'-'<luired lo m.iximi~ comn1ercial 
performance, improve financial acrnuntability, implement and drive strntegic 
planning, man.ii;e t!ll' cxpect.ltion.s of key stakeholders and .iddress customer 
service as a major priority. Oth<'r issues requiring the managers' attention are 
training, recruitment and the performance monitoring of staff and the 
contracting out of services previously done in~liouse. 
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lmpllct of c/1m1ge 011 tire rolrs of 111aimgrrs. Corporatisa9,,in and 
management reform of the clc,;;tricity supply industry has heralded many 
changes to the way managers m11nagc lhL'i-r businL'5S uniL<;. These cl1<1.ngcs will 
impact in differenl ways on individual nmnagcrs and may make their role 
easier or more difficult to fulfil depending on their understanding of what they 
,ire l'XJX'Cted to do ,md ho,,· arc they .iblc to do it. 111<" introduction of lll'W 
managenwnt system.~ is of concern for man;igers in terms of whether or not 
they have the appropri,1te skills to use those systems and whetlll'r or not U1ose 
systems will help the managers achieve their performance targets. 
Benefits of cl,a11ge. From the managers' perspective, what are the 
expected and perceived benefits of corporatisation and management reform for 
the managers, that is, what do tl1ey believe is in it for them, as welt as for the 
organisation and its st,cikeholdcrs. 
Working life iss11es. Major opportunities and challenges have been 
presented to managers of the electricity supply industry through a continuously 
changing working environment. Key working life issues identified in the 
liter.iture include workload; working conditions; personal and business unit 
pcrformrmct>; leadership; internal and external networks; rc>muneration; 
relationships; and career and learning opportunities. 
76 
~------
Soci1] =d Ideological 
Drlvc'ISfot Rcl"orming 
Auslrali•'• rublk 
F.lc-ctriclly Ulilitil'S 
lssu .. of Import1nce for Managers in th~ Public 
EledrkHy Supply lnd11-,1ry 
Un~ml.onding of lh, R,tion•I• for Corpouti .. tion 
R<'""""fmch.,n1:e 
Ch,nging Roi< ofM,n,ger,· 
~!o,imi,il>i c<1mmt•1d,,l 1•,,form,1nce 
Imp""'"' n,..,,.,-,1,,...,,,u.,~,bi~ly 
Cu,I\Om,·r focu, 
5Ll,•& ""l'"hH>.'t' 
o,.,.,rsh1r 
Coml"'Bti"n& 
1••'1f,,mo.1t1<,•impm,·.sn,·,,o 
C'""""'""I'""""' 
Cor1'1r.,u~,1"'" 
M,,,c,1:,•ri•ll"n 
ll,_•«.,:111'11u,,, 
Tr,,inin1i n~·nutm,-nt ,,..i 1••<fnrm"'"' mmuU•rin~ 
r,;,,-· M.>mi;o.,nrn! Sy,,, . .,,. 
Domlnanl Theori,,s 
l'r"l"'''Y fi~hls 
A~""')' 
l'ul,l"clu•ict• 
51.\ld••l.l,•r 
Managom<'nl ltdonn 
(Rt•,1"'"' fo, chan!l") 
Owrwrshir 
Utilil)' ma,imt'-"1' 
Sod,1lrc~l"""'l,ilily 
5toM'h.,kk• ,,,nu<">ee 
Outs<,u,ci111•, & <<>n!r,><<mi: out 
F'"''"'"'ll"·rl<>rm,ll1t'e 
s,,,,,,·1:"r''""'"g 
C u,tnnw, f,><u, 
Cultu1t•ch.n1~e 
Ori;,10lls.1ll<m,,I Chon~,· 
Cuhnr,,l Chmlf;< 
l.e,,J,•rslup 
lmp•<t ol Ch•nge on Roi<> of M,n,gon 
M,,,, "'" th,,• ,-,1"'-~·,eJ to ,lo 
A<e lhey ,,M~ In J., It 
Appropri>I,• ,~Jl, 
,\chK..,.<'flwnt ul 1x•1fommro• ~"gt'I< 
lkn,fit. uf Corpor,ll,.tlon 
Fo, the mm~,~''" 
• Forth,•mgani"IRn\ 
• For tl1emi;,,11i~,1;m,',,Mkholdm 
Wor~ln~ Uf< boueo: 
lnlem.,lnetw,,,l., 
E>ten..,I nt•twor~, 
ReL1li"n,hi1" w,th, GM. 1"-''-'f>, ,tiff 
Al"li'l' "' m,~1 n,-;,...,., Umt ""gm 
,\hill!,• hl mt'<I sl,,~elmlJ,•r,; e,pect.,li,"'' 
Tramlni;/lt•,1mmu "Pl""'""itit's 
Future <','1t'e! "Pl"><tun,\~-,; 
l 
Rc'Sc'1rch Qu.,,;tlons 
\\11,., jr,• m,,,..,g,·,s' u,.J,·"t,u~lmi:s of Iii,· ,,.,,.m,,le for th,• <'"l"""liWwn <>f w,~tt·m Ausual•1', public 
t•hu,ntr,uppll' ut,l,tv? 
\\'h,,t ,u,· tin• "!~1'f«,,nl, '"'"!\'" l!I "'''"''!;«·< ml,-.; "'"I a,,,.. h.m· t],.,.._, ,Mnb'i~ rln1tlC!t'<l "" ll~·ir ml,._ 
W\lhm 11·,~1,·n> ,lu,tt,1lc(, t•ht,u·,ty ,upply uulu>I')' M ,\ tc'<ull <>I''"!"""''"'""~ a,,.I '"'""'F,l1\lt'!11 rufo1m7 
\\11,11 '"" "''""'I.''". 1~,«·r•~"c' nr ll,,• t...,~·•" ku '"'"""''''"- for tO< "<r,"''"'""'' '""' f.,, 1.,~- w,~tem 
1'n.,,·,,Lll.,•lml<l,•"lmm,·,.r1~,r,1u,-,1i'"1? 
\\1\jt ar,• "'"'"'f,''"' 1~·1c·,•pu,"" of !ht• inop.><I <>f ""l"""L"1t;,m ,mJ m,,n,,g,,t""'' rd<1m1 on th,•qunlity of 
u ... .,~.,,1.,,.i:hf,•? 
fi!;ure 2.5 
An.ilytic<1! Franwwor!<.: corporntisation am\ its impact on managers 
This figure shows the Tc\alionship between the theory driving the public 
ek>ctricity supply industry rl'forn1 agL•mfo and the consequential changes to the 
mam1gers' roles and ll'orking life and the perceived benefits of such change. 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
A review ()f similar cases and relevant literature and facts from 
Sl..'Condary data has demonstrated that the study organisation was similar to its 
Eastern st.1tes counterparts in terms of organif.ational structure, management 
practices and reform agenda prior to corporatisation. TI1e analytical framework 
developed diagrainmatical\y in this chapter describes the practical and 
theoretical clements of corporatisation and management reform a~ it applies to 
Australia's public l1tilitics. The framework enables a structured examination of 
the interacting fealures of government reform and the instruments of change 
used to achieve the reform objectives and how these impact on managers' roles 
and working life. It also identifies kt'y lines of inquiry for this study and 
defines the key thumes and boundaries of the literature search undertaken in 
the next chapter, informs the research approach elaborated on in chapter four, 
the preliminary interview questions in chapter five, and provides a focus for the 
data anal yr.is, synthesis and discussion in chapter eight 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
TI1e previous chapter added to the study context and justification for the 
research described in chapter one. It focused on managers within one of 
Australia's state electricity supply utilities, premised on the similarities of each 
sl:ilte in terms of organisational structure, management practices and reform 
agenda prior to corporatisation. Important insights and information from the 
previous chapters were used to construct the analytical framework (figure 2.5) 
which defines the key themes and boundaries of the literature search 
undertaken in this chapter. The literature reviewed in this chapter pertains to 
the social and ideological considerations underpinning the reform agendas of 
Australia's state governments when restructuring and corporatising their 
ek>ctricity utilities. ltembodk>s broad domains such as economics, public polky 
and business management in order lo build an analytical base for a practical 
understanding of the phenomenon of corporatisation and management reform 
in the Australian ek~tricity supply industry generally, and the impact on the 
role of managers specifically. 
The chapter is divided into three important literature themes logically 
arranged to address key components of the analytical framework. TI1e first 
section identifies the macro issues for reforming Australia's public electricity 
utilities. It examines the arguments in the literature that support economic: 
reform of the public sector as a cal:d!yst for change within the electricity supply 
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industry. Section one also explores the literature pertaining to the ideological 
debate over managerialism and corporatisation which were adopted by both 
the stale and federal government as agendas for electricity utility refo,m. Key 
components of the reform agendas included the issues of ownership, 
importance, size and structure of utilities, and the necessary management 
reforms to deliver on expectations of productivity and economic performance 
improvements which was seen as precursors to competition and deregulation. 
Section two identifies the key drivers for management reform within 
Australia's public electricity utilities. It explores the literature which describes 
the theoretical, social and Ideological considerations for corporafuation in terms 
of organisational ownership and management performance; the social 
responsibility of the corporation and its managers; the go;ernment and 
managers as utility maximisers; and the influence of stakeholders on the 
organisation and its managers. Section two also examines U1e literature 
pertaining to managerialist concepts such as outsourcing and contracting out, 
financial performance, strategic planning, customer focus, and culture change 
as it relates to the corporatiscd utility and those who manage its day-to-day 
operations. 
Finally, section three examines the literature relative to the micro.-\evel 
reforms undertaken by the newly formed corporations in an attempt to 
transform management thinking and performance from publlc sector style 
management to the new manageria!ist style. Specifical!y, it reviews the micro 
policy issues which impact on the role of managers, their quality of working life 
in the electricity supply industry and the benefits of change to them resulting 
from corporatisation and management reform. 
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3.2 REFORMING AUSTRALIA'S PUBLIC ELECTRICITY UTILITIES 
Economic refonn of the public sector was a catalyst for change within the 
electricity supply industry. Electricity is viewed as a critical source of energy 
for all major industries, nationally and internationally. It perv-.ides every aspect 
of modem society and impacts on the economy as an CJssential service to 
customers and as an intermediate input into other industries where it plays an 
important role in the production of most other commodities. From the late 
1980's there was a growing awareness by government, business, academics and 
professionals that the electricity supply industry in Australia had to change. 
The debate was particularly strong around issues of size, structure and 
ownership, it revolved around how should an industry of such size and 
importance to the economy be managed to satisfy boU1 government and 
commercial objectives. Slate-owned utilities in Australia, were being pressured 
to change the way they did business (Eby & Hazan, 19%). It was reported that 
throughout Australia, industry and commerce were calling for a reduction in 
electricity tariffs to make them more competitive with their overseas 
counterparts {Carnegie, 1993; Harman, 1993a; Hilmer, 1993; Industry 
Commission, 1991a, 1991b). This section identifies the literature pertaining to 
the macro issues which support the reforming of Australia's public electricity 
utilities. 
3.2.1 Size and importance of the ele<:tridty supply industry 
From the early 1990's, in response to economic and political pressure 
from major stakeholders for refonn of the electricity supply industry, the 
Federal and state governments' set up boards of inquiry chaired by Hilmer 
(1993); Carnegie (1992 and 1993); Ham1an (1992); M<:Carrey (1993) and others. 
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Their responsibility to government was to investigate and report on the changes 
necessary to make AustTalia's public utilities more efficient and effective 
without the need for on-going regulation. It was argued by Deane (1989), 
Duncan & Bollard (1992), Harman (1993), Quiggin (1997) and others that 
significant micro level structural, cultural and managerial changes would have 
to occur in order to achieve the perceived gains from macro level changes like 
deregulation and corporatisation. Recommendations aimed at stimulating 
competition and making significant improvements in productivity and 
efficiency would see the state owned utilities restructured to be more 
compatible with competitive markets. This process would require the 
regulatory functions being separated from commercial functions and in some 
cases, separation of potentially competitive parts of an enterprise into several 
distinct businelises {Harman, 1993b; Hilmer, 1993; Quiggin, 1997). TI1is was to 
be the catalyst for substantial restructuring of the electTidty supply industry. 
A centTal element of the restTucturing of public and private sector 
organizations in many countries has been the substantial reorganization of the 
workforce based on the reduction of employee numbers. Duncan & Bollard 
(1992) report that work force reductions in New Zealand were a key element of 
public sector reform, where before corporatisation, it was common for 
... e/cctricihj utilities to lie 0111.'T staffed due to poor mmmgemeut practices, union 
pressure, mu/ politicnl pressure lo take 011 more people (Duncan & Bo:Iard, 1992, 55). 
In AustTa!ia U1e thinking was no different, so inextTkably linked to the reform 
agenda for Australia's state public e\cctTidty utilities was a desire by 
government to reduce the size of its workforce. Accoramg to Pitkethly (1992) 
U1e period bet\veen the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, employment levels in 
Australia's public utilities swelled by over 20 per cent {Pitkethly, 1992, 18). In 
fact, Hyman (1995) reports that st.ate owned utilities worldwide were often used 
... ns emf!loymeirl agendes iu times of higlr rmemployment (Hyman, 1995, 190). ln 
U1e Western AustTulian context the practice of overstaffing had led to poor 
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management and work practices which contributed to high labour costs and 
low productivity (Hannan, 1992, 4). Hannan considered that restructuring and 
staff reductions were necessary in order for Western Australia's gas and 
electricity utility (SECWA) to eliminate restrictive work practices and adopt a 
commercial focus in a competitive environment (Hannan, 1993a, 2). 
Simmons & Bramble (1996) report major staff reductions in the electricity 
and associated industries in Australia and that restructuring and work force 
reductions were most signifil'.ant in the )X'riod 1987 to 1993 where employment 
in the electricity supply industry fell by thirty four percent. For example, they 
claim that the electricity genemting and mining industry under the State 
Electricity Conunission of Victoria (SECV) went through significant change in 
the period 1989 to 1994, and the workforce of almc,st 24,000 dropped to less 
than 10,000. Around the same time the Electricity Commission of New South 
Wales reduced its v.'orkforce by thirty percent in the two years to June 1990. 
While in Western Australia in the lead U? years to corporatisation staff numbers 
in the state elech 1city and gas supply utilily fell by twenty eight percent, or 696 
jobs, in the period 1987 to 1994 (p.218). These reductions were most heavily 
borne by lower skilled blue-collar workers, such as trades assistants and 
labourers, who made up the bulk of employees. There were also cuts in trades' 
people, technical, engineering, clerical and administrative staff and 
management across the organisation. In fact, because of the prevailing low 
unemployment rate in the eighties, utilities found staff were more willing to 
accept vc.luntary redundancy and work force reductions. A different orthodoxy 
emerged in the early nineties, however, where increased staff reductions due to 
restructuring was m,•t with strong resistance from the unions, resulting in long 
and protracted disputes (Simmons & Bramble, 1996, 219). 
In conclusion, there are strong arguments in the literature 
recommending significant micro level structural, cultural and managerial 
83 
changes in order to achieve the perceived gains from macro level changes like 
deregulation and corporatisation. Work force reductions were a central element 
of public electricity utility restructuring in order to reduce costs and increase 
productivity. However, there was still strong debate over who should own the 
utilities and how should they be managed. The next section looks at what the 
literature has to say about the issue of ownership as a ideology for the reform of 
Australia's electricity supply utilities. 
3.2.2 Ownership as an issue for reform 
The previous section discussed the arguments revolving around the size 
and importance of electricity utilities. In discussing structural change the 
question of ownership frequently arises in the debate over corporatisatio~, 
which invol,.;es a change of stahls from public service orientation to a state-
owned corporatised body. The object of such change is to reduce the drain on 
revenue raised from taxpayers and to provide a return to government. There 
will, however, always be a call for the provision of subsidised goods and 
services to enable government to meet its social or community service 
obligations in pmviding for the poor and underprivileged (Hess & Adams, 
1999, 7). Wiltshire (1987) considers that if a utility is to be left to implement any 
social objectives of government, the question then to be addressed is whether 
these obligations will be spelt out fonruJly by the govenunent, or left to 
informal behaviour on the part of the utility (p.39). Most importantly, it must 
be asked whether the utility will be left to implement these objectives free from 
scrutiny or whether some form of regulatory fran1ework will be devised for the 
post-corporatisation period to keep check on the extent to which that utility is 
adhering to these objectives (Wiltshire, 1987, 39). Electricity regulation was 
born out of the need to set prices because normal market mechanisms were not 
present, however, it has extended we!! beyond this as regulators have accepted 
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social and political agendas, such as monitoring the quality and reliability of 
electrical supply (Felton & Harper, 1998a, 2). 
Government versus private ownership has long been the subject of 
debate by academics and business writers such as De Alessi (1980), Sanchis 
(1997) and Shirley (1999). This debate focuses on ownership and the rights to 
profits which are clearly defined within the private sector, but diffused and 
uncertain in the public sector (Harris, 1991, 152; Sanchis, 1997, ·l). Other writers 
in favour of public utility reform and corporatisation invariably focus on the 
improvements to be made in productivity and efficiency, and the reduced drain 
on government revenue (Carnegie, 1993; Harman, 1993a; Labour Research 
Centre Inc, 1990; Stuhmcke, 1997). Further, Painter (1988), Twohill (1989) and 
Maddock (1993) view corporatisation is a method by which the government 
retains ownership of utilities while introducing a programme of reform aimed 
at improving the financial return to government from those utilities. They 
contend that the executive and senior and business unit managers of such 
organisations play a key ro!e in supporting and giving credence to government 
arguments for the need to restructure and rationalise public owned state 
utilities (Maddock, 1993; Painter, 1988; Twohili, 1989). However, Rosenthal and 
Russ (1988) claim that this view is somewhat oversimplified because a grossly 
inefficient government is just as likely to lose an election and replaced by a 
government with a platform of improved administration. They concede that 
the underlying hypothesis for introducing competition into Australia's 
electricity supply industry was the assumption that it would bring cheaper 
power for a similar standard of service through greater efficiency. However, 
they contend that the polarised debate over public versus private ownership 
has provided remarkably little evidence that any of those assumptions would 
be proven correct (p.200). 
For Pitkethly (1992) the issue of ownership is clear cut, he considers that 
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the shortcomings stemming from government ownership of electricity supply 
utilities can be reduced by corporatisation. In essence, he claims that 
corporatisation seeks to improve performance by restructuring the utilities to be 
more commercially orientated, this involves two broad sets of initiatives. The 
first is to introduce measures to provide the authorities with dear commercial 
objectives and managers with the necessaty power and autonomy to pursue 
these objectives without undue government intervention. Pitkethly argues that 
managers must also be more accountable for performance and that there is a 
nad for the introduction of measures to monitor performance, such as rate of 
return targets and a comprehensive range of non-financial indicators. The 
second initiative is to create a commercial operating environment similar to that 
which applies in the private sector. This requires the removal of factors that 
both advantage and disadvantage the operators of electricity authorities. For 
example, tax concessions and public sector borrowing constraints (Pitkethly, 
1992, 19). 
Opposing arguments advanced by academics and business writers, such 
as Dawkins (1986), Quiggin (1986), Alford (1993), Dunford, Bramble & Littler 
(1998) and others, favour the continued operation of the States' electricity 
supply utilities along public sector lines. These arguments are generally based 
on a requirement for government fulfillment of social obligations that would 
not be done if the utility were operating as a private business. These 
community service obligations are defined in Australia by Borthwick (1991), 
Harman (1993a), Nagarajan (1994) and Hess (1999) as non-commercial activities 
undertaken by a government business enterprise which meet the social 
objectives identified by government and include the losses in supplying 
electricity to rural and remote areas. Borthwick (1991) further argues that 
undertaking community service obligations involves an enterprise carrying out 
an activity that is obviously not commercially viable, or which it could only do 
at higher prices (Borthwick, 1991, 5). 
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3.2.3 Competition and performance improvement 
Traditionally, Australia's electricity supply utilities were government 
owned enterprises and like their counterparts overseas held a monopoly over 
the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. Governments' 
co;1trolled and regulated the power industry, ensuring that utilities had little, if 
any, competition. As a result, electricity utilities and their suppliers have taken 
advantage of the security and stability afforded by the monopoly situation 
(Carnegie, 1993; Ferguson, 1996). They have had relatively easy access to 
capital and, as many academics have noted, have had little or no financial 
accountability (Harman, 1993a; Hyman, 1995; Prowse, 1989). This in tum has 
had a fundamental influence on the hierarchical and monopolistic financial 
structures and management habits that evolved which were conceived to be 
authoritarian and anti-competitive (Hilmer, 1993; Walker, 1994). Decisions 
were made and imp!emented by engineer-managers with little or no business 
value analysis or attention to customer requirements (Simmons & Bramble, 
1996). Customers, whether small and regional, or large and commercial, were 
not consulted, but were told what was considered best for them and supply was 
offered on a take it or leave it basis. Often government intervention was 
required to settle an impasse over line routes, supply voltage and tariff. 
Ultimately, the lack of competition and commercial imperative within the 
industry was the impelling force of subsequent change. There was intense 
lobbying by industry and commerce for the monopoly utilities to be broken into 
smaller, competitive organisations (Carnegie, 1993; Dawkins, 1986; Hyman, 
1995; Maddock, 1993). 
Much of the debate over the competition and restructuring of public 
electricity utilities has focused on New Zealand and the UK, but Australia has 
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not been neglected. The literature on government refonn in Australia during 
the early to mid nineties shows strong debate between academics and 
professionals, such as Carnegie (1993); Ha11T1an (1993); Harris (1991); Hilmer 
(1993) and McCarrey (1993), who all argued that competition in the electricity 
supply industry was a good thing for governments because it would lead to 
better outcomes for consumers in terms of access, cost and reliability. The 
debate centered on restructuring and the introduction of competition for 
traditional public sector activities. Hyman (1995) examined the beneficiaries of 
competition in the public electricity supply monopolies and found the 
governments see increased profits as providing additional funds to help solve 
environmental, social and developmental issues. Many utility managers also 
see competition as a positive move. They want sufficient profits to improve 
their remuneration and conditions and to allow their utilities to expand to meet 
customer demands. Likewise, customers want the best possible service for the 
lowest price (Hyman, 1995). 
As the public versus private ownership debate continued throughout the 
nineties, Harris (1991) reported that competition and regulation seemed likely 
to be the more fundamental determinants of the economic performance of 
electricity enterprises than their ownership status (p.156). Harris conceded that 
limited competition for many of Australia's public enterprises had reduced the 
incentives for efficient management. He proposed that, through the constraints 
imposed by ongoing government ownership, corporatisation would investigate 
incentives which approximate those that exist for private sector managers 
(Hanis, 1991, 55). Haggett (1994) agreed with Harris and further claimed that 
competition is a distinct emerging form of organisational control within the 
public sector. He stated that Australia's government owned utilities could 
improve their efficiency either through direct competition with other utilities 
for the supply of electricity, or at least by the introduction of enforceable, 
stringent perfo11T1ance standards. Competition (market and non-market based) 
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" 
;, viewed by Hoggelt as , me= of coo<dinating .J( cti,iti~ of d~entmlised 
units and the extended developinent of perfoJmance monitoring and 
management techniques. Finally, Hoggett noted (fuat the introduction of 
' competition to vast areas of the public sector since 19!37 ... appears to be bringing 
about a 11mjor change in tlie way in wliicli workers and ilumagers behave (Haggett, 
I' 
1! 
1994,19). 
An important tenet in the Australian deba.i:e was whether public 
':i 
electricity supply utilities could ever be restructured ro·be as cost efficient in the 
" 
same competitive environment as their private s~ctor counter-parts and 
whether the community, or rather the user of each sE•rvice, is best served by 
private or public monopoly or through competition. ~~vocates of competition 
' such as Forsyth {1986), Hensher (1986) and Prowse (1989) maintain that private 
companies would outperform public electricity utilities because private 
enterprise is more efficient and operates in a competit:i,\fe market. Hilmer 
(1993), in his role as chairman of the Independent Inquiry into a National 
Competition Policy (1993), reported that corporatisation of government trading 
enterprises is less likely to offer significant public benefit, unless appropriate 
structural and management reforms were carried out before, or in concurrence 
with, corporatisation. I'lilrns!r further reported that competition policy, 
comprising rules governing the conduct of finns, plays an important part in the 
consolidation of any structural reform (Hilmer, 1993, 216). Commissioned in 
October 1992 and presented to government in August 1993, the Inquiry found 
... strong a11d widespread co11111m11ihJ s11pport for imp/eme11ti11g rm effective National 
Compctitio11 Polici; (Hilmer, 1993, iii). 
3.2.4 Conunercialisation 
Conunercialisation is defined in appendix 1. Prowse (1989) claimed 
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commercialisation and corporatisation was seen as being applicable to publicly 
owned entities w~ich operated in an environment where there was some kind 
of market for their product. In those cases the focUS was on business unit 
performance an<l management accountability in relation to business objectives 
and the resources used (p.117). Rosenthal and Russ (1998) agree and further 
claim that accountability within the electricity supply industry is an issue that 
has been keenly debated by public sector analysts for a considerable period of 
time. They contend that accountability and public interest in electricity matters 
give the community and government a measure of control over the utility and 
involvement in its operations, considered important in the context of issues 
such as tariff schedules and environmental issues (p.37). Johnson and Rix 
(1991) also consider accountability for public agencies is an issue of concern for 
politicians, academic researchers, organised groups and journalists, and that 
confusion within the debate centres around financial accountability as provided 
through the companies' code and the necessary political and social 
accountability expected of authorities in a Westminster style parliamentary 
democracy. Further, they argue that the appropriate balance between 
autonomy and control is fundamental to the structure and operation of public 
enterprises in most countries of the world, therefore they contend that public 
utilities should be required to discharge their commercial responsibilities with 
the community at large, while adhering to their social and corporate 
responsibilities CTohnson & Rix, 1991, 100 - 104). Ingersoll (1989) considers that 
commercialisation would see increasing pressure applied to managers in all 
levels of government to provide evidence of an increasingly commercial 
approach to the acquisition, utilisation and valuation of assets. This 
commercialised approach to the management of government trading 
enterprises would see managers called upon to provide strategic business. plans, 
which included financial planning. reporting and accountability. Ingersoll 
conceded that social and other obligations incumbent upon government 
agencies may predml£-U1e achievement of profit. A fundamental tenet of 
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Ingersoll's argument was that social objectives, such as community service 
obligations imposed on public electricity supply utilities were expressed in 
general terms and accounting systems often did not distinguish between the 
costs of achieving social goals and the costs of undertaking commercial 
activities (Ingersoll, 1989, 169). Wood and Jones (1993) view commercialisation 
as a top down process that needs to become participative once critical policy 
decisions are made. Moreover, as government considers the introduction of 
change, staff need to be involved in the design of their work and the 
clarification of the organisation's role. Wood & Jones considered that the 
economic imperative was to produce more with less, and that an essential 
component in achieving improved productivity was for government trading 
enterprises (GTE's) to use their human resources .. . effideutly, effectively and 
/111111m1ely (Wood & Jones, 1993, 25). 
Harman (1993), in contributing to U,e debate over the reform of Western 
Australia's public electricity utility, claimed that commercialisation is often 
confused in public debate with corporatisation (p.9). He described 
commercial~ation as ... tire process of settiug clear commercial objectives far pu!Jlic 
euterprise rmd at lire same time e11suri11g tltat it is 11ot in a privileged pasitio11 relative to 
its private sector competitors for the ac/1ieveme11t of its com111erdal performance 
indicators (Harman, 1993a, 9). This was expanded upon by Dixon and Kouzmin 
(1994) who defined commercialisation as the levying of user charges reflecting 
to varying degrees the economic cost of providing goods and services (p.58). 
Dixon and Kouzmin also claimed that questions raised as to the alleged 
unsatisfactory performance in the public sector were met with proposals for a 
range of commercialisation reforms to improve efficiency. They also noted that 
public agencies were under political pressure to identify services for which 
charges could be increased or introduced in order to recover costs, reduce losses 
or increase profits. At that time commercialisation witllin the public sector at 
all levels of government was becoming common~place from the mid to late 
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1980'j.(Oixon & Kouzmin, 1994, 60). 
McCarrey (1993) in his role as chainuan of the Inde~ndent Commission 
to Review Public Sector Finances (volume 2, 1993) claimed that 
commercialisation is an administrative refonn that embraces all principles of 
corporatisation except the emphasis on competitive neutrality. He believed 
that, with the shift towards maximisation of commercial perfonmmce, 
improved financial accountability and customer focus, the utilities would adopt 
business models which were more commercially orientated and competitive 
(McCarrey, 1993). Maddock (1993) took this concept further and argued that 
managers of public utilities are expected to make operational decisions 
emulating those taken in the market and to provide for a return to the 
shareholder (government) (p.14). However, Rowlands (1990), Maddock (1993), 
Harman (1993a) Kearney, Hays and Steven (1998), and others, had concerns 
that this fonn of government and corporatlsed utility relationship may not 
':'ark as planned because in practice politicians tend to interfere in the running 
of their corporations. 
Garth Pitkethly (1992), as Assistant Commissioner with the Industry 
Commission, studied the performance of Australia's electricity supply industry 
from the onset of commercialisation in the mid to late eighties through to the 
early nineties. He argued strongly in support of corporatising Australia's 
electricity supply utilities. While his study did not address the impact of 
change on managers, it does contribute to the knowledge of government reform 
of Australia's electricity utilities. Pitkethly, like Twohill (1989), Lansdown 
(:990i Dixon & Kouzmin (1994) and Howard (1994), found that organisational 
performance had improved in the years leading up to the early 1990's, but the 
achievement of further efficiency gains required the utilities to be corporatised 
in order to enable effective competition to evolve. He claims that ... tlie pressures 
for clmnge lmve been intensified by a growi11g awareness of tlie serious implicaH011s tlmt 
~ ~ 
poor performance by electricity authorities llas far industry i11 each state aud far already 
strai11ed state fi11nuces (p.18). Furthermore, he considers that management 
performance within the electricity supply industry must improve, and 
corporatisation will help, but concedes that low public sector style management 
rewards and incentives have encouraged a culture ... tlrat is geared towards 
i11mri11g agaiust failure (p.18). He also found that public utility management has 
... been stifled by i11tr11sive govermueut illterve11tio11 (p.18) and that managers are 
forced to comply with govemment directives that are dearly at odds with 
prudent commercial practice. Finally, he considers that managers must be held 
accountable for their performance, they must be provided with clear 
commercial objectives and have the necessary power and autonomy to pursue 
these objectives without undue government intervention. This, he argues, 
could be achieved through corporatisation (Pitkethly, 1992). 
3.2.5 Corporatisation of the eiedricity supply industry 
Shirley (1999) in examining the roles of privatised versus state.-owned 
enterprises defines corporatisation as efforts to make state owned enterprises 
operate as if they were private firms facing a competitive market. Shirley 
argues that with corporatisation, individual state governments retain 
ownership of their enterprises and operate them under the companies code 
with a Board of Directors, appointed by the government to make policy 
decisions (Shirley, 1999). The literature shows that the ideological debate over 
corporatisation, which has continued since the early nineties, invariably focuses 
on the public sector, its size, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and the 
like. The literature further suggests that the move to corporatisc Australia's 
electric utilities was seen to be an answer to their perceived poor performance. 
These views are supported by strong argument in the literature which claims 
that efficiency within government trading enterprises can be improved if 
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operated along private sector lines (Considine & Painter, 1997; Painter, 1988; 
Simmons & Bramble, 1996). Twohill (1989), Deane (1989) and others 
contributed to this orthodoxy by pointing out that central to any rationale for 
corporatisation is the concept and belief by many that private corporations, 
large privately owned companies, are always more efficient than public 
enterprises or public service departments. They argued therefore, that public 
sector management should imitate the organisational structures, the power 
relations between boss and workers, and the profit motive of the private sector 
giants. (Duncan & Bollard, 1992; Dunphy & Stace, 1994; Hilmer, 1993; 
Maddock, 1993). Carnegie (1993) agreed, but added a cautionary note by 
recommending that where government business enterprises are competing 
against other firms any net competitive advantage flowing from their 
ownership should be neutralised. Quiggin (1986), on the other hand, saw the 
issue of corporatlsation as a reactionary attack on public control and ownership 
of industry (p.23). He argued that the debate in Australia was fuelled mostly by 
overseas examples, most notably, the public sector reform policies of the 
Thatcher government in the UK and electricity industry reform and 
deregulation in the United States associated with former Presidents Carter and 
Regan (Quiggin, 1986, 23). 
Academics and professionals have long held the common view that 
governments, when faced with budgeting problems within their utilities, see 
corporatisation as a programme of liberalisation to improve the efficiency of 
their trading enterprises and as a viable option to raising taxes (Hilmer, 1993; 
Hyman, 1995; Stace & Dunphy, 1997). Federal and state governments view 
corporatisation as consisting of two interrelated activities, both of which impact 
significantly on the role of the manager. One is the process of administrative 
reform of management style such as work practices, financial accountability 
and control. The other is the process of creating a competitive market for 
monopolies such as electricity, water and gas (Sly & Weigall., 1992; Watts, 
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1996). Corporatised utilities would induce competitiveness that would free up 
market forces and lead to greater micro and macro-efficiency. Managers of the 
corporatised utilities should have a single clear objective which is the 
maximisation of commercial performance. They should have the authority to 
make key decisions in order to a achieve efficient commercial outcomes, be free 
to decide on recruitment, remuneration and dismissals, to set business plans 
and be accountable for performance against established objectives set by the 
Minister (McCarrey, 1993). Other contributors to the corporatisation debate, 
such as Pitkellily (1992), Dixon & Kouzmin (1994) and Walker & Walker (2000), 
saw corporalisation as a vehicle through which significant industry 
restructuring could be undertaken; including large-scale staff reductions and 
the flattening of hierarchical management structures. They reported that in 
many instances llie outcome of corporatisation was the loss of key personnel 
and employee career path<;; managers were increasingly faced with staff 
shortages, exacerbated by recruitment restrictions which resulted in increased 
contracting out of services (Dixon & Kouzmin, 1994; Pitkethly, 1992; Walker & 
Walker, 2000). 
Academics and management writers such as Rosenthal & Russ (1988), 
Dixon (1995) and Hilmer & Donaldson (1996) contended that the viability of 
corporatisation as a stimulus for public sector reform, with expected improved 
organisati,:;fal.l performance, would depend largely upon managerial 
performance. They noted that, although most significant change manifests 
from the top-down, it is the managers who are ultimately responsible for the 
success or failure of the change within their organisation. Managers provide 
leadership for their employees who emulate their behaviours and performance. 
In a like manner, managers look to senior management and the executive for 
clear direction and support With corporatisation and associated change, 
managers would be held accountable for their own performance and that of 
their respective business units. In addition, they would be expected to 
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participate in strategic planning and observe strict budget controls, but if the 
managers are not convinced of the importance for change, or understand the 
necessity for it, then is unlikely that they would drive it with the necessary 
vigour for success (Dixon, 1995; Hilmer & Donaldson, 1996; Rosenthal & Russ, 
1988). 
Hilmer (1993), while agreeing that the success of the corporatised entity 
depends upon the managerial performance of the executive and managers, 
consideted more importantly that it depends heavily on minimalist government 
involvement. For Hilmer and other academic writers and researchers, such as 
Deane (1989) and Duncan & Bollard (1992), corporatisation is a process of 
minimising government involvement and devolving responsibility to the 
executive and managers as well as introducing new reporting systems to make 
middle and business unit more managers accountable for their actions. 
Harman (1993) agreed, he claimed that corporatisation should increase both 
managers' autonomy from the government as owner, and managerial 
responsibility, but at the same time it must preserve tl1e public interest. He saw 
this being done through an agreement of the corporate plan between the 
Minister and the executive. The executive would have direct accountability to 
Parliament through an openness to parliamentary inquiries and tl1e tabling of 
the annual reports (Harman, 1993a, 9). Harman's views were aligned with 
those of Duncan & Bollard (1992) who, in drawing heavily on property rights 
and public choice literature, had argued tlmt the responsibilities and initiatives 
of managers which result from corporatisation would have to be redefined so as 
to bring them into line with the principal's (government's) objectives. TI1ey 
consider that in this new arrangement, managers would be responsible for the 
effective and efficient use of inputs, for pricing their products and for marketing 
them within performance objectives set by the Minister (p.9). 
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3.2.6 Managerialism as an ideological driver for change 
This section reviews the literature on managerialism as an ideology for 
management reform in the public sector with particular focus on management 
reform adopted as part of the broad corporatisation reform agenda. It is not 
intended that the review of the literature on managerialism be exhaustive nor a 
critique from a multi·paradigm perspective. However, the literature review 
will acknowledge important contributions to the managerialist debate that are 
relative to the aims of this study and described in chapter one. The literature 
reviewed in this section shows the importance of managerialism as an ideology 
for management reform within the public sector, as described and reported by 
academics and others when reporting the shift in management style that 
occurred with the corporatisation of Australia's state electricity supply utilities 
throughout the 1990's. 
Duncan & Bollard (1992) reported that corporatisation is a form of 
managerialism and was to be the vehicle through which various state 
governments would introduce managerialist ideology to mruiagement and staff 
of their electricity utilities (p.9). This tenet has been supported by Clarke & 
Gewirtz (2000) and Brehony (2002) who consider that a key part of the 
corporatisation process was management reform, driveu by the managerialist 
ideology which they describe as having an output emphasis focused on 
efficiencies, cost.;::utting and revenue raising. The ensuring debate engendered 
an important shift in discourse from public administration to public 
management It introduced managerialism to public management. Academic 
and business writers such as Considine (1988), Painter (1988) and Dunford 
Bramble & Littler(1998) describe managerialism as a flexible market-based form 
of public management that emphasises goal setting. planning and the 
measurement of results. In Considine's (1988) critique on the corporate 
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management framework, he postulates that managerialism as an ideology 
elevates economic rationality to primary status in the public sector. Moreover, 
managerialism is committed to four key management concepts: the product 
format, autocratic instrumentalism, systems integration, and purposive action 
(p.7). In later literature, Considine & Painter (1997) claim that although 
... mmmgerialism is 11ow tlie widely 11sed term employed to describe all the 
organisationnl chnnges ac/iieved in the public sector si11ce 1979, it is 11eit/Jer n11 elegant 
11or 1111 exact descripthm (Considine & Painter, 1997, 2). However, Reynoldson 
(1999) has also conducted an extensive study of managerialism as an ideology 
and its application to management reform in the public sector and has found 
that the term managerialism encompasses most, if not all, the changes that 
characterise public sector reform in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990's. 
He argues that even in cases where there is some doubt about its 
appropriateness, such as with its applicability to market-style reforms, there is 
substantial overlap and linkage with public sector reform in general. 
Accordi11gly, mmmgerialism remains tlie term that best describes t/1e content of clmnge 
ill tlw public sector llirouglio11t the 1990's and is the focal point in dismssio11s of reform 
(Reynoldson, 1999, 35). 
As the debate that unfolded on new managerialism in the public sector 
in the late 1980s predicted, reform improvements have not been without cost, 
particularly in societal terms, where the greater the increase in productivity, the 
higher the pace of labour shedding which left many without jobs and 
departments understaffed (Considine, 1988; Painter, 1988; Yeatman, 1987). In 
reporting the corporatisation of public agencies in Australia Dunford, Bramble 
& Littler (1998) explored the issue of productivity improvements and workforce 
reductions further. They claim that the evidence suggests that much of the 
espoused efficiency gains attributed to managerialisrn since the late eighties 
may actually represent the intensification of labour usage brought about by 
industry restructuring and workforce reductions. That is, fewer people were 
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doing more work. They believe that the redesigning of core processes, and 
flatter and often centralised organisational structures, paved the way for cost 
reductions through reduced diversification and staff requirements. In addition, 
a market based relationship between branches and divisions within the newly 
corporatised government agencies replaced hierarchical ones through the 
contracting out of some functions previously done within the organisation 
(Dunford et al., 1998). 
Academics and professionals have emphasised the importance of 
managerialism in the management reform process of Australia's public agencies 
and have described how it has promoted a greater concentration by 
govenunents' on the issues of t'lallagement and how their organisations are 
managed. Considine and Painter (1997), Yeatman (1998), Quiggin & Spoehr 
(1998) and others argue that government agencies within Australia have been 
influenced considerably by the rise of managerialism and the important role 
played by politics and politicians in the determination of public policy and 
responsibility for organisational performance. All these scholars provide 
examples of both internal politics, where significant groups such as professional 
workers may demand relatively autonomous working conditions, and external 
politics, where political interference in the activities of public organisations can 
occur when a minister responds to some special interest groups. They further 
report that managerialism highlights the importance of the role and 
accountability of individual managers, resulting in a closer examination of the 
processes and responsibilities of management. Painter (1988) and Kingwell 
(1993) agree, and claim that managerialism was brought about by an 
understandable reaction against bureaucratic formalism and proceduralism. It 
embodies an output emphasis and measures management performance on the 
basis of outputs, wherever possible in quantifiable terms. They consider that in 
order to achieve this, Australian govenunent agencies must be restructured in 
an attempt to create middle management responsibility centres, that is, self 
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contained productive units with clear duties and targets (Kingwell, 1993, 2; 
Painter, 1988, 1). However, Considine (1988) believes that this concentration on 
output perfonnance is a contentious issue. He claims that rather than 
rewa·rding public servants for rule conformity, error avoidance and attention to 
detail, managerialism rewards them for achieving output targets and punishes 
them for under performance (p.7). Further criticism of the managerialist 
concept comes from Mulgan (1995) who suggests that managers are motivated 
by self-interest to advance their own careers and remuneration and in doing so 
increase the size and importance of their own business units. Mulgan considers 
that managerialism is over concerned with outcomes and neglects how these 
are achieved. In Mulgan's view the focus on outcomes and the monopoly 
position of most government deparOilents has led public servants to overlook 
the importance of following due legal process and of acting with personal 
integrity (Mulgan, 1995, 7). 
Dixon and Kouzmin (1994), who studied commercialisation within 
Australia's public sector, also found that managers under the managerialist 
ideology are required to be more efficient and effective in their use of resources; 
less discriminatory in their personnel management decisions; more 
participative in their decision making styles; and more customer orientated in 
their service delivery. Dixon & Kouzmin argue that economic efficiency is an 
important ingredient of managerialism, it appeals to many managers and non-
managers in Australia and abroad. However, they believe that the obsession 
with economic efficiency is highly ideological and focuses on means and 
obscures ends, that is, it only looks towards the costs of operations and input 
reduction rather than legitimately encompassing innovation. Finally, Dixon & 
Kouzmin report that public sector managers have long been under siege to 
deliver for less cost than their private sector counterparts. Underlying this are 
financial pressures brought about by the increasing demand for services that 
cash-strapped governments could not afford (Dixon & Kouzmin, 1994). 
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Ovlii-seas research by Lawler & Heam (1995) on the rise of 
managerialism and its impact of change on social services departments in the 
United Kingdom found that public sector organisations had &oved away from 
their traditional position ... as organisatifms wlric/1 were seen as being administered 
rat/1er flum managed (p.8). FOr example, managers in public sector organisations 
in the UK had been under pressure to consider private sector management 
practices and to transfer those approaches to their own contexts. Also, the rise 
of manageriallsm saw an increased emphasis on intervention costs and a 
concerp with management cost effectiveness on a greater scale than previously. 
In this way, !.ianagerialism has promoted the. values of management above 
those of professionalism and has resulted in professional workers being more 
closely scrutinised, especially regarding the cost of any interventions that they 
decide are appropriate. Lawler and Hearn point out that successive 
governments in the UK have wished to reduce the role of the state in the 
provision of all traditional services and have espoused.the free market as the 
desired means of allocating resources (Lawler & Hearn, 1995, 7). 
3.2.7 Deregulation of the electricity supply industry 
Prior to corporatisation, st.ate owned electricity utili.ties, operated within a 
tight regulatory framework set by the government. The ,regulations ensured 
that the govt::rrunent monopolies had little or no competition. · It was the 
government who wrote the rules and changed them whenever it wished, the 
government selected the managers who operated its utilities, guaranteed the 
utilities' debts and set the price for service. In addition, the government chose 
whether to make a profit from its utilities or to use them for social or political 
purposes instead (Hyman, 1995, 9). Academics and influential sources 
supporting private ownership and a deregulated competitive market have 
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argued in favour of corporatisation and deregulation as a means to create a 
more profitable and efficient electricity supply system. Hilmer (1993), Maddock 
(1993), Alkhafaji (1993), and others, daim that deregulation is generally 
accompanied by a policy of corporatisation to improve the efficiency of the 
government utilities, They report that since the initial rush for 
commercialisation and corporatisation from the 1980's through to the mid 
1990's the electricity supply industry worldwide is rapidly moving rowards 
total deregulation. They define deregulation of the electricity industry as the 
process of opening up government owned and controlled electricity utilities to 
competition, that is, allowing commercial generators and retailers of electrical 
energy to transfer electricity for a fee through the government owned 
monopoly transmission and distribution lines (Alkhafaji, 1993; Deane, 1989; 
Harman, 1993a; Hilmer & Donaldson, 1996; Hyman, 1995; Maddock, 1993). 
Deregulation is further defined and discussed in appendix 1 of this thesis. 
Hilmer (1993) further adds that in order to increase competition, unofficial 
restrictions on entry, embodied in the statutory monopolies and granted to 
most of the government utilities, should be removed. Gibson (1999) is also a 
strong proponent of deregulation and looks upon it as a catalyst, not only for 
lower electricity prices, but also for the utility companies to supply additional 
services such as gas, cable television, telephone, Internet access and home 
security, as is already the case in the USA (Gibson, 1999, 17). Other writers such 
as Forsyth (1986), Rowlands (1990) and Eby & Hazan (1998) take the 
corporatisation and deregulation debate further and discuss the role of 
managers who must introduce and drive the necessary changes. They contend 
that managers must not only rethink the way they manage their business units, 
but guin and apply additional skills in order to accommodate their new roles in 
a corporatised utility that must operate in an increasingly deregulated market 
(Eby & Hazan, 1998; Forsyth, 1986; Rowlands, 1990). 
Harman (1993a), Maddock (1993) and others argue that corporatisation 
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and dertgulation are part of an evolution that electricity utilities are 
undergoing and are generally precursors to privatisation. Not all agree, 
however, such as Dawkins (1986), Quiggin (1986), Kahn (1995) and Mallabone 
(1999) who argue against deregulating and selling off electricity utilities. They 
consider there needs to be a persist~nce of monopoly and continuing regulation, 
particularly in the local distribution networks and electricity transmission for 
three closely related reasons. First, to provide continuing protectton for 
residential and small business customers. Second, to ensure fair and efficient 
competition between utilities and others wishing to enter the market, including 
access to the utilities' monopolised or the partially monopolised infrastructure 
such as overhead lines and electricity substations. The third reason they 
advance in favour of retaining monopoly and regulation within the electricity 
supply industry is the safeguarding against cross subsidisation of competition 
by the incumbent utilities at the expense of their monopoly customers. That is, 
subsidi~ing markets which are subject to competition with profits from markets 
that have no competition (Dawkins, 1986; Kahn, 1995; Mallabone, 1999; 
Quiggin, 1986). Lee (1994) also argues that without some form of regulation 
asset transfer from monopoly government trading enterprises, such as in the 
case of privatisation, would result in a change from one monopoly supplier to 
another. In this situation neither cost or performance is likely to change very 
much (Lee, 1994). Finally, Beldotti (1998) views deregulation and 
corresponding increased competition from an envirorunental perspective and 
proposes that it could mean utilities spending less time and money on research 
and development resulting in increased air pollution due to a redur.ed 
commibnent to developing renewable energy resources, such as solar and wind 
power (Beldotti, 1998). 
Kahn (1995) expands further on the argument for continued regulation 
.Md states that it is not considered possible nor prudent to totally eradicate 
direct regulation of what has traditionally been considered authentic public 
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entities, such as electricity, gas and telephone seivices. Specifically, public 
utilities were to be restructured so as to ensure the separation of regulatory and 
commercial functions, the separation of nahlral monopoly and potentially 
competitive activities, lilld the separation of potentially competitive activities. 
Kahn's argument for the continuation of some form of regulation takes into 
account the capital investment costs of the incumbent utility companies, such as 
the construction of transmission and distribution lines substations, etc. These 
capital costs, lie claims, have been carried over into the competitive era, 
insufficiently depreciated on the books, but are what provides the utilities with 
the opportunity to earn a rehlm, e.g., charging a fee for private generators and 
retailers to transfer electricity from generation sources to custoners through the 
transmission and distribution lines. In addition, the existing utilities have been 
subject to continuing community seJVice obligations which are not borne by 
competitors. For electricity supply utilities, community seJVice obligations may 
include the provision of electricity to regional and underprivileged customers, 
uniform domestic tariffs across the network and the subsidisation of energy 
conservation programs, e.g., subsidies for solar hot water systems and 
fluorescent lighting. and the investment in more environmentally sustainable 
technologies, e.g., generation of electricity from solar and wind energy. Kahn 
claims a further problem occurs when government utilities have an obligation 
to serve as the providers of last resort to all customers, and to incur the cost, 
largely fixed, of fulfilling that responsibility. The introduction of competition, 
he claims, also offers electricity customers the opportunity to avoid those costs 
by shifting to other suppliers in order to take advantage of competitively priced 
power, while retaining the option of returning to the government utility and 
demanding seIVice without penalty. Kahn also believes that the government 
benefits from deregulation because it allows for realistic prices to !,e set in the 
market reducing the burden on taxpayers, and provides utility managers with 
sufficient profits to allow the utility to expand and meet the demands of 
customers (Kahn, 1995, 4). 
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3.3 MANAGEMENT REFORM WITHIN AUSTRALIA'S PUBLIC 
ELECTRICITY UTnITIES 
This section examines the literature underpinning the social and 
ideological considerations for corporalisation of Australia's state electricity 
supply utilities in so for as they influence the government reform agenda and 
impact on the day-to-day operations of managers. Corporatisation was seen as 
an important step in the introduction of competition and deregulation and it 
was intended that the utilities would introduce a managerialist approach to 
management and adopt business models which were more commercially 
orientated and competitive. 
3,3,1 Ownership and management performance 
Wiltshire (1987) and Sillanpaa (1997) consider the debate over the 
ownership of public electricity utilities and management perfonnance causes a 
dilemma for governments wishing to pursue the corporatisation path, and 
managers, who are expected to accede to the government's wishes, but may not 
fuJly understand or be convinced of the rationality for such change. However, 
governments must first convince their managers and voters that their 
methodology and timetable for public sectc.r reform will be in the best interests 
of the state (Sillanpaa, 1997; Wiltshire, 1987). Success in achieving this will 
ultimately pivot on the efficacy with whkh government, as owner, provides the 
necessary legislation and foundation for corporatisation and its intended 
influence over the running of the new business (Duncan & Bollard, 1992; 
Hyman, 1995). De Alessi (1~80) conducted research into the economics of 
government versus private ownership of electricity utilities, specifically the 
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economic principle of property rights. He found that managers of public 
electricity utilities have little incentive to seek wealth maximising tariff 
structures. Managers of private firms however, would seek to maximise output 
sales and hence income to the organisation and would therefore be more likely 
to increase charges, but only for selected customers. De Alessi found that 
because managers working in the public arena are more constrained in their 
operations they exhibit grea'er risk aversion than managers of private firms, 
leading to a slower response to changes in supply and demand conditions. 
There was a tendency for them to adopt a more uniform and more simple 
pricing regime, however, these tariffs rarely reflected the true cost of supply 
(De Alessi, 1980, 29). 
Harris (1991) argues that of the managers of public utilities should be 
more entrepreneurial and effective in their business dealings. Moreover, he 
considers that there could be a preference in some sectors for continuing public 
ownership, because of the potential for hiding the cost of bestowing favours on 
particular interest groups (Harris, 1991, 149). Dtu1can and BollarJ (1992) on the 
other hand, see this as normal and argue that politicians quite rationally use 
state enterprises to pursue political objectives which may conflict with staled 
efficiency objectives. However, Walker (1994) considers that intervention by 
government in Australia's public electricity utilities was not in accord with the 
prevailing climate of economic rationalism, deregulation and competition 
policy, which was a major factor in the push for their corporatisation. Walker 
contends that with corporatisat:ion traditional mechanisms of public 
accountability and reporting are significantly altered because the scope for 
ministerial direction and interference is narrowed when the government 
becomes a shareholder and managers would be required to run the utilities as 
successful businesses just like their private sector counterparts {Walker, 1994). 
Even so, a problem may arise when the objectives of owners and managers 
diverge and undue government influence in the runnll\g of the corporation may 
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give rise to disagreement between the Mirtlster and the CEO as to the direction 
it should take. Also, the information available to both of them may differ 
manifesting into distortions of strategic plans, reprioritisation of budgets and 
blurred key performance indicators (Duncan & Bollard, 1992; Maddock, 1993; 
Sanchis, 1997). Duncan & Bollard give an example of this conflict where the 
government's objectives may be for improved commercial performance from its 
electricity utility, while at the same time retaining community service 
obligations as part of the its social public duty. On the other hand, the CEO 
may wish to pursue a more user pays approach and push for full cost recovery 
and tariff increases placing himself or herself in direct conflict with the 
government's or owner's requirements. Duncan & Bollard contend that the 
traditional managers of the utility will ultimately have to adjust for this discord 
and accede to the owners requirements or the pressures for organisational 
change will see them marginalised from the mainstream management hierarchy 
(Duncan & Bollard, 1992). 
TI1ere is broad consensus in the literature that the role of engineers, as 
managers, is underpinned by the technical rationale taken as axiomatic that 
electrical engineers in public electricity supply utilities are required to not only 
design and build them, but more significantly, to manage them. Carter and 
Mueller (2002) consider that the changing role of managers resulting from 
corporatisation provides a dilemma for many senior and middle managers, 
some of whom are professional engineers first and managers second. TI1ey 
argue that the role of engineering-managers of government business has 
changed. The role of serving the shared or common interests of citizens, with 
little regard for cost, was being eroded and replaced by an economistic 
orientation to outcomes created by the do.minruice of economic rationalist and 
managerialist agendas. However, there is an expectation by the public that 
engineering values will remain dominant, and that the engineering profession 
will perform certain functions within an electricity supply utility as if still set in 
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a static, monopolistic environment of public ownership (Carter & Mueller, 2002, 
1329). This view is further legitimised through the arguments advanced by 
Simmons & Bramble (1996) and Walker & Walker (2000) and others who claim 
that the power industry was built on an engineering culture, where the chief 
executive officer, the executive, and senior and general management positions 
were all predominantly held by engineers who had progressed through the 
organisation. Many started as graduates and worked their way up through the 
business designing and constructing electricity supply systems, argued to be of 
very hlgh standard and reliability and often with little regard for cost. McLeod 
(1999) supports the claim that engineers have held the majority of management 
positions within the state electricity supply utilities. However, McLeod also 
argues that engineers do not necessarily make good managers. He reports that 
for many engineers advancement was typically based on seniority, mentoring 
and experience rather than leadership quality, competency and knowledge, 
resulting in the development of pocket cultures, elitism and a lack of real 
leadership (McLeod, 1999). 
As a result of corporatisation, utilities in NSW, WA, Tasmania, NT and 
Queensland have only one shareholder; the respective state governments who 
retained ownership of their electricity supply monopolies (Electricity Supply 
Association of Australia, 2002). When such a significant event occurs, the 
analytical focus of management performance is then upon where the decision-
making authority, and 'doing', lay within the organisation. Attention to public 
utility ownershlp and management refonn has focused on differences in 
incentives between public and private firms, arising from differences in the 
ability of the owners to monitor managers and to ensure that business 
objectives are met (Considine & Painter, 1997; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Duncan & Bollard, 1992). It is argued by Hilmer & Donaldson (1996) that good 
management prevails when managers are under the continual scrutiny of a 
tough-minded and independent executive which clearly demonstrates it is 
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acting in the owner's best interests (p.5). For corporatised utilities, it is the 
responsibility of the executive, acting on the owners behalf, to enter into a 
contractual relationship with senior and middle managers. In accordance with 
such contracts the managers undertake to perform various tasks on behalf of 
the executive and in exchange it agrees to reward them in mutually acceptable 
ways (Giddens, 1984, 28-30). Boston et al (1997) and Considine & Painter (1997) 
agree with this view, and further argue that ownership and management 
performance rests on the notion that social and political life can be understood 
as a series of contracts, or mutual obligations and agreed relationships, set out 
in writing, and becoming ... the framing discourse for public sector change 
(Considine & Painter, 1997, 216). They contend that individual contracts, 
administered to senior and middle managers within the newly corporatised 
utilities, is a technique to confirm the efficacy of managers' effort and 
accountability to the shareholders (Boston, 1987; Considine & Painter, 1997). 
Conversely, Lee (1994) considers the absence of dear ownership rights reduces 
incentives for the executive to monitor managerial performance and thereby 
ensuring cost minimisation and profit maximising. Also, this can result in the 
managers of the newly corporatised utilities not performing to their full 
potential due to the absence of realistic and achievable incentives. Lee claims 
the evidence shows that managers constantly encounter issues of under 
resourcing with capital and operating budget cuts, and expectations from the 
executive for them to do more with less (Lee, 1994, 11). 
In terms of rewarding managers for effort, Dunford, Bramble & Littler 
(1998) believe that owners can encourage managers to respond efficiently to 
market incentives, particularly where they receive a share in the profits or gain 
improved conditions, a luxury vehicle with private registration and so on. 
Managerial contracts, made available to selected senior and middle managers 
were seen by the executive of the newly corporatised utilities as a means of 
encouraging managerial excellence through a bonus scheme linked to key 
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performance indicators (KPI's). In tum these were linked to individual 
performance monitoring, an important process for comparing the managers' 
ongoing business unit results to corporate KPI's, such as, financial, commercial, 
and customer satisfaction and safely performance (Dunford et al., 1998). 
tntimately organisational performance and, hence success as a business, will 
depend largely upon the skills and commitment of the individual managers, 
senior management and executive and the degree of interaction between them 
as managers and the owners of the organisation. However, if U1e objectives set 
for the corporation are to be achieved, managers need to be given the flexibility 
to run their bllsiness units and freedom from political interference in making 
the necessary decisions. This means that greater emphasis needs to be placed 
on empowerment and accountability, which in tum requires clearly defined 
objectives and a means for measuring performance and the achievement of 
objectives (Dixon, 1995; Hilmer & Donaldson, 1996; Hilmer, 1993; Prowse, 1989; 
Rosenthal & Russ, 1988). This was the framework for the executive-
management contract and reward system adopted by all of Australia's 
corporatised utilities in the 1990's. 
Shirley (1999) researched the effects of ownership on performance, and 
the effectiveness of management contracts as a means of measuring and 
rewarding performance. She found U1at information problems impact on the 
effectiveness of management contracts, where owners and managers have 
different sets of information, and each can use their exclusive information to 
improve their position at the expense of the other. Also, because future events 
are unknown it is impossible to design a contract that will cover all 
eventualities. To alleviate such information problems, contracts usually include 
promises of rewards and penalties. However, without suitable incentives 
managers will not be strongly motivated to achieve performance targets, and 
penalties for poor performance such as firing or demotion were seldom applied 
(p.123). Shirley al:_·o found that managerial autonomy, reported to be important 
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for managers in the achievement of their targets, was promised but seldom 
delivered, forcing managers to use their knowledge of the firm to negotiate 
multiple soft targets that were easy for them to reach (Shirley, 1999, 125). This 
view is also shared by Stewart (1992) and Yeatman (1994) who claim that, 
without dear motivation and executive support, managers will see little reason 
for changing the status quo of their business units; to do so could result in role 
change and possible increased responsibility for little or no increase in utility 
(Stewart, 1992, 57;Yeatman, 1994). 
3.3.2 Government and managers as utility maximisers 
Leibenstein (1979), Sanchis (1997), McKenna (1999), and others, view 
managers as decision-making utility maximisers dominated by self-interest, 
who individually adjust their work behaviour and motivation in order to 
maximise their utility. They further claim that managers as individuals do not 
always act in the best interest of the owner, and activities undertaken to pursue 
utility maximisation may not minimise the costs incurred by the organisation 
e.g., increasing the number of staff reporting to them in order to justify a 
remuneration review based on increased responsibility (Leibenstein, 1979; 
McKenna, 1999; Sanc!tis, 1997). The nature of the utility managers seek to 
maximise is not clearly defined, however McKenna (1999) believes it may 
include financial, leisure and socialisation factors (p.165). Simmons & Bramble 
(1996), Sanchis (1997) and Shirley {1999) take tl1e utility maximisation debate 
further and argue that not only public managers, but bureaucrats and 
politicians will also pursue their own self interests rather than the public 
interesl; or the will of the population at large. For example, govenunent may 
choose to increase the likelihood of it being re-elected by approving budget 
increases to allow for increased staff numbers (to improve employment figures) 
and additional public works programs, such as building power stations in 
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marginal electorates. This may be undertaken regardless of cost and whether it 
is economically sensible. Painter {1998) agrees, and claims that in Australia 
corporate management has the political atlTaction as an instrument for asserting 
government and managerial power over public organisations, their employees 
and clients (p.2). It is achieved because of the limited information exchange 
between bureaucrats and taxpayers which inhibits public monitoring of 
spending, something that was common throughout Australia's electricity 
supply industry during the 1980's. 
3.3.3 Social responsibility 
An important literature theme to emerge during the early years of debate 
over reforming Australia's electricity supply utilities was the issue of socially 
responsible loss-making activities, and who would provide them if the utilities 
were to move out of government ownership. The social needs of the isolated, 
poor and underprivileged in Australian society have been addressed in reports 
to Federal and State Governments by Hilmer {1993), Carnegie (1993), McCarrey 
{1993), Harris {1991) and others. These reports show that within every 
community some individuals and groups are disadvantaged by physical or 
social factors including geographic remoteness, physical disability, gender, race, 
ethnicity and age. Equable access to the electricity supply, as opposed to 
quality and cost, is argued by Hess and Adams {1999) to be a matter of social 
responsibility. They maintain that citizens must be protected from natural 
disadvantage and one way of achieving this was through state intetvention and 
by imposing community service obligations on corporatised utilities (p.7). 
However, in examining the privatisation of the electricity supply industry in 
United States and Great Britain, Ernst (1993) and Alkhafaji {1993) have 
demonstrated that the private sector cannot generally afford to undertake 
socially responsible loss.making activities without an unacceptable increase in 
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prices. They found that social responsibility diminishes when state-owned 
enterprises are privatised. In a public enterprise however, loss-making 
activities can be supported depending upon the subsidies which the 
government is prepared to provide. Moreover, public enterprises are more able 
to fund socially responsible loss-making activities and provide services to 
underdeveloped areas than private enterprises, be.:ause gains and losses are 
more dispersed among the ultimate owners, i.e., the taxpayers (Alkhafoji, 1993; 
Ernst, 1993). 
In terms of undertaking and managing socially responsible loss-making 
activities, Simmons & Bramble (1996), Walker & Walker (2000) and Carter & 
Mueller (2002) have found that public utility managers, who are predominantly 
engineers, actually have no problem with the concept of social responsibility. 
Many joined the growing electricity utilities as engineers during the rapid 
growth period from the early 1950s to the mid 1980's. They predominantly 
focused on technical efficiency and the logistical considerations related to 
infrastructure such as power station, substation and line construction. TI1ere 
was little call for commercial business sense and costs were of little 
consideration as many of the activities they undertook were for political and 
social purposes, and would never return the cost of implementation. An 
example of this was the rural electrification extension scheme undertaken in tl1e 
1950s by all states of Australia as part of a decentralisation policy (Carter & 
Mueller, 2002; Simmons & Bramble, 1996; Walker & Walker, 2000). Lehmann 
(1997) found that even after the corporatisation of Western Power in 1995, there 
was strong belief among staff that the government should continue to subsidise 
its development in unprofitable rural and remote areas (Lehmann, 1997). 
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3.3.4 Stakeholder influence 
This section identifies the literature pertaining to stakeholders, (Vho they 
are, and what influence they have in the management and operation of the 
public-owned electricity supply industry. In reporting the various issues 
associated with the privatisation of utilities and the stakeholders associated 
with them in the UK, Wheeler & Sillanpaa (1997) define stakeholders as 
individuals and entities who may be affected by business and who may in Wm 
bring influence to bear upon it. They identify dii'ect stakeholders as investors, 
employees, customers, suppliers and local communities. Secondary 
stakeholders are identified as regulators, civic groups, pressure groups, 
commentators, trade bodies and competitors (Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997, x). 
These definitions are supported Keen and Sease (1998) and McKenna (2000) and 
provide a framework for describing the influence of stakeholders in the context 
of change in the electricity supply industry (ESAA, 1999). 
Felton & Harper (1998) hold a broad view of stakeholding. They include 
everyone who has a 'stake' in how the electricity s11pply is run. They consider 
major stakeholders in the electricity supply industry to include; 
o Customers: people and organi<;ations who use electricity and receive 
services from utilities in the industry. 
• Employees: everyone who is employed in the industry including utility 
employees, management and suppliers and their personnel. 
• Investors: individuals and financial institutions that have invested either 
equity or debt capital into the industry. Corporatisation is an example 
where the government is an investor, often as sole shareholder; and 
• Regulators: this category includes the general public, future generations and 
Clther regulating bodies set up by government to oversee the operations of 
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the electricity supply industry in tenns of monitoring prices and the quality 
' 
and reliability of supply (Felton & Harper, 1998a, 2). 
Cullum (1997) looks at the concept of stakeholding and examines the 
various definitions advanced by its supporters. In particular, he considers 
whether consumers of electrical energy and the regulator are indeed 
stakeholders and whether a stakeholder analysis is even in the interests of 
consumers. Cullum views stakeholding as an increasingly important but 
complex political concept and claims that the primary duty of the electricity 
supply industry regulator is not necessarily to protect consumers, as Felton and 
Harper, Wheeler and Sillanpaa, and others suggest, but instead to ensure that 
reasonable demand is met, to ensure that companies make enough money and 
~ promote competition (Cullum, 1997). However, in the normally accepted 
view, (Felton & Harper, 1998a; Keen & Sease, 1998; McKenna, 1999; V&eeler & 
Sillanpaa, 1997), and the one adopted for this study, the regulator and 
consumers are viewed as key stakeholders of the public utility. In the 
Australian context, Stace & Dunphy (2001) refer to the regulator and consumers 
as political and community stakeholders respectively and argue that both have 
considerable influence in the decision-making p;ocess within public utilities. 
Stace and Dunphy claim that public managers are account.able for managing 
expectations of political and community stakeholders and such stakeholders are 
equally, if not more, demanding of management performance. This often leads 
to higher rates of management turnover if stakeholder requirements are not 
anticipated or met (p.2-4). For political stakeholders such as the regulator, 
influence may be in the form of inspections and reports of the utilities' 
operations for compliance with appropriate electricity supply regulations, the 
meeting of power quality requirements, etc. Such reports are made to 
parliament via the appropriate minister and if unfavourable can attract 
unwanted minisl'erial scrutiny of the utility, and possible intervention. 
Consumers have influence over management decisions through appeals to the 
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ombudsman and the minister, who may direct the managers to undertake 
programs which the managers may consider are unnecessary or undesirable. 
Like Stace and Dunphy, Considine & Painter (1997) also recognise the influence 
stakeholders have over public sector managers in Australia in tenns of impact 
on decision-making and the formulation of stTategic plans within government 
owned corporations. They consider that all public sector managers are 
empowered by their stakeholders, i.e., the voting public, to use the legitimate 
authority of the state as well as public money in order to carry out their tasks. 
Success will depend upon strategies the managers adopt to carry out their tasks 
and how well they maximise the benefits for the public while minimising 
cost:s.(p.161). 
In describing what they believe the sustainable corporation in AustTalia 
should look like, Dunphy & Griffiths (1998) extended the stakeholder concept 
adopted by Wheeler & Sillanpaa (1997), Felton & Harper (1997), Keen & Sease 
{1998) and others, to include employees and their representatives. Dunphy & 
Griffith view industrial democracy and worker partidpation as an attempt to 
define how workers' stake in the organisation should be recognised. Central to 
this tenet is that managers must take into account the interests of employees 
and their representative unions when preparing their business strategies. To 
support their argument Dunphy & Griffiths draw ,, parallel between 
shareholders investing capital into the firm while workforce members are 
investing their lives. Dunphy Griffiths also agree with the views of Wheeler & 
Sillanpaa (1997), Felton & Harper (1997), Keen & Sease (1998) and others Uiat 
the concept of stakeholders has been extended in recent years to other key 
groups with an interest in the firm's future, such as regulators, investors, 
consumers and suppliers. Finally, like Felton & Harper (1997) Dunphy and 
Griffiths consider that future generatioru; should be added to the list of 
stakeholders so that strategic decisions by managers are evaluated in terms of 
potential effect on the lives of succeeding generations (Dunphy & Griffiths, 
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1998, 197). 
3.3.5 Outsourcing and contracting out 
Like their counterparts in Great Britain, New Zealand, America and 
numerous other countries around the world, the corporatisation of Australia's 
electricity supply utilities in the 1990's has bought with it significant 
restructuring and change within the engineering community for both the 
utilities and private enterprise. The utilities are down sizing their engineering 
departments and outsourcing traditional services such as engineering design, 
plant maintenance and construction works in an effort to contain costs, improve 
efficiency and reduce union influence in employee matters. Outsourcing 
includes the contracting out of specialised work traditionally done within the 
organisation and usually involves work being done by people for organisations 
other than the producing unit. For example the fabrication of purpose-built test 
equipment and electrical fittings, and maintenance activities which were mostly 
unavailable, outside the organisation because of their specialisation. 
Corporatisation and outsourcing are considered by Considine & Painter (1997) 
and Dunford et al (1998) to be the common policy instruments used by 
government to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness of 
government agencies to their clients and customers. Both are aimed at reducing 
government expenditure and improving managers' accountability through 
tighter performance specifications and greater use of contracting out. 
Outsourcing is favoured because of a belief that private enterprises is more 
innovative and productive, and provides higher levels of customer service than 
public enterprise. Further, outsourcing WOl'k is seen as a method of 
accomplishing the objectives of government while at the same time supporting 
structural and management reform such as corporatisation. (Considine & 
Painter, 1997, 10; Dunford et al., 1998). Other arguments in favour of 
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outsourcing include those of Reid (1994), Shepherdson (1996), Mcleod (1999), 
and others, who believe that outsourcing is primarily driven by cost 
considerations and shifting production to non-union sites in order to 
substantially increase employer bargaining power when negotiating with 
unions. Prior to corporatisation, unions enjoyed a wide coverage within the 
electrical supply industry and had the strength and ability to use the political 
system to secure significant bJ.rgaining power when negotiating awards. Cost 
reductions were to come from the savings to be made from reduced wage 
demands by unions and the more effective use of staff who would be freed up 
to concentrate on core activities within the utilities, e.g., project design and 
management and network operations such as switching and fault investigation 
(McLeod, 1999; Reid, 1994; Shepherdson, 1996). Finally, the increase in 
outsourcing activity from Australia's public utilities has meant an increase in 
business for external companies that now provide their services to U1e utilities. 
Hyman (1995), Miller (1996), Walker & Walker (2000), and others, note that 
outsourcing is changing the nature of the electricity supply business in tenns of 
size, structure and method of operation and is creating a significant challenge 
for most Australian utilities. Outsourcing now accounts for a significant 
number of what were previously core activities and reflects the ongoing 
structural changes taking place, such as the move to smaller engineering 
departments and fewer engineering staff in favour of using external service 
providers (Hyman, 1995; Miller, 1996; Walker & Walker, 2000, 145). 
Some scholars and observers of the electricity supply industry have 
shown that there is a 'downside' to outsourcing. For example, Paddon (1991) 
challenges the idea that effective internal organisational change within 
government trading enterprises can be achieved through competitive tendering 
or contracting out. Paddon claims that missing from the outsourcing debate is 
an assessment of its impact on the role of the manager in terms of increased 
responsibilities, and of the effectiveness of outsourcing in terms of quality of 
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service and control and accountability of the contractor (Pad don, 1991). Hess & 
Adams (1999) also believe that there is a strong focus today on contestability, 
i.e., work that was formally done exclusively by the utilities is now put out to 
tender in order to allow external parties to compete against the utilities' 
workforce. They consider that outsourcing in the reforming of public 
monopolies is de-emphasising cost efficiency which may lead to the quality of 
outsourced services being overlooked. TI1ey argue in favour of a more balanced 
approach to con testability and contracting out to ensure quality service delivery 
(Hess & Adams, 1999). Others urging caution in the use of outsourcing include 
Norton (1999) and McLeod (1999) who claim there are both advantages and 
disadvantages with the contracting out services traditionally done in-house. In 
terms of disadvantages, they consider that the practice represents a serious 
problem for managers in electricity utilities, particularly in the engineering 
design and planning sections which rely heavily on engineering and technical 
expertise, these skills can be lost penuanently to tl1e utility. For example, many 
engineers and key technical staff leave the organisation tl1rough natural 
attrition or redundancy, while others leave to join the contractors for higher 
salaries and (sometimes) better conditions. The resultant vacancies are mostly 
left unfilled, satisfying executive demands for staff reductions. However, 
because of reduced recruitment and little consideration for succession planning 
the skills and expertise leave tl1e organisation with the employee. This loss of 
specialist staff such as engineers and designers makes it difficult for the utility 
to keep up with new and emerging technology and puts it at the mercy of what 
is offered by contractors. Managers are faced with the dilemma of making do 
with less staff and must deal with the detrimental impact on their remaining 
staff of employee reductions. Due to the increasing number of contractors, 
managers also find their role includes contracts and contractor management 
with the accompanying problems of job ownership. In terms of advantages 
with outsourcing, both Norton and Mcleod believe that outsourcing provides 
utilities with the flexibility necessary to remain competitive and provide 
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employment security to remaining employees. Outsourcing also provides the 
opportunity to use scarce resources more effectively. For example, outsourcing 
low value-added work, such as vegetation management and pole maintenance. 
This frees up staff within the utility and enables them to concentrate on high-
value added work such as customer funded projects where the customer pays 
the utility to provide a service, e.g., cable jointing and specialist electrical testing 
(McLeod, 1999; Norton, 1999). 
3.3.6 Financial perfonname 
The resources boom from the late seventies through to the early eighties 
saw most of Australia's electricity utilities faced with soaring capital and 
operating costs brought about by the need to expand the electricity grid in 
order to supply rapidly increasing demand. Capital investment was large as 
the utilities' borrowed to finance the building of power stations, substations 
and transmission lines. According to Rosenthal and Russ (1988) during the 
1980's electricity supply utilities attempted to finance these capital works 
through revenue from tariffs using a range of pricing methods, even though 
economists cannot agree which pricing method is the best. Rosenthal & Russ 
consider the problem lies in the conflicting social and economic objectives that 
governments and utilities face when setting electricity price levels and where 
consideration of social objectives leads to unprofitable low pricing for the 
needy. Any shortfalls in revenue were covered through borrowings on 
domestic and offshore markets for capital expansion. Furthermore, 
governments prefer utilities to pay for infrastructure and expansion through 
borrowings rather than through price increases, despite high interest rates. This 
meant that some utilities plunged deeper into debt by borrowing to cover 
interest payments on loans for projects still under construction. Federal and 
state governments saw these rising debts as part of a national trend 
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contributing to Australia's worsening exchange rate and, as a consequence, calls 
from both the public and private sector for new pricing and financing policies 
intensified throughout the mid to late eighties (Rosenthal & Russ, 1988). 
The traditional guidelines for utility pricing methods has been tl1at 
government bodies are non-profit making therefore their primary function is to 
provide the best service at the lowest cost. However, inextricably linked to the 
financial performance of the newly corporalised utilities is the emergence of 
competition and deregulation where new financial strategies will require dose 
assessment of assets, systems and activities controlled by the utility. Hyman 
(1995) in reviewing the reasons why utilities are privatised claims that that the 
move towards competition changes the foundation principle upon which the 
financial structure of the monopoly electricity industry has been built (p.38). In 
a regulated monopoly situation the product is priced to recover the cost of 
producing it and any financial costs. In a competitive market however, the 
product price is not related to its cost, thus, the recovery of financial costs are 
not assured. Therefore, claims Hyman, electricity supply utilities must 
increasingly position themselves to reduce prices and capture a greater market 
share (p.203). However, if this was to be achieved while the utilities remained 
in government hands, i.e., without privatisation, they would need to be 
restructured in order to provide better financial management and greater use of 
technology (p.219). Further, traditional approaches to planning. staffing and 
supplier relationships (p.215) wi!l have to be redesigned as the organisation can 
no longer be viewed as a business process focusing on customers' needs alone, 
but must devote more resources to improving its competitiveness and valuing 
more highly financial management skills such as budgeting. pricing strategy, 
cost accounting and cash management (p.214). Finally, Hyman believes there is 
an expectation by government for a greater rehlm on earnings, so growth in 
shareholder value will be a key element for financial success in an increasingly 
competitive marketplace. To achieve this, new focus would be placed on profit 
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margins and market share requiring a new financial business culture, new 
accounting concepts and new measures of financial success (p.216). However, 
shareholder value need not increase through cost reduction alone. According 
to Hyman, not only must managers get the most out of core business activities, 
but they must also develop, unregulated income streams (Hyman, 1995, 216). 
Beer, Eisenstat and Spector {1994) reported key changes undertaken 
through the late eighties and early nineties by corporatised utilities in the 
United States in order to improve financial performance and organisational 
efficiency. Beer et al claim that there are problems associated with only 
defining success in terms of improvement in financial performance with little 
regard for organisational efficiency. They contend that corporate financial 
performance can be influenced by many situational factors including market 
share, customer satisfaction, cost-cutting initiatives, financial strength and past 
investment decisions. Business success is a measure of U1e quality of decisions, 
managerial competence and underlying co!"porate culture. Beer et al believe 
that sow1d financial performance involves enhancing the contributions and 
abilities of managers and workers at all levels of the organisation and possibly 
redefining the corporate culture. 'Ihis involves reducing the exclusive reliance 
on managerial auU10rity, rules, procedures and introducing teamwork. Such 
changes result in a flatter, less hierarchical and more flexible organisation, more 
suited to taking the initiative in reducing costs, improving quality and 
responding to customer needs (Beer et al., 1994). 
With regard to financial measurement, conventional methods of financial 
analysis often shed little light on the overall efficiency of an organisation 
(Walker & Walker 2000). Such methods are often undertaken with a specific 
agenda for example, to support arguments for the downsizing or outsourcing of 
unprofitable business units. Walker & Walker claim that governments, in 
reviewing the efficiencies of their electricity utilities, have pushed for 
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corporatisation on the basis of past inefficiencies and poor financial 
performance. One way to avoid such misinterpretations is to focus on the 
contributions made by business units towards the recovery of overheads and 
hence profits (Walker & Walker, 2000). 
3.3.7 Strategic planning 
Strategic planning places systematically planned change on the agenda 
of boards of management and senior executive teams report Dunphy and 
Griffiths (1998). Strategic planning also encourages managers to recognise that 
the environments in which their business units work are dynamic and, if goals 
and objectives are to be met, the managers must confront and adapt to changes 
in the surrounding environment. Further, strategic planning should also be 
market-driven and managers should encourage employees to participate and 
think like business owners. Finally, Dunphy Griffith consider that corporate 
success depends largely on the effectiveness of the strategic planning process 
and on the ability of managers to manage the interests of an increasingly wide 
range of stakeholders while ensuring the corporation demonstrates an 
environment.al conscience and acts responsibly in the community (Dunphy & 
Griffiths, 1998). 
Maddock (1993), Dunford Bramble & Littler (1998) and others report that 
corporate strategic planning was adopted by Australia's state utilities from the 
early 1990's as a means to coordinate the efforts of their newly corporatised 
utilities. Corporate plans were introduced to set out senior management's 
vision for the firm lllduding its mission statement, values, competitive 
advantages and strategic issues. Typically, strategic plans are linked to a 
number of critical success factors or strategic result areas (SRA's). In the 
electricity supply industry these llldude safety; reliability of supply; employee 
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issues; customer service and customer satisfaction; productivity; financial 
performance such as budgets, marketing and sales; and corporate image. 
Progress towards these goals is to be assessed on a quarterly basis relative to set 
targets. Linked to the SRA's are related key result areas (KRA's) which 
underpin performance agreements between the various state governments and 
the executive, and between the executive and senior managers within the state-
owned utilities. Performance agreements between managers, senior 
management and the executive are used as a key mechanism for driving the 
implementation of the overall reform strategies, adopted by each state 
government. The KRA's are also used as indicators for adjustments to the 
position and remuneration of the executive and senior managers within the 
utilities (Dunford et al., 1998; Maddock, 1993; Pitkethly, 1992; Simmons & 
Bramble, 1996). 
3.3.8 Customer focus 
Customers behave according to the principles of freedom of choice: all 
the customer needs to make these choices is freely available, accurate 
information and fuU access to markets where there are diverse, competing 
suppliers and an absence of monopolistic behaviour (Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997, 
p240). In reforming their utilities, govemmei,ts have looked to customer focus, 
or focusing on customers' needs and satisfying those needs as an important part 
of commercialisation. Howard (1994) also reports that the case for 
commercialisation is being increasingly widened from one of cost efficiency 
within public utilities to customer focus and quality of service. Thus, 
governments are attempting to develop indicators of quality of service and 
customer responsiveness and publish data on these indicators in order to show 
commercialisation in a positive light (Howard, 1994). 
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Hyman (1995) views customer focus as an important part of eleclricity 
deregulation and industry restructuring. He observes that competition in the 
retail market has seen many small eleclricity producers entering the market and 
taking business that would have normally gone to the incumbent utility. 
Hyman considers that, in order to flourish some of the existing utilities will 
have to embark on product leadership strategies in order to address more 
customers' needs and to create new markets. As a result, these utilities may 
offer packages to homes and businesses that include other services such as 
telephone, cable television and Internet and possibly gas and water. In order to 
accommodate customer focus, significant change must first occur within the 
organisation such as, specialised case teams and account managers, who will 
require new job descriptions; new management systems that include 
recognition and reward; and information technology for managing the 
customers' total package and relationship with the utility (Hyman, 1995). Stace 
and Dunphy (2001) however, urge caution with what they term to be ... 11 firm's 
preoccupation witli customer needs (p.56) when customers often don't even know 
what they need. For example, this 'preoccupation' with customer focus could 
lead to under-performance in other areas of strategic importance within the 
organisation. Stace & Dunphy extend this argument to include internal 
customers, i.e., people from one branch performing work for people in other 
branches within the same organisation, which Stace and Dunphy claim often 
leads to confusion and may detract from the long-term success of the firm 
(Stac,: '· •mphy, 2001). 
3.3.9 Culture change 
Corporate culture underlies much of the way in which things get done in 
the organisation. It can be expressed through its myths, heroes, stories, jargon, 
rights and rituals and it encompasses the company's goals and dominant 
125 
ideologies in the environment in which the organisation must do business 
(DeMarie & Keats, 1995). Corporate culture is also described as a common 
perception of dominant values within an organisation which includes 
motivation, teamwork, unambiguous corporate goals, and performance 
management systems. She stresses the importance of changing the corporate 
culture of electricity supply corporations in order for them to achieve 
competitive advantage in a deregulated market {Petrovic-Lazarevic, 1999, 3). 
Corporate culture, claims Elliott (1999), must recognise employees as 
individuals if the workplace is to be 'soulful' and the work meaningful to 
employees. Elliott considers that corporate strategies which impact on the 
organisation's culture must recognise that human spirit cannot be completely 
confined within the boundaries of explanation, measurement and outcomes, 
there must be a balance between the economic aspects of business and the 
human aspects (p.20). However, frequently the pressures of meeting 
productivity outcomes invariably means that any notions of making work more 
meaningful for employees seems idealistic and unworkable. In fact, policies 
such as down sizing and cost-cutting. if not part of a wider and long-term 
strategic re-orientation, often lead to unworkable cultures in which trust levels 
are severely eroded and resources are stretched to the limit (Elliott, 1999, 21). 
Organisational restructuring and adjustments to staff numbers are considered 
by Williams, Dobson & Walters (1993) to be import.ant strategies to enable 
organisations to adapt to changes in their internal and external business 
envirorunents. However, they caution that the methods by which restructuring 
and downsizing are applied will directly impact on organisational culture. A 
positive impact, where change is accepted and business improvements 
identified, would result from a process of clear communication and willing 
participation by all employees (Williams, Dobson, & Walters, 1993, 71). 
Changing an organisation's culture is one thing. but getting managers to accept 
the change can be difficult reports Waddell (1998) who claims that managers 
are not universally open to change, even in the context of significant 
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environmental adjustment and will often resist change unless they are 
convinced of the need for it (Waddell & Sohfil, 1998). Geletkanycz (1997) 
studied corporate executives in twenty countries and found that executives 
often develop a strong attachment to the status quo. He believes many develop 
a strong personal attachment to existing policies and profiles, particularly those 
who have long tenure with the organisation. This, Geletkanycz argues, 
effectively impedes culture change in organisational strategy and the systems 
and practices supporting it (Geletkanycz, 1997, 619). 
It is argued by Simmons & Bramble {1996) that government activities in 
the Australian electricity industry, such as the generation and supply of 
electricity, have been successful in the past due to their cultures being bound to 
the need to minimise risk, operate efficiently and deliver a public service. Now, 
the electricity supply utilities have been influenced by the rise of managerialism 
and subsequent corporatisation, and an agenda of management reform which 
requires a different set of values or culture with strong commercial focus 
concentrating on customer service, business excellence and innovation {p.225). 
Simmons & Bramble claim that this managerialist approach has seen successive 
governments move away from a welfare culture, characterised by state 
provision of welfare services, to an enterprise culture, a reliance on the free 
market to provide goods and services which consumers demand, and are 
prepared to pay for. They further believe that the cultural change programs 
which accompanied corporatisation were initiated within the whole of 
Australia's state electricity supply industry as part of the broad management 
reform agenda. Simmons & Bramble found that a key theme of these cultural 
change programs was an attempt by state governments to change the culture of 
their organisations from one driven by engineers and production to one 
focusing on customers and marketing (Simmons & Bramble, 1996). Similarly, 
according to Riley (1998), there is a need to change the business orientation and 
hence the culture of senior and middle managers in Australia's state utilities. 
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Titls includes encouraging them to have a more direct influence on the way that 
their business units meet the new challenges of the industry, for example, by 
identifying ways to add value to customers' requirements and by implementing 
a range of new service concepts (p.21). At management levels, Riley found the 
common themes driving culture change were the need for sound commercial 
and business knowledge and a management style that provides a clear sense of 
direction, sets challenging but realistic standards, and seeks to improve staff 
capabilities for the longer term. However, these are difficult to inculcate in an 
industry with a strong public service tradition. Managers, for example, respond 
to the predictable components of corporatisation, e.g., increased accountability 
and greater efficiency for their business units, but the impact of discontinuous 
and transformational change such as regular organisational structural reviews 
and restructuring, take most by surprise (Riley, 1998, 23). 
Stace and Dunphy (2001) have observed that with the restructuring of 
Australia's electricity supply utilities, a board of directors is superimposed on a 
hierarchical management structure. Therefore, in order that structural 
repositioning and structural change be effective .. it must be reinforced by 
cultural change. Stace & Dunphy maintained that structure provides the key 
working and power relationships hi the organisation, whereas culture defines 
the key values that support those relationships. Such culture change programs 
need to align the behaviour of managers with U,e interests of the owners 
(taxpayers), represented by the respective state government minister. Several 
private sector measures were also introduced, which included full cost recovery 
or services provided to customers, asset and risk management, and 
procurement and cash management practices. Stace and Dunphy note that 
much of the private sector measures adopted by the newly corporatised utilities 
actually came from management consultants employed by individual business 
units, and the adoption of these new measures called for a culture shift in the 
way the organisations were managed. The public sector style of management 
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was no longer considered appropriate. Faced with the new challenges of 
managing a corporation, managers were empowered to act and be accountable 
for their actions; they also realised that they had to experiment, be innovative 
and take risks if they are to create a sustainable future for their organisations 
(Stuce & Dunphy, 2001). 
Other key components of culture change programs associated with 
restructuring and corporatisation of Australia's electricity utilities were an 
increased emphasis on workforce training and the implementation of teamwork 
and benchmarking. These change programs were driven by the philosophies of 
total quality management (TQM) which sought continuous improvement in all 
processes, products and services, with an emphasis on the importance of 
measurement (Hill & Hutton, 1997; Simmons & Bramble, 1996; Stace & Dunphy, 
1997). The TQM system requires an understanding of the role of the customer 
and the supplier, it recognises that management plays a key role here and 
emphasises the necessity for the involvement of employees at all levels (Stace & 
Dunphy, 1997). The benefits of TQM are argued to be increased productivity 
and quality of senrice, however, the proactive identification and exploitation of 
business opporL,mities has also resulted in significant increases in 
accountability and responsibility for middle and senior managers (Fisher, 1990; 
Graham, 1992; Jones, 1998; Simmons & Bramble, 1996; Stace & Dunphy, 1997; 
Stein, Ruzek, & Wallage, 1991). Not all agree that the culture change 
underpinned by TQM was successful Hoggett (1994) for example argues that 
attempts by senior management to shape the culture of public organisations 
were a characteristic of the late 1980's and have generally failed, TEiilaining 
largely as ... symbolic aud rhetorical nrtift1cts (p.19) towards which the majority of 
staff are highly cynical. In fact, even attempts to shift public organisation 
culture by persuasion such as training and empowerment appears to have 
failed (p.19). In fact, Haggett believes that it is the U\troduction of competition 
which is responsible for the major change in the way in which public sector 
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managers and workers behave. Competition, is therefore a powerful practice 
which forces public service organisations to accept the new values of public 
enterprise in which workers and managers are subject to the progressive 
intensification of labour, i.e., doing more work with less people (Hoggett, 1994, 
19). 
Executives of Australia's public electricity utilities who were charged 
with the responsibility of corporatising their organisations knew what they had 
to do but saw difficulties in how to achieve the necessary changes, often 
because they lacked the skills and confidence to undertake high-risk activities 
such as earning unregulated income by tendering for work outside the 
organisation and in some cases overseas (Stace & Dunphy, 1997, 2-4). 
GeletkMycs (1997) «p~ds on this ~a claims that m~ag,ra in high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures such as those working in the public sector, 
where there is no reward, only sanctions for undertaking risk, tend to feel 
uncomfortable dealing with uncertainty. As a result, they lean towards greater 
structure, dear rules, and standardised operating procedures, i.e., they don't 
change from a previous role-directed work environment. By contrast, 
managers from low uncertainty avoidance cultures, where there is a culture of 
tolerance to risk and risk-taking is often encouraged, are more comfortable with 
instability and are more open to experimentation with new untested initiatives 
and are a.lea more likely to engage in greater entrepreneurial activity 
(Geletkanycz, 1997). Pitkethly (1992) claims that prior to the corporatisation of 
Australia's public electricity utilities government ownership precluded many 
commercial disciplines and risk-taking activities such as partnerships with 
other businesses to generate electricity and build transmission lines. Pitkethly 
considers that as long as the rewards and incentives for public sector managers 
to apply efficient management techniques are smaller than the private sector, 
they will continue with a culture of 'uncertainty avoidance'. That is, poor 
public sector incentives will continue to encourage a management culture that 
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is geared towards insuring against failure. For example, in the past this has 
been manifest in the public electricity supply industry through excessive power 
station construction and the adoption of engineering standards that provide for 
higher levels of reliability than would be applied in the private sector 
(Pitkethly, 1992, 18). 
3.4 ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE FOR MANAGERS WITHIN 
AUSTRALIA'S PUBLIC ELECTRICITY UTILITIES 
This reviews the literature pertaining to the micro level refonns 
undertaken by the newly formed corporations in an attempt to transform 
management thinking and performance from public sector style management to 
the new managetia1ist style of management. It is divided into three subsections 
which reviews the literature about the changing roles of managers, their q11ality 
of working life as a result of corporatisation and other management changes 
and the benefits that managers get from such changes. 
3.4.1 Role change 
In describing the change methodologies used in Australia by the 
executives of the newly formed corporations from the mid eighties through to 
the mid nineties, Stace & Dunphy (1997) report on managers' responsibilities 
for implementing co!'porate change, such as total quality management (TQM), 
best practice or benchmarking, training needs analysis and horizontal 
organisation restructuring. In some of their earlier literature, Dunphy and Stace 
(199.:C) claim the creation of flatter organisational structures was achieved by 
stripping away several layers of management to lessen the communication 
distance between top management and the organisation's frontline employees. 
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Additionally organisational reform introduced a radical devolution of authority 
and accountability through the development of profit accountable strategic 
business units and project style operations. Managers who once concentrated 
their attention predominantly on the technical and production process and 
largely left personnel matters to others now found they were expected to be 
accountable for both results and people (Dunphy & Stace, 1994, 47). Beer, 
Eisenstat and Spector (1994) reported similar findings from a review of recently 
corporatised utilities in United States. For example, when electricity utilities are 
corporatised, the roles of managers are transformed as they are put under 
pressure to ;i.dopt a more commercial style of management. There is a 
significant shift away from dedicated hurr,an resource professionals to a greater 
onus being placed upon managers to attend to recruitment and selection, 
performance management, training and the career development of employees. 
However, Beer et al also report that without suitable preparation and training, 
many managers find it difficult to adjust to their new roles and for them it is 
'business as usual' (Beer et al., 1994). For even with the significant restructuring 
that follows corporatisation, most the original engineering-based managers are 
reappointed in the positions they held prior to restructuring. Thus, a'l Simmons 
& Bramble (1996) also point out, while corporatisation brings the significant 
structural changes that both business and the government want, because of the 
reappointment of the original incumbents, the utilities can fail to significantly 
alter the predominance of engineers in management roles {p.220). 
In a later work Stace & Dunphy (1997) report that managers can now be 
required to deal with structural change, continuous improvement or radical 
transformation, and empowerment or leadership and comnmnd (p.6). ln order 
to cope with these changes, managers must be flexible in their behaviour, to mix 
'soft and hard' approaches in their leadership style to meet changing situational 
conditions, and not be intransigent with regard to change (Stace & Dunphy, 
1997, 6). Hyman (1995) holds the view that managers are the only unifying 
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force that cnn institute the changes necessary to transform a government-owned 
regulated monopoly into a competitive organisation. He argues it is managers 
who form the human side of the organisation and it is their people and 
leadership skills along with their business knowledge that will determine the 
success or failure of such a transition. Moreover, the success or failure of such 
change has Jess to do with operating systems, cost control, regulatory reforms 
and customer setvice, and more to do with the outcomes of business 
understanding, good decision-making, accountability and a willingness to 
champion change (Hyman, 1995, 216). This view is supported by Riley (1998) 
who argues that organisational success requires the effective alignment of 
... people capability (p.21) with new business imperatives. This is a deliberate 
recognition that business strategy is achieved by people who are effectively 
managed, it includes managers at all levels of the organisation from the 
executive, who are managed by the Minister or CEO, senior managers, who are 
managed by the executive, and so on down through the various levels of 
management to the front-line managers (Riley, 1998, 21). In summaty, both 
Hyman and Riley consider an early and thorough understanding by managers 
of their role along with appropriate strategies and informed employees are 
necessary ingredients of a successful and competitive electricity business 
(Hyman, 1995; Riley, 1998). 
With corporatisation in Australia's public electricity supply utilities, 
therefore, came a shift in the way organisations were being managed (Dunford 
et al., 1998). Managers were more accountable for their business unit's 
performance and, as a consequence, found themselves employed under 
contracts linked to performance targets upon which salaty reviews depended. 
Further, they were now empowered leaders, expected to make decisions and be 
accountable for them. In their new role they were also required to provide 
appropriate resources through procurement recruitment and training to 
improve productivity and the profitability of their business units (Dunford et 
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al., 1998). Painter (1988) considers that performance targets linked to the output 
and productivity of a business lllllt actually dispenses with the need for 
detailed control of staff and financial input. Thus, performance monitoring in 
modem public management devolves responsibility and accountability to 
managers, and encourages initiative and entrepreneurialism (Painter, 1988, 1). 
There is common agreement in the literature among many management writers 
such as Smith, Barnard & Smith (1988), Beer, Eisenstat & Spector (1994) and 
Considine & Painter (1997) who collectively claim that devolving responsibility 
and incorporating reporting systems such as budget reviews makes managers 
more accountable for their actions. The accountability debate is taken further 
by Painter (1988) who claims the budget process itself stTOngly conforms to an 
output format and is therefore a major management tool for imposing control. 
Thus, ... ratlter tlum rewarding managers for rnle co11for111itiJ, errar avoidance mid 
11ttenfio11 lo detail, it (the organisation) rewards tl:em for achieving output targets and 
pmiishes tltem for mrrier performance (p.1). Lawler and Heam (1995) add that the 
rise of managerialism has seen an increased emphasis on intervention costs 
such as closer scrutiny of capital project proposals, and a concern with cost 
effectiveness on a greater scale than previously (p.8). In this way they claim 
that ... 111a1111gerialism /ms promoted the values of mamigement above those of 
professio1mlis111 (p.8). In swnmary, the introduction of managerialism as an 
ideology underpinning management reform into Australia's electricity supply 
utilities provided a catalyst for significant changes to managers' roles. This has 
resulted in their performance and decisions being more closely scrutinised than 
prior to the introduction of managerialism. 
As the technological base of organisations became increasingly 
sophisticated, the nature of the administrative task also changed. Managers' 
roles changed from the administration of rules to introducing and managing 
technological change. In their review of the performance of Australia's public 
utilities, Walker & Walker (2000) found that managers play a vital role in the 
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introduction of new technology and their promotion was increasingly based on 
expertise in this area. Walker & Walker contend that the introduction of new 
technology actually secured the organisational change and major productivity 
gainE. within the electricity supply industry. For example, major investments in 
technology enabled the automation of many labour intensive functions 
contributing to significant cost reduction (Walker & Walker, 2000). 
Much research has been undertaken to determine how managers go 
about their work, but little is known about what managers actually do when 
canying out their designated roles. Some researchers such as Mintz berg {1973), 
Hales (1986), Fondas & Stewart (1994) and Brehony (2002) have related their 
findings to a theoretical standard and sought to show how dramatically 
managerial practice differs from management theory. For Machin (1982) and 
Stewart (1982) this forms part of a wider investigation of managerial jobs within 
the framework of demands, constraints and choices, that is, what managers 
must do, what they cannot do and what they may exercise choice or discretion 
over. Machin's expectations approach examines the relationship between tl1e 
actual and perceived expectations of managers in terms of what each manager 
expects of others in an organisation and what they perceive others expect of 
them. While Stewart's work has concentrated upon the choice inherit in 
managerial jobs and the resulting discretionary variation in what managers do, 
her major investigation has been of the demands made upon individual 
managers. Stewart however, does not investigate the origins of demands, but 
simply treats them as inherent characteristics of jobs (Machin, 1982; Stewart, 
1982). Hales and Nightingale (1986) contend that both Machin's and Stewart's 
research is a reasonable argument for investigating the nature of and variation 
in managerial jobs, as given to and perceived by individual job incumbents. 
However, they claim it leaves unexamined tl1e possibility of a discrepancy 
between the demands which managers perceive as being made upon tl1em by 
their jobs and the actual demands made upon them, not by their jobs, but by 
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other members of the organisation (p.5). 
Hales and Nightingale conducted qualitative and quantitative research 
into the organisational circumstances that define what managers in the UK are 
supposed to do. They found that the whole job of the manager is much more 
than the assigned roles and that different role requirements competed for 
available resources. Managers were also expected to control costs on the one 
hand while maintaining standards and quality on the other. In addition to 
these conflicts over time and resources, role requirements of the manager were 
found to conflict in terms of the types of role activity and the skill needed by the 
manager. Managers were also required high levels of analytical, numeracy, 
literacy, and social skills, the latter being important in managing staff. Finally, 
Hales and Nightingale reported that a major limitation with their study was a 
failure to locate evidence on what managers actually do within the context of 
what managers are required to do (Hales & Nightingale, 1986, 5). Role 
definition, according to Levinson (1959, 1966), can be divided into role 
conception or the individual's perception of their role and the demands 
attached to it, and role performance on the individual's actual behaviour 
(Levinson, 1959, 1966). Hales & Nightingale (1986) summarise role demands 
into four classifications. First, explicitness, coherence, clarity, specificity, and 
degree of consensus. Second, source, via the identification of a role set. Third, 
the strength of expectations, for example, must, should and can. Finally, the 
focus, either what the role incumbent must do, in terms of role behaviour, or 
what the role incumbent must be, in terms of role attributes (Hales & 
Nightingale, 1986, 4). 
In tenns of managers' roles and behaviour, Hales and Mustapha (2000) 
argue that most studies of managerial work are limited by their exclusive focus 
upon actual managerial behaviour rather than upon the role descriptions of the 
managerial job (p.5). They contend that the extent and way in which 
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managerial work varies or remains constant across jobs, levels, functions, 
organisations, industries and cultures has important implications for tr<'ining 
and education, recruibnent, appraisals, remuneration and careers. In 
developing the role of managers further, Hales and Mustapha (2000) argue that 
a distinction has often been made between the technical component of 
managers jobs, reflecting their specialist contribution and the managerial 
component, reflecting their responsibility for getting others to do things (p.20). 
They claim that job-related variations often see managers working less as 
managers and more as technical specialists, that is, some middle managers' core 
activities are surrounded by differences in terms of the technical and 
managerial components of particular jobs. This results in the managers having. 
in effect, a dual role, not only as managers but also as technical or professional 
specialists (p.22). This dual role may see managers choosing to concentrate on 
matters that enable them to meet performance targets (Hales & Mustapha, 
2000). 
From an Australian perspective, Beer et al (1994), Sinunons & Bramble 
(1996) and Walker & Walker (2000) report the different role requirements of 
managers within Australia's public electricity utilities, which now include 
business unit administration, seeking new business opportunities, 
entrepreneurship and innovation. They note that these new roles compete for 
managers' time and resources and may lead to conflict where business unit 
managers have expectations placed upon them to control costs on one hand 
while maintaining standards and quality on the other. When faced with this 
dilemma, managers from an engineering background, that is the majority of 
managers in Australia's electricity utilities throughout the 1980's and 1990's, 
will tend to concentrate on technical issues and neglect administration duties 
(Beer et al., 1994; Simmons & Bramble, 1996; Walker & Walker, 2000). Whether 
this situation had changed that more than half a decade after the 
corporatisation of Australia's electricity supply utilities is unknown due to a 
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lack of any significant studies in this domain in Australia. Titis study 
investigates and reports the Australian situation seven years after the 
corporatisation of one of Australia's state electricity supply utilities. 
A study by Hales & Mustapha (2000) into the variations and 
commonalities in managerial work of middle managers in former Asian 
manufacturing organisations found that overall managers have accepted their 
new roles and remain individually responsible and accountable for the 
performance of their business units. They manage staff and monitor 
performance, attend to recruitment, selection and training, handle information 
and deal with technical and administrative issues. Customers have a general 
expectation that the business unit is well-managed. Under these situations, 
they may only require access to the manager on occasions. If the business unit 
is nut being well-managed they may require increased time with the manager to 
discuss complaints or improvement recommendations (Hales & Mustapha, 
2000). 
In summary, there is an abundance of literature about the new 
responsibilities of managers as a result of significant organisational change and 
the resultant changes to managers' roles as a result. However, the literature 
does not report what the managers actually think about these changes to their 
roles, nor does it report what has been the impact of these changes on the 
managers roles in terms of making their job easier or more difficult. This study 
addresses those gaps in the literature. 
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3.4.2 Quality of working life 
There is general agreement in the literature that there is no single well 
developed or well accepted definition of the term 'quality of working life' 
(Eilon, 1976; Lawler, 1975; Levine, Taylor, & Davis, 1984, 81). This seems to 
suggest that different people have different perspectives as to what makes for a 
high quality of working life, see also definitions in appendix 1. The OECD 
defines the quality of working life as the possibility to work continuously and 
divides the definition into objective work conditions, such as pay, hours of 
work, holidays, physical working conditions, technology, etc; and subjective 
work conditions, such as job satisfaction, attitudes towards the organisation and 
supervisors (OECD, 1977). This definition is used in this study. 
Walton (1973) contends that in recent years the phrase 'quality of 
working life' has been used with increasing frequency to describe certain 
environmental and humanistic values neglected by industrialised society in 
favour of teclmological advancement, industrial productivity, and economic 
growth. He further considers, that within business organisations, attention has 
been focused on the quality of human experience in the workplace (p.11). 
Walton's study proposes eight major analytical categories ranging from 
adequate and fair compensation for work to the social relevance of work. These 
categories provide a framework for analysing the salient features of the quality 
of working life in Walton's research. The eight categories are briefly 
summarised here: 
Adequate and fair compensation. Walton claims the typical impetus for 
employment is earning a living. Adequacy of compensation affects the 
quality of working life. Additionally, there are operational meanings 
between the level of compensation paid and factors which can impact on 
this, such as training. job responsibility and working conditions. 
139 
Safe and healthy working conditions. This relates to the hours of work and 
physical working conditions that provide for a safe and healthy working 
environment. Legislation, union action and employer concern have 
resulted in continually rising standards in this regard. 
Opportunity to develop and use capabilities. Walton considers an individuals 
autonomy and self-control over their work is important in the 
development of a wide range of skills and abilities as well as self-
improvement and self-esteem. Additionally, autonomy and self-control 
enables an appreciation of the relevance of the work and consequences of 
actions. 
Future opportunity for growth and security. This relates to career 
opporhmities, both in terms of income and security. These are often self-
actualising, by self-improvement through education, training and work 
experience. 
Social integration into the work place. This relates to the ability of workers to 
pursue personal relationships in the workplace. Personal relationships 
are an important dimension of the quality of working life and have a 
significant impact on one's work and career. 
Rights within the work organisation. This relates to the involvement an 
employee has in the workplace regarding decision making, and how this 
affects his or her status within the organisation. 
Work and the total life space. Work and personal corrunitments can have a 
positive or negative effect on an employees lifestyle and relationships. 
Excess demands by the employer can seriously affect an employee's 
ability to perform other life roles, such as partner or parent. 
Alternatively, under utilisation of an employees skill or time may see 
them shift their attention to other activities. 
The social relevance of work life. In order for employees to appreciate the 
value of their work and careers, it is important that organisations are 
socially responsible in their treatment of employees, marketing practices, 
products and waste disposal (Walton, 1973). 
Similar to Walton (1973), Brown (1977) did a study in Canada of 
managers and their quality of working life and found that good quality 
working life exists in an organisation that is managed collaboratively in such a 
way that its goals and purposes are achieved and there is growlli in the self-
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worth of individuals within the organisation. Brown reports that organisations 
and individuals are increasingly productive when people have an increased 
opportunity to participate in and contribul'e to the goals of the organisation. 
Moreover, in a fully effective organisation, organisational goals and employees' 
3oals are mutually supporting. rather than conflicting (p.546). Brown also 
found that when people are given more opportunity to be creative, the result is 
greater satisfaction and productivity. However, those at the policy level of the 
organisation must provide the needed sense of purpose and direction, they 
must provide a supportive cHmal'e and the resources necessary to facilitate 
these positive changes. Brown concludes that the majority of Can.idians 
surveyed ranked interesting work as theil' primruy concern regardless of 
income level. Next in the ranking was having confidence in and the helpfulness 
of supervisors and work associ.ites. Promotional opportunities, challenge and 
growth and then financial considerations, along with person.it relationships on 
the job, and comfort and convenience of work were given low priority (Brown, 
1977, 547). A quantitative five-year tracking study by Warr.ill & Cooper (2000, 
2001) and Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison (2000) has yielded similar 
findings to W.ilton (1973) and Brown (1977). The ongoing study by Worrall et 
al in conjunction with the Manchester School of Management has monitored the 
quality of working life in corporate Britain on an annual basis since 1997. In its 
sixth year, the study has focused on the impact of key organisational, social and 
economic changes on 5,000 individual managers using data gathered through 
annual self-administered questionnaire suiveys. The main aims of the study by 
Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison were to produce a more socially complete 
view of the impact of recent business and economic trends; to develop a better 
understanding of the processes and factors which influence the quality of 
working life; and to better understand the relationship between organisational 
change and its effect on the workforces in order to design more sensitive human 
resource management policies. Their study so far indicates that the majority of 
change initiatives since 1997 have consisted of cost and staff reductions. These 
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changes have impacted profo1U1dly on managers in terms of job security md 
morale with many managers believing that not all change objectives have been 
achieved and the resultant staff cuts have left many areas undershlled. A 
significant finding of the study was the concern that managers had expressed 
over the increased hours of work they were expected to undertake resulting in 
adverse personal and social effects, particularly the impact on their relationship 
with their children. They reported that their organisations did little to help 
them balance their work and home commihnents. Many managers indicated 
that they were less inclined in 1999 to work the long hours they did in 1997, 
even though most reported having an office and the necessary technology at 
home which meant U1ey were virtually attached to the office 24 hours a day. 
Worrall et al also found that managers' job satisfaction had declined 
consistently from 1997, while their work.load was reported to have increased 
over the same period. The majority of managers also reported increasing 
information overload and the need for a broader range of skills to do their job 
(Worrall et al., 2000; Worrall & Cooper, 2000, 2001). 
In conclusion, Worrall et al found that exposure to continuous change is 
now a fact of working life in corporate Britain and that restructuring has 
generally not delivered the intended outcomes. Additionally, the demand by 
managers for a better balance between home and working life is both consistent 
and strong, but it doesn't appear as though anyone in authority is listening, 
leaving many managers to take matters into their own hands and reduce their 
time at work. Also strong is the realisation by managers at all levels that their 
career development is their own responsibility. Half of the managers 
interviewed regard valuing, rewarding and investing in people as the most 
important way to improve their quality of working life. Factors such as 
improved communication and consultation, and clearly defined targets and 
goals were significantly less important to managers (Worrall et al., 2000; 
Worrall & Cooper, 2000, 2001). 
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As a result of there being very little discussion frt the Australian 
literature. or any other literature for that matter, on the managers' opinions of 
llie impact of corporatisation on their roles and llieir quality of working life, the 
findings by Worrall et al (2000, 2001) are not compared with other studies a~~.-
this point. However, the concepts and findings of llieir study are compared 
and reported willi the findings of this study in chapters eight and nine. 
3.4.3 Benefits of change 
Watts (1996), Zifcak (1997), Stace & Dunphy (2001), and others ct1l 
consider that there were various beneficiaries of the organisational and 
restructuring changes resulting from the corporatisation of Australia's public 
electricity supply utilities. For managers, corporatisation meant greater 
autonomy and flexibility within specified goals, greater role clarity, and 
increased participation in decision-making through corporate and branch 
strategic planning. They also became change leaders and the introduction of 
contracts and performance agreements meant increased remuneration for 
many. However, managers also found their roles had changed, they had 
increased financial accountability and were now responsible for what were 
previously human resource functions such as the performance management of 
their staff, recruibnent and selection, training and skills development. 
For the organisation, corporatisation meant achieving policy objectives; 
more effective allocation of resources; performance level agreements with 
government and key managers; rationalisation of workforce and union 
representation; increased productivity; increased level of financial and social 
accountability; improved level of responsiveness to customer requirements; 
competition; market orientation and a competitive focus and; increased return 
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to govenunent. 
For key external stakeholders, corporatisation meant greater accessibility 
and responsiveness of services; improved seivices; increased level of social and 
commercial equity i.e., the inlToduction of e!ectTical supply industry 
deregulation, and the introduction of a regulator to oversee supply tariffs, 
safety and reliability; a wider range of product choice; price stability and in 
some instances a decrease in real tenns; improved access for suppliers of goods 
and seivices and a greater use of contractors and outsourcing; greater 
enviroJUI1ental awareness; and higher return on revenue which is a bene!it to 
government and taxpayers. 
Finally, with corporatisation came significant organisational 
restructuring that saw many employees made redundant or redeployed 
elsewhere within other govenunent agencies. For those who remained, the 
introduction of industrial democracy, which played a key role in public sector 
reform, allowed employees to have greater involvement in decisions which 
affected their working life. Other benefits for employees have included: 
increased job satisfaction; improved skills development and career paths; and 
increased remuneration, particularly where skills audits have been done as part 
of the national competency standards (Labour Research Centre Inc, 1990; Stace 
& Dunphy, 2001; Watts, 1996; Zifcak, 1997). 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The review of the literature in line with the key themes and boundaries 
identified in the analytical framework (figure 2.5) shows that from the early 
1990's, Australia's public electricity supply utilities undeiwent similar 
structural and management refonns to those previously undertaken in 
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electricity utilities in the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand. 
The social nnd ideological considerations underpinning Australia's reform 
agenda, which includes management reform, were also similar to those applied 
overseas and are well documented in the literature. What is not so well 
documented, however, are studies into the impact of significant structural and 
system changes on the roles and working life of managerr. in Australian public 
electricity utilities resulting from the electricity reform agenda of 
corporatisation and management reform. A study by Worrall & Cooper (2000, 
2001) and Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison (2000) was found to have the 
most in common with the objectives of the study presented in this thesis and 
will be compared and reported with the findings of this shldy in chapters eight 
and nine. 
The next chapter describes the methodology used in this study to gather 
the research data and to analyse and synthesise it in order to answer the 
research questions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
The analytical framework, developed in chapter two identified the 
important social, ideological and theoretical considerations underpinning the 
reform of Australia's public electrtcity supply utilities and the key lines of 
inquiry for this study which translate into the research questions described in 
chapter one (section 1.4). This chapter describes the methodology by w:iich the 
data will be gathered and analysed in order to answer those questions. 
Data was gathered using a three-stage approach. The first stage 
consisted of an in-depth review of secondary data relative to the electricity 
supply industry and !,'lTuctural changes and new management systems 
introduced as management reform into the study organisation during the 
period 1994 to 2002. It also included an extensive review of the literature on 
corporatisation, management reform, managers' roles and quality of working 
life issues, with particular emphasis on the electricity supply industry in 
Australia. Preliminary open-ended interviews were also conducted as part of 
stage one in order to address gaps in the literature and to inform a 
questionnaire survey applied in stage two. The findings from the preliminary 
interviews are triangulated and synthesised with findings from the other two 
research stages in chapter eight. 
Stage two of the data gathering was divided into a pilot survey and a 
main questionnaire survey, which was administered to the whole target 
population. The third and final stage of data gathering consisted of follow-up 
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focused interviews, which validated findings and enabled further exploration 
and analysis of important themes that emerged from stages one and two and 
which have been expressed in the research questions in chapter one. 
4.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Chapter one described the study context, the c9.se selection and the 
research questions. In this study the focus is on the managers of one Australian 
state-owned electricity supply utility who are rer,ponsible for implementing the 
broad government reform agenda, which brings with it a shift from 
'administration' to 'management' and 'leadership'. The study presents a new 
perspective on senior, middle and business unit managers in Australia's public 
electricity supply industry and reports on the changes and the impact of those 
changes on the role and working life of managers resulting from the refonn 
agenda of corporatisation and management reform, which includes 
commercialisation and a broader philosophy of managerialism. The research 
explores managers' roles and working life in terms of the associated skills, 
competencies and behaviours required of them as a consequence of 
corporatisation and management reform. The study also contributes to the new 
emerging orthodoxy that questions the rationale of corporatisation and 
management reform (Considine & Painter, 1997; Mcl<enna, 1999; Shirley, 1999; 
Vigoda, 2002; Walker & Walker, 2000; Wise, 2002), from the perspective of the 
managers. That is, it explores the managers' understanding of the rationale for 
corporatisation, the benefits arising from it and the impact it has on their roles 
and working life. 
147 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.3.1 Research design considerations 
The research combines qualitative and quantitative data. This is 
represented in Figure 4.1 which diagranunatically displays the main data 
collection, data synthesis and the outcomes of the study. Because of time, 
distance, access and cost considerations this study only focuses on managers 
within one Australian electricity utility. The research site is representative of all 
Australian state electricity utilities of the era since, according to Harris (1991), 
Hilmer (1993) and Hyman (1995), it displayed similar organisational structure 
and management practices prior to corporalisation. 
Multiple data sources were used in this study. These featured primary 
data gathered through inteiviews and surveys combined with existing 
secondary data. This process provided for the triangulation and synthesis of 
data from different methodological viewpoints. The researcher considered that 
given the different dimensions of the problem under investigation, data 
collected from multiple sources using a variety of methods has the advantage of 
making the study less vulnerable to the well-documented limitation of using a 
single method for researching managerial work (Kotter, 1982; Martinko & 
Gardner, 1985). Validity was enhanced through the process of triangulation 
which allows the findings from the qualitative investigation to be checked 
against the findings of the quantitative study (Punch, 1998, 247; Ticehurst & 
Veale, 1999, 115). This methodological approach is not unusual and is well 
documented in the literature by Ticehurst & Veale (1999), Brewer & Hunter 
(1990), Creswell (1994) and others. For example, Ticehurst & Veale argue that 
different approaches to evidence gathering provide holistic triangulation which 
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allows for phenomena to be examined from multiple perspectives to enrich 
understanding by allowing new and deeper dimensions to emerge (Ticehurst & 
Veale, 1999). Brewer & Hunter (1990) also suggest that data triangulation offers 
flexibility and an in-depth approc1ch that is not always available with more 
simple designs using either qualitative or quantitative data alone. Morse (1991), 
Breitmayer, Ayres & Knafl (1993), Creswell (1994) and others view the 
triangulation methodological approach to social research as a'>signing either, or 
both, qualitative or quantitative values, such as text or numbers, to the social 
phenomena being studied. 
In order to gain both before and after data for this study participants 
were asked to indicate on a questionnaire how they felt about certain aspects of 
their roles and their undel'Standing of the organisation in 2002 and how they 
thought they felt about the same aspects previously in 1994. This modified 
approach to the before-after research design (Ticehurst & Veale, 1999) was 
necessary because of time and cost constraints and provided two sets of data on 
managers' roles and their perceptions of the impact of change on their working 
life. 
It is possible that data collected by the before-after research method may 
be affected by memory since a period of around seven years is a long time for 
anyone to remember exactly how they liad previously felt about their roles and 
organisational understanding. However, it was considered that since 
participants would be making the pre-corporatisation (1994) evaluations in 
relation to their current evaluations (2002), the current evaluations would serve 
as standards to evaluate their feelings in 1994 and thus minimi.se memory 
distortions. Further, the 1994 measures serve as baseline dab from which to 
deduce any improvements in managers' roles and working life in 2002. Thus, 
the data of interest are the 2002 data. Brewer & Hunter (1990), Trochim (2002) 
and others argue favourably for this method of dealing with the effects of 
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memory over time and, although it will not completely eradicate memory 
distortion they consider it better controlled than if participl'nts were to make 
absolute judgements or evaluations. 
4.3.2 Research design framework 
The multi-method research strategy gi-aphically illustrated jn figure 4.1 
supports a triangulated study methodology. Ticehurst and Veale (1999) view 
research frameworks as diagrammatic displays of the conceptual status of 
theory, phenomena and variables that underpin important research questions. 
Sinularly, Punch (1998) contends that developing research questions using a 
framework often brings into focus the implicit thinking about the topic, which 
in tum gives direction to the sampling decisions that are required (p.39). 
Stage one of the research schema consisted of two important 
components. The first, was a review of important secondary data and the 
development of an analytical framework (figure 2.5) in chapter two. The 
second, was qualitative research in the form of preliminary interviews (section 
4.4.2 and chapter five) which were developed from the secondary data. Stage 
hvo (chapter six) consisted of the pilot and main survey qttestions which 
explored U1e complex relationship of role change drivers, new management 
systems, and government and executive expectations. Follow-up jnterviews ll1 
stage three (chapter seven) were generated from the data analysis in chapters 
five and six. Finally, the findings of the three research stages were triangulated, 
synthesi&ed and discussed in context with the literature in chapter eight to 
provide more robust results in order to support the research implications and 
recommendations for future re&earch in chapter nine. 
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Research Design Framework 
This figure shows the research method, from data collection and analysis, to 
synthesis of findings and discussion, and presentation of study implications 
and recommendations. 
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4.3.3 Data collection methods 
This study used an ethnographical qualitative (Ticehurst & Veale, 1999, 
104) and a quantitative approach to data gathering which featured multiple 
sources of information to enable data triangulation. Tite data was collected 
through a three-stage approach. The first stage was multifaceted and consisted 
of an in-depth review of literature and corporate documentation which related 
to Australia's electricity supply industry at the macro-level and structural 
changes and new management systems introduced as management reform at 
the micro level during the period 1994 to 2002. The available literature on 
macro-level change was relatively extensive, but very limited on micro-level 
aspects of corporatisation and management reform. Because of the literature 
limitations, st.age one of the research method explored aspects of management 
change and managers' perceptions of that change within the public electricity 
supply industry specifically. It included preliminary open-ended interviews 
based on internal documentation, e.g., corporate documents, memoranda and 
staff notices and union newsletters, and the researcher's personal e::perience 
within, and knowledge of the study organisation. The preliminary open ended 
interviews were conducted with twenty selected managers from the target 
population of 130. Those selected for the preliminary interviews had a broad 
cross-section of experience and worked in either front-line (senior section 
heads), middle or senior (general) mam1gement positions for more than ten 
years with the target organisation. The selection criteria is described in more 
detail in section 4.4.2. Important issues themes and concepts that emerged from 
the preliminary open-ended interviews were used to inform the questionnaire 
survey in stage two. Yin (1994), Zikmund (1997), Punch (1998), Trochim (2002) 
and others support the use of preliminary interviews in order to identify 
important issues, generate survey questions and enable the inclusion of the 
wide and varied experience of the study population. Further, Zikmund (1997) 
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considers the gatl1ering of secondary data an important component of 
exploratory research which can be used as a diagnostic tool to point out issues 
of concern or to generate possible explanations for motivational patterns within 
a study population such as working conditions, workload and impact on leisure 
time, remuneration, career and training opportunities etc (p.103). 
Stage two of the research schema consisted of two parts. The first part 
(a) was a pilot survey used to verify the final survey design and ensured that no 
important concepts or issues were omitted and that the questions were 
unambiguous and not repetitive. The pilot survey was administered to eleven 
randomly selected managers representing a cross section of the target 
population in terms of tenure and experience; using the same selection criteria 
adopted for the preliminary interviews (section 4.4.2). The random selection 
ensured the participants were different from those used in Stage one. 
The second part (b) of Stage two consisted of the main questionnaire 
survey which was self-administered to the whole target population of 130 
managers. Writers such as Miles & Huberman (1994) and Ticehurst & Veale 
(1999) claim that questionnaire surveys usually involve only a proportion, or 
sample, of the population that the researcher is interested in. For this study 
however, the questionnaire was administered to the whole target population of 
130 managers, which consisted of all senior (general) managers, midd!e 
managers and senior section heads who are responsible for the performance of 
either n division, branch or business wtit within Western Power. It was found 
that surveying the whole target population atlTacted a high response rate and 
enhanced the representativeness, internal validity and statistical significance of 
the data. For this survey the response rate was 85.4%, i.e., 111 responses out of 
a tot?.! of 130. The administration of the questionnaire survey was aided by the 
researcher's knowledge of and experience within the organisation, ease of 
access, centralised management structure and the internal mail system. 
153 
The third and final stage of data gathering consisted of follow-up 
focused inteiviews with sixteen randomly selected managers using similar 
selection criteria to the preliminary questionnaire, stage one. The random 
selection ensured the participants were different from those used in Stage one 
and part (a) of Stage two. The follow-up interviews were used to validate 
findings and enabled further exploration and analysis of important themes and 
issues that emerged from stages one and two. Important issues that were 
identified but beyond the scope of this shldy are discussed in chapter nine as 
considerations for future research. 
Data gathered in stages one and three were entered into a MS Word 
document categorised under key themes based on notes taken during the 
inteiviews. The analysis centered on emerging ideas, the clarification of themes 
and storage of memoranda from the field data. Data gathered in stage two was 
entered into the statistical analysis software SPSS and analysis such as the 
coefficient alpha or Cronbach Alpha test of reliability was undertaken and is 
reported in chapter six. Coakes and Steed (2001) and Trochim (2002) describe 
the Cronbach Alpha test as a commonly used test undertaken as an internal 
comparison test of reliability, which ensures that questions are free from 
variable errors. 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
This section describes in detail the three stages of data collection and 
provides the reader with an insight into how the data was collected, the players 
involved and the level of their participation in providing the data. 
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4.4.1 Exploratory Research~ Secondary Data 
Secondary data was sourced from company bulletins; internal 
newsletters; documentation from senior management and the managing 
director; published annual reports and statements of corporate objectives; 
Western Power employee suiveys and opinion polls; and other internal 
communications. This comprised information about government, corporate 
and executive objectives for organisational change; the structure and timetable 
for change; and employee perceptions of change. Staff numbers, financial 
performance, productivity and other indices for the periods before and after 
corporatisation are also contained in the secondary documentation. Another 
rich source of data came from the researcher attending internal training courses 
and workshops, branch and business unit presentations, strategic planning and 
information sessions. 
Additional data was sourced from relevant electricity industry Web-
sites; technical publications, such as Electricity Supply Association of Australia; 
conference proceedings; books, by authorities knowledgeable of the electricity 
supply industry; and, newspaper and journal articles. These provided an 
important source of information for comparisons of size, structure, 
performance, ownership, and levels of political involvement across the 
electricity supply industry. 
Important themes and issues identified from the exploratory research 
were used to inform the line of inquiry to be taken in the preliminary 
intetviews. 
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4.4.2 Preliminary Interviews 
The preliminary interviews were conducted face-to-face in order to 
capture the wide and varied experience of the managers and to enable further 
in-depth inquiry into key issues as they arose. The purpose of the preliminary 
inle!views was three-fold (refer to the Research Design framework figure 4.1). 
First, data from the preliminary interviews was used to inform the 
questionnaire survey design and question structure. Second, themes and issues 
that arose from the preliminary interviews, but he.cause of their complex nature 
could not be satisfactorily addressed by quantitative methods, were used to 
inform questions in the follow-up interviews, stage three. Third, data from the 
preliminary interviews was used for comparative purposes in chapter eight as 
part of the triangulation process adopted for this study. 
Sample size, location and selection criteria 
Western Power is a diverse organisation with many of its 2,500 
employees distributed over a 2.5 million square kilometre landmass (Western 
Power Annual Report, 2002). However, it is centralised in terms of managers 
and senior section heads, i.e., the target population. Of the total target 
population of 130 persons, all but sixteen (twelve percent) work in the head 
office and of those only seven work outside tl1e metropolitan area {table 4.1). 
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Table4.l 
Locations of target population 
Target Group 
General Managem' 
Branch Managers-' 
Totals 
Corporate Head 
Office 
, 
" 
" 
'" 
Within Metro Area 
" 
' 
Ou!aide Metro Area 
" 
' 
' 
, 
The sample size for the preliminaty interviews was influenced by three 
important factors: 
(1) Selection criteria. A selection criterion was applied to ensure that each 
potential interviewee was in a management position prior to 1994 and had 
continuously worked for Western Power since. While this reduced the 
sample size, it was considered necessaty to ensure a continuity of 
experience over the critical period 1994 to 2002. 
(2) Representation. Ma.'\agers fitting the selection criteria were then sorted 
according to division (e.g. the Transmission Division) and management 
category (e.g. general managers, middle managers and senior section 
heads). At least one participant for each management category in each 
division was then randomly selected. However, in the case of the general 
managers, only two were interviewed as not all passed a selection criteria 
and some were unavailable for an interview. Apart from the general 
managers the selection criteria resulted in the interview of at least one 
branch manager and one senior &."'Ction head from each of the seven 
divisions, see table 4.2. 
' General mnnagers in W::sllem Power are responsible for 11 division which co.,,,i5hl of a number of 
branches or busmess units and ..,.;lions. General mnnagers arc also referred to as acnior man.1gers in this 
study which rcla"'5 lo the general l<!rminology used m the !i!Je,ature. 
' Branch managers in Wesllem Power urc responsible for a bronch within 11 Jivi,ion. 'They are generally 
n..fcrred loo,; miJJ!e mru1agers- m the Literature. 
• Senior section heads in Wesl<!m Power are 1"-'Sponsible for a section or business unit .,,,d a referred lo "" 
business unit mnnagera m the literature. 
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(3) Risk of identification. Many branch managers and senior section heads 
selected for an interview declined, claiming they could not spare the time 
(on average 2.5 hours per interview). This could have been due to 
prevailing job and role uncertainty and the significant organisational 
restructuring that was occurring throughout the organisation around the 
lime of the preliminary interviews. Where a branch manager or senior 
section head declined an interview an alternative person, who satisfied the 
selection criteria, was chosen from the same management category and 
from the same division. Many managers also indicated a reluctance to 
discuss sensitive organisational issues and concerns in an interview 
situation, particularly where their branch or business unit was small (less 
than 10). However, as evidenced from the high rate of survey returns 
(85.4%), they were willing to participate where they felt their anonymity 
was secure. 
Table4.2 
Target populations and preliminary interview numbers 
Torge!Group ToL1l Target Population Number lntcJVreWed 
General Mruw.gc,a 
' ' 
Brnnch Manage,s 
"' 
• 
Senior Secrion Heads 
" 
rn 
Totils 
"' "' 
Interview structure 
The interviews were semi-structured and formalities for the interviews, 
such as limes, dates and location, were made by telephone and confirmed bye-
mail prior to the event. All interviews were conducted with the full consent of 
the individual concerned and each participant received a statement of 
disclosure and informed consent prior to the interview. Interviews were 
conducted in the participant's office or some other convenient pllvate location 
such as a conference room and each interview lasted around two and a half 
hours. The interview participants were given as much time as they required to 
answer each question. Apart from asking questions the researcher only 
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intervened where additional information or clarification was required or the 
respondent drifted away from the subject. Responses were hand written by the 
researcher and later transcribed into a MS Word document for analysis. 
Twenty-eight questions were asked during the preliminary interviev.•s. 
These were formulated from significant issues which emerged from the 
exploratory research, the analytical framework (chapter two, figure 2.5) and the 
researcher's first-hand knowledge. The questions sought to determine a 
baseline of managers' understanding and were broadly structured under eight 
main themes which explored the managers' perceptions and understanding of: 
the rationale for corpomtisation; the management system and organisational 
changes which have occurred since corporatisation; financial accountability; 
strategic planning; competition and customer focus; contractors and contracting 
out of services; stakeholders; and, working life issues (chapter five, table 5.1). 
Analysis of interview data 
The interviews provided information on managers' understanding of the 
reasons for corporatisation, the beneficiaries of it and the impact it has had on 
their roles as managers. The Ll,tcrviews also informed of the changes to 
managers' roles since corporatisation in terms of responsibility and 
accountability for business unit performance; managerial autonomy; 
empowerment to take action and make decisions; recruitment and selection; 
performance management; introduction of new technology; strategic p!anning; 
and their ability to manage stakeholders. Finally, the preliminary interviews 
also provided useful insights into changes in managers' workloads; working 
hours; leisure time; stakeholders; remunt;"ration; employment ::onditions; 
management contracts; job satisfaction; promotion opportunities; and training. 
The analysis of the data from the preliminary interviews are summarised 
in chapter five. The data was used to inform the survey design and question 
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structure in chapter six and was later referred to in chapter eight for 
comparative purposes as part of the triangulation process adopted for this 
study. 
4.4.3 Pdot survey 
A pilot survey was undertaken to test and verify the final survey design 
and to ensure that no important conc~pts or issues were missed. The pilot 
survey was administered by mail to eleven randomly selected persons, 
representing around nine percent of the target population (Table 4.3). This 
population was different from that used for the preliminary interviews, 
however, the demographic: breakdown was the same, as seen in table 4.3. 
Table4.3 
Target population and pilot survey numbers 
Ta,gelGroup Total Target Population Number in Piiot Survey 
o_.,,cml Man.,gcrs 
' 
, 
Branch Man.,g= 
"' ' 
Senior Section Heads ., 
' 
Totals no n 
Data from the pilot survey was edited, tabulated and coded into SPSS 
{Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) Version 10. The process of 
exploratory data analysis has been specifically designed by statisticians for the 
purposes of examining a data set (Coakes & Steed, 2001, 30; Kinnear & Gray, 
2000, 88) and was applied in this study to examine the data set for construct 
validity and design. This process also confirmed that all the important concepts 
and issues identified in the preliminary interviews were included in the survey. 
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Exploratory data analysis using 'descriptives' and 'frr.;quencies' was used 
to examine the variables for errors and aberrant values. The frequencies within 
descriptive statistics gives frequency distributions for both nominal and ordinal 
data along with percentages and cumulative percentages, which were used for 
assessing the normality of the variables using the Kolmogorov-Smimov statistic 
with a Lilliefors significance level. Coakes and Steed (2001) state that, with this 
test, normality is assumed if the significance level is greater than 0.05 (p.35). 
4.4.4 Questionnaire survey 
Sample size 
For this study the questionnaire was administered to the whole target 
population of 130 managers, which consisted of all senior (general) managers, 
middle managers and senior section heads who are responsible for the 
performance of either a division, branch or business unit within Western 
Power, see table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
Breakdown of target populations 
Targ<'IGroup 
General Man.,gers 
Brarich Managers 
5"nior Section Heads 
Total 
Survey structure 
ToialNumber in W<'Sb,m Power 
' 
"' 
" 
"" 
The survey questionnaire (appendix 2) consisted of six sections each 
containing number of questions making up twenty one questions in total. 
Thirteen of the questions required respondents to record their answers on a 
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five-point Likert scale. Of the remaining eight questions, six required the 
respondent to select one or more responses from a list and two required either a 
'yes' or 'no' response. Thirteen questions had provision for comnlents to allow 
for the respondent to qualify or expand upon their choices, however, very few 
did. 
Section one of the survey related to managers' understanding of the 
rationale for inlToducing corporatisation and management reform within 
Western Power and what they believed to be top management's three main 
reasons for ongoing management system changes. It also sought their 
perceptions of the benefit that specific stakeholders such as customers, industry, 
unions, government, executive, managers and employees would get from 
corporatisation using a combination of 'yes' or 'no' and multi-choice responses. 
A five-point Likert scale, where 1 was 'no benefit' and 5 was 'significant 
benefit', was used to determine managers' perceptions of the benefit that 
stakeholders would get from the corporatisation of Western Power. Section one 
also collected information on the length of service that the managers had with 
the organisation and the average branch or section size they had been in charge 
of over that time. 
Section two sought to determine managers' perceptions of how 
effectively senior management had communicated management system 
changes to them. Fourteen management systems were listed and the 
respondent was asked to make a selection against each from a five-point Likert 
sca!e, where 1 was 'totally ineffective' and 5 was 'totally effective'. This section 
also ought to determine the understanding managers have of their roles at the 
time of the questionnaire compared with seven years ago, using a five-point 
Liker! scale where 1 was 'mttch Jess clear' and 5 was 'much clearer'. 
Section three questioned the extent of managers' involvement in the 
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introduction of new management systems within Western Power. It also 
sought to determine managers' perceptions of how important it was for them to 
be involved in the planning and implementation of new management systems 
and initiatives within the organisation. 
Section four related to managers' perceptions of the impact of the new 
management systems on their roles as managers or section heads within 
Western Power. The fourteen management systems that were introduced into 
Western Power were listed. Against each management system the respondent 
was asked to make a selection from a five-point Likert scale, where 1 was 
'largely negative impact' and 5 was 'largely positive impact'. Against the same 
fourteen management systems managers were also asked to select from a five 
point Likert scale the importance of those management systems in supporting 
the achievement of their perfmmance targets, where 1 was 'unimportant' and 5 
was 'very important'. 
Section five sought to determine managers' opinions of which key 
stakeholders significantly influenced their roles as managers or section heads 
and their business unit's performance, both before and after corporatisation. 
The nine key stakeholders listed in the questionnaire included tile state 
government (Minister), Treasury, competitors, employees, industry groups and 
so on. Against each of the nine key stakeholders, the managers were requested 
to select 'yes' or 'no' in tenns of significant influence, for the periods of pre-1995 
and post-1995. Section five also sought to detennine if managers perceived that 
Western Power had gained any advantage from having the state government as 
sole shareholder. For this, a five-point Likert scale was used where 1 
represented 'a very significant disadvantage to Western Power' and 5 'a very 
significant advantage to Western Power'. 
Finally, section six related to managers' opinions of how the introduction 
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of the new management systems and corresponding organisational changes had 
affected the quality of their working life over the past seven years in ierms of 
working conditions, role performance, remuneration, career and training 
opportunities, motivation, job satisfaction, hours of work and so on. For each of 
these, a five-point Likert scale was used, where 1 was 'largely negative' and 5 
was 'largely positive'. Managers were also asked to provide a 'yes' or 'no' 
response to each of the following questions: do they consider their current skills 
adequate for what they are expected to do; do they consider they should learn 
new skills; have they sought new skills; and, do they consider Western Power 
should provide training for any new skills they may require? The impact of 
new management systems on managers' workloads over the past seven years 
was also explored through a question listing eighteen recently introduced 
management systems such as customer focus, financial accountability, 
competition, productivity, performance management, continuous change and 
strategic planning. For each of these, a five-point Likert scale was used where 1 
was 'largely negative impact' and 5 was 'largely positive impact'. 
Survey administration. 
A brief message outlining the forthcoming survey and its purpose was 
electronically mailed to all the target population one week prior to the survey 
being administered. Distribution of fue smvey was furou: '1 internal mail to all 
the target population with instructions and a cover letter introducing lhe 
researcher, the purpose of the survey and a statement of disclosure and consent. 
A return freepost envelope addressed to the researcher's university was 
provided so that completed surveys could be returned with total anonymity. 
Zikmund (1997) claims that this form of survey allows individuals to participate 
and present their views anonymously within a controlled framework. 
A reminder notice was electronically mailed to all the target population 
at intervals of one and two weeks after the initial mail-out. A final notice, 
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worded as both a reminder and a thank you, was sent one Wet!k after the 
return-by date. This approach yielded a greater than eighty five percent 
response to the survey. 
4.4.5 Follow-up focused interviews 
After the data from the preliminary interviews and questionnaire 
surveys were analysed (chapters 5 and 6), face-to-face follow-up interviews 
were conducted in a like manner to the preliminaiy interviews. Sixteen 
managers were randomly selected from the target population (table 4.5). This 
was done using the same criteria as that outlined for the preliminary interviews 
in section 4.4.2 and which enabled the validation of findings and the in-depti;'° 
exploration of key issues that emerged from the analysis. 
Table4.5 
Target populations and follow-up interview numbers 
Target Group 
General Managers 
Bran<hManagorn 
s._.,,,o, Section Heads 
Totni. 
Total T1ITget Population 
5 
'" 
.. 
Each interview took an average of thirty minutes during which twelve 
questions were asked, see table 4.6. Important key issues identified in the 
analysis of the dato (chapter seven), but beyond the scope of this study are 
dfucussed later in chapter nine as issues for future research. 
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Table4.6 
Follow-up interview questions 
This table lists the questions that were asked at the follow-up interviews 
in order to validate findings and further explore key issues from stages one and 
two of the research schema. 
Number 
What has been the imp,,ct of financL,! and budgeting system,; on your role as monager and 
the performance o/ your busine,;, unit? 
2 W!~,t has been the impact of strntcgic planning on your role as manager and your ability to 
achh!ve performance targets? 
3 What has been U,e impact of performance management and performance targets on your role 
and remuneration! 
4 How has the use ol contract labour and <;ontracting out of seivices impac!Ed on your role as 
manager? 
5 Wh.,l has been the impact of the puTSuit of unreguL,lcd income on your role as m,umger and 
the pe,formance of your businc>ss unit? 
6 How has cu.stomor focu.s impact..,d on your role as manager? 
7 W!"'l has been the impact of empowerment on your role as mMlilge,l 
8 W!,at has bee-i, the impact ol the mnn.,gerial leatlersh!p initiali"" on your ,ole as manogerl 
9 What has been the impact of <:arporatisalion and nP.w management systems on the l<'<hnkal 
<:amponc't'lt of your role as manogcrl 
10 What has been the impacto/ corpo,at:isntlon and organisaliona! reotructuring nn the clarity of 
your role as n,anager? 
11 What has been the Impact of corporatisation on your ca=r opportun!lics? 
12 What has been the impact cf corporotisation and new mai~,gcment oys""'1s en the time you 
spend doing work rclalm activ!ticsl 
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4.5 DATAANALYSIS 
The research design in this study is based on the gathering and 
triangulation of evidence from both a qualitative and quantitative research 
methodology. The qualitative research in the form of semi-structured 
interviews was informed by key themes from the secondary data and the 
literature. Quantitative research in the form of a mail-out questionnaire survey 
was administered to the total target population of 130. The response to the 
survey was greater than eighty five percent and was of sufficient size for critical 
analysis. 
The preliminary interview and focused follow-up interview were 
recorded as field notes and later transcribed into MS Word. The 'Find' and 'Go 
To' search feature of MS Word enabled quick location of pertinent sections of 
text and key words. 
Data from both the pilot and main questionnaire survey was edited, 
tabulated and coded into SPS.5 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) 
version 10. Ticehurst & Veale (1999) consider survey data to be ideally suited to 
computer-ba..ed analysis because of the consolidation and analysis required of 
large amounts of data that are involved in the analysis of a survey (p.197). 
The analysis of the data from the preliminary interviews, the survey and 
follow-up interviews is undertaken in chapters five, six and seven. Chapter 
eight deals with the triangulation of the comparative quantitative and 
qualitative evidence contrasting the new managerialist role of managers with 
their previous role under the public sector management system. The 
triangulation analysis also correlates the responses and perceptions of 
managers to those role changes and the identified changes to their quality of 
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working life. 
4.6 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
4.6.1 Validity 
The preliminary semi-structured interview findings provided valuable 
input into the content validity of the questionnaire survey. Validity was also 
enhanced through the process of triangulation, which allowed the findings 
from the qualitative investigation to be checked against the findings of the 
quantitative study. In addition, the questionnaire was rigorously pre-tested in a 
pilot survey to confirm structure and the respondents' understanding of the 
questions and the relevance they have to them. 
External validity was also improved through the literature and industry 
review in chapter two which showed tl1at Western Power underwent 
restructuring and corporatisation in a like manner to its counterparts in the 
Eastern states. After the organisational reform and corporatisation in the 1990's 
of all of Australia's state owned public electricity supply utilities, Victoria and 
South Australia went on to privatise theirs. The other states, including Western 
Australia have continued with deregulation and competition refonns, but 
retained their electricity utilities with the state government as sole shareholder. 
4.6.2 Reliability 
A coefficient alpha or Cronbach Alpha test of reliability (Coakes & Steed, 
2001) was undertaken using the statistical ana:ysis software SPSS Version 10.0. 
This is one of the most commonly used tests (Coak.es & Steed, 2001, 147) and 
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provided an internal comparison test of reliability and ensured that the 
questions were free from variable errors. 
Sekarnn {1992) and Trochim (2002) contend t'1at reliabilities less than 0.60 
can be considered poor, while those over 0.70 are acceptable. Reliability 
coefficients in excess of 0.80 are viewed as good. The results of the alpha tests 
are detailed in chapter six where the quantitative data was assembled and 
analysed against the research questions. 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
A research design framework showing a diagranunatic display of the 
research method, from data collection and analysis, to synthesis of findings and 
discussion, and presentation of study implications and reconunendations was 
developed in this chapter {figure 4.1). The three-stage approach to data 
gathering adopted for this study consists of secondary data and preliminary 
interviews, questionnaire survey and follow-up interviews. Because of time, 
distance, access and cost considerations the study only focuses on managers 
within one Australian electricity utility. However, according to Harris (1991), 
Hilmer {1993) and Hyman {1995) Western Power is representative of all 
Australian state electricity utilities of the era since it displayed similar 
organisational structure and management practices prior to corporatisation. 
The next chapter describes the preliminary interview questions, the 
administration of the interviews and the analysis of the data. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW FINDINGS: ST AGE 1 
5.1 OVERVJEW 
Stage one of the research schema consisted of two important 
components. The first was a confluence of important secondary data drawn 
from Western Power documentation and the researcher's personal experiences 
and observations from both within the study organisation and the electricity 
supply industry in general, and the ·development of an analytical framework 
(figure 2.5) in chapter two. The second was qualitative research in the form of 
preliminary interviews. The secondary data provided an insight into the 
significant changes that Australia's electricity supply industry has undergone 
through the period 1990 to 2003, the objectives of which were principally to 
improve organisational productivity and efficiency through a policy of 
restructuring and management reform based on managerialist principles and 
practices. The analytical framework identified issues of importance for 
managers in the public electricity supply industry as it underwent 
corporatisation and management refo,m. These were used to frame the 
research questions described in chapter one and to inform the preliminary 
interview questions explored in this chapter (table 5.1). Participant selection 
and the method by which the preliminary interviews wete conducted was 
described in chapter four. Twenty managers were interviewed and the results 
of those interviews were analysed in this chapter and the findings used to 
inform the development of the questionnaire survey in the next chapter. 
The interview questions explored the managers' personal opinions and 
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understanding of corporatisation in terms of the reasons for it; the meU1od by 
which it was introduced; the main beneficiaries of it; the impact of it on their 
role as manager; and corporate performance since its inhoduction. The 
questions also explored managers' views about the many micro issues 
associated with corporatisation and ongoing changes to their roles and working 
life in terms of their understanding of the reasons for the changes; how the 
changes were communicated to them; the impact of the changes on their roles; 
and the benefits of the changes to key stakeholders. Finally, the questions 
focused at the personal level, on working life issues such as their career 
prospects; their workload and hours of duty; performance management; their 
management contracts; the clarity of their roles; and their internal and external 
networks. 
5.2 SELECTION CRITERIA 
The interviews were conducted with two general managers, eight branch 
managers and ten senior section heads within Western Power. For ease of 
reporting, they are referred to as 'managers' 'respondents' or 'participants' 
throughout the following chapters. The twenty managers represent around 
fifteen percent of the total target population of 130. Those interviewed were 
chosen because they had more than eight years service within Western Power, 
were in management positions prior to 1994 and collectively represented a good 
cross section of the branches and business units within the oq~anisation. 
Although females participated in all stages of the research their participation 
rate is not noted in this study because the size and structure of some branches 
and sections within Western Power may lead to their anonymity being 
compromised. In addition, specific gender issues are not addressed in this 
study. The sample size and selection criteria are discussed in section 4.4.2. 
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5.3 PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
A review of secondary data pertaining to the corporatisation of 
Australia's public electricity supply utilities, with particular attention to the 
Western Australian situation, was undertaken in chapter two. However, this 
mostly provided the corporation's view, or the common knowledge and official 
view, of the reported benefits and the necessity for organisational change and 
the introduction of new management systems to support management reform. 
It provided little of the personal i."1Sights of managers and what they actually 
thought and felt about the many micro issues associated with corporatisation 
and ongoing changes to their roles and working life. A review of secondary 
data from within the study organisation did provide some information that was 
common knowledge. For example, the beliefs and concerns of staff about 
change within the organisation, shared through conversation and other sources 
such as union newsletters and general information notices, commentaries and 
cartoons. Commentaries and cartoons were particularly prevalent on 
workplace notirc boards during the period leading up to and immediately 
following corporatisation. Because of the anonymous and unofficial way in 
which cart0ons and commentaries 'appeared' on the notice boards they gave 
staff the opportunity to express their concerns without fear of retribution. Two 
commentaries, which reflected a common mood among staff at the time, read; 
Due to a lnck of interest, 1/ie light at tlie end of tlie t111111el will be turned off 1111til further 
,10tice and Tire floggi11gs will c1mtim11: 1111til morale improves (staff notice board, 
1995). 
The analytical framework (figure 2.5) developed in chapter hvo from the 
secondary data provided a map of how the secondary data and ihe lil'erature 
merged within the research context and objectives and gave direction to the 
sampling decisions. The important issues for managers in the public electricity 
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supply industry were listed and prioritised based on the research aims and 
questions set out in table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1 
Important issues arising from the analytical framework and preliminary 
intetview gue.tionq 
lmporlaot l!.SUCS 
Man.agers' under.;tanding of 
Uw, r,1lion.ale for 
co•por,1tis.11ion ,1nd U,e 
d/iwr.; for change within the 
.. ~1<.'C!ridty supply industry. 
New rn.anagemmt systems 
,ind organisation.al change, 
U~1t h.w,• in'fl introdun"1 
sinct, <mporatis.1tion. 
lncrcas<'<i focus on lirumcial 
accountability since 
rnrporatisatlon. 
n... introduction olslrategic 
planning within Wcsh'm 
Power. 
]ncf!wa .. "1 focus on 
comp,.•lilion aml customc, 
focus since corporatisation. 
Prclimin.a1-y !mcrv!cw Question., 
\\/hat arc n,1U11>gers' unde,standing of U1c ratio11dlc for corporatis.ilion 
and U1cmain n,asons for Uw introduction of cmporati.sation into 
Wc'Sh'mPnwcr 
\'/ho Jo managers con.sider arc U,c mah, bcnelicW.ries of rorporatis.ition 
\\Iha tare U1cadvnn!Dgesand dis.1Jvantages of h.wing Uie WA 
gowmmc'llt as th,·solc slwcholdcr in Western Power 
\\/hat has bee~, U,e Ul\pact of rnrporalh1tio11 on U,e manage,,;' mies. 
Comparison of job roles now nml prior turnrporatis.,tion 
lfow were m,m,1gcrs involve.! witli the introduction of corporatisation 
into Western Pmn>, 
WhJlan, m.:mar,ers' opinions of rorpor,1tc pe,formance in terms of 
pmJurlivily, cflicic,ncy and effectfrcncss sincte rnrporatisation 
\V101t is ni,,nagcr< undcrst,nding of cl"1ngc man.:igc,nrnt 
\\/hat haw l><'C11 li,e main rh,1ngcs in m,1nagc>tnC'nl syslcmS and 
prnctir<.>s in W<>stem Powe, owr tl,e past sevm yc'ars 
How wen, nc>w management sysl<'ms ruid org.1nis.1ti011<i\ ehang...,. 
<omn1unicah."1 tn man,,gers and wh.11 was their involwmcnt in the 
implc'filcntafa,n of tlmse changes 
Wh,11 du m,Ul,1)\<'rscnnslder to be tl1c main reasons furon~oing 
manngemcnt sysl<'ms changes 
What were \he m~in benefils of manag,'1nent •;o"sti,m and organis.1tional 
chang,>s 
\\Iha\ an, manager.;' pcreeptiun.s of tl1e impact ol organisational ch.ing,,,; 
on U1eir rok'S since rnrporot:is.1tion 
\V1"1ton• man1y,ers' opinions on fin.1nci.1I accauntabilH)' and how MS !t 
Ul\p.icb.~l un their rolc'S as managers 
What an, man.1grrs' Vi'-"''S on Wc.,;tt,m Power's strab.r,lc plnnning 
prna."S.s and the impact al strati,gic p~mning on their rolc'S 
\'Iha\ nn• man.agers' understanding of compctitfon and customer fr,cus. 
Continued next page. 
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Important !SSUL'S 
Tho increasing use of 
contr,.ctor,; and tl>C 
rontracling out of scrvia,s 
,,incc cmpor,.ti.sation. 
The impM! of corporatisatiun 
on stakeholder,;. 
n-., imp,1ct of co,po,atisation 
and new man.,gcmrnt 
systems on wo,king life. 
·,·.'1 
,, 
,, 
Prt'limln.1,y lnlcrvicw Qu<"Slions 
111/halan• ma"'1gL.,., vie,.,.son the increasing US<'Of <<mt,act labour 
within W<Slcm Pt1""'cr and U,,,ccm\rn<ling out ofserviN.'5 pn."ViOusly 
dullt' within the organisation 
\Vlw do man.1ger..wn.si,lcr are Wes!lam Power's most importanl 
smkcholdeis 
Ha=<hang,.,. sinceco,pu,ati.sation ,1fftoct,_,J Wc'5lo.'m Power's ,1bility to 
meet smkeholdcr c•recmtion., 
\.Vho do man.:~crs' conside, t<> be their priority stoke holders nt pn.>s<,nt 
Who were Uoe manager.;' p,iuritystakeho\dcr.; prior tucorporatisation 
Haw ch,1nges tu man.,ge,s' mle, affc,:t..~I their ability to m""t the 
cxp,:<:mtionsof their priority stakeholder,;, now and prior to 
corpor,.tbation 
11\fh,1\ ha., been u...., impact of corporatisation on !hei, working 
conditions 
Wlrnt h'1S IN.~'11 tlw impMt of corpo,nti.sation on !heir carceT p•<>Sp<.'C!s 
\'llh.1lhas b<,,,n th<"impactof corporilti.s.ation ofworklo.,d and hou..,.of 
Jul)-' 
Whal ,lo manager,; think of J>l'fformilll«: man.,gemrnt and how has it 
impacn,d on tl,ei, roles 
'Nh,11 an, m,1nager.;' perceptions of n1anagroicnl wn\r,1cls and have 
Uu.-,;e had any iml"'cton their per.;onal performal\C<! 
Has rn,pOfatisa~on affecbxl the <kirity of t.hcir rolc>s M managers 
\'llh.,t ha,; h<'-'ll the impact of <Dfporatis.1Hon on the manag<"rs internal 
and e•tcmalnetwnrks 
5.4 FINDINGS FROM THE PRELIMINARY INTERVIEWS 
This section is divided into eight main topics which are subdivided into 
the qul'Stions used for the preliminary interviews. These are shown in table 5.1, 
above. The interviewee responses are reported and analysed within the context 
of these questions. 
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5.4.1 Corporatisation 
Understanding of the rationale for corporatisation 
All interview participants displayed a good understanding of 
corporatisation as applied to Western Power and electricity utilities in general. 
They viewed corpvratisation as a process in which a government business 
enterprise, e.g., electricity utility, is restructured along the lines of private 
cnterpri&e with a board, CEO and shareholders (usually the government, as sole 
shareholder). All the participants understood the government requirements for 
the new corporatiscd business to be run according to the Corporations Act, to 
conform to corporation laws and to pay corporate taxes and dividends. Most 
believed that Western Power endeavours to perform like a private organisation 
in a competitive, deregulated market. Some however, considered the 
corporatisation of government agencies to be n sham and reported that such 
agencies ... acl like n prii'llfe organisation, but iJ~/l!i11 //re cm1r.fmi11ls imposed by the 
mi11ister. 
The main reasons participants gave for the introduction of 
corporatisation into Western Power were: energy industry reform; 
deregulation; competition; price reduction; productivity and efficiency gains; 
the commercialisation of business decisions; and improved financial 
accountability. Other reasons included: making the network available for open 
access; justification of costs to the public and the owner (by reporting balance 
sheets, profit and loss statements); following a fad and simply following other 
utilities around Australia and overseas; a response to the Energy Board of 
Review which was not possible as government dcparbnent; the need to be a 
corporation in order to act as a true corporation, rather than just applying 
government imposed social obligations; part of the micro economic reform 
agenda, i.e., to drive efficiency gains; lo support federal und state industry 
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reforms and to promote commercial business acumen and process 
improvements; for government lo show Western Power is not getting 
preferential treatment by making a level playing field, i.e., operating on equal 
footing with competitors allows business comparisons and performance 
measurement; the first step towards privatisation; and, the creation of an 
orgi!Jlisation that acts in a more commercial manner, understands risks and 
gives broad accountability for actions. 
Beneficiaries ofcorporatisation 
Interview participants were asked who they considered to be the main 
beneficiaries from the corporatisation of Western Power. Most considered the 
state government lo be the strongest beneficiary due to increasing dividends 
being paid by the corporation from increased profits, restructuring (staff 
reductions), greater cost control and productivity (contain prices), continuation 
of community service obligations, enactment of political objectives e.g., built 
puwer stations. Also, some managers claimed that successive governments 
have benefited from the corporation of Western Power through the payment of 
stale taxes whkh were previously exempt and through the more businesslike 
and commercially focused way that the organisation was being run, enabling 
increasing dividend rates from 40 to 60 percent over the past seven years. 
However, some managers reported that a down-side to the increase in 
dividends meant Jess money was available for capital works and th£ 
maintenance of important infrastructure. They consider that this has resulted in 
... tire a5se/s beiug ru11-dow11 mrd 1111 foCl"eased likelihood of equipment failures. 
Commercial and industrial customers were also considered by most 
participants tu be among the main beneficiaries of corporatisation. They were 
reported to have benefited most from tariff reductions due mostly to contract 
re-negotiation and, in some instances, due to government interventions 
promoting commerce and industry in the state e.g., investment and 
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employment. 
Some participants also considered domestic customers were significant 
beneficiaries of corporatisation due to the stabilisation of domestic tariffs over 
the past seven years which they believed were brought about by efficiency 
gains and productivity improvements. Apart from cheaper power, all the 
interview participants considered that Western Power customers were 
receiving a better service through more open policies and improved internal 
procedures. 
Other beneficiaries of corporatisation were reported to include the board 
and the executive as they were perceived by the interview participants to have 
more control over their working life and business direction, even though they 
have to report to the minister and political interference can, and reportedly 
does, apply. The executive have also gained significant salary increases and 
bonuses since corporatisatior. (Western Power annual reports 1996 • 2003). 
These are reviewed annually and indexed against organisational performance 
in terms of profit and key performance indicators. The managers also 
considered themselves and other employees to be beneficiaries of 
corporatisation as a result of job continuity; employment in a more dynamic 
environment, i.e., more in tune with global business models compared with the 
previous government utility model; increased salaries; bonuses; and a clearer 
business direction. Finally, some of the participants considered there was 
considerable benefit from .. .lmving 011e sel of polides a11d clear direction from 011e 
boss (i.e., the managing director). 
Finally, unions were perceived by managers to have gained no benefit 
from corporatisation. They claimed that union membership by both managers 
and staff had declined since corporatisation in 1995 when award rationalisation 
reduced the number of awards and agreements, and simplified human resource 
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management procedures and reduced union representation from fifteen unions 
to only two. Managers lost direct union representation as a result of the 
exclusion of the Association for Professional Electrical Scientific and Mechanical 
Engineers Australia (APE.5MA) from the Western Power Award created in 
1995. Since corporatisation engineers and industrial chemists within Western 
Power have had to rely on another union, the Australian Services Union (ASU), 
to give them indirect representation in award negotiations. 
Advantages and disadvantages of WA government as sole shareholder 
The managers participating in the preliminary interviews offered a wide 
range of responses when questioned on the advantages and disadvantages of 
having the WA government as the sole shareholder in Western Power. 
Advantages included: more commercial strength due to government backing, 
for example, by leveraging off the govemment credit rating meant acr,?ss to 
cheaper finance; increased returns to government (and hence the people of WA) 
through more efficient and profitable business operations; assets (i.e., the 
electricity utility) remained in the hands of the community; there was now 
greater concern for the environment and individual customers (i.e., increased 
community awareness); and business decisions made by the government with 
regard to the electricity industry, such as tariff setting, were generally made in 
the best inten?sts of the community. Some participants considered that having 
the state government as sole shareholder made it easier for the executive to 
understand the government's expectations. 
Identified disadvantages included the difficulty in resolving politically 
sensitive issues, such as easements for transmission lines through national 
parks and other environmental issues such as vegetation clearing. As one 
manager stated ... public pressure rmd political motives dn'vr. govern111e11t a11d tltus 
blllrs tlie lines of expectatio11s. Other disadvantages cited were: government 
interference in tenns of employee numbers, forcing many vacancies to go 
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unfilled; business decisions and board membership; the government setting the 
agenda on issues such as tariffs, dividends and executive salaries; government 
influences on spending, for example, for capital and operating expenditure. 
The government can also overrule Western Power decisions regarding new 
businl•ss ventures and partnerships. 
Having the government as sole shareholder was also seen as inviting 
interference from other government departments, such as community services 
groups with regards to fixing of tariffs and debt recovery and the Treasury with 
regards to investment and borrowing restrictions. Some of the managers 
interviewed considered the state government viewed Western Power ... /!S a 
forge busiuess lo ltelp willr !',Oda/ policies a11d slate ,fei,e/opment and ... a piggiJ bank 
from whicll i11cre11sed divideuds could be drawu. Finally, Western Power was 
perceived to be responsible for the cost of community service obligations 
(CSO's) imposed on it by the government. However, many considered CSO's 
should be provided for through the taxation system, thus allowing Western 
Power to act more commerciall)'. One manager commented that ... Western 
Power /ms greater commrrdal restrictions limn comparable private orgm1isatio11s. 
Impact of corporatisation on role as manager 
Participants were also asked to describe the impact of corporatisation 
and the government as sole owner on their roles as managers. Most considered 
that the government as sole owner ... clouds the rfedsiou-making process Jrori, 
purely commercial to Ille issues of om11ers/1ip and possible interfi.'l'wce. They 
considered there was more focus on individual customers who now have the 
right to appeal directly to the minister or to take up issues with the regulator, 
and this can impact on how managers run their business units. Some 
contrasted this with private companies ... wliere 01Jly commercial issues apply a11d 
1101 political ones. 
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Managers were more aware of the potential for political interference by 
politicians and other government departments. They considered their roles 
were affected by an additional need for constant awareness of current 
government policy; community concerns; environmental issues; government 
reporting requirements; and what is happening in other government 
departments. Additionally, managers reported that considerable time was now 
spent on handling ministerials, that is, responding to public complaints and 
questions from other organisations through political channels such as 
government ministl'l'S. 
The managers were also aware of the potential for political interference 
in business decisions such as the rationalisation of seJVices in country areas 
because of the affects on local communities. They claimed that prior to 
corporatisation, SECWA was manage,d geographically with depots and 
customer service centres distributed throughout the South West interconnected 
system. With corporatisation this has changed to a costed supply basis to better 
recognise the profitable and non-profitable areas of the organisation. The 
managers claimed that L1iey are now tasked with concentrating on the profitable 
areas and paying less attention to the non-profitable ones, resulting in all but a 
few depots outside the metropolitan area remaining. Some managers 
considered that local communities see social and community responsibilities as 
more important than economic reasons for maintaining costly regional depots 
and payment centres. TI1is, they claimed, impedes the benefits of technical and 
strategic business change. 
All of the managers interviewed considered the most significant driver 
for change in the energy industry to be commercialisation They thought that 
they now placed a greater emphasis on improving customer servict! and were 
more aware of business costs and the need for competitive costing in the supply 
and delivery of services. This required them to analyse the market in terms of 
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competition, financial performance, organisational efficiency, stakeholder 
management, customer service and shareholder dividends, as one senior 
manager claimed .. . prior to corporatisah"o11 we were merely diligent p11blic servallls -
inward /ookiug ami 11011-competiti,ie. Corporatisatio11 /ms made us think like private 
e11terpn"se i.e., look for extra sales aud add 11alue lo assets. Finally, the managers alEo 
believed that commercialisation meant there was now a greater need to ensure 
employee awareness of Western Power's commercial role and its public image 
to customers and the community. 
Most of the managers, however, expressed concern that 
commercialisation had come at the expense of technical excellence. The 
majority of managers at Western Power are engineers, but this career choice 
was now taking second place to their new role as resource managers where 
they have greater respDnsibility for human as well as financial resources. TI1ey 
claimed that corporatisation has placed a greater focus on the bottom-line: they 
must now develop codes of conduct and employee management standards. 
TI1ey are now responsible for human resource issues such as recruitment, 
employment, employee contracts, training, performance management and 
terminations, all of which the managers claimed were formerly the province of 
human resource managers. The managers also noted that human resource 
accountabilities and reporting requirements had increased, but corporatisation 
had bought about more flexibility and freedom to do things within the 
organisation, such as directly negotiate staff contracts and salary. For example, 
managers were now directly involved in negotiations for certified agreements 
with salaried employees. 
All the managers interviewed considered that commercialisation 
introduced with corporatisation had resulted in a reduction in bureaucracy and 
rule application. One manager claimed that ... there is 1ww more emplmsis 011 
business 11eeds1 niles come secoud a11d ca,z readily be cl11111ged. Managers reported 
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that there was now a greater emphasis on financial planning and accountability. 
For example, pre-corporatisation, the focus was on budget allocations and 
spending. now the focus was on profit and loss cost accounting, strict budget 
control and taxation and financial reporting as per corporate requirements. A 
few described frustration over missed business opportunities due to the 
govenunent enforcement of five-year budget plans for capital which could not 
be varied ... ,m/ess it suited tlie government. However, such variations usually 
cost more than any likely return on expenditure, for example, the installation of 
generating equipment in remote areas or line extensions to commercially 
unviable customers. One senior manager daimed that government interference 
in the budgetary process ... affected 1/ie strategies for capital mid operntiug spend-
plnns mid removed tlte jlexibi/il:lJ to den/ wit/1 nd /we 1111plm111ed changes. Most saw 
this as impeding the introduction of new technology and processes as the 
opportunities presented. Finally, some considered budget inflexibility as a 
cause for concern when unplanned events such as storms or bushfires ... strained 
already scmit funds. This, they claL-ned, left managers with no alternative but to 
spend scarce time preparing business cases for budget variations. 
Some of the managers intetviewed thought that they now had 
contradictory objectives. For example, they now had to act in a commercial 
manner, but were expected to respond to non-commercial objectives set within 
the organisation, and, in some cases by government. For example, direct 
government requests to act in a non-commercial manner included supplying 
electricity at and below cost to some large businesses, or, the carrying out of 
community servic<> obligations and issues of significant capital expenditure 
which ... appear to beuefit ouly selected businesses. Not all the managers were 
supportive of commercialisation and business profits. Some indicated a 
preference for the past where managers in government agencies were public 
servants where their role was ... serving the public, 1101 tlie fimmcial needs of a 
commercial orga11isntion. They further considered that in order to provide the 
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public with reliable qua1ity electricity they should not be impeded by budget 
restrictions. However, when questioned further on this, all conceded that some 
cost control was necessary. Also, they did not want to see their salaries 
returned to pre-mrporal:isation levels. 
Involvement in the introduction of corporatisation 
The managers participating in the preliminary interviews were 
questioned regarding their personal involvement in the changes associated with 
the introduction of corporatisation into Western Power. Four claimed to have 
been involved, but only through their nonnal work function at the time. For 
example, some were already working in a human resource function set up to 
identify employee issues associated with corporatisation, or were involved in 
strategic planning processes and meetings designed to identify strategic 
direction for the new company. The managers who indicated no involvement 
in the introduction of corporatisation claimed they were not invited or included 
in any formal discussions. Most claimed that prior to corporatisation very few 
managers below general manager level were consulted or had the opporhmity 
to be involved in the introduction of corporatisation and the associated culture 
change program FOCUS into Western Power. One manager thought that the 
reason for such secree1; was because of the debacle of the FORS where branch 
managers had openly demonstrated a dear dislike of the changes and had not 
willingly participated in them. Although the FOCUS change program was to be 
presented to all Western Power staff the executive chose the team to continue 
the presentations after the consultants had finished the initial introduction, 
leaving little opporhmity for others to be involved. Most other managers 
claimed that, apart from information published in the press and what could be 
gleaned from the 'grapevine,' they only found out about the new organisational 
5 5 functional and Organisational Revit."W underlnken in SECWA in L,te 1988 and early 1989 with 
particular emphasis on reducing levels o/ ma1111gcmcnl and decentralising decision making. Sec du,plc, 
two fo, details. 
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stTucture and reporting hierarchies when it suited senior management to tell 
them. One claimed that this was ... wlieu lie saw vacrmdes ,uk'l.7tised, and another 
reported that he was notified at a planning meeting where he was told ... you 
will /cam lo /i,,e with it (corporalisation). 
Corporate performance 
The managers were asked about their perceptions of corporate 
performance, in terms of productivity, efficiency and effectiveness, since 
corporatisation. Most considered there had been a significant change in 
emphasis from the way performance was measured. The methods of data 
measurement had become more complex, making it difficult in som;:- instances 
to compare past performance measurements with the current ones. For 
example, new technology which had provided a relatively easy measurement of 
quality of supply was now a key performance indicator. Some managers 
considered that the performance measures used wer.:> erroneous and not 
standardised across the electTicity supply industry. For example, the customer 
per employee ratio for which there was no tTue industry-standard. However, 
all agTeed that there were indicators that had proved that productivity had 
improved substantially. Examples were fewer employees; higher profits; 
increased returns to shareholder; no increases in electTicity prices for some 
years; and improvements in financial, environmental, technical and safety 
performance. 
The managers were asked if they believed corporatisation has had any 
impact on performance, in terms of improved productivity, efficiency and 
ef[~tiveness, in Western Power since 1995. Although all agreed that 
performance had improved and most believed it was attributable to 
corporatisation, one manager considered ... it would luive lmppeued a11yway and 
corporatisntio11 merely made it easier to ac/1iei>e. Others believed that the benefits 
delivered to customers since corporatisation could have been achieved without 
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corporatisation. that is, with the appropriate reform of SECWA and with a 
suitably experienced CEO. Yet others considered that tariffs would probably 
rise after tlie /w11ey1110011 or of the organisation was further disaggregated or 
privatised. Significantly, all the managers considered that corporatisation had 
allowed a sharper focus on competition, customers and financial accountability. 
One manager claimed that . .. a11y i11drpe11de11t orga11isatio11 free of the p11blic sen.rice 
etltos would luwe fomid it easier lo 11111ke the to11g/1 and hard dedsions 11ecesSl!nJ for 
productivity improi,ement. The majority of managers however, saw 
corporatisation as the key driving force for making the change from a 
government department to a commercially focused, competitive business. They 
considered that corporatisation, driven by market structure and 
commercialisation, was absolutely fundamental to performance improvements. 
They also considered that both the organisation and employees were more 
commercially focused and had a better understanding of the business direction. 
One manager claimed that ... empl01;ees are working beyo11d tlreir areas of aut/writy 
to satisf,J fire customer. 17rere are less limn lmlf tire mmiber of people ,ww doing tire 
same or more work limn before. 
5.4.2 Management system and organisational changes 
Change management 
In exploring the managers' understanding of the process fer, introducing 
change into the organisation it was found that most viewed it as a responsibility 
which was managed by only a few people, mostly senior management 
appointed by the ex(..::utive. Most saw the method by which FOCUS was 
introduced into Western Power as u prime example of introducing change, and 
the selected teams chosen by the executive to run the FOCUS workshops as an 
example of managing that change. All the managers agreed that the 
introduction of FOCUS and corresponding management system changes had 
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resulted in a significant culture change throughout the organisation. The 
majority were in favour of organisational changes and the introduction of new 
management systems provided there was clear benefit for them and the 
organisation. They also considered that the need for the changes and the 
executive's intentions must be clearly communicated to all staff prior to 
implementation of any changes, but this was rarely done in Western Power. 
All of the interviewees believed that the introduction of new 
management systems often required considerable effort and attention on the 
part of those given the responsibility for introducing them. It was reported that 
in some cases those who were selected to manage the change project were taken 
'off-line', that is, their sole role was to manage the introduction and 
implementation of the change at the corporate level. It was often left to branch 
and business unit managers to manage the introduction, training and 
implementation of the new systems into their work areas. For the branch and 
business unit managers their involvement with change management often 
meant additional responsibilities and aP. increase in workload as it was rare for 
these managers to be freed from their normal duties. For this reason four of 
those interviewed indicated a reluctance to become involved with change 
management at any level, and seven indicated a reluctance to get involved 
unless it was part of their performance targets and therefore linked to their 
remuneration. Performance targets as part of performance management is 
discussed further in section 5.4.8. 
Management system changes 
The managers were asked to identify what they considered to be the 
most important management system changes that had been introduced into 
Western Power since corporatisation. They identified 14 new management 
systems and 5 key business strategies which they considered important in 
supporting management reform in temlS of influencing their role as a manager, 
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'I 
their abmJ: to meet performance targets and their work.loads. They were: 
Ii 
• FOCU:':, (Focus on Organisational 01ange Understanding and Skills - a 
culture'.' change program introduced with the corporatisation of Western 
Power); 
• MLI (}~anagerial Leadership Initiative); 
ii 
• Change Management (introduction and i.,nplementation of branch and 
busine:ls unit restructuring); 
• Transformation (a restructuring and cultural change programme introduced 
to only the generation segment of Western Power); 
• Strategic .Planning (at divisional and bmnch levels); 
• TEAlvI (111e Employee Achievemrmt Measure - a performance management 
system); 
• SIRSS (Strategically Integrated Recruibnent and Selection System); 
• SLA (Service Level Agreements); 
• SVA (Shareholder Value Adding - a system for evaluating the financial 
viability of capital expenditure); 
• MIMS {Mimcom Information Management System - the main IT system 
used in Western Power); 
• Customer Focus (emphasises the importance of satisfying the needs and 
expectations of customers); 
• Commercialisation (developing and operating business in an open and 
competitive business environment); 
• Financial Accountability (accountability for capital and operating budgets); 
Md 
• New Technology (a wide range of IT applications introduced to automate 
and improve systems of work). 
187 
In addition to the above, some of the managers also identified 
Benchmarking Business Unit Perfonnance, Environniental Issues, Contracting 
Out of Services, ConlTaCt Labour and the Pursuit of Unregulated Income as 
strategies for business improvement. 
The manag,~rs claimed that new management systems and business 
strategies occupied a large portion of their time in terms of introduction, 
implementation, training, etc. All of the managers reported that the 
introduction of any new system usually resulted in them having to learn the 
new system, often outside normal working hours in order to apply it and to 
enable them to train others. Furthermore, the introduction of new systems 
often meant more work for them in terms of having to write new processes and 
procedures, manage IT projects and budgets associated with the new systems 
and manage staff issues such as lack of skills, under~resourcing and complaints 
of increased workload. Some of the managel'S interviewed expressed 
annoyance over the introduction of new management systems and business 
strategies because there had been no improvement to their remuneration or 
position even though in some instances workloads had increased by more than 
forty percent as a r~sult. Furthermore, they claimed that much of this 
additional work often went unrepC1rted in their performance reviews. The 
reason they gave for this was that some of the changes were i.Htroduced after 
their perfonnance targets had been set, and were often concluded twelve to 
twenty four months later. They considered that the low number of 
performance reviews, often only one for the year, did not help either. 
Communication of changes and involvement in their introduction 
The managers were asked to describe how the new management systems 
and organisational changes were communicated to them and their involvement 
in the implementation of those changes. Most considered that the 
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communication of changes within the organisation had been top-down and 
very poorly managed, particularly during the critical years leading up to and 
immediately after corporatisation (1994 - 1995). In contrast to the low level of 
information received prior to corporatisation, most managers considered that 
they had been adequately informed about the changes introduced since 1997. 
However, communication was still mostly top-down and some reported that 
they still had concerns over the communication of minor changes within some 
divisions and branches. Furthermore, the majority of managers considered that 
there was only limited consultation between senior management and them 
prior to any change being introduced, and this situation did not improve until 
af~r the introduction of the introduction of the Managerial Leadership 
Initiative (MLI) in 2000. The methods used to communicate changes within the 
organisation included: workshops, corporate videos, Power People (an internal 
magazine), Power Net (electronic distribution of information using desktop 
PCs), written and verbal presentations by HR and senior management 
representatives, e-mail (electronic mail), involvement in strategic planning; 
notice boards and the informal word of mouth 'grapevine'. 
The managers thought that since corporatisation the executive and senior 
management had adopted a more participatory approach to tl1e introduction of 
change which had slightly improved thefr opportunities to be involved in the 
introduction of new management systems and organisational changes, but 
while most welcomed the opportunity, not all wanted it. They claimed that 
they were discournged from being involved because it took their attention away 
from their core job, and any time that they spent with such activities meant 
more time that they had to work after hours in order to catch up with their 
normal work. Significantly, while some did not want to be involved with the 
introduction of new management systems and change, all of the interviewees 
believed it was important for tl,em to be involved or at least have a say in what 
changes were being planned and how they would be introduced into their areas 
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of responsibility. The four managers whc indicated they had been involved 
, with the introduction of new management systems into Western Power claimed 
their involvement had been at a higher level and mostly related to strategic 
planning at either a divisional or branch level. This high level of involvement 
had also meant being part of the decision-making process and being on the 
project teruns which introduced the new systems, provided training etc. 
Reasons for ongoing management system changes 
Managers were asked what they considered to be the main reasons for 
ongoing management system changes in Western Power over the past six years. 
The managers believed the main reasons were changing markets; changing 
expectations and needs of people and society; constantly changing energy 
infrastructure; and deregulation of the electricity supply industry providing for 
competition through independent generators and retailers. 
Changing technology was also seen as a key reason for the changes. One 
manager gave an example of new generating plant which required less people, 
but increased technology to operate them. A few of the managers considered 
improvement such as seeking new business in the form of unregulated incom~, 
i.e., marketing of engineering design and construction expertise, and enhancing 
existing business as important in staving off the perceived threat of 
disaggregation and privatisation. One manager stated, ... if we do11't perform to 
gauer11111e11t (owners) expectntiom Western Power will be broken up n11d sold off. 
Benefits of management system and organisational changes 
Section 5.4.1 analysed from a macro level perspective the managers' 
perceptions of who were the main beneficiaries from the corporatisation of 
Western Power and why. 'Ibis section analyses the managers' perceptions from 
t..fi.e micro level perspective, and seeks their views of the benefits arising from 
the management system and organisational changes introduced since 
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corporatisation. The question was asked in order to give the managern an 
opportunity to describe and expand upon the changing nature of their roles, 
and issues affecting their working life from a personal perspective. 
All the participants considered that Western Power had benefited frum 
management system changes in some form or another. Identified benefits 
included: employees now more customer focused with a better understanding 
of business needs and imperatives; the move from a bureaucratic government 
enterprises to a commercial corporation had provided improved service 
delivery to customers; the introduction of strategic planning which had 
sharpened senior management focus on what is important to the business. The 
managers also considered that the changes which followed FOCUS had 
released much untapped talent such as innovation, business, financial and 
marketing skills that had previously been suppressed under the old (SECW A) 
system. Finally, most reiterated the belief that, with increasing deregulation 
and.competition, change is necessary in order for Western Power to survive as a 
government-owned organisation. 
While all thought that Western Power !tad benefited significantly from 
the changes, they identified areas where th~re has been little or no benefit, and 
in some cases, negative benefit. For example, the greater emphasis on cost 
management and return on investment had led to some fringe and rural 
customers being disadvantaged. With increasing pressure to reduce budgets, 
system reinforcements and key maintenance had been neglected in some rural 
areas in favour of urban and industrial areas where the return on investment 
was much higher. 
Significantly, some of the managers interviewed considered that 
successive organisational change since corporatisation had gradually led to an 
over concentration of intellectual capital on the commercial side of tl1e business 
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compared to the technical side. This is not surprising since the majority of 
management positions were predominantly held by engineers prior to 
corporatisation. Since corporatisation many new management positions have 
gone to people from IT and financial backgrounds. Some interviewees 
considered that the increase in non-engineering based management positions 
had led to a weakening of engineering skills and a shortage of engineers due to 
a lack of promotional opportunities. Some claimed that the decrease in 
engineers had increased their workload and made their job difficult, sometimes 
at the expense of personal life. It had also led to the contracting out of many 
core activities. 
When questioned as to how the organisational changes could have been 
done differently, interviewees noted that staff reductions were handled poorly, 
that there should have been more consultation with front-line managers and 
staff and a less haphazard approach to selection and application This resulted 
in some managers expressing disappointment over the ad hoc way in which 
staff were shed, resulting in many of them losing key staff whilst having to 
retain poor performers. They claimed that often only a few managers were 
involved in the change process. One manager claimed, ... there wM little 
ccmszlltatio1~ wost just hnd to accept it (the change). It would ltave been better if more 
were iuvolved. A few claimed that some key changes were handled at the 
divisional level, applying different rules to those that would have applied to the 
whole corporation. They claim that tl1is resulted in confusion over different 
performance requirements and outcomes across the organisation. Also, some 
managers reported that there was insufficient effort by senior management to 
pass on the changes or even provide adequate resources for their 
implementation. One manager claimed, .. . tlzeir responsibility suddenly becnrrte our 
problem, theiJ would just drop the change manifest 011 our desk and nm. 
Finally, the pace of change within the organisation was criticised by 
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some of the managers who held the view that, ... cltnnges /mue bee11 slow, 
incomplete 1111d rnrely rl!i11forced by se11ior mmmgewent. They cited the introduction 
of performance management (TEAM) and the introduction of new technology 
such as the Document Management System (OMS) and Mimcom Information 
Management System (MIMS) across the organisation as examples of slowly 
introduced, incomplete and rarely reinforced management systems. They 
considered sen;or management should have put more effort into 'selling' the 
changes and in providing appropriate training. 
Impact of changes on managers' roles 
The managers' perceptions of the impact of corporatisation on their roles 
from a macro level perspective were analysed in section 5.4.1. This section 
analyses from a micro level perspective the impact on managers' roles ol 
organisational changes introduced since corporatisation. The question was 
asked in order to give the managers an opportunity to describe and expand 
upon the changing nature of their roles, and issues affecting their working life 
from a personal perspective. It was found during the interviews that the 
managers used this question to elaborate further on issues they had raised 
previously. However, at the risk of repetition this was considered too 
important by the researcher to omit from the data analysis. 
All the managers indicated that they now have multifaceted roles which 
impack"'<i negatively on their personal lives, but positively on their dealings 
with senior management, peers and staff. However, many of the managers 
considered that role clarity were still an issue for them and considered that their 
roles had been poorly communicated to them. Some claimed that because of 
this much of the work they did was similar to what they had done prior to 
corporatisation, nevertheless, they saw a weakening of their technical skills as a 
result of a stronger focus on comrnercialliation and financial accountability. 
While others considered that in addition to their technical skills they must 
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improve their commercial skills as well. They all agreed that they must now be 
competent in financial matters; teclmology; customer service; service quality; 
marketing and sales; human resources, including selection recruitment and 
training; health and safety; environment.al and statutory requirements; and 
leadership. All of these roles were reported by the managers to have grown in 
importance in response to increasing government and community expectations 
and increased business competition. 
A key issue to emerge from the preliminary interviews was 
commercialisation where managers now have to be more cost focused; have a 
greater awareness of commercial drivers, competition and financial 
performance; be more rigorous with budgeting processes; have a greater focus 
on value adding and the bottom-line, along with the introduction of the concept 
of shareholder value adding (SV A). All tl,e interviewees considered this to 
require a much greater focus on business objectives. They also felt that they 
must keep up witl, technological and organisational change or get left behind. 
They perceived that there was an increased focus on their personal 
accountability through performance management (TEAM) and management 
contracts administered by senior management and executive. Most reported 
that they felt compelled to learn new skills, however, there were mixed 
opinions as to who should provide the necessary training and funding. Also, 
and most significantly, many of the participants considered that tedmical 
managers were being forced to be business managers and leaders first and 
engineers last, often with little or no training. Finally, they thought tl,at they 
were now viewed by senior management as change leaders, and that they must 
effectively communicate and implement business imperatives and the new 
business systems and organisational changes to their staff. 
Key issues identified by the managers as having a negative impact on 
their roles, in terms of increased responsibility and workload and the need to 
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acquire new skills, included: increased accountability and reporting 
requirements; a greater emphasis on business needs e.g., reducing bureaucracy 
and rule application; tighter control on staff levels and increased technology in 
lieu of staff; customer focus i.e., greater emphasis on customer service and 
customer satisfaction; the introduction of the concept of stakeholder 
management whereby stakeholder management at all levels, within and 
external to the organisation, becomes a key business imperative; increased 
contracting out of services, due to ongoing staff reductions and the loss of key 
skills from within the organisation; greater emphasis on strategic thinking and 
planning; less focus on technical issues and technical excellence i.e., a departure 
from total quality management, a keystone of FOCUS; less inward looking and 
more competitive such as the introduction of market discipline. lil describing 
the impact of conunercialisation on his role, one manager claimed that he now 
... only added assets and increased system supply capndti; where there was a 
guaranteed rehm1 011 investment, whereas in the past we often factored in spare 
capadty during tlie desig,1 phase to allow for expected load growt/1. 
Performance management using TEAM was seen to have significantly 
increased managers' workload with the setting of individual performance 
targets for each employee, conducting regular reviews and focusing on the 
individual's perfonnance as well as the perfonnance of the group as a whole. 
All agreed that perfonn11J1ce management required a greater emphasis on 
people management and people Issues. Many found this difficult due to their 
acknowledged lack of people 11J1d leadership skills. This has forced some 
managers, who were traditionally technical experts, to seek additional training 
in areas such as leadership, performance management, conflict resolution, 
negotiation and counselling to handle employment matters such as career paths 
training and job opportunities. 
Technological change was found to impact positively on the role of 
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managers because it generated more data to help with decision-making. It also 
provided decision support systems and sophisticated modelling tools which 
were important to managers. Important technology changes included the 
provision of PCs on every desk which were linked via servers and wide area 
networks (WAN) to all parts of the organisation. Also, the introduction and use 
of common software applications across the organisation made it easier to send 
and retrieve information from key stakeholders within and external to the 
organisation. With information tedmology budget and expenditure data is 
available daily which streamlines account billing and other financial services. 
Some managers also reported that the technology assisted with power system 
design and operation, condition monitoring, system fault location and reporting 
and enables staff reductions. 
Technology changes also included the introduction of e-mail, mobile 
telephones and laptop computers. Managers reported that e-mails, while 
improving internal and external communications also took up two to three 
hours per day. Some managers reported that they had become virtual slaves to 
e-mail whereby the majority of their daily tasks were done at their desk creating 
and responding to e-mails. It was reported that this method of communication 
had taken precedence within the organisation over other forms of 
communication to the point where many managers were passing even simple 
instructions to staff via e-mail, even though the staff were located only a few 
metres away. When questioned further on this, most agreed that while e-mail 
had increased their workload it had provided them with a system for 
communicating wiU1 a large number of people at the same time. Almost all 
managers reported that having a mobile phone and lap-top computer has 
meant that they are now doing more work at home. Some expressed concern 
that this practice had a negative impact on their family life and leisure time, but 
consider it was expected of them as part of U1eir job. Managers felt pressed to 
keep up-to-date with the changing technology. Finally, technology had brought 
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a whole range of new responsibilities such as staff training. security and access 
to and abuse of information. These issues are discussed further in section 5.4.8. 
5.4.3 Financial accountability 
Financial account.ability was viewed by all the managers as fundamental 
to their jobs and the major means of account.ability for all managers. They now 
felt more account.able due to a sharper focus on the bottom-line, i.e., reducing 
costs and spending within budgets. All agreed that the emphasis had shifted 
from purely financial budgets to a strategic planning approach lo identify how 
business plans impact on the budget, but this required a very good 
understanding of the cost structures driven by corporate strategic planning. 
Not only was there a cost management focus but also a focus on return on 
revenue. Financial accountability was therefore a motivator for them to prepare 
precise budgets, to review them monthly, to control expenditure and to be 
accountable for outcomes. 
Managers had found that the new budgeting systems and financial 
accountability were complex and often required people with specialist 
knowledge and skills, particularly during budget planning. Some financial 
programs were aimed at reducing risk, increasing revenue, disposing of assets 
and managing the corporation's debt to equity ratio. New systems such as 
activity based costing were introduced to help managers gain better financial 
visibility, for example, labour and material costs in maintenance areas. The 
Nlimcom Information Management System (MIMS) which linked a multitude of 
previously separate systems, such as, budgeting, payroll and awards, 
purchasing and stores, project management, asset management, and asset 
maintenance. All the respondents considered that the introduction of :MIMS 
into Western Power had been poorly conceived, planned and implemented, for 
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instance there was very little introduction or training prior to its 
implementation in July 2000. This resulted in valuable time being spent 
learning the system and helping staff to cope with it. 
Some managers thought that Western Power was good on financial 
accountability but poor at the pricing of services and cost recovery, particularly 
with pricing and cost recovery associated with requests from customers for 
increased supply, such as, larger cables or transformers supplying eleclTidty to 
their businesses to cater for business expansion. The managers contended that 
cost recovery was pursued on an ad hoc basis, and true costs were rarely 
recovered. They suggested that low levels of empowerment, interference by 
senior manc1gement, and senior rnanag',:,c_ent reluctance to apply strict business 
procedures was the main reason for this problem. Reluctance was atlTibuted to 
fears that aggrieved customers would seek a political solution through the 
Minister. 
Another concern expressed by some about financial accountability was 
that budgets were not being developed simultaneously with strategic planning 
even though the two were linked. Therefore, business plans set by strategic 
planning rarely aligned with the budget cycle, resulting in constant tinkering 
with budgets throughout the year. Government calls for increased dividends 
from Western Power and tighter budget constraints were also cited as concerns 
for managers because of the constraints it imposed on capital and operating 
expenditure. This was particularly evident on the engineering side of the 
organisation where managers claimed that budget cuts meant reassessing the 
risk to the business for work not done. One manager claimed that successive 
budget cuts had resulted in a significant reduction in inspections and 
maintenance throughout the rural distribution system. Finally, a few managers 
reported that the ongoing restructuring within Western Power had left them in 
control of, and accountable for budgets that had been set by others during a 
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previous structure and for a different business purpose. 
5.4.4 Strategic plapning 
All the managers interviewed knew of the strategic planning process 
within Western Power. However, not all were involved with strategic planning 
and some did not view it. as an impo~tant part of their work. Their opinions of 
strategic planning included: ... helping people to focus 011 current stmtegic issues; 
... should inrlude lower ma1111ge111e11t levels ill tlte stmlegic planning process; ... it is 
only re/ev1mt to lite executive level; ... all staff levels should be involved in strategic 
planning, ... allows for a wider view of the Jn1si11ess plans; .. . ba/m1ced· scorecard 
methodolog11 better, however it is still Jlot really robust; .. .it (strategic planning) is a 
fad, better t/11111 the last (SECWA), but not muclz; and .:.tlie process is evo(vi11g, it is a 
mdimenhmJ process tlmt does not recog11ise tire lmrd realities of f11l11re competitors. 
Otl1er views of strategic planning were that it was a one mod£! fits all 
process which was difficult to adapted at business unit level and that it should 
include branch and business unit levels. That is, some managers saw strategic 
planning as a process handed down by top management with littl.e involvement 
or input by line managers. However, others claimed that Western Power had a 
strong strategic planning process, but there were weaknesses in its application 
in tliat it did not link directly to the budget process. Therefore, branch and 
divisional budgets were often not aligned to the corporate strategic plan. 
Strategic planning was found to impact significantly on some of the 
managers' roles who indicated during the interviews that they spent up to 
fifteen percent of their time identifying the core elements of strategic plans and 
including them in their business plans and processes. This included having to 
realign budgets with strategic plans and meant having to neglect some core 
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operational activities. They reported that achieving performance targets and 
business unit objectives which often shifted during strategic planning and 
budget cycles placed added pressure on them. Two managers claimed that low 
staff morale, high staff turnover and skills shortages were all related, to some 
degree, to poorly applied strategic planning and. budgets. 
Two of the managers expressed concerns about political interference 
from both the minister and other government departments such as Energy 
Safety and Environmental Protection which both directly and indirectly 
Pressured senior managers to change their strategic plans often after they were 
considered finalised. Examples of this pressure included the government 
requiring a higher dividend than previously indicated, or a reduction of certain 
tariffs, or Energy Safety requiring upgrades and improvements to the 
distribution system. These requirements impacted either directly or indirectly 
on capital and operating budgets. Although some managers claimed they had 
an involvement with divisional and branch planning, most indicated a 
reluctancP. to take responsibility for the outcomes of corporate strategic 
planning set by senior management and the executive with no little or no input 
from them. This often resulted in branch plans and business objectives being 
interpreted differently from the corporate plan. For example capital 
replacement of assets not identified in the corporate plan. 
5.4.5 Competition and customer focus 
All the managers saw that the greater competitiveness for customers and 
increased accountability for business unit costs impacted on their roles. For 
example, they were expected to deliver on measurables such as cost 
management, cost reduction, customer service, and technical and commercial 
innovation. They now had to regularly review infrastructure and budgets in 
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order to do more with less. They now had to become more commercially 
focused and compete with businesses outside of Western Power, for instance by 
increasing unregulated income through external work such as engineering 
design, project management, eleclTical construction and maintenance. 
Customer focus was considered to include ... a better mufersfmtding of 
customer needs, wmzagi11g C11sto111er's expectations mid co11st1mt improvements in 
customer service fW/ir,en;. One manager claimed, ... cuslomrr focus was aba11t 
ide11tifijing tlie 11eeds and requireme11ts of the customers rwd delivering better t/um 
acceptable products. Some managers considered customer focus to be a cultural 
change moving from the previous SECWA culture of"take it or leave it'' to the 
new Western Power customer satisfaction culture. This view however was not 
supported by all. One manager claimed ... C11sto111er focus ca11 be an obsession by 
111111111geme,1,t and 11of necessarily cost beneficial to Westrr11 Power. An example of 
this was the money spent on sponsorships and advertising in order to attract 
and retain domestic customers, where Western Power was still the sole 
provider and likely to be so for some years to come. 
All the managers interviewed claimed that customer focus had a 
significant impact on their roles. It increased their duties and responsibilities 
through the net!d to continually question and review the way things were done 
within their business unit. Customer focus also required understanding of new 
rules and standards. The managers explained that previously, ... We set tlie 
sfandards and tlie world accepted that. Now, since corporatisation, customers' 
expectatio11s have c/umged, tli!Jlj want a say ill tire service tliey are provided. So there 
was an increased need to communicate with and satisfy both intemal and 
extemal customers which ... 11ieans you lmve to go and talk to people. Can't sit back 
a11d wait far work and issues lo come to you. A further new requirement was to 
respond to customers' requests and to track and report on job progress. They 
had to improve the training and management of their staff to be more customer 
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aware, as one manager explained, ... there was a need to keep our people involved 
and foctised 011 t/Je e11stomer. This is difficult considering past customer practices. 
Ven; 11111ch a e11lt11re c'1a11ge, we must manage stakelwlders a11d c11sto111ers well. 
5.4.6 Contractors and contracting out of services 
Managers were asked their views on the increasing use of contract 
labour within Western Power and if it had impacted on their roles as managers. 
Most considered it made their role easier as they have more authority over 
contractors, as one manager said, ... if tile contractors don't perform tltey are 
termi1mted. They viewed the use of internal contractors as n"Cessary in order for 
Western Power to conduct its business with an increasingly smaller workforce. 
One manager claimed, ... sometimes tliere are 110 available iuteriml staff with tlte 
required skills to do the job and co11tractors becoute necessary. 
The main perceived benefits of contract labour included: peak·lopping of 
resource requirements during busy periods, i.e., employing contract labour 
when workloads are high, or 'peaked' and putting them off when workloads 
are normalised or low; the avoidance of awards and award conditions thereby 
giving managers greater freedom when choosing contractors and assigning 
tasks; contract labour being a means to bi:eak the power of organised labour; 
and the use of contract Jabour for non.core activities was freeing up key staff to 
seek new business. 
However, all the managers inteiviewed considered that the hiri11g a11d 
firing of contractors and setting rules w/Jicli tltey must abide had moderately 
increased their workload. Managers reported they now had to manage 
:individual employment contracts for the contractors and carefully select 
contractor training to ensure that internal staff were not disadvantaged and that 
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the training delivered was value for money. Other ~oncerns expressed by 
managers over the use of contract labour included: the generally increased 
labour costs associated with contract labour had impacted on projects and 
budgets; and the loss of expertise and skills from Western Power if core and 
essential work was done by contract labour. One manager reportf:J that eighty 
percent of his staff were contractors. Reliance on short term contracts and 
sometimes shortages in availability also caused concern for managers. Other 
concerns included difficulties in focusing contract labour on business objectives 
and complaints from full-time staff who believed that contractnrs got 
preferential treatment by way of office accommodation, training, choice jobs 
and higher salaries. 
Managers were questioned about their views on the contracting out of 
services that were traditionally provided from within Western Power. 
Contracting out non-core and non-strategic work was acceptable to most, but 
only ... providing tliere w11s clear eco11omic benefit to do so and where it does 1101 affect 
tlte competitive11ess of tlze b11si11ess. For example, the use of contractors for peak 
workloads and specialist functions to meet deadlines using fewer full-time 
equivalent employees was deemed acceptable. However, a common theme to 
emerge was that Western Power must retain key resources to do the day-to-day 
core work, e.g., skilled linesman, design engineers and technical staff. 
Significantly, many did not believe that this was happening and they expressed 
concern that important expertise was being lost to Western Power through the 
non-replacement of key staff when they left because of promotion, retirement or 
redundancy. Many senior tedmical roles that were made redundant due to 
restructuring were now being filled by contractors or consultants. Furthermore, 
they believed that the increased use of contractors and the lack of succession 
planning had put at risk the essential skills and experience needed to safely and 
effectively design, construct and maintain Western Power assets. Moreover, 
many expressed concern over the quality of the work being done by some 
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contractors and claimed there was a need for improved auditing and contractor 
accreditation. They claimed that increased plant failures and customer 
interruptions were the direct result of contracting out maintenance work such 
as pole and line inspections, vegetation management and streetlight 
maintenance, etc. 
All interviewees believed that contracting out had brought them 
increased duties and responsibilities through having to plan and manage the 
external contractors' work as well as that of staff. Much of this additional work 
included tenders and specifications and the preparation of contract documents. 
They also reported that they had to specify the work more dearly for 
contractors than for permanent staff. Other issues included: increased planning 
and management responsibilities based mainly on commercial and capital cost 
considerations; insurance consideratioru; and managing risks associated with 
dealing through a third party, i.e., contractor; issues of standardisation and 
consistency of work due to the non-permanence of contractors; having the skills 
to manage contractors or contracts; and the legal implications in terms of 
contract law and health and safety. Finally, most of the managers saw the 
contracting out of services as breaking the psychological concept of a job for life 
and corporate loyalty. 
5.4.7 Key stakeholders since corporati.Bation 
Managers were asked who they considered were Western Power's most 
important stakeholders since corporatisation. They identified a wide range of 
stakeholders which included the state government, i.e., through the Minister for 
Energy; industrial, commercial and domestic customers; other government 
agencies such as the Office of Energy, i.e., as a pseudo regulator, Treasury and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); competitors; the unions; the 
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executive; Western Power managers; and Western Power employees. 
The government was considered to be the most important stakeholder 
because it owns Western Power and is the sole shareholder. The executive and 
board must report to the Minister who can direct policy and influence the 
strategic direction of the organisation. The Minister must approve any tariff 
increases and set the level of dividend payable from Western Power profits. 
This was interpreted by one manager as ... wlint tlie owner wm1ts tl!e owner gets. 
Respondents were mindful of the fact that the government has the power to 
split Western Power into a number of corporate businesses or to privatise it, but 
they thought that the managing director of Western Power wanted it kept a 
vertically integrated organisation. This was considered to be the main driving 
force for Western Power to demonstrate commercial adeptness and to continue 
to improve productivity. 
Customers, whkh included industry, conunercial and domestic 
customers were also seen as important stakeholders because they not only 
provided Western Power with its revenue, but could also influence the way that 
Western Power ran its business. For example, they could appeal or complain to 
the government via their parliamentary representative or go directly to the 
Minister for Energy, the Ombudsman or the Office of Energy if they felt they 
were not getting the quality of supply or service they desired. Also, 
deregulation and competition, essential components of corporatisalion, had 
enabled independent power generators to enter the energy market and sell 
electricity directly to large consumers. This meant that dissatisfied industrial 
customers were able to shift away from Western Power to an alternative 
electricity supplier. 
The Office of Energy, in its role as pseudo regulator, was also considered 
to be an important stakeholder because it could require Western Power to 
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change standards and modify existing work practices under the Electricity Act 
and the Energy Safety Act. These requirements could impact on Western 
Power's resources and influence its position in the market. For example, the 
Office of Energy can influence height of overhead lines and other safety 
clearances. Acco!'ding to some managers compliance in such instances could 
result in budget blowouts. The State Treasury was considered important 
because of the borrowing limitations it could set against Western Power and the 
significant influence it had in the setting of the dividends Western Power paid 
to the state government. Finally, managers considered that the Environmental 
Protection Agency could also have an impact on Western Power through 
environmental issues such as the containment of spills and leaks and vegetation 
management under overhead lines in environmentally sensitive areas. As one 
manager indicated, .. . t/ieij (Environmental Protection Agency) could be ven; ltard 
ou 11s if theiJ dmse to be picky. 
Competitors were considered by most of the interviewees to be 
important stakeholders for Western Power because of the influence they have 
over its strategic plans and commercial operations. However, some believed 
that business competitors have not yet gained significant benefits from the 
corporatisation of Western Power because of network access problems and 
government delays in introducing full electricity deregulation. This has 
excluded many potential new entrants into in the generation and retail sectors 
and has enabled Western Power to continue to be the monopoly provider. 
Many of interviewees considered employees, which included the 
executive, managers and staff, and their representative unions were importa."lt 
stakeholders because of the influence they have on Western Power's economic 
performance and its ability to meet the demands of its key stakeholders. The 
executive were responsible for setting the strategic direction of the organisation, 
for ensuring the organisation was run according to the Companies Code and 
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Practice and ensuring the state government's der.1ands, as owner, were met. 
The respondents considered that managers were important stakeholders 
through their role in the day-to-day ruru,ing of the organisation and through 
the carrying out the executive's plans. Although some believed that unions 
have lost their status in Western Power due to union rationalisation (Cahill, 
1995) introduced in 1995 they still had an important role in the formulation of 
agreements and award variations between employees and the executive. 
Others claimed that depending on the political persuasion of the state 
government in power at the time, unions and employee groups could use the 
government to exert significant influence on Western Power's strategic plans if 
they chose to do so. For example, in the areas of employee numbers, 
restructuring and the introduction of new management systems. Simmons & 
Bramble (1996) had reported that significant union rationalisation had occurred 
during 1984 to 1994 as a result of a prolonged dispute over the restructure and 
corporatisation of the South East Queensland Electricity Board. 
All the managers considered Western Power's ability to meet its 
stakel10lders' expectations had improved significantly since corporatisation. 
This was attributable to greater public awareness of Western Power as a 
corporate body rather than just another government agency, through brand 
naming and marketing, and through a greater staff awareness of stakeholders' 
needs. The managers also believed that meeting stakeholders' expectations 
meant increasing returns to the government; containing electricity tariffs 
through substantial and sustainable cost cuts and business performance 
improvements; continual awareness of prices and competition; high standards 
of employee and public safety; and demonstratable environmental compliance. 
Managers were asked who they considered to be their priority 
stakeholders. They identified customers; the state government; the Office of 
Energy; the managing director and the executive; branch managers; Western 
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Power employees; and other intemal business customers, e.g., other branches 
and section that use their services. As a comparison, managers were asked who 
they considered to be their priority stakeholders seven years ago. Common 
responses included the community and customers, their immediate general 
manager, fellow employees, internal business customers, and major suppliers of 
equipment. Only three managers considered their stakeholders to be the same 
as before corporatisation. 
1be managers were also questioned about changes in their ability to 
meet the expectations of their priority stakeholders. Most considered that there 
was now a wider range of stakeholders who were not a priority seven years 
ago, for example the pseudo regulator (i.e., the Office of Energy) and a 
str€ngthened Environmental Protection Agency, along with increased 
community expectations for Western Power to act as a responsible corporation. 
These, and increased penalties for non-compliance were perceived to have 
driven many of the strategic planning decisions and had added significantly to 
managers' workload. They also now had retail relationships with large 
contestable customers and had to set up co-generation agreements with private 
generators. These, they claimed, required lengthy negotiations and the 
scrutinising of complex contracts for which they were accountable. As a result, 
of increased involvement with stakeholders most of the managers considered 
they were more empowered and had greater authority and accountability than 
seven years ago. Overall, all the managers considered that this had improved 
their business knowledge, clarified their roles and enabled more flexibility to 
address issues such as employee contracts and contractors. 
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5,4.8 Working life issues 
Corporatieation and impact on working conditions 
The interviewees were asked of their opinions about changes which have 
occurred to their working conditions as a result of corporatisation. Most 
considered that they now felt more empowered to make decisions without 
having to refer to their supervisor or senior manager. As a result, the majority 
of interviewees considered that they were prepared to take more responsibility 
and be accountable for their own work and that of their staff. As one said, ... 1 
don't 111i11d taking owners/tip and being respousib/e for work, proz•iding 1 make Ille 
decisions. Furthermore, all reported increased job satisfaction and increased 
motivation to do work that they planned, implemented and controlled without 
involvement from their immediate supervisor. TI1ey claimed that they would 
seek direction if they did not understand what they were required to do or did 
not know how to do it. Some considered that this improved their credibility 
and authority with their staff, as one claimed ... at least we appear to know w/Jat 
we're doing. The majority believed that having greater control of their work 
enabled them to prioritise it and the work they gave to their staff. This helped 
them achieve personal and business unit performance targets. However, some 
reported that they did not always get clear instructions from their senior 
manager which sometimes resulted in them having to redo work. This 
concerned them, but they believed that communication between themselves, 
their supervisors and their peers had improved as a result of the MU. 
Overall, all believed that safely and employment conditions had 
improved since corporatisation. It was reported that safety and employee 
welfare was promoted as the number-one priority for the corporation. 1his had 
resulted in increased training and awareness for managers and staff in areas 
such as safety, employee fair treatment and equal employment opporhmity. 
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However, some of the managers interviewed considered that there were aspects 
of their working conditions that had not improved since corporatisation. For 
example, they claimed that open-plan office arrangements, introduced as part 
of ongoing business unit restructuring and accommodation rationalisation was 
a distraction and of concern for them. They reported that it was difficult and 
sometimes stressful having to deal with sensitive staff issues in an open-plan 
office which enabled others to overhear the conversation. They did not believe 
that the availability of conference rooms solved this problem as often the 
conference rooms were unavailable and sometimes issues between them and 
their staff required a spontaneoU!l response, not being delayed while they 
relocate to another area. Furthermore, some considered that the new working 
arrangements had significantly reduced the available work area for themselves 
and their staff and had resulted in cramped conditions and unnecessary clutter 
of files and office equipment. 
Corporatisation and impact on career prospects 
Managers were asked if cotporatisation had had any impact on their 
future career prospects. Almost all respondents spoke positively of this 
explaining that they now had wider career choices. They believed that this was 
helped by the move away from the public service system of promotion through 
seniority towards a process that selected on merit and recognised good 
performance. Furthermore, in their view, corporatisation and accompanying 
organisational change had created many new management positions and some 
managers had benefited significantly from this. Others saw this as an improved 
opportunity to get promotion, although this opportunity decreased 
significantly as they moved up the levels due to the flatter organisational 
structure since corporatisation. For some, the only promotions left for them 
were the positions of general manager or managing director and they did not 
believe that had much chance of those. Overall, most of the managers 
considered that if they chose to stay with Western Power they would continue 
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in a management role and only sideways movement was likely. 
The managers also considered that there would be career advancement 
opportunities outside Western Power if they chose to leave. They believed that 
their future career prospects had been enhanced through new skills and their 
external business dealings which had put them in contact were with potential 
employers. They saw opportunity in Western Power being an independent 
non-government organisation, where they could get a range of experience and 
business knowledge in both technical and commercial fields. 
Impact on workload and hours of duty 
All of the managers interviewed thought that the broader changes 
introduced through corporatisation over the past seven years had had a 
significant impact on their workload and working hours. Most acknowledged 
they focused less on engineering issues, but a greater emphasis on business 
needs has offset this. They now had to be more cost focused and financially 
accountable. They had to develop and scrutinise business unit, branch and 
section budgets and regularly report progress. Undue i.'"1fluence from the 
executive and the need for complex submissions to get approval to spend 
allocated budgets was highlighted as a frustration and source of much wasted 
effort. Most considered that once budgets were approved they should be 
allowed to conduct their business within those budgets without continually 
having to justify each expenditure increment. 
All the managers viewed technology changes which usually 
accompanied the introduction of new management systems and the normal 
evolution of a modern office as having the most impact on their role and 
workload. The managers reported that most of the technology and 
management system changes improved their productivity, they now had access 
to larger amounts of data enabling better, more meaningful and accountable 
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decisions. However, they claimed that more data meant mure time required to 
analyse and report information from it. Finally, all reported that to benefit from 
technology and new management systems they had to set aside time to learn 
and apply it. 
Heightened emphasis on customer service, stakeholder management, 
increased contracting out of services, and ongoing human resource 
performance management, recruitment and selection were also seen as having a 
significant impact on managers' work.load. The increased emphasis on 
customer service and stakeholder management identified a shortage of many 
new skills and the requirement for significant recruitment and training. The 
managers claimed that ongoing change and organisational restructuring, 
designed to improve the organisation's flexibility and efficiency, was often at 
the cost of employee numbers. There had been a steady decline in the numbers 
of available staff due to redundancies and others becoming disenchanted and 
leaving the organisation. This left managers with fewer staff and many of those 
who were left had insufficient skills to do the new work. They also saw an 
increase in the need to make greater use of technology in lieu of staff. However, 
most of the managers reported time being spent on a continuous cycle of 
submissions to senior management and the executive for approval to replace 
staff, increase staff numbers or hire contractors. Further, if they were lucky 
enough to get the staff replacements or increases approved, they had to spend 
time on recruitment, training and contracting issues. 
Shortages of skilled staff were claimed to be the reason for increased 
network failures and supply problems that resulted in increased workload and 
hours of duty for managers. Most of the interviewees reported that shortages of 
skilled staff because of reduced training and recruitment across most branches 
within Western Power had meant many key operational sections were under 
resourced and reliant on contractors to performed important maintenance 
212 
work. Some claimed that there Vfere problems with this approach as many of 
the contractors had limited network experience afld oHen did not do or report 
things that experienced staff would. Furthermore, the shortages of skilled staff 
had resulted in key majntenance work being postponed on the aging network, 
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sometimes many years, or not being done at all. One manager claimed 
... reduced mnintennnce work 11111de tlw ecomm1ic fig11res look good, but !ms left t/w 
system in poor co11ditio11. OJ:lters claimed that it was a combination of reduced 
maintenance and a lack of capital expenditure in the distribution system that 
had resulted in increased supply problems for customers. It was reported that 
increased intervention by the minister and other government deparhnents, e.g., 
the Office of Energy, in Tesponse to complaints from domestic and commercial 
customers over supply problems had resulted in substantial increases in some 
of the managers' workload and hours of duty. They had to re-prioritise work 
and to pay increased attention to the reallocation of resources and budgets. 
One manager said ... we spend too much time pntcliing up tlw system rntlter t/11111 
m11intni11i11g or replacing it. Some blamed the increased customer complaints and 
external intervention on the ageing network and reduced maintenance activities 
over previous years, which one manager claimed ... mnde tire economic figures look 
good, bill /ms left tlie system in poor co11ditio11. 
Finally, some managers considered that their workload had increased 
due to ring fencing, or the process of. identifying and separating some business 
units from the mainstream organisation. Managers perceived this as an attempt 
by the executive to demonstrate to the government that a verticall}' integrated 
organisation which included generation, transmission, distribution and retail 
could provide all the efficiencies of several competing organisations with the 
one board. Some thought that ring fencing had resulted in ... barriers to clear 
i11fom111tiou flow across divisions, lending to i11efficie11cies nud t/w building of empires. 
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Performance management 
Most managers considered performance management to be a useful 
human resource management tool which enables formal talks between 
individuals and managers. But all agreed that performance management was 
not being fully utilised across the organisation and it still required further 
refinement. One commented that performance management was ... e111bn;o11ic 
and still /ms a long way to go. Another claimed that .. .it i5 prelhJ basic a11d relies 
heavily on commitment from 11m1mgers. All the managers believed that 
performance management should be less structured, more flexible and linked to 
a reward system. Performance management was seen by all as necessary for 
confronting poor performance, but interestingly, only a few alluded to its 
potential for rewarding good performance. Furthermore, the majority of 
interviewees claimed that got very little feedback from their senior managers 
between performance reviews. Most did not know whether their supervisor 
considered that they were doing a good job or not, but believed that 110 news is 
good news. All agreed, however, that perfomrnnce management needed to be 
directly linked to business plans and remuneration. Performance planning, 
enablement and review was therefore important to prevent failure and promote 
success. 
Perceptions were sought of how the current approach to performance 
management differed from pre corporatisation. Most stated that there were no 
individual performance measures prior to corporatisation, while some claimed 
that performance management introduced prior to corporatisation was ... a 
cn11ie attempt to align managers and employees. Significantly, all agreed that prior 
to corporatisalion perfonnance management was generally not accepted by 
employees or managers, although there were some minor exceptions in 
branches more closely aligned with the executive thinking of the time. 
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It was claimed that the re-introduction of The Employee Achievement 
Measure (TEAM} in 1999, in conjunction with management contract~, ~mproved 
the acceptability of the performance management process. Managers were 
appointed under contracts for which salary increments and bonuses were 
dependent on performance reviews. Many of the managers saw this as a good 
thing and claimed that it enabled them to focus most of their uttention on work 
that was linked to performance targets in order to gain a good performance 
review, however, some work was neglected as a result. Interestingly, the 
managers also believed that they were held accountable for their performance 
and the performance of their business unit relative to other business units 
within the organisation. Some explained that prior to TEAM it was difficult to 
quantify performE!Ilce as it did not deal with tough issues. There was also more 
widespread knowledge and acceptance of performance management now tha..ri 
there was prior to corporatisation. Concerns about performance management 
have been partially allayed, although there was still a reluctance among 
employees to accept TEAM. However, This was reducing as more employees 
chose individual contracts in lieu of award agreements. 
In terms of performance management issues affecting their role as 
managers, they all considered that performance management required a greater 
focus on individual employees' day-to-day practice and time was required to 
reflect on their performance. This p~ople work had also increased managerial 
workloads. More time had to be spent on monitoring and appraising, 
conducting reviews, setting clear objectives and getting feedback from 
employees. Some managers reported delegating the more technical work to 
others so that they could attend to performance management issues which they 
were not adequately trained to do. Some found setting goals and confronting 
performance issues with individual employees to be stressful, and others 
openly indicated a dislike for performance management. Overall, performance 
management helped managers to develop better relationships with employees. 
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It helped them with selection and recruibnent and in sorr.e instances retention 
of key employees. 
Management contracts 
Managers' perceptions of management contracts were generally positive. 
All of those interviewed considered that their remuneration had improved 
since corporatisation and believed that management contracts were responsible 
for that. However, some expressed concerns that they take away the security of 
employment, particularly the 'sunset clause' which gives no guarantee of 
renewal. Contracts were seen to be fairly generic and as oue size fits n/1. Most 
questioned the need for them and viewed them as genernlly inflexible, stating 
that it was very difficult to negotiate anything different from the standMd 
format. They would have preferred that contracts be tailored to the individual 
position and contain a stronger link between performance and pay, that is, 
... people should be rewarded for good wurk. contracts seemed to be presented with 
a ... take it or leave it attitude initially, but were ... getting better rmd b~comiug more 
flexible, for example, by containing salary packaging. 
When questioned about the effect of management contracts on their 
personal performance, most thought that contracts had not significantly 
influenced their performance as managers, but simply put in print what they 
should be doing. Others claimed that they concentrated most of their efforts on 
work that was linked to performance targets in order to achieve them and 
maximise their potential salary review. Yet others considered personal 
performance a matter of personal integrity and saw themselves as giving :;1eir 
best performance regardless of any contract. For example, two managers 
claimed that they had always focused on deliverables and ensured that branch 
outputs werf! in line with business imperatives, regardless of pay or reward. 
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Clarity of role 
Managers were asked if corporatisation has affected the clarity of their 
roles as managers. Half considered that the clarity of their roles was still a 
major issue in Western Power. They claimed that the requirements of their 
roles were poorly communicated to them and tended to be negotiable between 
their manager and senior managers. Also, roles varied with business unit size 
and function. Some also considered their roles had been downgraded since 
corporatisation making their responsibilities less clear which resulted in them 
doing what they tlta11gllt best. They had found that corporatisation had become 
a ce11trnlisatio11 po!ici;. Many managerial roles had lost their status and many 
positions had gone. One interviewee claimed never having a role that was 
clearly defined therefore corporatisation had brought little change. The other 
half of those interviewed however, stated that corporalisation had helped to 
clarify their roles in terms of perfonnance management, planning processes, 
financial accountability and safety and environmental compliance. One 
respondent thought that corporatisation had enhanced the clarity of his role to 
enable firm policies and procedures to be adopted. This respondent had found 
in the past that role clarity could be affected by the whim of the government of 
the day, for example, customer disconnections for non-payment were often 
overtumed by the Minister after lobbying by social welfare groups. 
Overall, the majority of the managers thought that issues affecting the 
corporation and its economic performance were now better explained. Business 
and performance requirements were generally clearer and there was a greater 
focus on costs and the production of the best product in a timely manner. 
Corporatisalion had also defined a range of potential clienl:13 and customers that 
were previously ignored. This ir1cluded partnering deals with independent 
power generators, greater use of external service providers, and seeking 
unregulated income by providing construction, project management and 
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engineering skills to external organisations in Australia and overseas. 
Impact on internal and external networks 
When asked if corporatisation and organisational changes had affucted 
their abilily to maintain internal and external networks, half of the managers 
responded that it had hindered, but not significantly affected, their internal 
networks. The increase in workload compelled them to deal predominantly 
with those necessary networks which would help achieve business needs. Even 
so, managers now dealt with a wider range of people. The remaining 
respondents considered that their internal relationships had improved since 
corporatisation. They saw a greater need to focus on people both internally and 
externally to make sure they had the right skills. They were also more focused 
on the commercial aspects of the business and now dealt with people from most 
branches and divisions across Western Power. 
In terms of external networks all the managers considered tlmt these had 
increased significantly since corporatisation. This was because Western Power 
now had a much broader business base, a wider range of potential clients and 
customers, different players in the market, and new rules. For some, seeking 
unregulated income had increased their external networking both within 
Australia and overseas. 
Managers were also asked what they have done to maintain or establish 
new internal and external networks since corporatisation. Internal networks 
were seen as important and involved getting to know and understand the role 
of all the other business units within Western Power. Stakeholder management 
and customer focus were also forms of external networks. It was now deemed 
important to contact the customers, to know who they are and become known 
to them creating direct lines of communication with key customers. For 
example, it was reported by one manager that account managers regularly 
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made personal contact with clients to confirm satisfaction and to determine if 
there were any issues of concern. The account managers hav2 also become 
accessible to clients 24 hours a day via mobile phones and e-mail. 
All the managers agreed that since corporatisation they had become 
more involved with influential st.1keholder organisations outside Western 
Power, such as business and community groups, manufacturers and their 
representatives, consultants and service providers and local government and 
industry organisations. As one manager said, ..• we 11ced to devote more 1w11-work 
time to meeh"11g and sodalisi11g wit/J tire coJ11petitio11. They saw themselves as more 
involved in joint forums, steering conunittees and industry groups; targeting 
potential customers, partners, alliances, and bidding and reviewing tenders and 
contracts. Whenever the opportunity presented, managers would create 
strategic alliances with e:ctemal business partners and conduct open book 
accounting with vendors. This had never been done in the past. They also 
considered that, with the globalisation of businesses and products, it was 
necessary to establish closer working relationships with other utilities both in 
Australia and abroad. 
Not all managers, however, were overly enthusiastic about networking. 
Some expressed concern about the amount of effort they were required to put 
into the establishment and maintenance of new internal or extemal networks. 
They U10ught that there was an over concentration on networking and external 
relationships in order to increase commercial activity, and that this could be at 
the expense of effectively managing their staff. One commented, ... we must 
e11s11re we dou't over co11ce11trate 011 tire cammerdal br1sitiess to the detriment of rmr 
people sl,.i/1 /evels. Another claimed ... we 11111sf 111ai11tai11 a balance of values wit/Jin 
the business i.e. commerdal versus lmmmz eleme11f amt don't 111nrgi11alise the value of 
kei; employees. 
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5,5 CONCLUSIONS 
The preliminary interviews analysed in this chapter and the secondary 
data reviewed in chapter lwo have provided the first element in the three stages 
of the study methodology. The interviews were conducted with twenty 
managers from across the organisation. Each were asked twenty-eight 
questions which addressed important topics identified from the analytical 
framework and the analysis of data from the exploratory research. The 
questions were designed to further explore and clarify those important topics. 
The managers had a good understanding of corporatisation and the main 
reasons for it and management reform as applied to Western Power and other 
Australian elecb"icity utilities. They identified 14 new management systems 
introduced through corporatisation which they considered supported 
management reform and were import.ant for the success of Western Power as a 
commercial business. Corporatisation provided increased benefits to the 
organisation, stakeholders and the community. The WA state government was 
the utility's most important stakeholder. However, interference by government 
through policy and reporting requirements impacted significantly on managers' 
roles. This, and other changes to their roles had Jed to significant increases in 
responsibilities and workload, sometimes at the expense of their personal life. 
The changes also required managers to seek additional skills and to change 
their focus from engineering excellence to human resource management and 
leadership. 
The results from the prel.imirurry interviews were used to inform the 
questionnaire survey and are synthesised in chapter eight with the findings 
from chapters six and seven. The next chapter presents the survey findings for 
stage two of the study methodology. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SURVEY FINDINGS: ST AGE 2 
6.1 OVERVIEW 
The methodology, described in chapter four provided, inter alia, for the 
investigation to draw upon both qualitative and quantitative research 
conducted in three stages. Stages one and three form the qualitative research 
that was undertaken in the form of preliminary interviews in chapter five and 
follow-up focused interviews in chapter seven. However, given the constraints 
of time, and access to the target population, the researcher considered that 
quantitative research was more appropriate as the primary research instrument 
for this study. Nevertheless, the preliminary interviews and findings from it 
provided valuable information which addressed the research questions and 
identified further important lines of inquiry that were used to inform the 
questionnaire survey. It also enabled the questionnaire survey for the 
quantitative data to be refined as well as strengthening the content validity of 
the instrument Pre-resting in the form of a pilot survey was conducted to 
confirm the survey structure and prospective respondents' understanding of 
the questions and their relevance. 
The questionnaire survey was presented to the total target population of 
130 which comprised all the senior managers, middle managers and senior 
section heads within Western Power during 2001 to 2002 when the study was 
undertaken. All of the target population are responsible for the perfoJmilllce of 
either a division, branch or business unit. For convenience, the target 
population are referred to as managers, participants or respondents throughout 
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this chapter; these terms are used interchangeably. Of the total target 
population of 130 managers, 27 were female and 103 male. There were 111 
responses, equaling to a respo11Se rate of 85.4%. The ratio of male to female 
responses cannot be detennined from the research data due to the anonymity 
built-in to the survey instrument. The anonymity also ensures that the 
functional position of individual managers cannot be identified from data 
collected about branch sizes or whether they were managers prior to 
corporatisation or not. The researcher considers that the assured anonymity 
was the main contributor lo the hlgh response rate. Another possible 
contributor to the hlgh response rate was the fact that the researcher works for 
the organisation. 
The quantitative research findings are described in this chapter and 
synthesised in chapter eight with the qualitative findings from chapters five 
and seven. 
6.2 KEY SURVEY THEMES AND FINDINGS: STAGE 2 
The questionnaire survey consisted of 21 questions. Most of the 
questiom; contained multiple sub questions which provided for a total of 151 
variables. The questions and variables were distributed over six major sections 
which addressed key themes and issues identified from the analysis of the 
preliminary interview data in chapter five. The first section had 5 questions 
with a total of 33 variables. It sought to detennine managers' understanding of 
the rationale for introducing corporatisation and management reform within 
Western Power and the perceived benefits for identified stakeholders. 
The second section consisted of 2 questions with a total of 15 variables. It 
sought to determine managers' perceptions of how effectively management 
system changes were communicated to them and how clear was their 
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understanding of their roles at the time of the sutvey in 2002 compared with 
their roles seven years before. 
Section three consisted of 3 questions witl, a total of 5 variables. This 
section sought to determine managers' involvement in the corporatisation 
process and the introduction of new management systems within Western 
Power. 
Section four consisted of 3 questions with a total of 40 variables which 
sought to determine managers' perceptions of the impact of new management 
systems on their roles, their internal and external networks, their relationships 
with peers and senior management and their skills development within 
Western Power. It also sought to determine the managers' views of the 
importance of newly introduced management systems in supporting the 
achievement of their branch or business unit performance targets. 
Section five consisted of 2 questions and 19 variables. It sought the 
managers' perceptions of the influence that stakeholders have had on Weslem 
Power and on their roles as managers, both before corporatisation and since. 
Section six consisted of 6 questions with a total of 39 variables which 
sought to determine how the introduction of new management systems and 
corresponding organisational changes have affected the quality of the working 
life of managers over the previous seven years. It also sought the managers' 
perceptions of the impact of new management systems on their workload, 
motivation, job satisfaction, training and learning opportunities, leisure time, 
hours of work, etc. 
It was appropriate to undertake an exploratory examination of the 
variables that comprised each of the key themes identified in the six sections, 
and which were later used to answer the study questions. Thus, in order to 
have an understanding of the strength of the variables and their significance for 
the research, particular attention was paid to the frequencies, mean, standard 
deviation, and inter-item reliability of the independent and dependant 
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variables. The frequencies were calculated using SPSS VlO and are reported in 
this shldy as a percentage of the total responses. A Cronbach alpha (Coakes & 
Steed, 2001) reliability check was also calculated for each factor grouping. In all 
cases the coefficient alplia for the variables examined was in excess of the 
minimum of 0.60 quoted by Sekaran (1992) for exploratory research. The 
results of the exploratory examination of the variables, along with an analysis of 
each of the six sections of the questionnaire survey are discussed in the 
following subsections. The analysis and discussion is further broken clown to 
specific questions and the significance of the variable frequencies. Where 
appropriate, some comparisons are made with the preliminary interview 
findings (chapter five) and the review of secondary data (chapter two). 
6.2.1 Managers understanding of the rationa.Je for corporatisation 
The firot section of the questionnaire survey identified the average 
branch or sec.lion size the managers had been in charge of, and how many of 
them were working as managers when Western Power became corporatised in 
January 1995. The first section also sought to determine the managers' 
understanding of the rationale for introducing corporatisation and management 
reform within Western Power and what they believed to be top management's 
four main reasons for ongoing management system changes. Finally, section 
one of the survey also sought managers' perceptions of the benefits to specific 
stakeholders such as customers, industry, unions, govemment, executive, 
managers and employees from corporatisation. 
Working as manager 
Question one sought to detennine if the respondents were working as a 
manager or section head when Western Power became corporatised. 
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Table 6.1 
Working as manager in 1995 
Dcsi:r1plion (variable II ) 
Workingo.sMenogerin1995 (111.1) 
Nol Working es Manager in 1995 (# 1.2) 
Mean 1.41 
Number Percent 
m n 
m 
The survey results indicated that 64% of the respondents were working 
as either a manager or senior section head when Western Power became 
corporatised. The remaining 36% were either promoted or had joined Western 
Power after it was corporatised. It is likely that many of those promoted to the 
role of manager had previously acted in a management position prior to their 
promotion. 
Average branch size 
Question two sought to determine what was the average branch or 
section size respondents have been in charge of since the corporatisation of 
Western Power. 
Table6.2 
Average branch size since 1995 
Description (variable II) 
Small(0-25people) {112.1) 
Large (more tJ,,,n 50 people) (ii 2.3) 
Medium (26 - 50 people) {ii 2.2) 
Mean1.5 
Number 
m 
m 
m 
Frequency 
" 
" 
Percent 
M., 
17.1 
16.2 
Frequency analysis indicates that of the responses 67% indicated Small 
Branch Size (up to 25 people), 16% indicated Medium Branch Size (26 to 50 
people) and 17% indicated Large Branch Size (more than 50 people). From the 
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data in table 6.2 it can be seen that 74 branches within Western Power consist of 
25 or less people. This demonstrates the wide diversity of activities undertaken 
within an electricity supply utility such as Western Power (refer also to figures 
2.3 and 2.4 which describe Western Power structure and key stakeholder 
influences at the time the survey was administered). 
Main reasons for corporatisation and management reform 
Question 3 sought to determine what managers believed were the four 
main reasons for introducing corporatisation and management reform into 
Western Power. They were asked to choose their four main reasons from a list 
of eleven in the questionnaire survey. The eleven reasons had been previously 
identified during the preliminary interviews. 
Table6.3 
Main reasons for introducing corporatisation and management reform into 
Western Power 
Description (variable 11) Number Frequency Percent 
Productivity/Efficiency Gains (# 3.4) m 
" 
55.0 
Energylndust,y Reform (# 3.7) m 
" "·' 
O,mpctition (# 3.1) m 
"' 
,.., 
Dercgulotion (113.3) m 
" '" 
O,mmerciallsation {business development) (# 3.6) m 
" 
44.l 
FuturePr1vat:isfl.tion (# 3.11) m 
" 
44.l 
Compcti~ Neutrality (creating a !evd ploying field) (#3,:2) m 
" "·' 
Improved FinancialAc<:ountability {113.8) m 
" "·' 
GrcatcrMonagerialAutonomy (II 3.9) m n 19.8 
Incroa.sed Returns to Government (# 3.5) 111 
" 
m 
OrgonlsatiOMl Downsizing {# 3.10) m 
" 
,., 
The survey responses were ranked according to frequency and converted 
to a percentage of total responses as shown in table 6,3. 
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The closeness of the top four variables relative lo the remaining seven 
indicates a strong perception among Western Power managers that key reasons 
for corporatisation were Productivity /Efficiency Gains (55%), Energy Industry 
Refonn (55%), Competition (54% ), and Deregulation (49%). This finding is not 
surprising considering the publicity given to corporatisation and the reasons for 
such refonn. Also, one of the key themes of FOCUS6, the culture change 
program initiated in Western Power in 1995, was to draw attention to the 
changing roles that managers and staff would have in the new corporation 
(Eiszele, 1994). The next two highest ranking responses were 
Commercialisation (business development) (44%) and Future Privatisation 
(44%). 
The strong perceptions among managers that Productivity/Efficiency 
Gains, Energy Industry Refonn, Competition, Deregulation and 
Commercialisation were the top reasons for corporatisation and management 
refonn is most likely linked to the increasing amount of attention that senior 
management and the executive have placed on these drivers for change over 
the past seven years (Eiszele, 1998a, 1998b; Eiszele, 1999). In addition, the main 
reasons for corporatisation advanced by the managers had also been promoted 
in the public arena by academics, economists and business, writers (Harman, 
1993b; Hilmer, 1993; Maddock, 1993) as the key elements of the electricity 
supply industry refonn and were strongly reinforced during FOCUS (Eiszele, 
1995; Widdis & Davis-Goff, 1995). Furthermore, privatisation and its 
consequences, while publicly not welcomed by Western Power senior 
management or the executive, had been extensively debated in the literature 
throughout the 1990's and raised in both the media and internal newsletters 
and union publications within Western Power (Australian Seivices Union, 1995; 
• FOCUS was w, '""onyu\ for Focus on Orgw,i,;,tional ChMgc Understmding nnd Skills, see also 
nppendix1. 
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Eiszele, 1998a; Eiszele, 1999; Electricity Supply Newsletter, 1999). 
Of the remaining reasons for corporatisation Competitive Neutrality 
(26%) and Improved Financial Accountability (26%) had a response frequency 
greater than Managerial Autonomy (20%), Increased Returns to Government 
(13%) and Organisational Downsizing (9%). The low response frequ-mcy for 
the variable Competitive Neutrality is understandable conside6ng the 
monopoly situation Western Power had at the time of this research, and still has 
(Western Power Annual Report, 2003). The introduction of full competition 
that was to follow the corporatisation of Western Power has progressed veiy 
slowly due mostly to a reluctance among senior management to encourage any 
significant competition and a reluctance among the private sector to invest in 
generators in Western Australia under the current legislation. Even with the 
current legislative reforms before the Western Australian Parliament, the 
likelihood of full competition is some years away (Harvey, 2003). Interestingly, 
the managers reported Improved Financial Accountability, Greater Managerial 
Autonomy, Increased Returns to Government and Organisational Downsizing 
to be the least important reasons for introducing corporatisation into Western 
Power. This is despite these reasons being well documented in the literature as 
key components of the Australian corporatisation reform agenda (Hannan, 
1993a; King & Maddock, 1996; Walker & Walker, 2000). It is likely the low 
ranking frequencies were because these components of corporalisation had all 
been initiated to vatying degrees over the years leading up to corporatisation 
and were already familiar to the managers, and therefore not seen as 
significant. For example, prior to corporatisation SECW A, as it was then, 
underwent substantial restructuring and workforce reductions along with the 
introduction of new measures for financial and management reporting. Both 
restructuring and financial accountability have been strengthened and refined 
since corporatisation and both have been tl1e focus of continued review since. 
Finally, the electricity utility was a source of revenue to the stute government 
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before it was corporatised and has continued to provide increased returns to 
government. Dividends have exceeded $1.04 billion since 1995 (Western Power 
Annual Report, 2003, 7). 
Stakeholder benefits &om corporatisation 
Question four asked respondents to indicate how much benefit they 
believed stakeholders got from the corporatisation of Western Power. They 
were given 14 variables, which represented stakeholders identified from the 
preliminary interviews, and asked to rate each on a five-point Likert scale 
where 1 was 'no benefit' and 5 was 'significant benefit'. 
Table6.4. 
Stakeholder benefits from thecorporatisation of Western Power 
D,,scr!pt!on {vnriable II) N=oo, Menn Standard l\C!n Total 
Deviation Corre!At!on 
WAStai,,Government (114.6) m ,.,.,, D.7.l70 0.25l6 
Wcsb,m Powens a Business (# 4.7) m 4.4144 
"·""" 
0.6,326 
Industry (# 4.3) m 4.2342 0.9420 D.6524 
Comme,da!Cuslomers (# 4.2) m 4.1351 0.'17(8 0.60:>"'7 
WcstcmPowNExccu~ve (114.9) m ,.0000 O.Sl21 0.3877 
Wcsti,m Power Managers (II 4.10) m ,.,., O.SlSO 
"·""'" 
Yourself (114.12) m 3.7117 1.1938 
"·"" 
Your Branch orSe<tion (# 4.8) m 3.ffi77 
'·""' 
0.6702 
Rcgu1A1ors ( #4.5) m 
'·""' 
1.1179 
"""" 
Wesllem Power Employees (II 4.11) m 3.43-12 1.1006 
""" 
SuppliersofSenliccs lo Wcsllem Power (# 4.13) m 3.3423 l.OJOl 0.4017 
Domcsl.ii:Customers (# U) m 3.2432 1.3019 0.3707 
BusincssCompctitors (#4.14) m 3.1441 1.1025 0.0195 
Unions (#U) m 2.3243 l.OIS9 0.4103 
Rcliab!Lity Coefficients 14 items Alpha 0.8220 
A Cronbach alpha reliability check was calculated for this question. The 
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coefficient alpha for the variables examined was found to be 0.82 (table 6.4) and 
in excess of the minimum of 0.60 quoted by Sekaran {1992) for exploratory 
research. 
The means of the variables (table 6.4) showed strong agreement among 
the respondents that the WA State Government, Western Power as a Business, 
Industry, Commercial Customers, The Western Power Executive and Western 
Power Managers were the greatest beneficiaries from the corporatisation of 
Western Power. In these cases the means were 4.50, 4.41, 4.23, 4.13, 4.00, and 
3.90 respectively. There was a moderate level of agreement that all the 
remaining tl1e stakeholders apart from Unions gained some benefit from the 
corporatisation of Western Power. The WA State Government, Western Power 
as a Business, and Industry were perceived by respondents to be the three 
greatest beneficiaries from the corporatisation of Western Power. 
The weakest areas identified in the questionnaire survey related to 
perceived benefits for Unions, Business Competitors and Western Power 
Employees. For these the means were 232, 3.14 and 3.43 respectively whicli 
represent a low level of agreement. These results are not smprising.. especially 
with respect to unions. Since 1995 there has been a grad ,Jal move away from 
' 
union membership by managers at all levels within Westein Power, due to poor 
union representation and the increased popularity of individual agreements 
, and managerial contracts among managers which do not require union 
representation for their administration. Union rationalisation was part of the 
corporatisation pr0Cess which saw the number of unions representing Western 
Power employees reduced from fifteen to two. One union, the 
Communications Electrical and Plumbers Union {CEPU), represents all wages 
staff and the other, the Australian Services Union (ASU), represents the 
administrative and technical staff. Engineers, who constitute the majority of 
managers in Western Power, ceased to have direct uni.on participation in 
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industrial relations issues when union rationalisation was introduced in 1994. 
From that time the Association for Professional Electrical Scientific and 
Mechanical Engineers Australia (APESMA) which had represented engineers 
and industrial chemists was excluded from the Western Power Award. The 
engineers and chemists now rely on the ASU to represent them in negotiations 
for enterprise bargaining agreements, award reviews, industrial telations 
matters, etc. 
Finally, with regard to the variable Business Competitors, the lack of 
significant competition in the generation and retail sectors of the electrical 
supply industry in Western Australia has enabled Western Power to continue to 
be the monopoly provider. Therefore, most managers perceived that business 
competitors have not realised significant benefits from the corporatisation of 
Western Power. 
Main reasons for management system changes 
Question five asked respondents what they believed to be the three main 
reasons for ongoing management system changes within Western Power. They 
were given six variables, which had been identified as important from the 
preliminary interviews, but from which they were to choose three. 
Table 6.5 
Main reasons for ongoing management system changes in Western Power 
De.cription (varUlblc N) N=>e, Frequency Percent 
Business A~vanlllge (i.e., competitive pos;tioning) (II 5.2) m % 
"'' Continuo11!1 lmprovcmcnl (# 5.3) m ~ ~· 
Response to MarkctCh.mge,; (# 5.1) m n M., 
Survival ofWcs\cm Powcraso Vertically Intcg·,aled Buaincso (# m ., 
"·" 5.5) 
Political Dire.,tion (II 5.6) m n 19.B 
Following Fads (# 5.4) m 
' 
,., 
231 
The frequency analysis shown in table 6.5 indicates that Business 
Advantage (86%) was the number one reason for ongoing management system 
changes within Western Power. This finding is most likely due to the strong 
attention that senior management had placed on the introduction of new 
technology and management systems since 1995 in order to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation in te1ms of productivity and 
financial management. The success of this strategy is evidenced by the $1.04 
billion Western Power has provided to the state government since 
corporatisation (Western Power Annual Report, 2003, 7). 
Continuous Improvement (66%) and Response to Market Changes (65%) 
were the second and third main reasons given for the ongoing management 
system changes within Western Power. These responses also reflect the 
productivity and efficiency gains from the inlroduction of new technology and 
improved reporting systems. 
The Survival of Western Power as a Vertically Integrated Business (55%) 
and Political Direction (20%) were given for the fourth and fifth main reasons 
for ongoing management system changes within Western Power. These 
findings reflect a belief by some that there is strong support from the executive 
for the retention of Western Power as a vertically integrated business, and 
many of the changes had been introduced for this purpose. The changes had 
also been introduced to support Western Power's strategic planning, in 
response to directions by the minister (Eiszele, 1995; Eiszele, 1998a, 2001). 
Following Fads (8%) was considered to be the least important reason for 
ongoing management system changes within Western Power. Interestingly 
however, the introduction of FOCUS in 1995 was dismissed by unions and 
many managers at the time as another example of the executive following 
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overseas fads for organisational change (Australian Services Union, 1995). At 
the time many believed that the changes introduced during the lead up to 
corporatisalion would fade away and become irrelevant as had other 
management initiatives in the past (Lehmann, 1997). 
6.2.2 Communication of management system changes 
Section two of the questionnaire survey sought to determine managers' 
perceptions of how effectively senior management communicated the system 
changes to them. This section also sought to identify the clarity of 
understanding managers had of their roles at the time of the survey compared 
with seven years earlier. 
Fourteen new management systems, introduced into Western Power 
since 1995, were listed in question six (table 6.6). Respondents were asked to 
indicate their perceptions of how effectively each of U1ese were communicated 
to them using a five-point Likert scale, where 1 was 'totally ineffective' and 5 
was 'totally effective'. 
A Cronbach alpha reliability check was calculated for this question and 
the coefficient alpha for the variables examined was found to be 0.81 (table 6.6) 
and in excess of the minimum of 0.60 quoted by Sekaran (1992) for exploratory 
research. 
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Table 6.6. 
Effectiveness of communicating new managgment system changes 
DE5criptio11 (variable #) Number Mem Slruldard It,,m Tola! 
Deviation Correlation 
TEAM (116.6) m ,.mo 0.9110 o.4m 
Managerial Leader-ship lnitialive',MLI) (# 6.1) m 3.M68 0.0000 
"""' 
Strategic Planning (# 6.5) m 3.8378 0.8795 0.4751 
CustomcTFocn.s (# 6.11) m 
'""' 
0.9528 0.4917 
FlrutncialAco:iunt!.bility {'t8.13) m 
""' "·"" "·""' SIRSS (# 6.7) m 3.46&5 1.1427 0.440! 
FOCUS (II 6.1) m 3.4414 1.024.1 0.4196 
Comme,dnllsation(Le. bU!1lnessdcvclopment) (# 6.12} m 3.396-l 1.0382 0.6102 
Shareho!deT Value Addinj; (SV A) ( If 6.9) m 
""" 
l.CJ.l27 0.2766 
New Technology (in ieneral) (#6.14) m 
'·"" 
0.9931 
""" 
Change Management {II 6.3) m 3.2162 
""'" 
0.5374 
Service Leve! Agreements (SLA's) {II 6.8) m 
'·""' 
l.0613 0.416.5 
Transfonnation {# 6.4) m 3.0721 o.%% 0.3240 
MIMS (#6.10) m 2.7477 1.1157 
"""' 
Re!L,bility C<>Clfident for 14 i""1'1S Alpha 0.Slot 
The means of the variables (table 6.6) showed agreement among the 
respondents that all the management system changes, apart from MIMS 
(Mimcom Information Management System, a business management software 
system), were effectively communicated to the respondents. TEAM (TI1e 
Employee Achievement .Measure, a perfonuance management tool), Stral€gic 
Planning and Managerial Leadership Initiative (MU) were perceived by 
respondents to be those most effectively communicated to them. In these cases 
the mean were 3.97, 3.85 and 3.84 respectively. TEAM and Strategic Planning 
were probably the most effectively communicated because they had been 
introduced, modified and reinforced over many years and senior management 
made them an integral part of the managers' perfonnance reviews. The MLI 
was also considered to have been effectively communicated most likely due to 
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the recency and the breadth of its introduction across the organisation and the 
recent substantial improvements that senior management had made to their 
methods of communicating change and other initiatives. Greater use is now 
made of e-mail and the company homepage {PowerNet) which is available to 
almost all office-based employees. In addition, there is being greater 
involvement of managers and senior section heads in the introduction and 
presentation of the MU. They now have the responsibility for inviting their 
staff to attend MU sessions and to attend with them, and to prepare and deliver 
core segments of the MU. 
The variables which scored the lowest in questions six related to 
Transformation (a restructuring and cultural change programme introduced to 
only the generation segment of Western Power) and Setvice Level Agreements 
(SLA's). For these the means were 3.07 and 3.09 respectively. The low scores 
most likely reflect limited application of these management systems across the 
organisation. For example, Transformation was only applied to approximately 
25% of Western Power staff. For service level agreements, the managers had 
indicated during the preliminary interviews, that although Service Level 
Agreements were supported by senior management, the majority of managers 
did not become directly involved in their formulation or application. 
The only management system change that respondents considered was 
ineffectively communicated to them was :MIMS. The mean for this was 2.75. 
Evidence from both the review of secondary data (chapter two) and the 
preliminary interviews (chapter five) indicated that the introduction of :MIMS 
into Western Power was not handled well and although there were regular 
newsletters and project updates circulated among employees, the majority 
considered :MJMS to be a hindrance to their work. The main reasons for the 
objections to MlMS were probably rooted in the lack of effective consultation 
between the end users of the application and the project managers during the 
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conception and introduction stages and due to a lack of training when it was 
first introduced. 
Oarity of understanding of role 
Question seven sought to identify the clarity of understanding managers 
have of their role today, compared with seven years ago. 
Table 6.7 
Clarity of understanding of role as manager today compared to seven years ago 
Description. (variable#) Number Frequency Peroonl 
SomcwhatOearer (117.4) m 
" 
4U 
Much Clearer (# 7.5) m 
" "" 
NoChang~ (#7.3) m w 18.0 
Somewhat Less Clear (II 7,2) m 
' "' 
MuchLcssClc.1r (#7,1) m ,. 
Mean3.B4 
The mean of 3.84 and the frequency analysis shown in table 6.7 indicates 
that managers are moderately clear on their understanding of their role today 
compared to seven years ago. Significantly, 41 % of the managers considered 
their understanding of their role at the time of the research was Somewhat 
Clearer than it had been seven years before. The increased use of TEAM as a 
tool for setting targets and as a measure of personal performance is believed to 
be one of the main contributors to the managers having a dearer understanding 
of their roles. Another contributor may have been the increased focus on role 
and task relationships introduced with the Managerial Leadership Initiative 
{MU) along with significant branch and section restructuring in line with 
changing business unit objectives over recent years (Western Power 
Memoranda, 2002). 
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Organfuational restruchlring and role tenure are the most likely reasons 
why some managers indicated that the clarity of their role was Somewhat Less 
Clear (8%) and Much Less Clear (4%). During the preliminary interviews, 
restructuring was a cause for concern with regard to future career prospects 
and indeed the future of the achlal job itself. It is also likely that the 36% of 
managers who had indicated they were not in a managerial position seven 
years ago {table 6.1) may have been unable to make an objective comparison 
between present and previous managerial roles. 
6.2.3 Introduction of new management systems 
Section three questioned the extent of the manager's involvement in the 
introduction of new management systems within Western Power. It also 
sought to determine the manager's perceptions of how important was it for 
them to be involved in the planning and implementation of new management 
systems and initiatives within the organisation in general. 
Extent of involvement with the introduction of new management systems 
Question eight asked respondents to indicate their involvement with the 
introduction of new management systems within Western Power on a five-
point Likert scale, where 1 was 'not involved at all' and 5 was 'highly involved'. 
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Table 6.8 
Involvement in the introduction of new management systems 
Desc,iption {vnriable II) NUn1ber Frequency P~rrent 
lnvo!v~'II (H 8.4} m 
" 
37.8 
Limited Involvement (11 8.2) m 
" 
31.5 
Notlnwlved at All (ii 8.1) m 
" 
17.1 
Highly !nwlved (1185) m B 11.7 
Don'!Know (#8.3) m 
' '" Mean295 
The mean of 2.95 and the frequency analysis, table 6.8, showed that the 
majority of respondents had some involvement in the introduction of new 
management systems. Managers interviewed during the preliminary 
intetviews had indicated that their involvement in the introduction of new 
management systems had largely consisted of attending meetings about the 
new systems, introducing the new systems into their workplace and training 
staff on how to use the new systems. The questionnaire survey showed that 
38% of respondents considered they had been Involved, and 12% Highly 
Involved in the introduction of new management systems (table 6.8). Menagers 
had indicated during the preliminary interviews that being Highly Involved 
meant being part of the project teams which introduced those systems into 
Western Power, and had prepared and presented training. 
The relatively low level of positive responses for the Highly Involved 
(12%) and Involved (38%) variables supports information from the secondary 
data and that given by managers during the preliminary interviews that much 
of the planning and the introduction of management system changes was done 
with little or no involvement from managers below senior management level. 
Also, those respondents who were not working for Western Power at the time 
of corporatisation would have most likely indicated Not Involved at All (i.e. 
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17%). 
Ways managers were involved with the introduction of new systems 
Question nine required managers to indicate the ways in which they 
were involved with the introduction of new management systems. The 
respondents were given three choices which were Participated In The Planning. 
Participated in The Implementation, and Other. Respondents selecting Other 
were asked to specify what they had been involved in. However, the response 
rate for this variable was around 6% and the only comments that were recorded 
were ... 110 involve111e11t at all; venJ limited involvement; involved only i11 auditing 
res11lts; and prepared presentntiom and coordinnted activities during a11d after 
i111pleme11tatio11. 
Table6.9 
Involvement with the introduction of new management systems 
Descriplion (variable#) 
Partidpaled 1n TI,c Implemcntution (ii 9.2) 
Participai,,d in The Planning (# 9.1) 
OUior (#9.3) 
Number 
m 
m 
m 
Frequency 
" 
" 
' 
"·' 
.. , 
The frequency analysis for this question indicates that the majority of 
managers participated in the implementation of new management systems in 
one form or another (table 6.9). Significantly, 55% had Participated in The 
Implementation and 39% indicated that they had Participated in The Planning 
of new management systems. However, it is unclear from the survey responses 
as to what form that participation took Indications from the secondary data 
and preliminary interviews were that it may have involved the preparation and 
delivery of presentations and training or the provision of suppo.t for activities 
such as the preparation and monitoring of training budgets and the 
administration of staff training records. 
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Importance of being involved 
In question ten the managers were asked to indicate how important it 
was for them to be involved in the planning and implementation of new 
management systems and initiatives within Western Power. A five-po.int Likert 
scale was applied, where 1 was 'unimportant' and 5 was 'very important'. 
Table6.10 
Importance of being involved in the planning and implementation of new 
management systems and initiatives within Western Power 
Description (variable 11) Number Frequency Perc!!llt 
Verylmportml (1110.5) m 
" 
37.8 
Quite [mpo'1llllt (1110.4) m 
" " 
Moderately lmporlalll (1110.3) m 
" 
17.l 
0/ Minor lmpo~llCe (# 10.2) m 
' " 
Unimportnnt (1110.1) m 
' " 
Mean4.00 
The Frequency analysis, table 6.10, showed that the 38% of respondents 
considered it was Very Important and 36% considered it was Quite Important 
for them to be involved in the planning and implementation of new 
management systems and initiatives. It is likely that the experience managers 
had with the introduction of new management systems such as, TEAM, Service 
Level Agreements, MIMS, customer focus and technology in general had made 
them aware of the implications of not being llwolved at the planning and 
implementation stages. For example, during the preliminary interviews 
concerns had been expressed about the way new management systems and 
organisational changes had been introduced into the organisation since 
corporatisation. Some managers had expressed concem that the lack of 
consultation prior to the announcement that changes were to occur had left 
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them unprepared and, in some instances, embarrassed when quizzed by staff 
about what was going on. Others had expressed annoyance that the 
introduction of new systems and changes within the organisation ultimately 
meant more work for them through the necessily for them to learn new skills, 
often in their own time or at the expense of othet job priorities. 
Respondents who had considered that being involved in the planning 
and implementation of new management systems and initiatives was 
Moderately Important (17%), Of Minor Importance (6%) and Unimportant (3%) 
were likely to be those who had been responsible for only a small number of 
staff (table 6.2) where the introduction of change was probably easier. 
6.2.4 Impact of new management systems on roles and performance 
Section four of the questionnaire survey sought to determine managers' 
perceptions of the impact of the new management systems on their roles, for 
example, their abilily to fulfil that role and achieve performance targets as a 
manager or section head within Westem Power. It also sought to determine 
what the impact had been on managers' skills, internal networks and 
stakeholders. 
The impact of new management systems on role as manager 
In question eleven respondents were again given a list of the fourteen 
management systems that had been introduced into Western Power since 
corporatisation (1995) and were asked to indicate their perceptions of the 
impact that each of these had had on their role as manager or section head. 
A five-point Likert scale was used, where 1 was 'largely negative impact' 
and 5 was 'largely positive impact'. In the survey con!:ext positive impact 
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implies that things have got better, easier or improved for the managers. 
Negative impact implies that things have got worse or are more difficult than 
previously and there are no perceived benefits. 
In order to have an understanding of the strength of the variables and 
their significance for the research, particular attention was paid to the mean, 
standard deviation, and inter~item reliability of the independent and dependant 
variables. The coefficient alpha for the variables examined was found to be 0.83 
(table 6.11) and in excess of the minimum of 0.60 quoted by Sekaran (1992) for 
exploratory reseafC'.h. 
Table6.11. 
ImQaCt of new management &]:Stems on role as manager 
Des<r1pl:ion (varl.iblc #) Number Mem Standa,d Item Total 
DevUltion Comelalion 
TEAM {II 11.6) m 4.1909 0.8513 
"·"" 
Managerial Leadership lnitw.tive (ML!) (/111.2) m 4.1727 
"·"" 
0.4822 
Strategic Planning (11 11.5) m 4.(1.155 0.7709 ossoo 
Financial .\ccountnbillty (1111.13) m 
'""" "·"" 
0.4846 
New Technology (in gertffal) (1111.14.) m 
'""" "·""' 
0.3114 
Cuslom.,,.Focu,, (/111.11) m 3.6182 0.8148 ,.,,., 
Commercialisation (business dovclopmenl) (1111.12) m 
'·""' "·""' "·""' 
Shareholder Value Adding(SVA) {1111.9) m 3.5727 0.8290 0.4406 
Change Management (ltll.3) m 3.5273 0.7258 
"·""' 
FOCUS (# 11.1) m '.1.4909 u"" 0.3166 
SlRSS (It 11.7) m 
'·""' 
0.9155 0.44.6.3 
Transformation (II JJ..1) m 3.4.515 
'"'"' "·"" Se1\"icc Level Agree,nent,i (SLA's) (#11.8) m 
'"""' """" "·"" MIMS(#ll.10) m wm ,..,,, 0.:>.576 
Reliability Coe/ficienlS 14. !hems Alpha 0.8281 
The means of the variables (table 6.11) showed agreement among the 
respondents that all the management system changes, apart from MIMS, 
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impacted positively on their roles as managers or section heads. TEAM, the 
Managerial Leadership Initiative (ML!) and StTategic Planning were perceived 
to have had the most positive impact. In these cases the means were 4.19, 4.17 
and 4.04 respectively. These results confirmed findings from the preliminary 
inte1views where although all the managers considered that the changes had 
meant more work for them, most believed that overall the new systems enabled 
them to perform more efficiently and effectively. 
TI1e systems that the respondents considered had the least impact on 
their role were Service Level Agreements (SLA's) and Transformation. For 
these the means were 3.39 and 3.45 respectively. It is most likely that managers 
believed that Service Level Agreements had a low impact on their roles because 
of the poor implementation and application of this system which resulted in the 
majority of manag,as not being involved with SLA's, nor being trained in their 
application. Similarly, managers considered that Transformation, a functional 
and organisational review, had a low impact on their roles because its 
application was confined to the generation sector which consisted of 
approximately 900 employees or about one-quarter of Western Power's 
workforce. 
The only management system change that respondents considered 
impacted negatively on their roles as managers was 1"11MS. The mean for this 
was 2.60. This level of response accords with the concerns that managers had 
expressed about the Mimcom Information Management System (MIMS) during 
the preliminary interviews. They attributed this negative impact to the need to 
acquire new skills, train staff and manage administration issues for a system 
that did not meet all their business needs. 
The importance of new management systems 
In order to determine how important new management systems were 
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seen to be in achieving performance targets, the managers were again given the 
list of fourteen new management systems and asked to indicate their 
perceptions of how important each of the management systems had been in 
achieving performance targets. A five-point Likert scale was used where 1 was 
'unimportant' and 5was 'very important'. 
The coefficient alpha for the variables examined was found to be 0.83 
(table 6.12) and in exces.; of th!' minimum of 0.60 quoted by Sekaran (1992) for 
exploratory research. 
Table 6.12. 
Importance of new management system in achieving oerformance targets 
Description (variable II) Number MeM Standard i"'1nTotal 
Deviation Correlation 
TEAM (11126) m 4.2182 0,!1608 0.5528 
Financial Ae<ounmbllity (H 12.13) m 4.1636 0,7484 0.5123 
Strategic Planning (# 12.5) m U273 0.8471 0.4521 
Custome, Focus {II 12.11) m 4.0l55 0.9519 0.4708 
M=geri.11 l.eadership Initiative (~ill) (# 12.2) m 3.9818 
"""" 
0.5428 
Now Technology (In general) (1112.14) m 
'·""' 
0.7952 0.3605 
Commen:iallsation (Business Development) # 12.12) m 
'·""' 
0.9412 
""'" 
Shareholder Value Adding (SVA) (# 12.9) 111 3.6182 o.ooss o.,m 
Ow,gc Management (# 123) m 3.5182 1.0112 o.sw 
Transfomwtion (#12.4) m 3.5091 0.9457 0.4002 
Service L,,vel Agreemm,t.(SLA's) (# 12.8) m 3.4636 
"·""" 
0.5175 
MIMS (111210) m 3.4000 1.2356 
"''"' 
$!R55 (# 12.7) m 3.2818 1.0149 0.4441 
FOCUS (M 12.1) m "'~ '""' '""' 
Reliability Coeffidenls 14 iloms Alpha. 0.8274 
The means of the variables (table 6.12) showed strong agreement among 
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the respondents that TEAM, Financial Accountability, Strategic Planning and 
Customer Focus were perceived to be the most important management systems 
for achieving their performance targets. In the,e cases the mean were 4.22, 4.16, 
4.13 and 4.04 respectively. 
The means of the variables for New Technology (mean 3.97), 
Commercialisation (mean 3.93), Shareholder Value Adding (mean 3.62), Change 
Management (mean 3.52), and Transformation (mean 3.51) indicates that 
managers considered these of moderate importance for them achieving their 
performance targets. Change Management attempts to involve managers at the 
introduction, training and application stages of branch and business unit 
restTucturing. however, evidence from the preliminary interviews suggests that 
not all managers are willing participants in change management. Shareholder 
Value Adding, and Transformation were unlikely to have been experienced by 
all the managers responding to the questionnaire survey. Nevertheless, it is 
probable that all managers would have been aware of these systems and would 
no doubt have opinions as to their perceived effectiveness within the 
organisation and ranked them accordingly. New Technology and 
Commercialisation had been identified in the secondary data and the 
preli-:_inary interviews as important drivers for the achievement of business 
unit performance. It is likely that many of the productivity and efficiency gains 
Western Power had experienced since corporatisation can be attributed to 
improved commercial performance and the use of new technology. For 
example, SCADN, a new centralised supervisory system which not only gives 
network controllers a real-time view of the state of all circuit breakers on the 
network, but also provides regularly updated informatkm on the supply status 
and power consumption of major customers. This enables problems to be 
quickly identified and action taken ro minimise the loss of supply to customers. 
•SCAD A. an ocronym foT Supervisory ContTol and Data Acquis11lon. 
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The wP.akest areas related to FOCUSS, SIRSS (Strategically Integrated 
Recruitment Selection System) and :MIMS (Mimcom Information Management 
System). For these, the means were 2.34, 3.28 and 3.40 respectively which 
indicates that managers believed these systems did little to help them achieve 
their performance targets. Although the principles of FOCUS and some of the 
change initiatives still prevail within the organisation, it is likely that it rated 
low because of the time that has elapsed since it was introduced (1995 to 1997). 
In addition, the introduction of the Managerial Leadership Initiative (MLI) in 
2001 has since overshadowed FOCUS. The MLI (mean 3.98) has been promoted 
as a management change program which surpasses FOCUS in all aspects of 
leadership. 
The impact of new management systems on skilla, internal networks and 
stakeholders 
Question 13 asked respondents to indicate their perceptions of what has 
been the impact of new management systems and organisational change on 
their skills, internal networks and stakeholders. A five-point Likert scale was 
used, where 1 was 'largely negative impact' and 5 was 'largely positive impact'. 
In the survey context positive impact implies that things have got better, easier 
or improved for the managers. Negative impact implies that things have got 
worse or are more difficult than previously. 
• FOCUS, an acronym for Focus on Organisational Change Understanding and Skill:,,""" o&> appendix 1. 
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Table 6.13. 
ImQact of new management m:'.stems and organisational change 
Description (variable II) N=oo, Me= Standard Item Tola\ 
Deviation Correlation 
Your Relationships With YourSubordinatcStaff (1113.5) m 0.00,0 
"·""" 
0.6270 
Your Relationship Wilh Your Supervisor {GM or Executive) m 3.9910 0.9954 ,..,,, 
(M 13.3) 
Your Relationships With YourPcelS (# 13.4) m 3.9550 o.so:n 0.6961 
Your Ability to Apply Your Commercial Skills (1113.12) m 
'""' "·"" ·~· 
Ongoing De,.,,]opffiC!lt of Your Commercial S!<ills (# 13.11) m 
'·""' 
0.7810 
"·™' 
Your Ability to Get Subordinate Stiff to Meet Business Unit m 3.8829 
"""" 
0.6618 
Targels (1113.7} 
Your Ability to Me,t The Expectations of Your Priority m 3.8468 0.!1549 0.7295 
Stakeholders (1113.8) 
Your ln!enud Networks (# 13.1) m 3.59,16 0.9943 
"·"" 
YourExtem.1] Nctworki; (1113.2) m 
'"""' 
0.8055 0.5271 
Ongoing Development of Your Technical Skills (II 13.9) m 3.5105 
·= "'"' 
Your Ability to Apply YourTL,chnkalSkills (#13.10) m 3.5135 
"·"" 
0.5014 
You, Relationships With Colleagues Outside Work (1113.fi) m 3.3514 0,5823 ..... 
Reliability Coeffidents 12 items Alpha 0.887\l 
The means of the variables (table 6.13) showed agreement among the 
respondents that the new management systems and organisational changes had 
impacted positively on all the listed skills, internal networks and stakeholders. 
For example, Relationships With Subordinate Staff (mean 4.01), Relationship 
With Supervisor (3.99), Relationships With Peers (3.95), AbjJity lo Apply 
Commercial Skills (3.95) and Ongoing Development of Commercial Skills (3.90). 
These results are supported by information from the preliminary interviews. 
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The least positive impact of new management systems and 
organisational change was reported for Relationships With Colleagues Outside 
Work (3.35), Ability to Apply Technical Skills (3.51) and Ongoing Development 
of Technical Skills (3.54). These responses seem to reflect managers' belief that 
their relationships with colleagues outside of work have improved only slightly 
with the introduction of new management systems and organisational change. 
It also reflects their concerns that continuous change had meant that many of 
the skills they had acquired previollsly were unsuitable for their new roles. 
This had left some of them with insufficient skills to perform their task 
effectively, but acknowledged that opporhmities to gain these skills had 
improved since corporatisation (table 6.23). 
6.2.5 Stakeholder influence 
Section five of the questionnaire suivey sought to determine managers' 
opinions of which key stakeholders have significantly influenced the 
organisation's business plans and budgets both prior to and since 
corporatisation. It also sought to determine if the managers believed that 
Western Power gained any advantage from having the government (i.e., a key 
stakeholder) as a sole shareholder. 
Stakeholder influence in business plans and budgets 
Question 14 listed nine key stakeholders which had been identified by 
managers during the preliminary interviews as having a significant influence 
on the organisation's business plans and budgets, and therefore on their roles as 
manager. The questionnaire survey participants were requested to select a 'yes' 
or 'no' response against each stakeholder in tenns of significant influence for 
the periods pre-1995 and post-1995. 
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Table6.14. 
Stakeholder influence in business plans and budgets pre 1995 
Descrlp~on (variable #) 
Slate Government (Minister) (# 14.1) 
Treasul}' (If 14.2) 
Emplo)'CCS (II 14.8) 
Commercial CustmnerS (1114.6) 
Indus!l}'Group:< (1114.4) 
OffiroofEncrgy (1114,'l) 
Domestic Cusl;IJmerS (M 14.5) 
CompcUtorS (1114.'l) 
ContractorS (# 14.9) 
,,, 
,.., 
"' ,.., 
,,, 
17.1 
17.1 
,,., 
'"' 
Significant Innuenee 
Pre-1995 
NO 
, .. 
'" 
"' ffi.S 
~., 
"·' 
.,., 
"·' M, 
The Frequency analysis (table 6.14) indicated that the managers 
considered the most significa."lt stakeholders in terms of influencing Western 
Power's business plans and budgets prior to corporatisation (pre 1995) were the 
State Government (Minister) (96%), Treasury {85%), Employees (50%) and 
Commercial Customers (34%) and Industry Groups (33%). This result is not 
surprising considering findings from the review of secondary data and the 
preliminary inteiviews which showed that Western Power was subjected to 
ministerial scrutiny, interference and influence in all levels of the decision-
making process from many levels of government prior to corporatisation. Also, 
many Commercial Customers and Industry Groups had the political and 
commercial power to significantly influence strategic planning and tariffs. 
Employees were considered to have significant influence in business plans and 
budgets prior to 1995 because of the high union membership and strong union 
representation in industrial award negotiations. Industrial action was common 
if the unions failed to achieve their demands. 
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The least significant stakeholders for the same period were the Office of 
Energy (17%), Domestic Customers (17%), and Competitors (13%) and 
Contractors (11 %). This result is also not surprising because prior to 1995 there 
were very few contractors working for the state electricity utilily and there was 
virtually no competition due to U,e monopoly environment the utility operated 
in. Also, prior to 1995 the Office of Energy had no significant influence over the 
electricity utility's operations and domestic customers, who had no alternative 
source of supply, had to accept the service they were given. 
Table 6.15. 
Stakeholder influence in business plans and budgets post 1995 
Signifkant Influence 
Post-1995 
Dc,-,cription {variable#) 
""' 
NO 
' ' Competitors (# 14.7) w., 
'' S!nteGovcmment (MinisbeT) (1114.1) 
"' 
11.7 
CommcrcialCu.stnme"' {# 14.6) ,05 "5 
rre ... ury (# 14.2) 76.6 ,,., 
Office of Energy (II 14.3) ~., ~., 
Industry-Groups (#14.4) ~., ~., 
Employees (# 14.6) 
" " Domestic Cu.stome"' (# 14.5) 37.8 m 
Contractors (11 H.9) 
" 
~ 
Frequency analysis of responses for post 1995 (table 6.15) indicates that 
the most significant stakeholders in tenns of influencing Western Power's 
business plans and budgets since corporatisation were Competitors (92%), State 
Govenunent (88%) and Commercial Customers (86%). These results give an 
indication of the impact of corporatisation and the resultant deregulation (albeit 
partial) and commercialisation within Western Australia's electricity supply 
industry. Furthermore, Western Power as a corporation has an obligation to 
run its business in a commercial manner. 1his has forced it to recognise the 
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influence that competitors can have on its commercial activities and the 
influence that the government has as sole shareholder. Other stakeholders 
which managers considered had significant influence in business plans and 
budgets post 1995 were Treasury (77%), most likely because of the influence it 
has on Western Power's borrowing capacity; the Office of Energy (74%) because 
of the wider regulatory and electrical safety responsibilities it was given with 
the enabling legislation for Western Power; and Industry Groups (74%) because 
they had retained their strong economic and political influence in the utility's 
business plans and budgets. 
The least significant stakeholders in terms of influencing Western 
Power's business plans and budgets since corporatisation were Employees 
(45%), Domestic Customers (38%) and Contractors (27%). It is believed that 
managers rated Employees low because of the greater use of contractors and 
the lessening influence unions had in Western Power's strategic plans and 
budgets post 1995 as a result of union rationalis.ition which saw union 
representation reduced from around fifteen unions to just two. Domestic 
Customers were most likely rated low because despite corporatisation and 
partial deregulation they still do not have a choice of electricity supplier. 
Finally, although Contractors were engaged by Western Powe,· in significant 
numbers, they were still not regarded by managers as having a significant 
influence in its business plans and budgets. This finding is surprising 
considering the large amounts of work contracted out, and even though 
contractors are accounted for as materials, rather than as labour, their overall 
cost would be significant. 
WA government as sole shareholder 
Question 15 sought to determine if the questionnaire survey participants' 
considered it an advantage or disadvantage for Western Power to have the 
Western Australian government as the sole shareholder. A five-point Likert 
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scale was used, where 1 was 'a very significant disadvantage to Western Power' 
and 5 was 'a very significant advantage to Western Power'. 
Table6.16 
Having WA government as sole shareholder 
Description (variable#) 
A Vcry51gnlfkantD!sadVlllllage to Western Power (# 15.1) 
A Minor Disadvan!Jlge to Western Power (# 15.2) 
Neither a Disadvonl>lgeor Advanl>lge (#15.3) 
A Minor Advantage to Western Power (# 15.4) 
A Sigrul!canl Advnnlagc to Western Powe, ( # 15.5) 
Mean 1.90 
Number 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
Frequency Percent 
~ = 
~ "-5 
H '20 
' 
,., 
5 '5 
The mean of 1.90 showed that the majority of respondents cons.idered 
Western Power was disadvantaged by having the WA government as its sole 
shareholder, see table 6.16. The frequency analysis indicates that of the 
responses, 52% considered it was A Very Significant Disadvantage to Western 
Power and 22% considered it was A Minor Disadvantage. It is likely that 
managers see Western Power being disadvantaged by reported government 
interference (section 5.4.1) in important strategic issues such as employee 
numbers, tariff rates, and new business ventures and partnerships. It is 
believed that many of the managers who reported it was Neither an Advantage 
or Disadvantage (13%) managed branches which were not significantly affected 
by government influence in Western Power. For example, Business Information 
Technology (BIT) whose main role was to introduce and maintain information 
management systems. Finally, 8% of the respondees considered it was A Minor 
Advantage and 5% considered it A Very Significant Advantage to Western 
Power. It is believed that managers in the financial sectors of Western Power, 
e.g., Western Power's Treasury, would view the increased bo1Towing capacity 
and lower interest rates from having the government as sole shareholder to be 
252 
an advantage to Western Power when large capital investment was being 
planned. 
~.26 Impact of new systems and organisational change on working life 
Section six sought to determine managers' opinions of how the 
introduction of new management systems and corresponding organisational 
changes have affected their quality of working life over the previous seven 
years, in terms of working conditions, role performance, remuneration, career 
and training opportunities, motivation, job satisfaction, hours of work, etc. The 
impact of new management systems on managers' workloads over the past 
seven years is also explo1ed in this section. 
Influence of changes to working conditions on managers' performance 
Question 16 sought the participants' opinions of the influence that 
changes to their working conditions had had on their performance as a 
manager since 1995. 
A five point Likert scale where 1 was 'largely negative influence' and 5 
was 'largely positive influence' was used . 
.( 
If ,, 
\\ 
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Table 6.17 
Influence of changes to working conditions on managers' performance 
Description {variable #) Number Frequency Percent 
La,gclyPositlvc lnfluenro (H 16.5) m M 39.6 
SUghtly Positive Innucncc (#16.4) m es 
"' 
Ncith..,- a Negative or Positive rnnuence (# 16.3) m 
"' " 
Slightly Negative Influence{# 16.2) m 
' 
,., 
La,gely Negative Influ= (# 16.l) m 
' 
, .. 
Mean3.96 
The mean of 3.96 showed that the majority of respondents considered 
that changes to their working conditions had had a Slightly Positive Influence 
(table 6.17). The frequency analysis indicates that of the responses, 40% 
considered that changes to their working conditions had a Largely Positive 
Influence on their performance as manager; 31 % considered changes to their 
working conditions had a Slightly Positive Influence; 18% considered that the 
changes had Neither a Negative or Positive influence; 7% considered changes to 
working conditions had a Slightly Negative Influence; and 4% considered 
changes to working conditions have had a Largely Negative Influence on their 
performance as manager since 1995 (table 6.17). 
The high level of positive responses may be attributable to organisational 
changes and restructuring along business unit lines and the introduction of new 
technology which has led to greater efficiency within the workplace. TI,e 
negative responses may be because of the increased workload which managers 
have reported as a result of changes and the introduction of new management 
systems within their workplace (section 5.4.2). 
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Rating of employment in terms of remuneration and conditions 
Question 17 of the questionnaire survey asked managers to rate their 
employment with Western Power in tenns of remuneration and conditions for 
the work they are expected lo do. The question was divided into two parts and 
managers were asked to respond for both prior and post corporatisation. A five 
point Likert scale was used for both parts of the question, where 1 was 'very 
poor' and 5 was 'very good'. 
Table 6.18 
Rating of emolovment in terms of remuneration and conditions prior to 
corporatisation 
Description (variable#) Number Frequency Percent 
Good (# 17.1,4) m 
" '" No Opinion (II 17.1.3) m 
" '" 
Poor (1117.1.2) m 
" 
ns 
Very Good {1117.15) m 
' 
2, 
Very Poor (1117.1.1) m 
'' 
Mcnn3.40 
Responses for the period prior to corporatisation, question 17.1, 
indicated a mean of 3.40, see table 6.18. The Frequency analysis of the 
responses indicates that 49% rated their employment with Western Power in 
tenns of remuneration and conditions as Good. The other variables were rated 
as No Opinion 33%; Poor 13%; Very Good 3% and Very Poor 1%. These results 
may have been influenced by those participants who were not in management 
positions prior to the corporatisation of Western Power. In addition, the 
significant organisational restructuring prior to and since the corporatisation of 
Western Power had resulted in many managers changing roles several times 
thus making accurate comparisons difficult. 
255 
Table 6.19 
Rating of remuneration and conditions now 
Description (varfa~le #) 
Good (# 17.2.4) 
VeryGood (#17.25) 
NoOpiuion (#17.23) 
Poor (ff 17.2.2) 
Very Poor {# 17.:tl) 
Mean3.9 
Number 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
Frequency Percent 
" 
sos 
" "' 
" '" 
'" ' 
' 
,., 
Responses for the post corporatisation situation, question 17.2, indicated 
a meanof3.9, see table 6.19. This was just within Good on the Likertscale. The 
frequency analysis indicates that of the responses, 50% rated their employment 
with Western Power in terms of remuneration and conditions as Good. The 
other variables were rated as Very Good 26%; No Opinion 13%; Poor 9%; and 
Very Poor 2%. 
The ratings for both Good and Very Good increased from the pre· 
corporatisation to the post corporatisation parts of questions 17. For the Good 
variable the increase was 1% and for the Very Good variable the increase was 
23.4%. These increases were mostly due to a reduction in the ratings of No 
Opinion, down 20.7% and Poor, down by 4.5% from the pre..corporatisation 
results (tables 6.18 and 6.19). It is believed that these shifts in the ratings were 
largely due to the improved c~nditions and remuneration that managers within 
Western Power enjoyed after corporatisation compared to the years leading up 
to it. Since corporatisation management contract::,, have been linked to specific 
performance targets which gave managers increa'ied incentive to improve their 
business unit performance. 
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Impact of organisational change on career opportunities 
Question 18 sought managers' opinions on what had been the impact of 
organisational change on their career opportunities within Western Power over 
the previous seven years. A five point Likert scale, where 1 was 'largely 
negative impact' and 5 was 'largely positive impact', was used for this question. 
In the smvey context positive impact implies that things have got better, easier 
or improved for the managers. Negative impact implies that things have got 
worse or are more difficult than previously. 
Table 6.20 
Impact of organisational change on career opportunities 
Descdption (variable#) Number Frequency Percent 
Larg<'ly Positive ImpacL.( # 185) m n 29,7 
SLightly Positive lmpacL.(# 18.4) m ~ 
" 
N<"ithe, Negative or P<»itivc lmp.1cl.(# 18.3) m m :!5.2 
Slightly Negative Impact..(# 18.2} m ,; 13.5 
Largely Neg.,tivc lmp;,ct..(# 18.1) m 
' 
'5 
Menn3.f>I 
The mean of 3.64. showed that the majority of respondents considered 
that organisational changes have had a positive impact on their career 
opportunities wiUllil Western Power (table 6.20). The frequency analysis 
indicates that of U,e responses, 30% considered that organisational changes 
have had a Largely Positive Impact on their career opportunities; 27% 
considered organisational changes have had a Slightly Positive Impact on their 
career opportunities; 25% considered the changes had Neither a Negative or 
Positive Impact; 13% considered organisational changes had a Slightly Negative 
Impact; and 5% considered organisational changes have had a Largely Negative 
Impact on their career opportunities within Western Power. The positive 
response indicates that managers have experienced, or are optimistic that they 
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will experience, improved career opportunities due to the corporatisation of 
Western Power and the changes that have resulted. 
Impact of new management systems and organisational change on skillB 
Question 19 sought managers' opinions about the adequacy of their 
current skills and whether they considered they should learn new skills and 
who should provide the training for those skills. The managers were asked to 
respond to four questions (table 6.21). 
Table6.21. 
Impact of new management systems ar:td organisational change on skills 
Description (voriBblc #) 
Do you ronsidcr you •~ould Lcam nL'II' skills? (# 19.2) 
Do you consider Wes!iern Power should provide troinrrlg for ""Y slsills you rnay 
requill'?(~ 19.4) 
Do you consider your rurrent skill,, odequn!i, for whnt you Oii' cxpc<lcd to do? (M 
19.1) 
Have you sought new skills?(# 19.3) 
?cn:cnt 
NO 
' ' 
~., 
'" 
' 
14.4 
20.7 
21.6 
The hequency analysis of the responses for each of the variables (table 
6.21) indicates that 91 % of the managers considered that they should learn new 
skills, however, only 78% indicated that they have sought new skills. There is 
also an interesting gap between the 91 % who considered they should learn new 
skills and th~ 79% who considered their current skills are adequate for what 
they are expected to do. It is likely that while managers considered their 
current skills were adequate, they also believed that it was important for them 
to learn new skills in order to cope with the different roles which resulted from 
restructuring and the introduction of new management systems. It is also 
probable that managers would have viewed learning new skills an important 
adjunct to the improved career opportunities which they acknowledged in 
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question 18 (table 6.20). This issue is explored further in the follow-up 
interviews, chapter seven. 
Skill development is of very high concern for the 85% of managers who 
considered Westem Power should provide training for any skills they may 
require to do their job. High university fees and the need for study leave are 
likely reasons why some managers believe that Westem Power should provide 
such training. Others may be resentful of the structural and management 
system changes that have been inflicted upon them since corporatisation and 
consider that if senior management wants them to undertake different roles 
then it is up to Western Power to provide whatever training they may need to 
undertake those roles. It is likely that the true picture lies somewhere in the 
middle as many of the managers who spent time acquiring the necessary skills 
at the time the changes were introduced, considered at the time of the survey 
that their current skills are adequate for their role. Others may have answered 
this question in light of the seemingly regular management system changes 
which also heralds new technology and further skill-learning for the managers. 
This issue is discussed in detail in chapter eight. 
Impact of new management systems and business strategies on workload 
Question 20 of the questionnaire survey asked participants to rate lhe 
impact of new management systems and business strategies on their workload. 
They were instructed to select an appropriate response against a list of eighteen 
variables which included thirteen of the management systems explored in 
earlier questions and an additional five variables to include key business 
strategies which have been adopted since corporatisation. The additional 
variables included Benchmarking Business Unit Performance, Marketing and 
Sales, Environmental Issues, Contract Labour, and Contracting Out of Services. 
Transformation as a management system was not included among the variables 
for this question because it had been applied for only a short period and its 
259 
application was restricted to the generation division, which represented about 
25% of staff. 
For each of the eightet!n variables, a five-point Likert scale was used, 
where 1 was 'largely negative impact', that is, workload has significantly 
increased and 5 was 'largely positive impact', that is, workload has significantly 
decreased. 
Table6.22. 
ImEact of management systems and business strategies on workload 
Dcscriptinn(,·orioble #} Number M,- Stando,d !!em Tomi 
Dcvioti<m Ccrrclati<m 
Employc"' P"rformonce Management (TEAM)(# 20.7) m 3.6455 1.0710 0.5857 
StrategicPlannmg (# 20.15) m 
'""' '""' 
0.7413 
[ntroduc~on of N...w Technology (II 20.17} m 
'""" "·"" 
0.4180 
Customer Focus (# 20.12) m 3.4727 
"·"" 
0.5627 
Bu<lgel:l & Finand,1[ Accountlbility (# 20.13) m 3.4636 Ul552 0,6710 
Ml.I (#201) m 3.lSl8 l.OJ91 
"""' 
Service U.'Vel Ag"-".'ll1ent(SLA's) (# 20.5) m 
'-"" 
29531 0.0114 
ContTactLabou, (# 20.16) m 3.2818 0.8142 0.443.3 
Marketing and Soles (# 20.10) m 3.2JZl 0.8340 0.4345 
ContTacting outol Services ( # 20.18) m 
'™' o.aea, 0.3812 
Environmentallssu<'S (#20.14) m 3.2455 
""~ 
0.4143 
ChangeM4rnrgement (# 20.8) m 3.2273 
"'""' "·""' 
Beochmarking Busin=Unit Performonce (# 21J.9) m 3.lSlS 
"""' "·"" 
PursuitofUnregulatcd Income (# 20.11) m 3.1455 
""" 
0.47ot 
Employ,.. Recruitment and Selection (SIRSS) (N 20.6) m 3.1000 
"·""' "-""" 
Shareholder Value Adding (SVA) (# 20.4) m 3.0818 0.7311 
"""' 
FOCUS{# 20.1) m a,, 0.9415 
""" 
MIMS (# 20.J) m ,..,~ 1.1588 0.2776 
Roll.~bility cooff!cients 18 it,,ms Alpha 011656 
260 
A Cronbach alpha reliability check was calculated for this question and 
was found to be 0.86 (table 6.22). 
'I"ne means of the variables which showed the strongest areas of 
agreement were Employee Performance Management (TEAM), Strategic 
Planning, the Introduction of New Technology, Customer Focus, and Budgets 
and Financial Accountability. In these cases the means were 3.64, 3.51, 3.50, 3.47 
and 3.46 respectively which indicates moderate agreement that workloads have 
reduced with the introduction of new management systems. However, it is 
believed that while these new management systems were introduced to 
improve business efficiency and management effectiveness, the systems 
themselves required a significant concentration of the managers' time and effort 
in order for them to be successfully introduced, embedded and sustained. 
Therefore, it is probable that managers' workloads had actually increased 
significantly at the time of introduction of ti,e new management systems, in 
some cases five to seven years ago, but at the time the questionnaire sutvey was 
administered managers were starting to see the benefits of those systems which 
had helped reduce their workload. The size of the benefits, in terms of 
workload reduction for the managers, may be limited by the likelihood that 
although many of the managers were now less focused on engineering issues, 
most of the workload reductions in that area were being offset by the 
requirement to place a greater emphasis on business needs. That is, the 
concentration of managers' time and effort to get the systems working as 
planned would have to some degree offset any reductions to the managers' 
workload brought about through the productivity and efficiency improvements 
the systems were supposed to deliver on. For example, MIMS which was the 
only management system change that respondents to question 11 had 
considered impacted negatively on their roles as managers (table 6.11). Both 
MIMS (mean 2.81) and FOCUS (mean 2.96) were reported in question 20 to 
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have moderately increased managers' workloads. For MIMS, the increase in 
managers' workloads was most likely because of the complexity of :c.1e system 
and its poorly managed introduction into Western Power (section 5.4.2). 
It is understandable that both FOCUS and MIMS would have been 
considered by managers to have increased their workload due to the magnihlde 
of the changes associated with the two programs. Although FOCUS ceased to 
be a key management system around 2000 many of the management systems 
listed in question 20 were the direct result of the FOCUS culhlre change 
program and were introduced between 1995 and 2000 as on-going change 
initiatives for business improvement. Management system changes associated 
with both FOCUS :i.nd lvllMS not only impacted on managers, but on 
employees across the organisation. They had to learn new skills in order to 
effectively use the new systems and division, branch and business unit 
perfonnance was now measured against many of the management systems. 
Perfonnance reviews for managers could also take some or all of these systems 
into consideration. Interestingly, the rvILI (mean 3.38) was not reported as 
having significantly increased the managers workload even though a key 
component of this program requires significant involvement by managers at all 
levels of its introduction. The reason for this is most likely because, at the time 
the questionnaire survey was administered, not all manapi?rs hac:1. attended MLI 
training. 
The remaining management systems and business strategy variables are 
ranked according to their mean in table 6.22 and all were reported to have 
slightly decreased the manager's workloads. It is likely, however, that the 
results do not reflect the true situation for some managers. For example, not all 
managers are responsible for Shareholder Value Adding, the Pursuit of 
Unregulated Income and Benchmarking Business Unit Perfonnance. Also, for 
the majority of the managers that were involved it is probable that they viewed 
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these as part of their normal workload and did not view them as an increase in 
work. Moreover, the Pursuit of Unregulated Income had only been seriously 
pursued in the two to three years prior to the administration of the survey. 
Therefore, their full impact on the managers' workloads might not have been 
noticed at the time the survey was administered. These issues are explored 
further in the follow-up interviews, chapter seven. 
Impact of new management systems on working life 
The final question in the questionnaire survey sought the managers' 
perceptions of how new management systems and business strategies had 
impacted on working life issues such as motivation, job satisfaction, training / 
learning opportunities, hours of work, etc. A five-point Likert scale was used 
for each of these variables, where 1 was 'strongly decreased' and 5 was 
'significantly increased'. 
A Cronbach alpha reliability check was calculated for this question and 
was found to be 0.61 (table 6.23). Titis is in excess of the minimum of 0.60 
quoted by Sekaran (1992) for exploratory research. 
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Table 6.23. 
lmQaCt of new management s~stems on working life 
Description (\tOriable #) Number MeM Standard 11.,mT01a! 
Deviation Correlation 
Your deg,ee of Acccunlability ns Ma!lllger or Section m 4.1622 0.69,17 0.4498 
Head (# 21.9) 
YourHoursofWork (#215) m 4.1351 0.,000 0.4016 
Time You Spend Organising nnd Attrnding Meetings m 4.0631 0.7661 
""" (#21.13) 
Your Personal Stress at Work (# 21.6} m 
'""" 
0.7622 0.1378 
Amol.!ntofWork You Tale Home (# 21.7) m 3.11919 0.8671 
"·""" 
Time You Spend on Employee Issues TiwtWcrc m 3.78.38 0.7187 0.2872 
Pn..,iuusly a HR Canccm (it 21.8) 
Your Empowerment lo lake Action and Mate m 3.7748 
"·'"" 
0.4988 
Decisions Without Referring lo Your Supervisor (GM 
or Executive) (It 2UO) 
You, Motivation (# 21.1} m 3.7117 0.8882 
'·"" 
Your Job Satisfaction (# 21.2) m 3.6667 0.11782 
'""'" Time You Spend Coachffig and Training Suhordinales m 3.6216 0.7392 0.3116 
(#21.12) 
Your Training/ Leaming Opportunities (# 21.3) m 3.5225 0.8512 O.Wl6 
Time You Spend on Non Core Activ!lles (# 21.11) m 
'""' '·""" 
0.0198 
You,Lci>ureTime (#21.4} m 2.0721 
'·""" 
0.51~ 
Re!UJ.bility Coefficients 13 items Alpha 0.6106 
Respondents to question 21 of the questio1maire survey reported that 
their Degree of Accountability as Manager or Section Head (mean 4.16) had 
increased the most of all the variables (table 6.23). This finding is not surprising 
considering that key managerialist and corporatisation objectives are 
management reform and financial accountability as well documented in the 
literature (Dunford et al., 1998; Hannan, 1993b; Hyman, 1995; Reynoldson, 
1999; Stace & Dunphy, 1997). Both financinl and managerial accountability 
were strong features of the Functional and Organisational Review (FOR) 
undertaken in the late 1980's prior to corporatisation. They were also 
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reintToduced and reinforced during the FOCUS culhlre change program when 
Western Power was corporatised. 
Other working life issues found to have a moderate level of increase 
were Hours of Work, Time Spend Organising and Attending Meetings, and the 
Amount of Work Taken Home. For these, the means were 4.13, 4.06, and 3.89 
respectively. The increased work related activities are mirrored in the moderate 
decrease in the managers' Leisure Time (mean 2.07). This non-working time, 
was considered by respondents to be the area of most concern for them. 
Despite the reported reductions in the manager's workloads due to new 
management systems (table 6.22) it is probable that managers were already 
working increased hours at the time the questionnaire survey was conducted 
and any perceived benefits have only moderately reduced those excess hours. 
This has resulted in managers having to use some of their leisure time in order 
to get their work done and meet performance targets. 
Respondents to the questionnaire survey indicated a moderate level of 
increase in Personal SI.Tess at Work (mean 3.90). The slTess is most likely 
attributable to role changes due to restructuring over recent years. Both 
restruchlring and role changes require cultural readjustments which can 
manifest into concerns by some over job security and, for others, future career 
opportunities. Restruchlring could further exacerbate sf.Tess if managers were 
placed in charge of sections and business units for which they may not have the 
appropriate skills. Question 19 of the questionnaire survey had sought to 
determine whether managers considered their current skills were adequate for 
what they are expected to do. The responses reflected managers' concerns that 
continuous change had meant that many of the skills they had acquired 
previously were unsuitable for their new roles (table 6.21). 
Managers had indicated a moderate increase in tJ:.e amount of lime they 
265 
Spend on Employee Issues lbat Were Previously a HR Concern (mean 3.78). 
However, it is likely that managers actually spend more time attending to staff 
matters than they indicated in the questionnaire survey. For example, some 
managers had indicated dming the preliminary interviews that their workloads 
had noticeably increased due to time spend attending to staff matters that were 
previously a HR function. These findings are supported by the secondary data 
(chapter two) which shows that sincE: corporatisation, and more recently since 
the introduction of the Managerial Leadership Initiative (MU) in the latter half 
of 2000, the executive and senior management have gradually devolved 
responsibilily for day-to-day employee matters, which were originally the 
responsibility of Human Resource (HR) pen;onnel, to the managers. These 
matters included staff training and the maintenance of training plans and 
registers, staff recruitment and selection, staff roles and responsibilities, staff 
performance management and staff employment contracts and increment 
reviews. 
The means of the variables showed a moderate level of increase for 
working life issues such as Empowet"!11ent to Take Action and Make Decisions 
Without Referring to Supervisor, Motivation and Job Satisfaction. The means 
were 3.77, 3.71 and 3.66 respectively. This increase is indicative of the changes 
that had occurred in Western Power since 1995. The secondary data (chapter 
two) shows that the introduction of empowerment through the FOCUS culture 
change program (1995-1997) had sent a clear message to managers and staff that 
it was acceptable for them to make decisions and to take responsible action, in 
fact ... nspomib/e risk-tnki11g (Widdis & Davis-Goff, 1995) was a common phrase 
used during the FOCUS work<ihops. It is likely that the ability to make 
decisions without constant referral to senior management for approval was 
seen to be a strong motivator by managers. For the same reasons managers 
probably gained increased job satisfaction. 
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The survey responses also showed a moderate level of increase for 
training and learning opportunities (mean 3.52). This finding is supported by 
data from question 19 of the questionnaire survey which showed that 78% of 
the managers hud indicated that they had sought new skills since the 
introduction of new management systems. The managers were also agreeable 
to undertake any training required for their job, but the majority considered 
that Western Power should provide training for any skills they may require 
(table 6.21). Finally, the review of secondary data (chapter two) had shown that 
since corpuratisation the executive has focused increased attention on new 
technology and new business systems in order to improve organisational 
effectivenes,; and efficiency. This had required the managers to spend 
significant time developing the necessary skills in order for them to introduce 
and promote the new systems among their staff. 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The questionnaire survey revealed a substantial consistency in exploring 
how managers perceive the broad organisational impact of corporatisation and 
management reform on their roles and working life. Furthermore, the width of 
the differences in perceptions between respondents for a\1 six sections of the 
survey was found to be relatively narrow. The researcher believes that this wus 
due to the strong content validity of the survey instrument, which was enabled 
by the findings of the preliminary interviews and the rigorous pre-testing in the 
form of a pilot survey. The key themes and findings from both the review of 
secondary data and the preliminary interviews ensured the questionnaire 
survey was relevant and was strongly focused on key issues that concerned 
managers within Western Power. 
There was a strong understanding by managers of the rationale for the 
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introduction of corporatisation within Western Power, the main beneficiaries of 
it and the main reasons for ongoing management system changes. However, 
the communication of management system changes was only moderately 
effective and no direct link was made between how effectively they had been 
communicated to the managers and the clarity with which they saw their roles. 
Nevertheless, it is considered likely that there is a link because of the high level 
of importance they had placed on their being involved with the introduction of 
new management systems. Furthermore, for managers, role clarity comes from 
an understanding of the management systems and how those systems fit within 
the organisational structure. Therefore, it is likely that ongoing restructuring 
and role tenure had contributed to a 'blurring' of role clarity for some, but the 
majority of interviewees considered that their roles were clearer in 2002 than 
they were prior to corporatisation. 
The secondary data and pre~ary interviews had identified the 
fourteen most significant management system changes, which along with 
organisational changes introduced since corporatisation, had impacted the most 
on the managers. These were explored further in the questionnaire survey 
where it was confirmed that the changes had impacted both positively and 
negatively on the managers' roles, working life, and on the achievement of 
performance targets. Furthermore, the new management systems and 
organisational changes introduced since corporatisation had a moderately 
positive impact on their skills, career opportunities, internal nehvorks and 
relationships with key stakeholders. The most positive being in the areas of 
remuneration and working conditions and managers' relationships with 
subordinate staff, supervisors and peers. Those working life issues found to be 
adversely affected were the managers' levels of personal stress, workload and 
working hours. It is most likely that the increased hours of work directly 
impacted on their leisure time. There was strong agreement by managers that 
their current skills were adequate for what they are expected to do, but most 
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believed that they should leam new skills, and the majority indicated that they 
had sought them. Moreover, they considered that Western Power should 
provide the training for any new skills they may require. 
The significant changes which have occurred, and the perceived benefits 
of those changes to the managers' roles and working life as a result of 
corporatisation are important for this study and are explored further in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS: STAGE 3 
7.1 OVERVIEW 
The data from the preliminary interviews was analysed in chapter five 
and key themes and issues identified during the analysis were used to inform 
the questionnaire sunrey. The analysis of data from the questionnaire survey L'l 
chapter six identified twelve important topics where further investigation 
would greatly improve the content and validity of the data. 11\ese topics were 
organised into questions for follow-up interviews and are listed in table 7.2. 
The follow-up interviews were conducted with sixteen randomly selected 
managers from across the organisation. In order to further improve t..'-.e content 
validity of the data, those interviewed during the follow-up interviews were 
different from those interviewed during the preliminary interviews. 
7.2 SELECilON CRITERIA 
The interviews were conducted with one general manager, five branch 
managers and ten senior section heads within Western Power (table 4.5). It was 
considered by the researcher that the content validity of the dala. would be 
enhanced if the sixteen managers chosen for the follow-up interviews were 
different from those who participated in the preliminary interviews. The 
selection criteria was the same as that wl1ich applied for the preliminary 
interviews i.e., the chosen managers had more than eight years service within 
Western Power, were in management positions prior to 1994 and collectively 
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represented a good cross section of the branches and business units within the 
organisation (chapter 4, section 4.4.2). 
Each interview took an average of thirty minutes during which twelve 
questions were asked. Important key issues identified in the analysis of the 
data, but beyond the scope of this study are discussed later in chapter nine as 
issues for future research. Although females participated in all stages of the 
research their participation rate is not noted hl this study because the siz.e and 
s~ucture of some branches and sections within Western Power may lead to 
it;iir anonymity being compromised. In addition, specific gender issues are not 
addressed in this study. 
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7.3 FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Table 7.2 lists the questions that were asked at the follow-up intelViews 
in order to validate findings and further explore key issues from stages one and< 
two of the research schema. 
Table 7.2 
Follow-up inteiview questions 
Number 
' 
' 
• 
, 
' 
' 
" 
" 
Qurstion 
What has been tl,e lmp,ict of /ioand.1! and budg<'ling systems on your role as manager 
and the per/om,ance of your business unit? 
What has been the imp,1ct of strategic plmm<ni; on your rule as manager and your ability 
lo achil,vc performance lilTfl<'\11 
\'l'h.,t has bC"Cn tl¥c impact uf perform= 111anagement and porformaru:e tari;ets on 
your role ,md r<'l11Unerntion1 
How ]~,s tl,e use of contract L1bour and con!raclmg nut of ""rvicc'S impach...! on your 
rule a.s manag<'rl 
\\1UI! has bi.•,n liw impact nfthe pursu!to/ unregulall;,d income anynur role as manager 
1111d tlie perlormonce of your businc:,., unitl 
Hn;,• hascustoowr focus irnpac!e;;I on yourrnl<'as milrulger1 
What has been the impact ol empowonnent on your rot.. a, ma,~1gcrl 
What ha, b,.--cn the impact of tlw rna11'1gerial leade,ship initiative on your tole as 
man.1ger? 
What ]~,s l><"<ITT the impact of corpo,atisation and new rnanagemmt sysh>ms on the 
iE'Chnical component of }'our rolc as man.1gc,r? 
What has l>l'<.'t\ lhc impact of rorporatlsation and organ1S.1tional n.'Structur<ng on tho 
clarity nl your role as marwgcrl 
Whal has bc,_.n tl,e impact o/ corporatisation on you, c,u,,,r opportunities? 
\\/hat has OC'<.'fl the imJ"'Clofcorporatisationand new rnnnagcmentsysb!m5on the time 
you opeml doU1g work n,l,it,,J odlvltics? 
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7,4 KEY FOLLOW- INTERVIEW FINDINGS: ST AGE 3 
This section provi es an analysis of the data gathered during the follow-
up interviews and is s uctured in the same order as the questions were 
presented in table 7.2. The findings from this analysis are synthesised in 
chapter eight with the fin ings from chapters 5 and 6. 
Financial accountability 
Financial accounta ility was identified in the preliminary interviews as a 
major issue for manager. in tenns of personal and business unit performance. 
It was also found lo h 1ve had a negative impact on their roles and had 
contributed to a noticea le increase in their workload, brought about by the 
introduction of new mm agement systems and increased expenditure related 
bureaucracy such as e preparation of business cases in order to gain 
expenditure approvals. The findings of the questionnaire survey, however, 
showed that the majorit) of managers considered financial accountability had 
had a positive impact on their roles, was important in supporting the 
achievement of their per{ nnance targets and had a slightly positive impact on 
their workload. In the su ey context a positive impact implied that things had 
got better, easier or im oved for the managers, whereas a negative impact 
implied that things had g t worse or are more difficult than previously. 
The follow-up int rviews found that the main area of disagreement 
between the above lindi1 gs was the individual managers' perceptions of the 
new financial manageme t systems and how they had impacted on their roles 
and workload. This per eption was found to be dependent upon the level of 
financial reporting the agers were required to do in order to carry out their 
duties. They all identi ied the Mimcom Information Management System 
(MIMS) as being import t to them for budgeting, financial reporting and 
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achieving performance targets. However, most believed that l\,:[JMS failed to 
meet many of their financllil management and budgeting needs. They reported 
that it was not an ideal system because it was too complex and lacked user-
friendly reporting software providing a significant source of frustration for 
many managers. For example, reporting problems included delays in the 
production of reports and the inflexibility of the reporting format which often 
caused unnecessary delays in gaining the required data and somel:imes several 
reports being produced where one should have been sufficient. Most managers 
attributed these problems to the IT specialists who lacked a clear understanding 
of the engineering and the commercial aspects of electricity supply and that this 
had resulted in a greater concentration on the system rather than on the output. 
All agreed, however, that it was likely that ongoing improvements to l\,:[JMS 
would enable better repol'ting in the future. Also, it was considered that their 
knowledge, understanding and acceptance of l\,:[JMS would improve as the 
system was further developed and more widely used. 
Managers had also reported during the preliminary interviews that 
financial accountability and budgets played an important part in their 
accountabilities a·1 managers and were part of the measurables used to assess 
their performance. When questioned on this during the follow-up interviews 
all agreed that there was a clear need for budgets and justification for 
expenditure. They saw Shareholder Value Adding (SV A), introduced into 
Westem Power in the late nineties, as a business management system enabling 
them to justify and control expenditure. Most considered that although SVA 
had increased their workload slightly, it had impacted positively on their role 
as it gave them the opportunity to highlight branch objectives and 
achievements to senior management. Some claimed that it had also helped 
them to identify training and staff shortages and to focus on the core 
responsibilities of their business unit through the need to carefully scrutinise all 
SV A submissions. Others considered SVA was cumbersome and required 
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specialist accounting knowledge to apply it effectively. It was also fdt that it 
did not adequately take into account expenditure on issues such as safety and 
conununity service obligations where there was not going to be any mcmetary 
gain or 'value adding' to the organisation. However, when explored further, 
some interviewees acknowledged that the SVA process did have provision for 
intangible, or non monetary, returns, but these were very sabjective and 
requir~d them to spend considerable time researching and writing up 
acceptable business cases for the executive. 
Some managers expressed frustration during the follow-up interviews at 
the controls that senior manr1gement and the board placed on their authority to 
spend within approved budgets. While different management levels had 
different delegated financial authority (DFA) some claimed they were unable to 
authorise expenditure for amounts considerably less than their limit without 
first making a formal submission to the board for approval. The approvals 
process was also considered frustrating for some and stressful for others 
because it involved the preparation of lengthy business cases to justify 
spending within budgets that had previously been approved. They were also 
concerned that approvals can take as long as six months to be proce:.sed. 
Although the business cases were seldom rejected, this practice commonly 
resulted in cost increases and consequent budget overruns due, for example, to 
varying ~xchange rates and price rises. One manager commented, .. .If does Ii/Ile 
to improve tr11sl be/11,e1•11 levels of 11m1mge111e11t, wily givens fiun11d11/ 1111t/10rihJ if tlley 
(the board) don't trust us to be 11ccom1t.1ble for ii? 
Finally, some of the managers interview•td during the preliminary 
interviews had considered Western Power to be good on financial 
accountability but poor at pricing of services and cost recovery. Some of the 
managers had contended that cost recovery had been pursued on an ad hoc 
basis, and the true costs were rarely recovered. They had given examples of 
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where customers requiring larger cables or transformers to supply expanded 
businesses or redevelopment would only be charged for a portion of the cost, 
with the balance to be recovered over time, or through increased power 
consumption. When questioned further on this during the follow-up 
interviews they claimed that cost recovery was random and in some instances 
not at all. The reluctance to recover the balance of the costs was considered by 
some to be loo hnrd because of the lack of direction and support from senio1' 
management. They considered this was due to fear that aggi-ieved customers 
would seek a political solution through the minister or ombudsman, thus 
bringing unwanted attention upon the branch or section. Some also considered 
that there was no incentive to recover costs because money already spent had 
come from their budgets and any money recovered went into consolidated 
revenue and did not improve their budget balance. 
Strategic planning 
Positive aspects of strategic planning to emerge from the preliminary 
interviews included a better understanding by managers of corporate business 
processes and a greater opportunity to be involved in the planning lo deal with 
issues that impacted on their branch or business unit and the organisation as a 
whole. Some also considered that the knowledge and understanding of 
strategic planning processes would hold them in good stead for work outside of 
Western Power. However, not all managers interviewed in the preliminary 
interviews had considered strategic planning to be an important part of their 
work and those that were involved considered ti"lat around fifteen percent of 
their time was taken on strategic planning issues. Some thought that it was 
only relevant for the executive level, while others believed that al! staff should 
be involved in strategic planning. The questionnaire survey had indicated ilia! 
strategic planning had a positive impact in supporting managers achieve 
performance targets, that it was effectively communicated within Western 
Power and that it had a largely positive impact on the managers' roles. 
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When explored further in the follow-up interviews, it was claimed that 
not all levels of management were involved or wanted to be involved in 
strategic planning. Furthermore, it was mostly divisional and senior branch 
managers who were involved in strategic planning at the higher levels, while 
lower levels of management and senior section heads generally were only 
involved in branch strategic plans. One manager claimed that at lhe lower 
levels of management, ... tlu.rJ• were goi11r; thro11g/1 the 111otio11s, where/11 tlie eXL'J'dse 
was lo cre11/e sub-pln11s aligned wit/, divisional and corporate plans. but mostly to 
ac/iieve tlie prrfornmuce targe/s of respective senior 11m11agers. 
Budgeting and its link with strategic planning had also been identified in 
the preliminary interviews as an activity which had impacted the most on the 
roles of managers. When this was explored during the follow-up interviews the 
managers all agreed that it was important for them to have a good 
understanding of cost structures ,md budgets for their respective branches and 
business units and that these must be in alignment with branch, divisional and 
corporate strategic plans. They also expressed frustration over the non-
alignment of budgeting with strategic planning, causing long delays in 
finalising budgets. Budgets, set with the best available information at the time, 
often had to be readjusted and returned several times to senior management 
before being approved. Managers from operational and service provider areas 
in particular reported that budgets set the previou~ November were often still 
being modified and sent back for approval in June the following year. Most 
believed the underlying reason for this was the executives' inability to finalise 
strategic plans and budgets without first referring to the resronsible minister, 
who in tum, was influenced by pressure from other government departm~nts, 
such as Energy Safety and the Environmental Protection Authority. This budget 
rou11d11bo11t, as one manager termed it, created planning and resourcing 
difficulties, particularly with the contracting out of work. This manager 
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claimed that because of insufficient resources within the differing engineering 
sectors of Western Power, there is a heavy reliance on contractors to fill 
resource gaps. However, external service providers were not prepared to 
undertake the recruitment and training of appropriately skilled personnel until 
they were assured of regular work, and assurance of this could not be given 
until plans and budgets were finalised. 
The managers were also asked to elaborate on concerns raised by some 
in the preliminary interviews that up to fifteen percent of their time was spent 
identifying core c!C'ments of strategic plans and including these elements in 
their branch business plans. Similarly, some of the managers interviewed 
during the follow-up interviews indicated a similar conunitment of time to 
strategic planning issues. When explored further, it was found that a few of the 
managers had included the time they took to present the branch and corporate 
strategic plans to their staff. A large portion of this time was also used in the 
planning and application of strategies to achieve strategic goals and key 
performance indicators set by the executive. The managers considered this to 
be in their own interests as strategic plans and key performance indicators were 
central to the targets set within TEAM (i.e., performance measurement) and 
played a key role in their remuneration reviews and contract renewals. 
Performance management 
Managers in the preliminary interviews had reported that divisional 
managers' performance targets were aligned with corporate plans. Similarly, 
the performance targets of branch and business unit managers were aligned 
with the branch plans. They all claimed that performance m..nagement (e.g., 
TEAM) was a useful system for managing staff performance, however, only 
some considered there was an adequate link bel'ween individual performance 
and remuneration. Moreover, they had indicated in the questionnaire survey 
that they considered performance manai,--ement had had a positive impact on 
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their role and workload and was important in supporting the achievement of 
their performance targets. 
The issues of performance management and remuneration were 
explored further in the follow-up interviews. The main findings were that 
managers did not consider extraordinary perfonnance was adequately 
identified and rewarded by senior management and the executive. Although 
most reported that they worked hard to ensure that their performance targets 
were met in order to maximise their remuneration and increase their share in 
any management bonuses. However, some expressed concern that although 
they had met their perfonnance targets their remuneration did not always 
reflect this. Some compared their roles, responsibilities and remuneration with 
similar positions in private enterprise, claiming they were not as well-paid as 
some of their contemporaries in private enterprise. \II/hen que~tioned further, 
however, they conceded that industry comparisons were difficult due to the 
current structure and isolation of Western Power which does not have the same 
economic pressures and competition as its Eastern States counterparts. Finally, 
some of the managers considert!d that their relationship with their senior 
manager was more important than achieving performance targets. They 
considered a good relationship enabled them to discuss problems and issues of 
concern more openly and that this resulted in favourable responses when 
requesting budget and resource variations. This supports both the preliminary 
interview and questionnaire survey findings in that the majority of managers 
considered that new management systems and organisational change had 
impacted positively on their relationships with supervisors, peers and 
subordinate staff. 
All of the managers interviewed during the follow-up interviews 
understood performance management to be an integral part of good leadership 
and an important part of their role as manager. However, they also thought 
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that the introduction of performance management for all levels of staff had 
increased their workload proportional to the number of staff in their section. 
They now set individual performance targets for each employee, conducted 
regular reviews and focused on individual performance as well as the 
performance of the group as a whole. Most managers viewed this positively, 
claiming that performance management at the individual level was an 
important management function enabling them to encourage and reward high 
achievers, assist others a..,d sanction poor performers. They also believed that 
performance management had led to more openness and accountability by 
those who participated in it and had improved their relationships with their 
supervisors, peers and staff as a result. Finally, some managers claimed that, 
with the introduction of performance management, they needed additional 
training to help them negotiate performance targets, conduct performance 
reviews and assist employees in matters such as career planning and training. 
Contract Jabour and contracting out of services 
Managers' perceptions of the increased use of contractors and the 
contracting out of services were explored in the preliminary interviews and the 
questionnaire survey. While not overwhelmingly in favour of conh·aclors and 
the contracting out of services, most managers thought this was acceptable 
providing the organisation retained key skills and only contracted out non-core 
and non-strategic work. They also believed that there should be clear economic 
benefits in using contractors. 
When explored further in the follow-up interviews, all the managers 
considered that contract labour and the contracting out of services was now a 
way of life in Western Power due to the significant reductions in permanent full-
time employees since corporatisation. ln some business units, e.g., IT, the 
majority of staff were contractors. A fow managers attributed the increasing 
use of contractors to the executive focus on the commercial performance of 
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Western Power and, in order for Western Power to demonstrate labour 
productivity and efficiency gains, contractors were costed against materials 
rather than labour. One manager claimed .. .it's a mwibers gmue, tliey (the 
executive) want to make it look as tlioug/1 we are doing morr wit/1 less ,xople. It was 
also claimed that this form of creatiue ncco1111ti11g distorts capital and operating 
budgets and disguises the true cost of labour within the organisation. Further, 
it causes problems with the identification of work on one hand and the actual 
amount of work completed on the other. One example of this was where 
parcels of corrective work were costed using internal labour, but the work was 
eventually done by contractors and costed in the budget as 'materials'. 
Some inteiviewees were concerned that senior management had reduced 
the workforce despite the increased workload, resulting in more work being 
put out to contracl'Jrs. They claimed that Western Power preferred to use 
contract labour rather than permanent staff. This resulted in a shortage of 
skilled people within the organisation, most significantly in the technical and 
engineering sectors with restrictions on external recruitment of technical and 
engineering graduates. The absence of any formal succession planning had 
resulted in shortages of skilled staff which had reportedly left many managers 
dependent upan, as one manager said, ... costly and sometimes 11111lerskilled rmd 
1mreli11b/e co11tractors. A few had stated concern over the loss of skilled and 
experienced staff needed to safely and effectively assess the risks to the 
organisation when formulating budgets, plans and strategies. Some also 
expressed frustration at continuously having to train new contractors. This 
took their attention away from training full-lime staff and left them exposed to 
accusations that contractors were getting preferential treatment. However, 
there was the view that contract labour made it easier to monitor the 
performance of individual contractors with the intention of making them full-
time employees if the opportunity arose. 
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Unregulated income 
All the managers involved in the preliminary interviews understood that 
the term unregulated income meant the seeking of payment for work that was 
not directly involved with the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electrical energy within Westem Power. For example, tendering to do work 
within other utilities or businesses locally, interstate ancl overseas. The 
managers claimed that the pursuit of unregulated income was driven by a 
directive from senior management and the executive to demonstrate that 
Western Power could compete in an open commercial market. The impact of 
pursuing unregulated income on the managers' workload was explored furth<.'r 
during the questionnaire suTVey where it was reported to have slightly 
decreased the managers workload. However, it is likely that the suTVey results 
do not reflect the true situation because the pursuit of unregulated income has 
mainly been restricted to those branches involved in engineering design and 
construction and maintenance, therefore, not all managers would have been 
involved. 
Unregulated income and its impact on the roles of the managers and 
their business units was explored further during the follow-up interviews. It 
was found that even though there was strong understanding of the perceived 
benefits from seeking unregulated income, e.g., the opportunity for managers to 
enhance engineering and commercial skills within their business units, only a 
few managers displayed any eagerness for pursuing it. Most of those who had 
been directly involved with unregulated income claimed that it distracted them 
from their core activities, taking 5% of their time, but creating 25% of their 
problems. It was claimed moreover that 90% percent of the learning from the 
pursuit of unregulated income was not applicable to Western Power needs. 
One manager said, ... it is like 11ski11g the mllomotive indmtn; to make refrigemlars. 
Tllis requires a redesign of work practices aud procedures. Consequently, managers 
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held concerns for how they would achieve their business unit performance 
targets with already dwindling resources being used for what they considered 
to be non-core activities. They thought that staff were already overworked and 
questioned. the logic of using key personnel in the pursuit of unregulated 
income when it meant meeting tight contract-Jal deadlines and dealing with 
delays in completing important internal work. Some claimed that this had 
resulted in contractors doing core work causing further resourcing difficulties 
with the r.eed to train the contractors to do the work not being done by key staff 
who were distracted by the unregulated work. There was also the issue of 
complaints from other staff who claimed that the contractors got preferential 
treabnent and the best work. Also, contractors were employed to do the 
internal wc,rk at a greater cost than full-time equivalent employees, for 
example, as one manager claimed, ... profits mnde 011 1mreg11/nted income nre spent 
payiug co11tractors to do tire work we s/Jou/d be doing 011rselves. 
There were others, however, who viewed the pursuit of unregulated 
income as an opportunity for their efforts to be recognised by senior 
management. They saw that unregulated income provided senior management 
with proof of their ability to undertake non-core activities and to manage them 
according to good commercial practice. It also enabled them to expand their 
own personal business skills and knowledge with the intention of furthering 
their careers outside Westem Power, for example, the opportunity to network, 
exchange ideas and work with peers in similar businesses, both in Australia 
and Asia. Finally, most managers identified the advantage that seeking 
unregulated income had for networking and becoming more involved with 
customers, businesses and community groups, and manufachlrers and their 
representatives, but they still did not want to do it. They acknowledged that 
there was a need for strategic alliances and close working relationships with 
other utilities both in Australia and abroad and saw the pursuit of unregulated 
income as a useful adjunct to this. 
283 
Customer focus 
The preliminary interviews had shown that managers identified 
customer focus as an important measure of their business unit performance, but 
one which had also increased their workload and made their role more complex 
in terms of new rules and standards. In contrast, the questionnaire survey 
found that managers considered that customer focus mostly had a positive 
impact on their workload over the past seven years, showing that they 
generally accepted customer focus and considered it as having enhanced or 
lessened their workload in some way. However, when these issues were 
pursued further in the follow-up interviews it was found that the managers 
interviewed considered that L11.ey must now place greater attention on lhe 
demands of external customers. They claimed external customers now get a 
faster response to their complaints, often brought about by direct intervention 
by the Minister and other government deparbnents. As a result, of this 
intervention the managers now focus more on the needs and demands of their 
external customers in order to avoid trouble. They reported that this had 
increased their workload significantly through the need to re-prioriti~ work 
and pay increased attention to resources and budgets. However, they 
perceived there were benefits in it for them, for example, focusing on both 
internal customers, i.e., other !.mmches and sections within the organisation, 
and external customers had given them a better understanding of the 
capabilities of their business unit and the reqdrements of their client base. 
Consequently, this had enabled them to plan their resource nee<l& and skill 
requirements better and to be in a 5tronger a11d more credible position when 
requesting increased budgets. 
The interviewees also saw customer focus a.i an important key 
performance indicator for their business unit and that good result in that area 
would help in their performance (and salary) reviews. Finally all the managers 
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interviewed in the final stage of the research agreed that focusing on both 
internal and external customers had had a positive impact on their working life 
in terms of improving their remuneration and position ,vi thin the organisation. 
They claimed it had also enhanced their personal skills and marketability 
should they choose to apply for work outside of Western Power. 
Empowennent 
The preliminary interviews found tl1at most managers considered that 
empowerment, wl1ich had been introduced during FOCUS' (i.e., the culture 
change program, January 1995 - May 1997) had given them a greater say in 
their business unit structure, how it was managed and employee numbers. 
They also believed that empowerment had given them the authority to make 
dedsions and be accountable for them, to challenge the norm, to be innovative 
and entrepreneurial and to push the boundaries of their working environment. 
These findings were confirmed in the questionnaire survey where more than 
70% of managers surveyed considered that since corporatisation they felt more 
empowered to take action and make decisions without referring to their 
supervisors. However, when explored further in the follow-up interviews some 
managers expressed concern that their areas of authority and empowerment to 
make spontaneous business decisions had been reduced. They believed that 
this was due mainly to the Managerial Leadership lnitiative (MLI) introduced 
to all levels of management and staff within Western Power from 2001. They 
were concerned that the MU had contradicted the earlier requirements of 
entrepreneurialism, innovation and pushing the boundaries, which had been 
key features of FOCUS, that is, these skills were no longer supported by senior 
management. They thought that since the introduction of the 11U, senior 
management had moved from a more literal understanding of empowerment to 
a more authoritarian approach with increased bureaucracy in management 
structu.re, particularly at the lower levels. For example, a key feature of the MLI 
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had been the defining of limits or boundaries within which subordinate staff 
could operate. They considered these limits were reshictive mrd regressive, as 
demonstrated in the constraints impo!.ed on expenditure within budgets U1at 
were already appruved. Furthermore, they believed that U,is added 
bureaucracy whether intentional or not, was making their roles more difficult 
and U1at they were now rules driven and spent valuable time seeking approval 
to do U,ings U1ey had done as a matter of course previously. Further examples 
included having to gain approval for training for subordinate stuff and the 
employment of temporary contract staff. In fact one manager claimed that 
... senior mmmgewent lmve used the ML! as 1111 opportrmit),• !o seize back tire 11111/mrihJ 
tllci; lost from FOCUS. 
Some of those interviewed considered there was a need for clear limits to 
their roles and responsibilities and the boundaries of their authority. This 
would be helpful in achieving performance targets and setting L.1rge~ for 
subordinate staff. Others believed limits were necessary to ensure they 
remained dearly focused on strategic goals and operated within their financial 
plans. Some considered that the move back to bureaucracy was due to a greater 
focus on organisational performance and recent organisational and role 
changes. However overall, most thought that if they had a problem with their 
level of authority, they could always discuss the problem with their senior 
manager and negotiate a change, although none of the man.igers reported that 
U1ey had actually done this. 
Leadership 
It was found during the preliminary research that Western Power had 
introduced the MU ostensibly to improve the leadership capabilities of all 
formal leaders, that is, all managers and supervisors Utat have staff reporting 
directly to U1em, and to introduce a level of understanding of the role 
• FOCOS, an ncronym for Focus on Organisational Change Undorst,intling anti Skills, see also ap~61 , 
relationship between them and subordinate staff within the organisation. The 
managers reported that the key leadership elements of the MU were role 
relationships and responsib1lities, accountability and limits, performance 
management and fair treatment. They also considered that the MLI had helped 
them focus attention on people management and personal leadership, 
something which FOCUS had failed to do. The responses to the questionnaire 
survey were similar in that the ML! was important in supporting the 
achievement of performance targets and it had a slightly positive impact on 
their workload and roles. However, in the three-month period between the 
administration of the questionnaire survey and the follow-up interviews there 
was a significant shift in opinions about the MU. Most of the managers 
interviewed in the follow-up interviews claimed that since the ML[ had been 
introduced they had found that their workload had increased significantly 
along with their MLI related duties, while for some, empowerment which lrnd 
been introduced as part of FOCUS was being eroded. Workload increases were 
reported to be due to U1e increased attention managers were now required to 
pay to the establishment of role relationships and role agreements between 
other teams, sections, business units and branches, and between U1emselves and 
U1eir staff. The managers had claimed that in order to do that they had to spend 
considerable time on discussions and, what some viewed as 'typist functions' in 
writing up the new role agreements. Some said that because of their work 
commitments they had to do this outside normal working hours. All the 
managers reported that they had to roll out the MLI to their staff which entailed 
the preparation and delivery of training to their staff during prearranged two 
day workshops. Most reported that this role was new to them and some 
expressed annoyance that they had to make the presentations, something for 
which they had no formal h·aining apart from a brief meeting with MLl 
coordinators prior to the workshops. Finally, all reported U1at when the :MU 
workshops had been completed their workload had increased due to an 
expectation by staff for them to provide greater detail and clearer instructions 
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when passing on work. Furthermore, they claimed that the reintroduction of 
TEAM with the !vfLI meant that they must now set performance targets, review 
performance and provide feedback to all their staff, not just those on individual 
employment agreements. 
Many of the interviewees believed that the introduction of the MU had 
signalled a more authoritarian approach by senior management where 
increased bureaucracy and rules had replaced innovation and 
entrepreneurialism. Many of the managers indicated that they were becoming 
concerned about the way the MLI was being administered. For example, they 
now had less say in their employee numbers and budgets. Some claimed that 
they now found it necessary to seek approval for things such as training and 
staff replacement even though they had been assigned an allocated number of 
staff and were told that staff recruitment and training was now their 
responsibility. When questioned about their understanding of the reasons for 
these changes which concerned them, most attributed the changes to a common 
leadership approach throughout the organisation in order for all business units 
to be aligned with corporate Key Performance Indicators, but only a few 
considered they were necessary. Importantly, most of the managers who were 
interviewed during the follow-up interviews considered that there was an 
urgent need for reviewing the application of the MLI principles to ensure that 
the organisation did not become burermcraticnl/y paralysed and return to the pre 
1995 management systems. 
Technical excellence 
Managers had expressed concern during the preliminary interviews that 
organisational changes and many of the new management systems favoured 
commercialisation and had come at the expense of technical excellence. This 
had been difficult to accept for many managers in Western Power who had an 
engineering background. The questionnaire survey found that most saw only 
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slight improvement in their opportunities to develop and apply their technical 
skil!s since corporatisation. The questionnaire also reflected their concerns that 
continuous change had meant that many of the skills they had acquired 
previously were unsuitable for their new roles. This was explored further 
during the follow-up interviews in order to determine the level of acceptance 
traditional technical marn1gers have in Western Power today. Similar to the 
findings of the preliminary interviews, most considered that their chosen 
careers as teclmical managers were being overshadcwed by the greater focus on 
commercial issues and financial accountability, i.e., having a greater awareness 
of cost versus quality and the need to be more business and customer focused. 
However, while a few lamented tire passing of tire good old days and the 
weakening of their tec!mical skills, they all considered it was in their best 
interests to change with business requirements and actively pursue a good 
commercial outcome for Western Power and improved remuneration for 
them~Jves. 
During the preliminary interviews the managers had also reported that 
organisational and management system changes had required a greater 
emphasis on employee and resource management issues. This increased focus 
on 'people' issues had further reduced the technical component of their roles. 
When further questioned during the follow-up interviews, the managers 
confinned that the changes introduced since corporatisation had impacted 
significantly on their roles in terms of how they dealt with stakeholders, i.e., 
senior management, customers, peers and staff. Many claimed that they l1ad 
acquired new skills to make this job easier, but it had stiJI led to a significant 
increase in their workload and sometimes at the expense of their personal life, 
e.g., taking work home or spending longer periods of time at work. 
Role clarity 
The analysis of the preliminary interview findings showed that half of 
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the managers interviewed considered role clarily was stiU a major issue, 
whereas the other half believed that corporatisation had helped to clarify their 
roles. These conflicting findings were replicated in the questionnaire survey 
wherein most of the respondents indicated that their understanding of their 
roles as managers was somewhat clearer today compared with seven years ago. 
While the others said their roles were less clearer. When explored further in the 
follow-up interviews eleven of the sixteen managers interviewed considered 
that they had a better understanding of their roles now than seven years ago. 
They also thought that the introduction of new management systems and 
organisatirJnal changes had been better communicated since corporatisation 
and particularly in recent years. Since corporatisation they had been 
increasingly involved in the introduction and management of change within the 
organisation and U1is required them to understand the systems and changes in 
terms of the impact on their business unit, and hence their own roles. 
The managers further claimed that their role clarity was significantly 
enhanced by the introduction of management contracts linked to the 
performance management process, i.e., TEAM, and perfonnance targets aligned 
with corporate or divisional strategic plans. However, some reported that the 
organisational restructuring which had divided or augmented their 
responsibilities had complicated their understanding of their roles, for example, 
the amalgamation of the transmission and distribution business units. Some 
expressed concern that their roles had changed significantly during the year, 
while their performance targets were set annually and rarely reviewed in 
between. This had left some with inappropriate performance targets and 
concerns that they had not been suitably evaluated for their efforts during 
remuneration reviews. 
Despite a reported decrease in empowerment and an increase in 
bureaucracy, most considered that the introduction of the Managerial 
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Leadership Initiative (MLI) had led to a significant improvement in role clarity 
across the organisation. They claimed that roles and role relationships were key 
elements of the :MLI and upon completion of the !'vJLI training they were tasked 
with identifying their key stakeholders and drawing up roles and responsibility 
agreements with them. Finally, most managers agreed that greater role clarity 
had enabled them to focus on the important issues for their business unit and to 
identify key corporate objectives. TI1ey also believed this had improved their 
understanding of commercial practices and business procedures, and for some, 
enhancing their chances of employment outside Western Power. 
Career opportunities 
The preliminary interviews had shown that the majority of the managers 
interviewed considered that corporatisation had improved their career 
opportunities within the organisation and the learning of new skills which 
would be of great benefit to them ::ihould they seek employment outside. 
However, most believed tliat the flatter organisational structure since 
corporatisation had enabled greater horizontal movement and the pursuit of 
different career paths, but had actually resulted in fewer promotional 
opportunities for them. The questionnaire survey revealed simik.r findings 
with the m11jority of managers indicating that corporalfaation had impacted 
positively on their career opportunities, that is, the ability to move sideways 
within the organisation in order to gain greater skills and experience. In order 
to verify these findings, managers were asked during the follow-up interviews 
for their opinions of the impact that corporatisatlon had on their career 
opportunities. The resronses were similar to the findings from both the 
preliminary interviews an.J. i:he survey questionnaire wherein most managers 
believed that because of the flatter organisational strncture there were fewer 
promotional opportunities, but their career opportunities, that is, their ability to 
change roles for the same remuneration had improved. They now had greater 
opportunities to participate in many different projects within the organisation, 
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which in tum improved their knowledge and business skills. For example, 
some had considered that Western Power's pursuit of unregulated income had 
given them an opportunity to experience competitive tendering and other 
aspects of commercial business which they would not have experienced if 
working for a non-corporatised government agency. Although the majority 
acknowledged that they hari felt compelled to seek additional skills to fulfil 
these differenl,roles, this was not seen as a wasted effort, particularly if the 
organisation paid for it. 
Hour.; of work 
BoU1 the preliminary interviews and the questionnaire survey illustrated 
concerns Umt the organisational and management system changes introduced 
through corporatisation over the past seven years had signfficanUy increased 
their workload and working hours and subsequently decreased their available 
leisure time. When questioned further on this during the follow-up interviews, 
all tl1e managers agreed that their hours at work or doing work-related 
activities had increased significantly over the past seven years and it was 
proportional to their increased workload. They all voiced concerns that 
increased working hours had a detrimental effect on their leisure time and their 
time with their families. 
All the interviewees for this stage of the research thought that the 
increased working hours were necessary for them to do their job and believed 
that the longer working time was forced on them mostly by increased 
workloads and staff shortages. Many reported that longer working time was 
stressful for them, but they felt compelled to do it through fears over job 
security. Most claimed that this was unacceptable and a few stated that unless 
the situation improved they would be seeking altemative employment. The 
main reasons they gave for the increased work.load and working hours were the 
same as those given during the preliminary interviews, e.g., technology 
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changes, increased customer awareness and stakeholder management. In 
addition, the majority of those participating in the follow-up interviews 
considered that the changing nature of their roles from work administration to 
people management had a significant impact on their workload and hence 
working hours. Previously they had managed work processes and had passed 
on instructions and requests for specialist intervention into staff matters, e.g., to 
human resources who dealt with recruitment and training matters. Now, they 
must manage people by clearly specifying the roles and responsibilities of 
individual staff and the work to be done by staff or contractors; they must 
provide adequate reviews and feedback to staff on work in progress and work 
completed; they must ensure that staff have the appropriate skills to do the 
work and where necessary provide adequate coaching and training; they must 
undertake staff recruitment; and finally, they must consult and counsel staff on 
work-related issues and career and training opportunities. In addition, all tl1e 
managers believed it was necessary for them to be continuously involved in tlte 
planning, implementation and application of any changes affecting their areas 
of responsibility. Titis included the introduction of new management systems, 
the most recent being U1e ML!. Finally, the managers confirmed that staff and 
skills shortages in many areas had resulted in U1em having to spend more time 
doing U1e routine work U1at would have been done previously by subordinate 
staff, e.g., completing and reviewing statistical reports and project requests. 
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The follow-up interviews analysed in this chapter have provided the 
final element in the three stages of the study methodology. The questions were 
designed to further explore and clarify important topics identified in the 
previous chapter. The analysis of data from the follow-up interviews identified 
increased responsibilities and workload for the managers as a result of new 
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management systems introduced since corporatisation. Working hours had 
also increased and this had a negative impact on managers' leisure time. Some 
of the new systems had improved their skills and career opportunities and had 
helped them achieve performance targets while other systems, e.g., financial 
accountability were seen as a source of increased frustration and slTess for the 
managers. Moreover, workforce reductions had resulted in the increased use of 
conlTactors which was exacerbated by the increased pursuit of unregulated 
income. Finally, an increased focus on leadership issues :ntroduced with the 
MU had meant role clarity for most, but there was concern that since the l'l'[LJ 
there had been a move back to a more authoritarian approach to management. 
TI1e findings from this chapter are synthesised in the next chapter with 
those from previous stages of the study to address the research questions 
described in chapter one. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DATA SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter employs the analyticfil framework described in chapter two 
to synthesise the theory and conceptions of corporatisation and managerialism 
presented in chapters one, two & three with the managers' perspectives 
reported in chapters five, six & seven. TI1e findings from this chapter are used 
to inform the implications and recommendations in chapter nine. 
8.1.1 Overview 
Chapter one introduced the study context and objectives supported by 
the analytical framework described in chapter two (figure 2.5). The framework 
defined the boundaries of the literature search in chapter three in terms of the 
relationship between the theory driving the public electricily supply industry 
reform agenda and the consequential changes to the managers' roles and 
working life. It also informed the three-stage research methodology elaborated 
in chapter four incorporating qualitative interviews and quantitative survey 
components and secondary data combined to address the study objectives. 
Stage one of the research methodology consisted of qualitative data gathered 
through preliminary open ended interviews with 20 managers representing a 
cross-section of the organisation. The data from stage one was analysed in 
chapter five and important themes and issues relevant to the study objectives 
were used to inform the questionnaire survey, stage two, which is the content of 
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chapter six. The survey was administered to the total target population of 130 
managers with a response rate was 85.4%. Important themes that emerged 
from stages one and two, were further explored through follow-up interviews 
with 16 managers in stage three of the study discussed in chapter seven. The 
findings from the three research stages are triangulated and synthesised with 
key literature in this chapter in order to make sense of corporatisation and 
management system change and its impacts on managers. 
8.1.2 Linking corporatisation, new management systemB and roles 
This chapter revisits the new management systems and business 
strategies which embodied the WA government's corporatisation and 
management reform agenda within Western Power, 1994 - 2002. The study 
evidence and literature presented relates to the impact of new management 
systems on the roles and working life of managers. The chapter also examines 
the respondents' unique understanding of the process of corporatisation and 
management reform. Those people given the task of implementing and 
promoting change identified changes perceived as effective and beneficial to 
management and to the organisation. Similarly, changes they perceived as 
having a negative impact on the organisation and the individual manager are 
considered from an operational perspective in the broader context of reform in 
Western Power and the WA goverrunent's corporatisation agenda. In doing so, 
the research addresses the gaps in the literature as descnbed in chapters one 
and two linking policy debates on corporatisation and public sector reform, on 
management change and the role of the manager within Australia's power 
utilities. The discussion presented in this chapter aims to provide valuable 
insights to inform future public policy and management practice. 
The study is premised on the fact that there has been very little discourse 
both in Australia and overseas, relating to the practical impact of 
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corporalisation and management reform on managers in the economically and 
strategically important industry of electricity supply. Previous work in the area 
has generally focused on financial, social and political aspects of the debate at 
the level of public policy examining reform agendas, or high-level economic 
' 
cost-benefit analysis. What is miSsing from the literature is any detailed 
analysis of corporatisation from the perspective of the manager. In general, 
managers' voices have not been heard and their experiences have not been well 
documented, with the exception of two recent empirical studies of the roles and 
working life of managers in the United Kingdom These studies, by Worrall & 
Cooper (2000, 2001) and Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison (2000), were 
found to be the most relevant to this research and were reviewed in detail in 
chapters two and three. 
8.1.3 Chapter outline 
This chapter is divided into four sections relating to the four major 
research questions addressed in this study (section 1.4). The corporatisation 
process, reforms and changes presented to the managers as new management 
systems (table 8.1, below) are discussed in relation to their impact on managers' 
roles. Managers being those charged with introducing and implementing the 
change in an operational sense. 
The following section addresses the first study question. It will report 
the managers' understanding of corporatisation as it was applied to Western 
Power and the reasons for it. It will also report their involvement :n the 
corporatisation process and accompanying changes and their perceptions of 
how well the changes were communicated to them. 
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8.2 RATIONALE FOR CORPORATISATION AND RELATED SYSTEM 
CHANGES 
This section addresses the first research question described in chapter 
one. Specifically, it answers the question of: 
Wlmt 11re 111111mgers' 1111dersf1111dings of tlie rntio1111/e fur tlie corporatisntion of 
Western Austmlia's public e/ectridhJ supply utility. 
In order to explore both the macro and micro-level perspectives (chapter 
one) of this question the section is divided into two main parts. The first part 
reports the managers' views on the reasons for corporatisation and 
management reform as it applied to them. The second part examines their 
collective understanding of the reasons for specific management system 
r:hanges as they relate to the introduction of corporatisation and management 
reform at Western Power. 
8.2.1 Rationale for corporaiisation and management reform 
The findings from chapters five and six suggest the four main reasons for 
corporatisation and management reform were perceived as: productivity and 
efficiency gains; energy industry refonn; competition in the energy market; and 
market deregulation. These reasons appear to be linked to the increased 
emphasis placed by senior management and the executive on these drivers for 
change over the seven years from 1995 to 2002, as reported by Eiszele (1998a, 
1998b, 1999a), and evidenced in Western Power newsletters and internal reports 
covering matters with high transparency in the Western local media and other 
areas within the public domain. Ultimately, the managers' tu1derstmding of 
accotu1ts of the rationale for corporatisation proved to be broadly consistent 
with the ideological and practical reasons reported in the literature by Carnegie 
(1993), Hibner (1993), McCarrey (1993), and others (tables 6.3 & 6.4). 
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The study findings from chapters five and six show that the Western 
Power managers' perceptions were consistent with the reform rationale 
reflected in government policy and changes introduced in power utilities in 
other Australian states over the period 1990 to 1997 (Peh·oleum Economist, 
2000; Simmons & Bramble, 1996; Walker & Walker, 2000). The Australian and 
international literature reviewed and the collective responses of the Western 
Power managers underpin the commonly held view that corporatisation was a 
process of restructuring and reform aimed at creating systems, practices and 
conditions consistent with those found in private enterprise. Corporatised 
government utilities operate with a board and managing director and, in the 
case of Western Power, the state govenunent as sole shareholder. The 
interview and survey respondents were also widely aware of the fact that 
Western Power was to be run according to the Corporations Act, to conform to 
corporation laws and to,pay corporate taxes and dividends. 
Finally, the study findings from chapters five and six show that the 
managers also considered that for the corporatisation process ID be successful it 
had lo encompass organisational changes and management reform, leading to 
the implementation of systems and programs associated with new public 
management. Notably, these consisted of strategic planning. performance 
management and budgeting and accounting approaches consistent with 
corporate governance and reporting standards. The managers' understanding 
of the reasons for the introduction of management reform within Western 
Power was found to accord with the views expressed in the literature by 
Maddock {1993), Dixon (1995) and Hilmer & Donaldson (1996) who reported on 
management reform within electricity utilities elsewhere in Australia. 
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8.2.2 Understanding of reasons for specific management system changes 
This section examines evidence of the managers' undersl'anding of the 
reasons for specific management system changes which occurred at the micro-
level. The major management system changes introduced in Western Power as 
an extension of the broader corporatisation and reform process 1995 - 2002 are 
shown in table 8.1 below. 
Table 8.1. 
New management systems 
NEW MANAGEMENT 
s,srnM 
DESCRIPI10N 
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
FOCUS A culture chnnge progrlllll introduced with the corpo,atisalion of Wcslcm 
Power In order lo improve COlpOrate performance and management 
arroW1mbility 
MU A leadership development program aimed At improving thecotnpany'• 
performance by dumgiog the mnnagcmentculturc from one of C<>mmMd and 
conlfol to one of people leadership 
Clwigc Management TI,e iovo!vemcntof managers in the inlfoduction of new =gcment sys!Iems 
and the implementation of bronch and busiocss unit rcslfucturing 
Slfategic Planniog Int:roduccd al dMsioru1l and brMch levels io order t,;, improve corporate 
performance and accountability 
TEAM A performaru,e mnnngementsyslcm iotrnduccd as partof!hl'.'FOCUSculture 
change programme 
S!RSS A new system ol rc<rui!ment and selection iotroduced in 19% as pa,t of 
,OCUS 
SLA Formalised sefVk~ level ngrwmenls between the asset owner, the nsr.ct 
manag"' and the service provider 
SVA A sysll'm fur evaluating the financial viability cf capltnl expenditure 
MIMS TI,c main IT sy,tcm used in Weslem Power 
Cll!lltlrncr Focus Emphasises the Importance of sntisfying U,cnecds and expectations of 
cuswmers 
Commen:iatisation °""eloping and operating business in nn opennnd competitive business 
cnvirorunent 
Fioancial Accounlab!lity Accounlabillty for capim.l and operating budgets 
New Technology A wide range ol IT applications introduced tt, ouWrnale nnd improve systems 
of work 
BU!llncss Sirateg!ea Benchmarking B usincss Unit Perform.:incc, Environrnenlal Issues, Conlfacting 
Out of Services, Contract Labour and the Pursultof Unregulated Income as 
st:ralcgics for lrusincss improvement 
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Four main reasons were reporteU for the introduction of specific 
management sysl'em changes in stage lwo, the survey component of the 
research (table 6.5). These were to give the organisation a business advantage 
over emerging competitors, to ensure continuous improvement in 
organisational effectiveness and efficiency, to respond quickly to industry and 
market changes, and to ensure the sutvival of Western Power as a vertically 
integrated business. There was the widespread opinion among the participants 
that the new management systems, and in particular commercialisation and 
strategic planning. had been introduced in order to prepare the organisation for 
full competition that would occur when the energy market was deregulated. 
Most of those interviewed and half of the survey respondents considered 
that deregulation of the state's electricity supply industry was necessary in 
order to breakdown Western Power's monopoly and promote competition in 
the electricity market. Interviewees considered that competition would mainly 
come from private retailers and generators entering the market and competing 
with Western Power by providing similar products on equal tenns. They 
further considered that the transmission and distribution sectors of Western 
Power, i.e., the 'networks' or 'wires' business, should remain with Western 
Power for providing network access for all public and private generators and 
retailers. This would allow commercial generators and retailers of electrical 
energy to transfer electricity for a fee through the government owned 
monopoly transmission ~nd distribution lines. These views fit with the general 
definition of dere3ulation reported in the literature by Deane (1989), Harman 
(1993a), Hilmer & Donaldson (1996), and others who see deregulation as a 
process of opening up government owned and controlled electricity utilities to 
competition. The managers' understandings were also in line with the actions 
reported by Walker (1994) and Ferguson (1996) to have been taken by the NSW, 
QLD, VIC and SA state governments after the initial corporatisation of their 
electricity utilities. Those managers who were not in favour of deregulation, 
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however, viewed it as a disadvantage for Western Power because it meant 
increased cost and reduced market share. For example, Western Power had to 
ensure adequate 'spilming reserve' i.e., immediately available supply of 
electricity should a private generator fail, but the economic cost of running less 
efficient plant to cover this was not fully recovered. 
Fifty five percent of survey respondents (table 6.5) and most of those 
interviewed considered Lhat the introduction of new management systems 
would ensure the survival of Western Power as a vertically integrated business. 
Managers were mindful of the fact that the government has the power to split 
Western Power into a number of corporations or to privatise H, but they 
thought that the managing director of Western Power wanted it kept a 
vertically integrated organisation. Some managers thought that this was the 
main driving force behind Western Power demonsti·ating commercial 
adeptness and improving productivity, but considered ring fencing had 
resulted in ... barriers lo clear information flow across divisio11s, leading to 
i11efficie11des and t/Je b1d/di11g of empires (se<.:tion 5.4.8). However, most 
respondents admitted that true competition would not be achieved while 
Western Power rerr.ained vertically integrared and it would only come about 
with the disaggregation of Western Power into separate corporations, 
regardless of whether the market was deregulated or not. This thinking aligns 
with that of Walker (1994), Ferguson (1996), Hess & Adams (1999), and others 
who argue in favour of the disaggregation of Australia's public electricity 
supply utilities in an attempt to open up the energy market to competition and 
improved efficiency. 
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8.3 MANAGERS' ROLES: CHANGES AND IMPACT 
This section addresses the second research question which was described 
in chapter one. Specifically, it answers the question of: 
Vvlmt are tlte significant clmnges to 111a11agers' roles and /ww lmve t/1ose clta11ges 
impacted 011 their roles wit/ii11 Western Austrnlia's electricihJ supply i11dustn; as a 
result of corpomtisntio11 and management reform. 
The section has been arranged into four parts. The first part reports the 
significant changes which have occurred to the managers' roles since 
corporatisation. The second part reports on the effectiveness of the 
communication of change between se11lor management and the managers. 
Change communication is discussed as it provides an important link between 
the change process and programs planned by senior management and 
managers who are responsible for implementing these in an operational sense. 
The third part reports on the managers' actual involvement in the introduction 
of change. As with the change communication dimension the intention is not to 
directly address a particular research question, or to identify direct causal links, 
but to highlight a significant clement shaping the roles and activities 
undertaken by managers in relation to the implementation of the broader 
change process. Finally, the fourth part reports the impact of change on the 
managers' roles. 
8.3.1 Significant changes to managers' roles 
The findings reported in chapters five, six and seven confirmed that the 
significant changes affecting managers' roles since corporatisation were directly 
attributable to new management systems (table 8.1, and described in chapter 
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five) and other organisational changes. 
This research has shown that new management systems and related 
organisational changes were important elements of the reform within Western 
Power and were introduced through an organisation-wide culture change 
program called FOCUS (Focussed on Organisational Change Understanding 
and Skills) (Widdis & Davis-Goff, 1995). Although FOCUS ceased to be a key 
corporate change driver around 2000, most of the management systems listed in 
table 8.1 were U1e result of business improvement initiatives identified through 
the FOCUS process and allied management review activiti~ (section 2.4.7). The 
research shows strong agreement among managers that FOCUS had been tl1e 
catalyst for ... the most c/1111/e11gi11g c/11111ges to their roles tlmt they /111d ever 
experienced. This included the time involved in learning and understanding the 
systems, introducing the systems, training staff in their use and managing the 
ongoing utilisation of the systems. These findings were not surprising 
considering the effort that the executive put into the introduction and 
promotion of FOCUS through the use of notice boards, promotional videos and 
intensive cross-organisational trallting workshops (Eiszele, 1995; Western 
Power Internal Publication, 1995). 
One of the key aims of FOCUS was to draw the managers' attention to 
the changing roles that tl1ey and tl1eir staff would have in the new corporation. 
It was to be a catalyst for increased productivity, reduced bureaucracy and 
greater control for managers over their roles. There was to be a greater 
concentration on business imperatives, budgets, cost control and performance 
measuring in line with a prevailing managerialist philosophy (Considine, 1988, 
7; Duncan & Bollard, 1992, 9) and underpinned by a Total Quality Management 
(TQM) approach to encourage employee participation (Stace & D1mphy1 1997, 
5; Waddell, Cummings, & Worley, 2004, 306). The impact of FOCUS and other 
management systems on managers' roles is discussed in section 8.3.4. 
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Evidence from the three research stages shows that management reform 
had in fact occurred and that the managers now had multifaceted roles. They 
were no longer just engineer-managers concerned only with tedmica! 
efficiency and production, but they now had a more commercial role. These 
new roles were also reported in the literature to have grown in importance in 
response to increased govemment and community expectations and increased 
competition within the electricity market generally. Duncan & Bollard (1992), 
Simmons & Bramble (1996) and Stace and Dunphy (1997), for example, have all 
reported that similar changes occurred to the roles of engineers as managers as 
a consequence of the corporatisation of electricity supply utilities elsewhere in 
AusLTalia and overseas. In New Zealand the eleclTicity supply industry found 
that corporatisation involved ... mdiwl slr11ch1ml rmd economic reform (Duncan & 
Bollard, 1992, 8) and involved far-reaching changes to managers' roles requiring 
them to focus their attention on the maximisation of commercial performance 
and financial accountability. This meant a significant change in organisational 
culture from one of production and technical efficiency to a more commercial 
and market orientated one (Duncan & Bollard, 1992, 58-64). 
Further similarities in the changes to the managers' roles found in this 
study were reported in studies by Sinunons and Bramble (1996) and Stace & 
Dunphy (1997). A case study conducted by Simmons and Bramble (1996) of 
workplace reform and corporatisation in the South East Queensland Electricity 
Board (SEQEB) showed a major theme of that reform program to be an attempt 
to change the management culture from one driven by engineers and 
production to one focused on customers and marketing and underpinned by 
the philosophies of Total Quality Management (p.213) and managerialism 
(p214). They reported that similar management refonns have occurred within 
the elecbicity supply industry in NSW, VIC, SA and WA (p.218). Equally, the 
corporatisation of Pacific Power in NSW was reported by Stace and Dunphy 
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(1997) to have involved significant organisational restructuring and cultural 
change which was also driven by the philosophy of TQM (p.115). They 
reported that the changes resulting from the corporatisation of Pacific Power 
were similar to those applied to electricity utilities in other Australian states 
where the main emphasis was on organisational restructuring.. tight financial 
controls and continuous improvement. These were all underpinned by a 
managerialist philosophy of management improvement and accountability 
(Stace & Dunphy, 1997). TI1is is of significance for the broad applicability study 
within the Australian electricity supply industry and the position adopted 
throughout U1at the Western Power case is situated in a similar political, 
economic, and legislative context to other electricity utilities throughout 
Australia and to a lesser degree, New Zealand and the UK. 
The evolution of the managers' role from engineer to business unit 
manager haE led to an increased concentration on the commercial aspects of 
generating.. transmitting and distributing electrical energy. Commercialisation 
has been described by Harman (1993a, 9) as an administrative reform which 
sets dear commercial objectives for public enterprise. It was initially 
introduced into SECWA in the early nineties and into Western Power in 1995 as 
part of the corporatisation and management reform. The data from this 
research (section 5.4.1) shows general agreement among managers that the 
productivity and efficiency gains Western Power has experienced since 
corporatisation were related to improved commercial performance. For 
example, managers considered that both the organisation and employees were 
more commercially focused and had a better understanding of the business 
direction. As one manager said ... tlrere are less thau half the m1mber of people now 
doing t/1.e snwe or more work tlia11 before. While the study evidence shows that 
commercialisation resulted in the managers having a better understanding of 
the business direction and was an important driver for the achievement of 
business unit performance targets, it also introduced significant changes to their 
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roles (section 5.4.2). These included a greater emphasis on improving customer 
service, an increased focus on cost and financial performance, a greater 
awareness of competition and the pursuit of unregulated income. Managers 
considered that this required much more attention by them to business 
objectives and to raising staff awareness of Western Power's commercial role 
and public image. 
The increased commercial emphasis forced the managers to become 
more accountable for the effo::tiveness and efficiency of their business units and 
this meant increased attention to financial matters. Data from all three st.ages of 
the research shows general agreement that improved financial accountability 
was an important driver for management reform and was a significant issue for 
the managers in terms of what they were expected to do and how they did it 
(sections 5.4.3, 7.4 and table 6.12). It played an important role in their 
accountabilities as managers and was one of the measurables used to assess 
their personal and business unit performance (section 5.4.3 & table 6.22). For 
example, managers were now required to prepare precise budgets, to review 
them monthly, to control expenditure, to focus on return on investment and to 
be accountable for outcomes. In addition, they felt that their attention had 
shifted from budgets, with limited scope focusing only on the operational needs 
of their business units, to a more strategic planning approach, which linked 
corporate Key Performance Indicators to business plans and budgets at all 
levels within the organisation. This shift in roles has been reported in the 
literature to have occurred in other Australian utilities as reported by Simmons 
and Bramble (1996), Walker and Walker (2000), and others. They contend that 
managers must adapt to this new role and if necessary, they must seek new 
skills. TI1is impact of change on Western Power managers' roles is discussed in 
sections 8.3.4 and 8.5.2. 
With the stronger focus on commercial performance, the managers also 
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found themselves concerned with attending to the demands of customers and 
key stakeholders. Stakeholders are defined by Vllheeler & Sillanpaa (1997) as 
individuals and entities who may be affected by business and who may in tum 
bring in£1uence to bear upon it (p.10). Stakeholders therefore are investors, 
employees, customers, suppliers and local communities. The key stakeholders 
in Western Power and the benefits they were perceived to have got from its 
corporatisation are discussed further in section 8.4.3. The evidence from the 
secondary data indicates that the executive considered that customers were 
important stakeholders for all levels of management and !:herefore customer 
focus was introduced into Western Power in July 1995 as part of the FOCUS 
culture change program (Western Power Internal Publication, 1995). It was 
acknowledged among the managers participating in this study that customer 
focus represented a culture shift away from the previous SECWA culture of 
'take it or leave it' to a new 'customer satisfaction' culture for Western Power. 
The greater focus on the needs and wants of their internal and external 
customers had also increased the managers' duties and responsibilities through 
the need to continually question and review the way things were done within 
their business unit. The evidence from this research shows that, although 
customer focus had made managers' roles more complex in tenns of new rules 
and standards, there was general agreement that they had a clearer 
understanding of what was required of them now than they had prior to 
corporatisation (sections 5.4.5, 7.4 and table 6.7). Furthennore, customer focus 
had improved managers' ability to meet the expectations of their priority 
stakeholders and had enhanced their internal and external networks. They 
attributed this to the strong promotion of customer focus as a key accountability 
for managers and its inclusion in their performance targets and ..:orporate and 
divisional strategic plans. 
The introduction of the Managerial Leadership Initiative (MLI) in the 
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latter half of 2000 to replace FOCUS brought further significant and widespread 
changes to the managers' roles. It was intended that the MLI would improve 
the company's performance by changing the management culture from one of 
command and control to one of leadership. Furthermore, the MLl objectives 
were to strengthen managerial leadership and enhance relationships between 
employees and their formal leaders. The MLI objectives therefore introduced a 
management framework that brought together individual and organisational 
capabilities. The interview data in this study showed strong agreement among 
managers that leadership issues had grown in importance within Western 
Power over recent years in response to increased government and community 
expectations and increased business competition (sections 5.4.2 & 7.4). As a 
result, managers' roles had also increased in terms of scope, key account.abilities 
and senior management expectations. TI1ere was a relatively strong agreement 
among managers that the development of relationships between their 
supervisors, peers and staff; their own accountability within those relationships; 
and performance management and fair treatment of staff were new 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the responsibilities promoted by the MLI helped 
the managers focus attention on people management and personal leadership, 
something which they considered FOCUS had failed to do. 
Like FOCUS, the MLI included managers' acceptance of performance 
management as part of their role. The Employee Achievement Measure 
(TEAM), a form of performance management, had been previously introduced 
as part of the FOCUS culture change program in 1995 in order to help achieve 
corporate and organisational goals. However, evidence from the secondary 
data shows that this was unsuccessful (Australian Services Union, 1995; 
Lehmann, 1997). The 'improved' TEAM introduced with the MLI was 
promoted by the executive as . .. an imporlaut ma11ageme11t fimcfiou n11d 1111 integral 
pnrt of good leadership (Western Power Corporate Strategic Plan, 2001). 
Managers were to use TEAM to encourage and reward high achievers, to assist 
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others and to sanction poor performers through setting and reviewing 
individual performance targets. However, the evidence shows that the 
intTOduction of TEAM increased managers' roles and responsibilities {sections 
5.4.8, 7.4 & table 6.11). Performance management meant managers were now 
responsible for staff selection and recruitment. They must set clear objectives 
and individual performance targets for staff, conduct regular performance ".... 
reviews and assist staff in matters such as career plaruting and training, all of 
which were formerly a specialist HR function. The impact of performance 
management on managers' roles is discussed in section 8.3.4. 
TI1e introduction of new management systems caused managerial work 
to become more intensive due to the ch;,.nged working practices and systems 
and reporting structures, shaped in part by the introduction of large scale 
information and communication technology across the organisation and it's 
broader customer, supplier and stakeholder networks. There was widespread 
consensus among managers that, since corporatisation, the nature of their roles 
had changed significantly from work administration to people management. 
There was an increased focus on key stakeholders and commercial issues, and 
that the new management systems that had enabled this were heavily reliant on 
new technologies such as personal computers and software applications. A 
majority of managers stated that in order to respond to market changes and the 
changing expectations for the needs of people and society, Western Power must 
continuously improve as a business and take advantage of changes in 
technology. Technology in the form of specialised software programs and data-
bases was seen as important in comparing corporate performance with other 
utilities. For example, interconnected database(; were set up using similar 
protocols, and containing organisational and network performance data, which 
was comparable across business units and the industry as a whole, allowing for 
cross industry comparisons for commercial and academic purposes. These are 
discussed in more detail below. The interview data from this research showed 
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a relatively high level of agreement among managers that there had been a 
significant shift in the way that performance was measured making it more 
complex, for which computers were ideally suited. These findings are 
supported by the literature which reports that the technological base of 
organisations generally has become increasingly sophisticated (Gibson, 1999, 
16; Schein, 1996, 14). This has been particularly noticeable in the electricity 
supply industry (Lewis, 1997, 23; Walker & Walker, 2000, 95) with its heavy 
reliance on engineering and technology systems to secure organisational change 
and productivity improvements. 
The Mimcom Information Management System (:MIMS) was introduced 
into Western Power in July 2000 as a single mainframe computer system to 
replace a multitude of separate HR, financial, administration, procurement and 
engineering systems. These systems had been administered by specialists, but 
now became the responsibility of the managers. The study found that the new 
systems now include certain aspects of employee administration, budgeting 
and financial reporting, safety, project management, asset management and 
asset maintenance (section 5.4.3). However, there were low levels of acceptance 
of :MIMS because the majority of managers were not consulted in the planning 
and implementation of it. This is discussed further in the next section. 
Other important technology changes highlighted by the managers 
included the introduction of e-mail, mobile telephones and laptop comp11ters 
for them in order to improve communication and access to information. From 
the interview data it was evident that each manager and all their staff now had 
a personal computer linked to all parts the organisation. As in many 
organisations this created a whole new working environment, and as a result 
they now spent much of their time responding to e-mail. There were now new 
teclmology related responsibilities for managers such as staff b·aining, security 
"'and access to and dealing with abuse of information. 
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This part of section 8.3 has discussed changes in managers' roles since 
COl'poratisation and doing so has addressed part of the second research 
question. The next part of section 8.3 will discuss perceptions of the 
effectiveness of communication of the change in Western Power. 
8.3.2 How effectively were the changes communicated? 
TI1e communication of change provides an important link between 
senior management and the managers who were responsible for implementing 
that change. Furthermore, the study of communication between senior 
management and managers provides useful insights for future organisational 
change and helps expand the body of knowledge relating to perceptions of 
communication within government agencies. 
For the managers, the most important component of any change 
program was clear and effective two·way communication. This finding is in 
accord with the literature by Larkin (1994), Gilgeous (1998) and Petrovic· 
Lazarevic (1999) who have given considerable attention to the importance of 
effective two·way communication within organisations. However, this research 
shows that poor communication in the years leading up to corporatisation 
meant managers were not adequately informed of the impending changes. 'This 
in tum led to a culture of mistrust between senior managers and those at the 
lower levels. Such a breakdown in trust evidenced in this study has also been 
described in the literature (Brooks & Harfield, 2000, 91; Galbraith, Lawler, & 
Associates., 1993, 102) as breaking the psychological contract between those in 
authority and subordinates. That is, there is an implicit belief by subordinates 
that those in authority will always keep in mind the best interests of their staff 
when planning change and will dearly communicate such change to them. In 
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this study, the mistrust occurred when senior man',l[;~~ focussed their attention 
on the technical detail and economic consequence5 of the restructuring and 
failed to communicate their plans to the lower levels. 
The evidence suggests that the culture of mistrust that developed within 
Western Power formed as a result of the traditional adversarial industrial 
relations culture which prevailed in the 1980's and the early 1990's and was 
further exacerbated by the heavy handed Functional and Organisational 
Review (FOR) introduced in late 1988 and early 1989. The FOR was undertaken 
in what was then SECW A with particular emphasis on reducing the number of 
levels of management and decentralising decision making (chapter two). 
However, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the FOR had been 
introduced into Western Power by what managers termed as 'stealth'. 
Furthermore, they claimed that the information senior management divulged 
when they presented the FOR was misleading and did not explain the reason 
for it nor the impact that it would have on their roles. As a result of the FOR, 
the managers experienced significant staff reductions and changes to their roles 
without any prior consultation from senior management. Similar events were 
reported to have occurred in utilities elsewhere in Australia as a result of early 
attempts to introduce commercialisation into public sector utilities prior to their 
corporatisation, and, like the Western Power situation, had created a culture of 
mistrust and resistance among lower levels of management and staff (Petrovic-
Lazarevic, 1999; Simrrt:):tlS & Bramble, 1996; Watts, 1996). For Western Power, 
the failure of senior management to adequately commWlicate change to lower 
levels continued up until the introduction of the culture change program that 
accompanied corporatisation. 
In contrast to the low level of information received prior to 
corporatisation, the evidence from the large-scale survey and interviews shows 
that apart from MIMS, which is discussed in later sections, most managers 
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considered that they had been adequately informed about the changes 
introduced since 1995. The implementation of the FOCUS culture change 
program in 1995 was the turning point in communication methods within the 
organisation. There was general agreement among the managers that the 
FOCUS training workshops, presented by senior staff and which the majority of 
employees attended, were the turning point in the method by which senior 
management communicated change within Western Power. The secondary 
data (chapter lwo) suggests that the FOCUS workshops gave all attendees a 
dear overview of the new strategic direction for Western Power and what was 
expected of them in the new organisation. From these were developed the 
mission statement (Western Power Internal Publication, 1995) and set of 
organisational values (Western Power - Policy Statement, 1996). The improved 
communications within the organisation were also attributed to the corpcrate 
videos, internal newsletters, PowerNet and e-mail. 
The evidence suggests that many of the communication improvements 
since the 1990's were attributable to new technology, e.g., personal computers, 
e-mail and mobile phones. Since the late 1990s, almost all employees have had 
regular access to personal computers and this has been largely responsible for 
the improved communications and information flow within the organisation. 
Tlris view is supported in the literature (Felton & Harper, 1998b, 2; Walker & 
Walker, 2000, 94) which shows that the use of technology to improve 
communications and commercial performance within electricity utilities had 
increased at a rapid r.:ite from the 1990's. However, it is likely that this 
technology would have been introduced regardless of corporatisation. 
Ckar free-flowing information has been described by Sease & Goffee 
(1989, 54) and Sinunons & Bramble (1996, 226) as strategically important for all 
levels in order for the managers to communicate their intentions and 
expectations both up and down the organisation and to know what was 
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expected of them. However, while this study found that the communication of 
change to the managers was relatively successful, evidence shows that the 
communication approach was largely top-down (section 5.4.2). Senior 
management communicated the changes, and their expectations of them, 
dearly lo the managers below throughout the reform period, but did not seek 
preliminary or ongoing opinions from the managers about the nature of change, 
how it should be implemented or any consideration of how it would impact on 
management roles. Changes were often introduced and announced fait 
accompli. These findings are consistent with those of Worrall & Cooper (2000, 
2001) and Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison (2000) who reported the 
negative impacts of change on managers in the United Kingdom resulting from 
limited one-way communication and a lack of consultation about restructuring 
decisions and change within their organisations. 
The evidence from the secondary data and stage one of the study 
suggests that a lack of consultation with the managers, staff and representative 
unions was the main reason for the general mistrust of senior management and 
their motives which had developed in the years leading up to corporatisation 
and for several years after, i.e., 1989 to 1997. In fact, the introduction of FOCUS 
had been dismissed at the time by unions (Australian Services Union, 1995) and 
many managers (Lehmann, 1997) as another FOR in a different guise and 
Executive enamoured with 'overseas fads' and widely hyped formulas for 
initiating and managing organisational change. The Australian Services Union 
also took industrial action between 1995 and 1996 which delayed the 
completion of the FOCUS workshops for several months. The research 
presented in this thesis shows that consultation with managers and key 
stakeholders with regard to the plarming and implementation of change did not 
occur until after the introduction of the Managerial Leadership Initiative (MU) 
which was rolled out to all employees in 2000 (section 5.4.2). Although the MLl 
itself had been introduced witL limited consultation among managers, the 
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principles and practices promoted by the MLI provided for major 
improvements in two-way communication and consultation between senior 
managers, the lower levels of management and staff. However, the evidence 
suggests that senior managers still only consulted with lower levels when it 
suited them. The MLl is discussed further in section 8.3.4. Failure to 
adequately consult with key stakeholders prior to the implementation of change 
was reported by Keen & Sease and Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison (2000) 
to be an important issue for managers in organisations that have a wide mix u: 
stakeholders and where the pace of change is high. For those managers, the 
lack of consultation impacts on their working life in terms of job security and 
personal stress. Working life issues are discussed in section 8.5. 
This part of chapter eight has presented a discussion of the methods of 
communication used to inform managers about changes at Western Power. The 
next part will focus on the managers' involvement in the introduction and 
implementation of that change. 
8.3.3 Managers' involvement in change 
Being responsible for the implementation of change was one way in 
which managers' roles changed. Although managers frequently reported 
involvement in tl,e change process both at the onset of corporatisation and in 
the years since, closer analysis of this data shows that this involvement was 
mostly superficial and mainly consisted of attending meetings about the new 
systems after they had been introduced into the workplace and training staff on 
how to use the new systems. v\lhile the managers thought it was in their best 
interests to be involved in the planning and the introduction of change at the 
senior management level prior to it's introduction into the lower levels, they 
claimed that they were rarely invited to do so {section 5.4.1 and tables 6.8 & 6.9). 
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In fact, the research evidence suggests that much of the planning and the 
introduction of management system changes was done with little or no 
consultation or involvement from managers below senior management level 
{section 5.4.1). The study further shows that this situation did not start to 
improve until after the introduction of the Management Leadership Initiative 
(MLI) in 2000. The principles and practices promoted by the MLI provided foi· 
major improvements in two-way communication and consultation between 
senior managers, the lower levels of management and staff. This provided 
increased opportunities for managers to be involved in change should they 
choose to do so. The MLI is explored further in section 8.3.4. 
Managers' understandings of the importance of being involved in 
change is consistent with the literature by Clark & Garside (1997) and Wood & 
Jones (1993). In developing a model for change management, Clarke & Garside 
(1997) argue the importance of involving people at all levels in the organisation 
in all stages of change. This includes planning.. preparation, communication, 
introduction and implementation {Clarke & Garside, 1997, 539). The 
importance of managers being involved in the planning and implementation of 
change is further reinforced by Wood & Jones {1993) who reported on the 
central issues relating to human resource strategies in government enterprises. 
They contend that commercialisation and corporatisation are top down 
processes which need to be participative in order to benefit from the 
experiences of staff and to deliver on productivity improvements. This makes it 
important for staff at all levels to be involved as much as possible in changes 
that impact on the role and design of their work. 
However, i:.1 contrast to the low levels of actual involvement, the results 
in all three stage~ of the research indicated that the managers did want to get 
involved, and in fact had become more involved given the significant impact 
the introdt•ction of new management systems had within their branch or 
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business unit (section 5.4.1 and table 6.10). This meant that managers had to 
spend time on resource and business unit performance issues that often 
followed the change. Moreover, the managers claimed that because they were 
not always involved in the early stages of change, senior management had often 
'got it wrong' resulting in key staff being under utilised, overworked or lost 
from the branch or business unit due to poorly planned and introduced 
changes. The importance of involvement by managers at all levels of change 
was noted by Devine & Trayner (1996). They reported the success of change 
initiatives within a Canadian electricity utility which they believe were 
attributable to collaboration and staff involvement at all levels throughout all 
stages of the change process (Devine & Trayner, 1996). Key elements of these 
initiatives were the joint development of shared values; management actions 
a.,d systems to match their words; time allowed to acquire new skills; and the 
development of trust and care between senior ~gement and staff. 
Another constraint on involvement was reluctance by some managers to 
get involved because it would take up a lot of their time. The findings of this 
study show that a few managers considered that involvement outside their core 
activities distracted them from otl1er important work and unless involvement 
with change was one of their performance targets they WP.re not interested in 
doing it (section 5.4.2). Shirley (1999) observed similar behaviour in state 
owned enterprises and suggests tl1at performance targets for managers are an 
effective way of measuring and rewarding performance. However, Shirley also 
found that managers would still opt to focus on multiple soft targets that were 
easy for tl1em to reach (p.125). This view is also shared by Stewart (1992) who 
claims that, witl1out clear motivation and executive support, managers will see 
little reason for changing the status quo of their business units; to do so could 
result in role change and possible increased responsibility for little or no 
increase in utility (Stewart, 1992, 57). This was also evident in this study of 
Western Power where some managers had indicated a reluctance to participate 
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in change if they thought it would keep them from their core duties and 
prevent them achieving performance targets, i.e., an increase in their workload 
without recognition through increased remuneration (section 5.4.2). In a like 
manner, those managers who indicated a willingness to become involved in the 
planning and introduction of change had an expectation that it would be 
included in their performance management plan, or involvement would 
enhance their career in some way. This motivation to satisfy self interests IS 
viewed by Mulgan (1995) as a failing of the managerialist approach to 
management reform and sees managers shying away from involvement in 
work that does not improve their utility. 
Problems of a lack of involvement by the managers as end-users are not 
uncommon where complex IT systems are introdt,!-ced. At Western Power the 
lack of a clear understanding of the engineering and the commercial aspects of 
electricity supply by IT specialists has often resulted in a greater concentration 
on the system rather than on the output. The introduction of the Mimcom 
Information Management System (MIMS) was an example of this. There was a 
general view that the introduction of MllvlS into Western Power had been 
poorly conceived, poorly planned and poorly implemented. While the actual 
ongoing project status was well reported, managers were concerned about their 
lack of involvement in the inception and acceptance stages of a system which 
numerous managers considered inadequate for their needs. Furthermore, there 
was a relatively widespread agreement among managers that the objections to 
MIMS were mainly due to the lack of effective consultation by senior managers 
during the conception stage, and by the project managers during the 
introduction stages, and the lack of training when it was first introduced. In 
reporting such problems, Schein (1996) captures the very essence of the 
problem that faced the engineer-managers at Western Power with the 
introduction of new technology. Schein (1996) found that the introduction of 
new technology within an organisation involves a complex process of 
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communication and consultation between executives, IT specialists and 
engineers. The IT specialist works towards improving management decisions 
under the direction of the executive, by focusing only on the kinds of 
information that can be packaged and electronically transmitted. However, this 
invariably results in a system which is not necessarily suited to the needs of the 
operator and often finds the operator with insufficient time and resources to 
devote to the learning process (Schein, 1996, 17). 
Section 8.3.3 has reviewed findings on the managers' involvement with 
the planning and intmduction of organisational changes and new management 
systems within Western Power. The next section discusses managers' 
perceptions of how the changes associated with corporatisation and 
management reform have impacted on their roles. 
§.3.4 Impact of change on managers' roles 
With corporatisation crone new management responsibilities. Managers 
were now expected to participare in the introduction and the implementation of 
change. The research evidence and secondary data showed that Western Power 
managers were viewed by the executive as change leaders (Western Power 
Internal Publication, 1995). However, if they were not convinced of the need for 
such change or did not understand the necessity for it then, they were reluctant 
leaders. While there had been exceptionally strong support for change, there 
had been a relatively low level of involvement by managers with the 
implementation of that change. The reasons for this have been discussed in 
8.3.3. Not all managers wanted to be involved with the implementation of 
change because it would mean additional responsibilities and an increased 
work.load without being freed from their normal duties (5.4.2). Furthermore, 
the manage,·s held a relatively strong view that the new management systems 
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and business strategies introduced through FOCUS during the period 1995 to 
2000 had occupied a large portion of their time in terms of introduction, 
implementation and training. and they were not willing to repeat the process. 
There was general agreement that the introduction of any new system usually 
resulted in them having to learn the system and write and implement new 
processes and procedures for it. Sometimes, this work had to be done outside 
normal working time (sections 5.4.8 and 7.4 & table 6.23). The literature reports 
similar findings of a reluctance by managers from former public utilities, the 
public sector and the private sector in the United Kingdom (Graham, 1992; 
Keen & Sease, 1998; Worrall & Cooper, 2000, 2001) to take on additional 
responsibilities because it meant increased workload and longer working hours. 
Other managers simply did not want change (section 5.4.1). They 
preferred to retain the status quo, i.e., ... serving t/1.e public, 11ot the fi11a11d11l 11eeds 
of a commerdal orga11isation. A small number of managers considered that 
Western Power was still a public organisation and that serving the public 
interest was more important than economic rationalism. This constituted a 
conflict between economic and social objectives which has been reported 
elsewhere by Rosenthal & Russ (1988) in the early stages of energy industry 
reform in Australia, and later by Walker (1994) after the corporatisation of 
Australian state utilities had commenced. Rosenthal and Russ (1988) consider 
that the respective state governments as owners are responsible and 
accountable for ensuring that their utilities take into account complex social 
issues that affect the community. such as tariff schedules and environmental 
protection. However, when setting business objectives, the utilities often face 
conflicting social and economic objectives which sometimes have to be resolved 
through political intervention (p.38). Examples of this within Western Power 
include increased intervention by the minister and other- government 
departments, e.g., the Office of Energy, in response to complaints from 
domestic and commercial customers over supply problems resulting from 
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Western Power's decreased capital spending. Such intervention usually 
resulted in substantial increases in workload and hours of work for those 
managers involved. They had to re-prioritise work and to pay increased 
attention to the reallocation of resources and budgets. As one manager said 
. .• we spend too much time p11tclii11g up the system mtl1er thm1 maintai11i11g or replaciug 
it (section 5.4.8). 
Nevertheless, there was a general view among managers that the 
changes which accompanied corporatisation made sense to them in the context 
of the need for industry and management reform (section 8.2). They saw that 
the changes which followed the introduction FOCUS had released much 
untapped talent such as innovation, business, financial and marketing skills 
that had previously been suppressed under the old bureaucratic and rule 
driven (SECWA) system (section 5.4.2). Moreover, FOCUS was considered tu 
have a positive impact on their roles in terms of its expansion and reduced 
bureaucracy. This generally gave them greater control and made their jobs 
easier and more interesting (table 6.11). For example, there was general 
agreement that the new management systems provided greater control over 
factors such as performance management, remuneration, and career 
opportunities (sections 5.4.8 and 7.4 & table 6.23). Although the flatter 
organisational structure which resulted from corporati.sation meant reduced 
promotional opportunities, the managers considered their career prospects had 
improved through increased ability to change career paths through sideways 
movement or leave the organisation with their new skills. This is discussed 
further in section 8.5. 
However, not all managers viewed their new roles as a good thing. 
Some saw their role as engineering-managers disappearing because the 
successive organisational changes since corporatisation had led to an over 
concentration on the commercial side of the business and a significant number 
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of management positions filled by people from IT and financial backgrounds 
rather than from engineering backgrounds. This increase in non-engineering 
based management positions had reportedly led to a weakening of engineering 
skills in senior positions and a shortage of engineers within Western Power in 
general (section 5.4.2). This was due to two reasons. Firstly, organisational 
restrucroring since corporatisation had meant a flatter, less hierarchical 
struchlre which also meant less engineer-management positions. This reduced 
the succession opportunities for engineers to progress to management 
positions, meant less recruitment of graduate engineers and an increased 
attrition rate through engineers leaving to fill positions outside Western Power, 
and secondly, successive organisational restructuring since corporatisation had 
reduced the technical and engineering positions within Western Power, this 
was despite system growth and increased work within the organisation (section 
5.4.2). 
The concentration on the commercial aspects of generating. transmitting 
and distributing electrical energy was found to have had some positive impacts 
on managers' workload and working hours. TI1e initial increases in workload 
and working hours as a result of commercialisation had been mostly offset by 
the managers focusing less on engineering issues. In fact, managers found their 
new roles helped them work more efficiently and effectively, helped them 
achieve their performance targets, and that it had slightly decreased their 
workload. Workload issues are discussed fur liter in section 8.5.3. 
The increased focus on commercialisation also meant increased financial 
accountability for managers. This was a significant issue in terms of what 
managers were expected to do, how they did it, and its impact on personal and 
business unit performance (section 5.4.1 and tables 6.12 & b.13). Financial 
accountability required them to prepare precise budget,, to review them 
monthly, to control expenditure, to focus on return on revenue and to be 
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accountable for outcomes. The managers agreed that financial accountability 
required a good understanding of the cost structures driven by strategic 
planning and this required additional skills and sometimes specialist 
accounting knowledge. They considered this to be important for them and the 
ol'ganisation despite the fact that managers below senior level had very limited 
involvement with strategic planning. Managers commented that strategic 
planning ... slwuld include lower ma11age111eut levels in tlle strategic pla1111i11g process, 
and, ... rill staff levels s/1011/d be involved iii strategic plrmuillg, it allows for a wider 
view of tile busiuess plans (sections 5.4.4 and 7.4). Although managers set the 
budgets they were often adjusted by senior management, or the managers were 
told how much they could spend regardless of identified needs. Also, budgets 
were not being developed simultaneously with strategic planning even though 
the tw"o were linked. As a result, business plans set by strategic planning rarely 
aligned with the budget cycle which resulted in the readjustment of budgets 
throughout the year (section 5.4.3). Nevertheless, the research shows that there 
was a clear need for budgets and financial control and that these not only 
played an important role in the managers' accountabilities, but were also some 
of the measurables used to assess their personal and business unit performance 
(tables 6.11, 6.12 & 6.23). 
However, not all the managers saw improvements in their roles as a 
result of increased financial accountability. Some were frustrated at having to 
seek formal approval from senior management to spend within their budgets 
and their delegated financial authority (DFA). This involved the preparation of 
lengthy business cases to justify spending budgets that had already been 
approved and for they were held accountable. These requirements were 
enforced by a few senior managers in order to retain tight financial control and 
meet financial performance targets, but as one manager commented ... It does 
little to improve trust between levels of 111mmge111e11t, why give as ftmmdal mitlwrihJ if 
they (the board) don't tn1st 11s to be ncco1mtable for it. (section 7.4). There was also 
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a common belief that senior management was placing too much attention on 
staff numbers and the reduction of operational costs rather than on true 
leadership issues. For example, managers below branch level now found it 
necessary to seek approval for staff training and staff replaceme.1ts, even 
though they had been assigned an allocated number of staff and had been told 
that staff training and the training budget was their responsibility. Similar 
findings of increased bureaucracy and cost control measures have been 
reported by Keen & Vickerstaff (1997). They conducted a study of change and 
its impact on local government managers in the United Kingdom and 
concluded that although tensions between flexibility and control were inherent 
within all devolved management systems, many managers were coming to 
realise that ... ll!ey had bew given the jlexibiliti; to 5ave money but not to spend it 
(Keen & Vickers ta.ff, 1997, 45). 
Command and control management techniques similar to those found in 
this study have been reported by Beer, Eisenstat & Spector (1994) who studied 
restructuring and management reform in the United States. They found that 
the requirement for managers to obtain approval for the smallest expenditure 
was common in organisations where there was a tendency for managers to be 
over-managed by senior managers who often possessed technical skills and 
functional expertise but lacked a broad business perspective and managerial 
skills (Beer et al., 1994, 16-17). This situation is not unlike that for Western 
Power where the majority of managers, including senior managers, crune from 
engineering or technical backgrounds and generally lacked business and 
managerial leadership skills (section 5.4.2 and table 6.21). For them, these skills 
were either acquired through additional training or through on the job learning. 
Skills as a working life issue for managers is discussed in section 8.5.2. 
Senior management introduced the Manageriitl Leadership Initiative 
(:MLI) into Western Power in 2000 in order to improve leadership skills within 
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the organisation (section 2.4.7). However, a general view among managers was 
that the empowerment which had been introduced as part of FOCUS and had 
encouraged innovation, entrepreneurialism and responsible risk-taking 
(Western Power Leadership Principles, 1995) was being eroded by the J\.[LJ and 
replaced with a more authoritarian approach to managing by senior 
management through increased bureaucracy and rules (section 7..1). These 
findings are contrary to the principles of managerialism which underpinned 
management reform in Ausb·alia's public dectricily utilities and promoted a 
move away from input controls and bureaucratic procedures, rules and 
standards to a greater reliance on output measures and performance targets 
(Boston et al., 1997; Considine & Painter, 1997). 
It appears that some senior Western Power managers would prefer to go 
back to the bureaucratic public service management style of rules and 
administration which was their primary function prior to corporatisation. Their 
motives for this are unclear, but the evidence suggests that it is not the 
principles of the MLl that are responsible, but more likely the MLl was being 
used by some senior managers as an instrument to apply further cost controls 
and performance improvements in order to better improve their own positions 
(section 7.4). A study by Hoggett (1994) into the privatisation of former public 
utilities in the United Kingdom reported findings on management control 
which are similar to those of this study. Haggett found that the emerging forms 
of organisational control within the UK public sector nppeared to promote 
increased formalism and proceduralism that reduced empowerment and 
entrepreneurialism and supported a process of standardisation and 
bureaucratic control (Haggett, 1994, 18). 
There have been reports in recent literature about similar moves towards 
increased centralised control and the extended development of performanc<! 
monitoring and management control techniques. For example, Worrall & 
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Cooper (2001) who conducted a five-year longitudinal study of managers from 
the public and private sectors and from former public utilities in the United 
Kingdom have reported a 'disturbing trend' towards centralist policies which 
apply increased constraints on managerial autonomy and aim at restricting 
managers' scope for entrepreneurialism and flexibility. The majority of 
managers in their study, particularly from the former utilities, had reported that 
restructui'ing had impacted on their roles in terms of increased workload; 
increased organisational focus on cost reduction; increased tendency towards 
centralised management; and reduced empowerment and employee 
participation which slowed down management decision-making. Worrall & 
Cooper (2001) refer to managers' reactions to increased bureaucracy and 
reduced empowerment as 'presenteeism' in which managers report for work 
but have no loyalty for the organisation (p.40). It is possible that if Western 
Power managers continue to experience decreased empowerment and 
increased bureaucratic control tl1eir attitudes and motivation toward the 
organisation will also change. 
Empowerment and its in1pact on managers' motivation and job 
satisfaction is discussed in section 8.5.1. Because similar events are occurring 
within Western Power, this shift in policy by senior managers is considered to 
be an important direction for further investigation in order to determine if the 
managers' opinions wiU have changed after the MLl has been fully 
implemented. The full implementation of the MLI has been delayed until late 
2004 due to the disaggregation plans for Western Power by the WA State 
Government. The disaggregation is discussed in section 9.5. 
Despite the reported increasing trend towards a more authoritarian 
approach by senior management, most managers considered that the MLl had 
helped them improve their leadership capab_iliti~,;; and the achievement of 
personal performance targets. But, in doing so, it had also resulted in increased 
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in responsibilities and workload for them. For example, the managers indicated 
an increase in the amount of time they spent on employee issues that were 
previously a HR concern (table 6.23). They were now required to set 
perfonnance targets, to review performance and provide feedback, to manage 
and review training requirements, and to provide counselling for all their staff 
(section 5.4.2). This was of general concern as only a relatively few managers 
considered that they had the necessary skills to discuss personal issues and 
performance directly with tl1eir staff. Skills as a working life issue for managers 
is discussed in section 8.5.2. 
The Employee Achievement Measure (TEAM), a fonn of performance 
management, was introduced by the executive as part of the FOCUS culture 
change program in 1995. It was to be closely linked to the slTategic planning 
process through Key Perfonnance Indicators in order to achieve corporate and 
organisational goals. However, there was a significant lack of motivation and 
commitment to perfonnance management in its earlier forms from managers 
and staff in the levels below general manager. For example, few managers 
attended the training, claiming they were too busy and didn't need 
performance management in order to run their business. Some even 
discouraged their employees from attending training. Also, as the process 
filtered down through the organisation, the key performance indicators became 
increasingly less appropriate, especially in engineering and technical sections 
(section 2.4.5). 
That employees resist change is not new, especially when they do not see 
benefits for themselves, or underst.and how it contributes to their role within 
the organisation. In her study of culture change within Australia's electricily 
supply industry, Petrovic-Lazarevic (1999) found that it was normal for 
employees at all levels to resist the introduction of change and she suggests that 
employees can be motivated to accept change through the use of a performance 
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management system. Such a system can be used to inform employees and 
provide feedback on their contribution and perfonnance within the 
organisation (p.4). A modified TEAM was reintroduced in 2000 and was 
communicated to all employees through the MLI workshops. It was promoted 
by the executive and branch managers as an important management function 
and an integral part of good leadership which would enable fonnal talks 
between individuals and managers and assist the managers in setting 
performance targets (section 5.4.8 and table 6.13). 
The new version of TEAM was accepted by the managera, most likely 
because the majority of them now had management contracts and their 
remuneration and bonus reviews were dependent upon the achievement of 
performance targets. Seen in this light TEAM was viewed as a useful human 
resource management instrument and an important managerial role which 
assisted them in their relationship with their senior manager and staff, and 
enabled open discussion belween management and staff about problems and 
issues of concern. Although TEAM had meant more work initially, there had 
been an overull decrease in the managers' work due to staff having a better 
understanding of their jobs and requiring less direction (sections 5.4.2, 5.4.8, 
and 7.4 & table 6.21). However, iJTespective of these good points performance 
management was not being fully utilised across the organisation and that it 
required further refinement in order to make it less structured and more 
flexible. Furthermore, there was general consensus that performance targets 
should be linked to a reward system in order to ensure that extraordinary 
performance was adequately rewarded (section 7.4). 
Staff recruitment was another new role for managers. The Strategically 
Integrated Recruitment and Selection System (SIRSS) took into account the 
capabilities of applicants to do the job through an examination of their previous 
experience based on certain 'dimensions' and 'capabilities' applicable to the 
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position for which the applicant had applied. It was the managers' 
responsibility to implement smss, and the data showed general agreement 
among managers that it had a slightly positive impact on their roles by assisting 
them in meeting personal and business unit performance targets through the 
selection of quality staff (tables 6.11 & 6.12). 
Another way in which managers' roles changed was through the new 
policy of customer focus. Customer focus was viewed by managers as an 
important accountability against which business unit and personal perfonmmce 
targets were measured. The literature reports custom2r focus to be a key 
accountability for managers of newly corporatised electricity utilities and an 
important part of commercialisation and management reform (Deveson, 1997; 
Howard, 1994; Hyman, 1995). Participants in this study saw that the 
achievement of perfonnance targets linked to customer focus had improved 
their remuneration. Also, the skills and experience managers had gained from 
the commercial application of customer focus was seen to improve the 
possibility of employment outside Western Power should they choose to leave. 
Moreover, custon1er focus and its link with stakeholder management was 
beneficial to the managers' role as it enabled them to establish and maintain 
mutually beneficial internal and external networks. 
TI1e pursuit of unregulated income was viewed by some managers to be 
an important part of their role while others strongly resisted it. There was a 
general understanding that the pursuit of unregulated income was driven by a 
directive from tl1e executive to demonstrate that Western Power could compete 
in an open competitive market. However, few managers indicated any interest 
in pursuing it. Those who did, reported increased workload and held concerns 
that if the activity increased it would distract them and key staff from their core 
activities and prevent the achievement of their business unit targets. A few 
who were involved with the pursuit of unregulated income considered that it 
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had significantly enhanced their external networks giving tl1em a much broader 
business base and a wider range of potential clients and customers both within 
Australia and overseas. They were more commercially focused and that their 
business unit was regularly able to compete with businesses outside Western 
Power in areas such as engineering design, project management and specialised 
electrical construction and maintenance (section 5.4.8). However, there were 
managers who queried the economic sense of paying contractors to do the core 
work of key staff who had been re-directed to work on projects attracting 
unregulated income (section 7.4). 
An important component of the reform of all public electricity supply 
utilities in Australia has been the increased use of contract labour and the 
outsourcing of work that was previously done within ;_he utilities. Western 
Power has downsized and contracted out many traditional services such as 
design, construction and maintem:.nce, ostensibly to improve efficiency. 
Findings of this research sho·N however that this practice was more likely to be 
used to reduce employee numbers in order to improve performance figures. 
For example, using contractors, and costing them against materials rather than 
labour. One manager claimed .. .it's II mm1bers game, tlle1J (the executive) want to 
11mke it look as tlwugh we 11re doing more wit/J less people (sections 5.4.6 and 7.4). 
Furthermore, the managers considered that this 'creative accounting' distorted 
capital and operating budgets and disguised the true cost of labour within the 
organisation which in turn caused problems with the identification of work on 
one hand and the actual amount of work completed on the other. 
There was also an exceptionally high level of concern among managers 
about the reductions in permanent staff which had occurred since 
corporatisation, despite increased workloads within their business units. This 
had caused a significant increase in the use of contract labour within the 
organisation and the contracting out of work previously done by Western 
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Power staff. For example, managers reported that in some areas, such as IT and 
drafting, the majority of staff were contractors (sections 5.4.6 and 7.4). In 
discussing the reform of Australia's public sector Walker & Walker {2000) claim 
that public agencies tend to outsource activities where private sector firms have 
a comparative advantage, and to provide services themselves where the work 
involved specialist activities (p.144). However, most managers saw the 
increased use of r:ontractors as the business direction the executive wanted to 
take, and while the managers did not agree with it, there was little they could 
do about it. A few managers thought that the use of contractors made good 
bll'iiness sense, provided they had the appropriate skills and were used mostly 
for non-core work or where there were dearly identified skill shortages . 
. ':•Jonetheless, most managers thought that this would make the organisation 
reliant on contractors who may not always be available when l"equired. Both 
Norton (1999) and McLeod (1999) have made similar observations in other 
Australian electricity utilities and have warned that the use of contractors to 
replace key technical staff who have left through natural attrition and 
redundancy could result in important skills being lost from the utility. They 
consider this poses a serious problem for managers, particulal"ly in the 
engineering design and planning sections which rely heavily on engineering 
and technical expertise {McLeod, 1999; Norton, 1999). The findings from this 
study are in accord with the literature and show that important engineering 
and technical expertise was also being lost from Western Power because of the 
Jack of succession planning and the non-replacement of key staff when they left 
(sections 5.4.6 and 7.4). As a result, many senior technical roles were now the 
responsibility of contractors or consultants. Skill shortages and the increased 
use of con tac tors to overcome this are discussed in section 8.5.2. 
Overall, participants thought that the m:e 0£ contractors and the 
conlTacting out of services made their role easier as they had more authority 
over contractors in terms of hiring and firing and setting the rules to which 
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contractors must abide. In addition, the use of contract labour had assisted 
them with recruitment and selection because it enabled them to try out 
potential employees as contractors prior to offering them permanent status. 
However, the evidence also st1.ggests that the use of contract labour had 
increased the managers' workload. For example, as well managing the 
contracts under which contractors were employed, the managers also dealt with 
staff issues relating to the use of contractors, such as complaints of preferential 
treatment, getting the best jobs and higher pay (sections 5.4.6, 6.2.6 and 7.4). 
The strategic planning process within Western Power was known and 
understood by managers at all levels within the organisation, however, not all 
managers had been involved with it, nor did they want to be. This was 
discussed in section 8.3.1. Strategic planning had meant changes to the roles of 
those managers involved, but it had only a moderate impact on their roles and 
had only moderately increased their workload (sections 5.4.4, 6.2.6 and 7.4). For 
U,em, most of the work associated with strategic planning had become their 
core work and in some instances had replaced other work rather than adding to 
it. Tasks associated with strategic planning such as setting, adjusting and 
administering divisional, branch and business unit plans and budgets, and 
ensuring that performance targets for staff were aligned with those plans were 
central to the targets set within TEAM and played a key role in managers' 
remuneration reviews and contract renewals. However, those managers below 
general manager level who were involved with strategic planning found that 
this task was made more difficult by divisional and branch plans often not 
aligning with corporate strategic plans because I.he strategic planning was also 
out of aligmnent with the budget cycles (section 5.4.4). This was because the 
corporate strategic plans were set by the executive with little or no input from 
U,e lower levels of management. Therefore, as mentioned for financial 
accountability above, time was reportedly lost in adjusting and readjusting 
budgets, business unit objectives and performance targets for staff because the 
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strategic planning was also out of alignment with the budget cycles (section 
5.4.4). 
Undue political interference from the minister and other government 
departments also resulted in significant changes to the strategic plans, often 
after they had been finalised. Examples of this included the government 
requiring a higher dividend than previously indicated, or a reduction of certain 
tariffs, or Energy Safety requiring upgrades and improvements to the 
distribution system {sections 5.4.4, 5.4.7.and 7.4). These requirements impacted 
either directly or indirectly on capital and operating budgets at the executive 
level and often resulted in managers having to rework branch budgets and 
business plans. Managers need an increased awareness of the propensity for 
government interference tl1Tough constant awareness of current government 
policy; community concerns; environmental issues; government reporting 
requirements; and what is happening in other government departments. 
Additionally, considerable time was now spent on handling ministerials, tl1at is, 
responding to public complaints and questions from other organisations 
tluough political channels such as government ministers (section 5.4.1). 
Political interference in the planning and running of government corporations, 
particularly utilities, is not uncommon and similar issues have been described 
by Maddock (1993) who claims that although improving the performance of 
Australia's state-owned utilities is a major component of government economic 
refonn policy, politicians continue to use the utilities to achieve political ends 
(p.15). For example, Watts (1996) reports in his study of the performance of 
Queensland's electricity distribution utilities that a major argument in favour of 
corporatisation was the expected reduction in government interference. 
However, this had not occurred to the degree which proponents of 
corporatisation believed it should, and the utilities still experienced government 
interference in issues like strategic planning and community service obligations 
{Watts, 1996, 97). 
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The positive aspects of strategic planning included a better 
understanding by managers of corporate business processes and a greater 
opportunity for them to be involved in the high-level planning of issues that 
impact on their branch or business unit and the organisation as a whole. Also, 
managers believed that the knowledge and understanding of the strategic 
planning processes would hold them in good stead for work outside of Western 
Power should they choose to leave (sections 5.4.4, 6.2.4 and 7.4). However, 
there was also general agreement that in order for others to gain these benefits 
from strategic planning, it would have to be extended down to all levels of 
management. 
The new management systems which had a low impact on the managers' 
roles included Service Level Agreements (SLA) and Shareholder Value Adding 
(SVA). Service Level Agreements were formalised agreements between 
requestors and suppliers introduced into Western Power in 1999 into all 
divisions by the executive as part of the customer focus and asset owner/ asset 
manager initiatives. Although there was a general understanding of the SLA 
concept, relatively few managers had personal experience with them and SLA 
had a low impact on their roles (sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.6). Shareholder Value 
Adding (SVA) was introduced into Western Power in 1998 by the executive as 
part of the financial management system within FOCUS. As a management 
system, SVA is a process of analysis and review which shows the costs and 
benefits for all expenditure in excess of twenty thousand dollars. Although 
there was a relatively high level of understanding by managers of the SV A 
concept, it had limited application across the organisation and had a marginally 
positive impact on managers' roles as it provided the opportunity to highlight 
branch objectives and achievements to senior management and to identify 
training needs and staff shortages. However, it had also increased the 
workload due to the need to prepare business cases for expenditure approval 
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(sections 5.4.2, 6.2.4 and 7.4). 
The Mimcom Information Management System (MIMS), the main IT 
system used in Western Power, was found to have a negative impact on 
managers' roles. Managers held exceptionally strong opinions about MIMS 
failing to meet many of their financial reporting and budgeting needs and as 
such made their job difficult. MIMS was considered a hindrance because it was 
too complex for their needs and lacked user-friendly reporting software. 
Moreover, the introduction of :MIMS into Western Power had been poorly 
conceived, poorly planned and poorly implemented (sections 5.4.3 and 7.4). 
The survey data shows that MIMS was the only management system change 
which the managers considered had only moderately assisted them in 
achieving their pt-rfonnance targets, had impacted negatively on their roles in 
tenns of making their work more difficult, and had a negative impact on their 
workload in terms of increasing their work (sections 6.2.2, 6.2.4 and 6.2.6). The 
main reasons for their objections to MIMS was the lack of effective consultation 
by senior managers and project managers and the lack of training when it was 
first introduced. 
The increasing use of teclmology to support ll-ie introduction of new 
management systems also meant that managers had to gain additional skills in 
order to apply the technology effectively and to keep up with changes. 
Although this often meant additional work-related hours, there was strong 
agreement that technological change had impacted positively on their roles 
because it generated more data to help them with decision-making. It also 
provided decision support systems such as sophisticated modelling tools which 
helped improve their efficiency and effectiveness (section 5.4.2 and tables 6.11 & 
6.12). However, as discussed earlier, the common use of personal computers 
which were linked to all parts of the organisation and which used common 
software made it easier to send and retrieve infonnation, but this also brought 
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with it a whole range of new responsibilities for the managers such as staff 
training, security and dealing with access to and abuse of information (section 
5.4.2). 
The proliferation of computers led to the overuse of e-mail and redefined 
the principal forms of communication within the organisation from telephone 
calls and memos to electronic mail Where once a short telephone call provided 
the necessary information there was now a tendency for long protracted debate 
through e-mail which generally added little value to the original query, but 
consumed a disproportionately large amount of the managers' time. The 
overuse and misuse of e-mail also meant that managers and staff were regularly 
overloaded with information and as a result, many important notices were 
often overlooked or inadvertently discarded (section 5.4.2). 
The availability of managers outside of normal working hours was an 
emerging problem. With the increased use of mobile telephones and laptop 
computers, there was a tendency for managers to take their work with them 
wherever they went, which made them contactable 24 hours a day. While there 
was a general view that this was expected of them, a few managers expressed 
concern that this practice had had a negative impact on their family life and 
leisure time (sections 5.4.8 and 7.4 & table 6.23). This is an important emerging 
quality of working life issue for managers and is addressed further in section 
8.5 which explores the impact of corporatisation and management reform on 
their working life. 
Thi,:; section has addressed the second part of research question two, 
specifically it discussed the managers' perceptions of how corporatisation and 
management reform impacted on their roles. 
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8.4 BENEJ:lll'S OF CORPORATISATION 
This section addresses the third research question which was described 
in chapter one. Specifically, it will discuss: 
Wlmt are mmmgers' percq,tio11s of the benefits of corporatisatiou for themselves, 
for the orgauisatio11, a11d for ke1J Western Power stakeholders. 
The first part reports the benefits of corporal:isation for the managers. 
The second part reports the benefits of corporal:isation for the organisation. 
Finally, the third part reports the benefits of corporatisation for key Western 
Power stakeholders. 
8.4.1 Benefits for the managers 
The expected and theoretical benefits of corporatisation for managers 
have been well reported in the literature (Boston et al., 1997; Shil'iey, 1999). 
However, the practical benefits managers received from corporal:isation have 
received less attention. In order to address the gap in the literature, this 
research has reported the personal experiences of Western Power managers 
from all levels and their perceptions of the benefits they received from 
corporatisation. 
Rowlands (1990), Sanchis (1997), McKenna (1999), and others, report that 
public choice theorists (Leibenstein, 1979) view managers of government 
agencies as decision-making utility maximisers dominated by sell-interest, who 
individually adjust their work behaviour and motivation in order to maximise 
their remuneration and conditions. Boston, et al (1997) argues that agency 
theory, which has played an important role in developing policy framework 
underpinning corporatisation, also assumes that individuals are rational, sell-
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interested, utility maximisers and that the interests of the agents (managers) 
and principles (government) are bound to conflict. 'TI\e current research has 
found that managers openly reported their desire to improve their conditioru 
and remuneration and did this through the pursuit of performance targets, 
sometimes to the exclusion of other work (sections 5.4.8 and 7.4). Mulgan 
(1995) views this motivation as a weakness in the managerialist approach to 
mrumgement reform. Boston et al (1997) concede there can be problems if 
managerialism is applied automatically, uncritically or comprehensively to the 
public sector, but consider there are adequate accountability provisions within 
the model to deal with these contingencies. 
The literature further reports that managers' roles changed with the 
corporatisation of public agencies. Duncan & Bollard (1992), Watts (1996), 
Zifcak (1997) and others believe that for public sector managers, corporatisation 
and new management techniques have meant greater autonomy and flexibility 
within specified goals; greater role clarity; increased participation in decision-
making through branch and strategic plaruring; increased financial 
accountability; the opportunity to become change leaders; increased leadership 
and human resource management role; participation in management contracts 
and performance agreements. As discussed previously in section 8.3.1 these 
role changes also happened to Western Power mmagers artd their impact on 
managers' roles was discussed in 8.3.4. However, they came at a cost to the 
managers Ill terms of increased workload, longer working hours and dEcreased 
leisure time (sections 5.4.8, 6.2.6 and 7.4). The<'..,e issues are discussed further in 
section 8.5. 
Despite their new roles the managers themselves did not consider they 
had benefited significarttly from corporatisation (table 6.4). Nonetheless, they 
saw some benefits from acquiring new skills in commercial and financial areas, 
technology, customer service, marketing and sales, humart resources which 
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included recruitment, training.. health and safety, and leadership (section 5.4.2). 
The benefits from tl1ese new skills were reported to include increased 
remuneration, increased opportunities for a wider variety of work, increased 
opportunities to change careers through sideways movements within the 
organisation, and the possibility of work outside Western Power should they 
decide to leave {sections 5.4.2, 6.2.1 & 7.4). Although new skills had improved 
career opportunities, promotional opportunities within Western Power were 
limited due to the flatter organisational structure since corporatisation. Goffee 
& Sease {1992), Graham (1992), Dunford Bramble and Littler {1998), and others 
reported that similar events and consequences for managers had occurred in 
other organisations. The impact of new skills on career opporhmities are 
discussed in section 8.5.2. 
Further identified benefits of corporatisation for managers included 
opportunities to be involved in the introduction of new management systems 
and organisational change. They considered that involvement in the 
organisational changes from planning and inception to application was 
important because it improved understanding of their roles and where they fit 
within the organisation (sections 5.4.2 and 6.2.3). However these opportunities 
did not eventuate until after the introduction the Managerial Leadership 
Initiative (MLl) in 2000 and even then not all managers wanted to be involved 
in change and consultation was still only when it suited senior management. 
But, this was a positive improvement compared with the pre-corporatisation 
years when senior management planned and implemented organisational and 
role changes without any consultation (section 8.3.3). 
This section has reported the benefits mana&>ers perceived they got from 
the corporatisation of Western Power. These benefits are in general accord with 
the literature (Duncan & Bollard, 1992; Watts, 1996; Zifcak, 1997). However, 
what appears to be missing from their research is closer analysis of the practical 
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benefits that managers perceived they got from corporatisation. The literature 
gives the general impression that managers have benefited significantly in 
many respects from corporatisation and considers that they are better off as a 
result of it. These researchers do not appear to have asked managers what they 
personally thought of the benefits and what it had cost them in return. It is also 
possible that they only concentrated their studies on senior and executive 
management levels which this study has shown gained the most benefits from 
corporatisation through the productivity and efficiency improvements 
delivered by the efforts of managers at the lower levels (section 8.4.3). This 
study shows that managers have gained few benefits from corporatisation 
when balanced against U1e cost to them to gain those benefits. Corporatisation 
has therefore come at a cost for managers in tenns of increased \'rorkloads, 
increased working hours and decreased leisure time. The most significant 
benefit which managers have got from corporatisation is new skills to improve 
their opportunities for horizontal career moves and employment outside of 
Western Power. The next section discusses the managers' perceptions of the 
benefits of corporatisation for Western Power. 
8.4.2 Benefits of corporatisation for the organisation 
Pitkethly (1992), Simmons & Bramble (1996), Jones (1998), Shirley (1999), 
and others all' consider that there were various benefits for Australia's public 
electricity utilities resulting from restructuring and organisational changes 
associated with corporatisation. This study found that Western Power had 
achieved the benefits described in the literature (sections 2.2 and 3.3) which 
included the achievement of policy objectives; the more effective allocation of 
resources and staff reductions; performance level agreements with government 
and between the exP.Cutive and branch managers; rationalisation of union 
representation; financial performance; social accountability; and responsiveness 
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to customer requirements (chapter five and section 6.2.1). 
The achievement of policy objectives benefited Western Power through 
the projection of a conunercially focused, vertically integrated organisation that 
provided signilicant dividends to the state government in the years after 
corporatisation (Western Power Annual Report, 2003). These objectives were 
achieved through organisational restructuring; the setting of perfonnance level 
agreements with government and behveen the executive and branch managers; 
the introduction of new business strategies and management refonn which 
included improved strategic planning; increased financial accountability; 
performance management; customer focus; the continuation of community 
service and other social obligations; and the mainta1-,1ng of a skilled workforce 
that was effectively and efficiently managed (sections 5.4.1, 7.4 and 6.2.1). 
The more effective allocation of resources and staff reductions were an 
important benefit to Western Power. They enabled the organisation to meet 
government performance targets through work force and labour budget 
reductior,s and skill diversification among staff. This was achieved through 
organisational restructuring; resource planning that included staff reductions 
through natural attrition and redundancies; a greater use of contractors and 
contracting out of services, which were not accounted for in labour budgets; the 
increased use of new technology to replace staff; and the introduction of new 
management systems and business strategies that improved business unit 
effectiveness and efficiency (chapters five and seven and section 6.2.1). In 
addition to staff reductions the reduction in union representation from fifteen 
unions to oniy two was also of benefit to Western Power through improved 
utilisation of remaining staff; reduced number of awards and agreements; 
simplified human resource manr.gement procedures; and the greater use of 
individual contracts and certified agreements (section 5.4.1). 
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The increased use of contractors and the contracting out of services was 
found to have assisted Western Power to conduct business with an increasingly 
smaller workforce and to overcome shortages of specialised skills in some areas. 
However, the study suggests that many of the skill shortages were the direct 
result of poorly planned restructuring, poorly administered redundancies and 
the lack of a formal succession plan (seclions 5.4.6 and 7.4). Nevertheless, the 
use of contract labour for the peak-lopping of resource requirements during 
busy periods, i.e., employing conlTact labour when workloads are high, or 
'peaked' and putting them off when work.loads are normalised or low benefited 
Western Power through the avoidance of awards and award conditions. As 
discussed earlier in section 8.3.4 the use of conlTactors had enabled Western 
Power to demonstrate labour productivity and efficiency gains through the 
costing of contractors against materials rather than labour. Contract labour for 
non-core activities was supposed to free key staff to seek new business such as 
unregulated income which was thought by some to be a benefit for Western 
Power. However, the majority of managers were not supportive of the pursuit 
of unregulated income as it had resulted in key skills being used to do the 
unregulated work and forced the managers to recruit contractors to do the core 
work (sections 5.4.6, 6.2.6 & 7.4). 
Social accountability was seen by managers as benefiting Western Power 
because it enabled it to show due diligence in its corporate responsibilities and 
to help government achieve those social responsibilities for which Western 
Power was held accountable. Some of the managers interviewed considered 
the state government viewed Western Power ... ns n large business to /lelp with 
soda/ po/ides a11d slate developmeut (section 5.4.1). Social accountability was 
achieved throi;..;h an increased organisation-wide awareness of environmental 
issues; the adoption of environmental policies and standards; the continuation 
of community service obligations such as supplying power to remote and rural 
areas; the continuation of a uniform tariff policy; the provision of concessions to 
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senior citizens; confonning with requirements of the O:impanies Code and 
payment of corporate taxes; corporate performance reporting; and improved 
employee and public safety (section 5.4.1). 
Section 8.4.2 has presented the findings of what managers considered 
were the benefits of corporatisation for Western Power. The next section 
discusses the managers' perceptions of the benefits of corporatisation for key 
Western Power stakeholders. 
8.4.3 Benefits of corporatisation for key Westem Power stakeholders 
Hill & Hutton (1997), Dunphy & Stace {1998), Felton & Harper (1998), 
Stace & Dunphy (2001), and others hold the broad view that stake holding in the 
electricity supply industry includes everyone who has a 'stake' in how 
electricity is generated, transmitted and distributed. However, they generally 
agree that the important stakeholders include customers, employees, regulators 
and investors, e.g., government. Managers involved in the current study listed 
a similar set of stakeholders which included the state government, i.e., through 
the Minister for Energy; industrial, commercial and domestic customers; other 
government agencies such as the Office of Energy, as a pseudo regulator, 
Treasury and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); competitors; the 
unions; the executive; Western Power managers; and Western Power employees 
(section 5.4.7). Moreover, the managers considered Western Power's ability to 
meet its stakeholders' expectations had improved significantly since 
corporatisation. This was attributed to the greater public awareness of Western 
Power as a corporate body rather tha.'\ just another government agency, to 
brand naming and marketing, and to a greater staff awareness of stakeholders' 
needs. 
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The managers considered that the main benefiting stakeholders were the 
WA state government, industry, commercial customers, and the Western Power 
executive (table 6.4). The literature (King & Maddock, 1996; Walker & Walker, 
2000) shows the main beneficiaries of the corporatisation of electricity utilities 
to be investors, e.g., owner, customers and employees in general. The reason 
for the difference is because the literature views all managers and staff as 
employees and does not distinguish between customer groups. This study, 
however, makes a distinction between the reported benefits of corporatisation 
for the managers, the executive, Western Power employees and their 
representative unions, and domestic, commercial and industrial customers 
(table 6.4). The differences between U1e study findings and the literature are 
discussed further in this section. 
Chapter two and earlier parts of this chapter show that the main benefit 
to the WA state government from U1e corporatisation of Western Power was 
increased dividend payments and the payment of state taxes which were 
previously exempt. For example, payments to government have totalled more 
than $1,046 million since 1995 and were enabled through increaged profits 
(Western Power Annual Report, 2003). The specific changes which increased 
profits included organisational restructuring, staff reductions, productivity and 
efficiency improvements and cost control (section 5.4.2). Furthermore, Western 
Power could increase its profits and hence its dividends to the government and, 
in theor;, provide increased capital for generation improvement and network 
expansion. In practice, however, this was difficult because the government 
restricted Western Power's operating and capital spending and viewed the 
organisation as a source of ready cash to be called upon to 'shore up' budget 
shortfalls (section 5.4.1). Further benefits for the government caine from 
Western Power achieving social and political objectives on its behalf. These 
included containing electricity prices; financing and providing community 
service obligations, uniform tariffs and concessions; demonstrating high 
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standards of employee and public safety and environmental compliance; and 
improving the infrastructure through thR building power stations and lines 
(section 5.4.1). 
Earlier chapters show the main benefits that large and medium 
consumers of electrical energy, i.e., industry and commercial customers, got 
from the corporatisation of Western Power was the partial deregulation of the 
energy market (sections 2.2, 5.4.7 and table 6.15). Although still not fully 
deregulated, it has opened the market to competition in the retail and 
generation sectors for large and medium consumers. Competition has 
improved productivity and efficiency within the WA electricity supply 
industry, but until full deregulation occurs, domestic customers in WA can only 
receive supply from Western Power. Competition has enabled industry and 
commercial customers to negotiate better rates with other suppliers of electrical 
energy (section 2.2). 
A further benefit that industry and commercial customers have got from 
the corporatisation of Western Power has been improved customer service. The 
evidence shows that both the organisation and employees were now more 
commercially focused and had a better understanding of business direction 
(section 5.4.1). Western Power now provides account managers, appointed 
specifically to deal with issues such as supply reliability and rates. 
Corporatisation had also meant that Western Power now has more flexibility to 
negotiate commercial tariffs without first referring to the government. This 
increased flexibility and faster decision-making has been of direct benefit to 
industry and commercial customers. Finally, Western Power now had the 
ability to enter into co-generation partnerships with others to produce and sell 
electricity, the commercial benefits of which would flow on to industrial 
customers {sections 5.4.1 and 7.4). 
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Many managers considered that employees and their representative 
unions were important stakeholders because of the influence they have on 
Western Power's economic performance and Hs ability to meet the demands of 
its key stakeholders. However, in this study the only employees seen to benefit 
the most from the cotporatisation of Western Power were the executive (table 
6.4) and this is not what has been found in the literature (King & Maddock, 
1996; Walker & Walker, 2000) which reported all employees of electricity 
utilities benefited from corporatisation. TI1e reported benefit for the executive 
was a dearer business focus through the setting of agreed performance levels 
with government. As a result, the executive had more control over their 
working lives, business direction and working conditions (section 5.4.1 and 
section 6.2.1). Increased organisational performance since corporatisation had 
also meant improved salaries and bonuses for them (Western Power annual 
reports 1996 - 2003). These are reviewed annually and indexed against 
organisational performance in terms of profit and key performance indicators. 
The reasons managers, employees and unions were not seen to benefit from 
corporatisation are discussed below. 
Managers were considered to be important stakeholders through their 
role in the day-to-day running of the organisation and through the carrying out 
the executive's plans. However, the research shows that managers themselves 
did not consider they had benefited significantly from corporatisation (table 
6.4). This was probably because their reported benefits (section 8.4.1) had come 
at a price in terms of increased workload and working hours. Furthermore, the 
study evidence shows that many management positions were lost as a result 
corporatisation and organisational chmge (section 5.4.2). This resultcrl in 
increased roles, responsibilities and workloads for the remaining managers and 
a flatter organisational structure which reduced tlteir promotional prospects 
(section 5.4.8). Goffee & Sease (1992), Graham (1992), Dunford Bramble and 
Littler (1998), and others reported that similar events and consequences for 
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managers had occurred in other organisations, both in Australia and the United 
Kingdom. 
For other employees, the study evidence suggests that they also 
benefited little from corporatisation. The downside for most employees was 
reduced career paths, increased workload and job insecurity (sections 5.4.8 and 
7.4 & table 6.23). Employee reductions were most heavily borne by trades 
assistants and labourers, but there were also cuts in the numbers of trades' 
people and technical, engineering and administration staff across the 
organisation. King & Maddock (1996), Simmons & Bramble (1996), Jones (1998), 
and others report similar reductions in employee numbers in other Australian 
electricity utilities. Possible benefits for the employees were improved 
communications within the organisation, clearer job roles and business 
direction, perfonnance bonuses, and, for some, improved salaries (section 2.4 
and table 6.4). 
Union rationalisation and loss of representation for many employees had 
also occurred as a result of corporatisation Gones, 1998; King & Maddock, 1996; 
Simmons & Bramble, 1996). Unions representing Western Power employees 
were perceived by the managers to have gained no benefit from corporatisation 
(table 6.4). Union membership had declined since corporatisation in 1995. This 
was due to a loss of direct union representation for managers a<J a result of the 
exclusion of the Association for Professional Electrical Scientific and Mechanical 
Engineers Australia (APESMA) from the 1995 Western Power Award. Since 
corporatisation engineers and industrial chemists within Western Power have 
had to rely on another union, the Australian Services Union (ASU), to give them 
indirect representation in award negotiations. However, although it was 
believed that unions have lost their status in Western Power due to the union 
rationalisation (Cahill 1995) introduced in 1995, they still had an important role 
in the formulation of agreements and award variations between employees and 
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the executive (section 5.4.1). 
This section has reported the benefits that the WA government, industry 
and commercial customers and the executive, as key Western Power 
stakeholders, got from corporatisation. The next section discusses managers' 
perceptions of the impact corporatisation on their quality of working life. 
8.5 IMP ACT OF CORPORATISATION ON QUALITY OF WORKING 
LIFE 
This section addresses the fourth research question which was to 
determine: 
Wliat were 111m111gers' percepHons of tlie impact of corpomHsaHon and 
mnnngement reform of tlie quality of their working life. 
A review of the literature found that quality of working life issues were 
abundantly reported during the 1970's and the 1980's by Walton (1973), Eilon 
(1976), Boisvert (1977), and Levine, Taylor & Davis (1984) and more recently by 
Juuti (1991), Graham {1992), Stace & Dunphy {1997) and Gilgeous {1998). 
However, most of these studies have dealt with the broad aspects of working 
life as it relates to the commwrity in general and there have been few studies 
which sought to explore the impact of change on managers' pe!'ceptions of their 
own working situations. 
The extensive literature search undertaken for this study found no 
Australian reports which dealt specifically with the personal concerns of 
managers and the impact of corporatisation on the quality of their working life. 
In fact, the literahlre search found only two reports which had some application 
for this study. These were recent empirical shldies into the roles and working 
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life of managers within the UK public sector, the private sector and the (former 
public) utilities by Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison {2000) and Worrall & 
Cooper (2000, 2001). They found that managerial work had become more 
intensive due to changes in work systems underpinned by new technology, the 
fragmentation of tasks and the organisational structures in whic\1 they had to 
work 
The impact of corporatisation and management reform on the working 
life of managers is discussed in this section from both a subjective and objective 
perspective as described by Levine, Taylor & Davis (1984). This section is 
arranged into four parts which address the four most important working life 
issues for managers reported by Eilon (1976), Juuti {1991), Stewart (1992) and 
Worrall & Cooper (2001). The first discusses the changes to managers' working 
conditions as a result of corporatisation. The second cont:aiJ.15 a discussion of 
the way managers' skill requirements have changed as a result of 
corporatisation. The third discusses managers' perceptions of their workloads 
since corporatisation. Finally, the fourth part includes a discussion of 
managers' perceptions of leadership as a responsibility for them and the impact 
this has had on their working life. 
8.5.1 Working conditions 
The literature shows that the managers' working conditions, and hence 
their job satisfaction (Mc Kenna, 1999, 170), are enhanced by empowerment, i.e., 
making decisions and being accountable for those decisions (Stace & Dunphy, 
1997, 175; Waddell et al., 2004, 556). However, Gilgeous (1998), who studied 
the quality of working life for manufacturing managers, found that for 
empowerment to be effective it must be clearly communicated from further up 
the organisational hierarchy (p.178). The researcher believes it is possible for 
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the hierarchy to withdraw empowerment in the same way as it can bestow it, 
although it would be expected that the withdrawal of empowerment would be 
done very subtly in order not to arouse the ire of the managers. The evidence 
suggests that the withdrawal of empowerment commenced at Western Power 
under the guise of improved management leadership in 2000 (section 7.4). 
Managers' motivation and job satisfaction had increased since 
corporatisation, however, there were indications that since 2000 management 
empowerment had decreased and roles had become blurred. There was general 
agreement that managers had been more empowered and had greater authority 
and accountability since corporatisation in 1995 and up to around 2000. This 
had resulted in increased job satisfaction and motivation and had also clarified 
their roles and provided them with more flexibility to manage key stakeholders 
and to address important employee issues {section 5.4.8 and table 6.23). 
However, the evidence from chapter seven suggests that this changed with the 
introduction of the Managerial Leadership Initiative {MLI) in 2000. Managers 
were now less empowered, less motivated and more confused over their roles 
because of imposed limits and the enforcement of procedures which they 
considered were restrictive and bureaucratic (section 7.4). Empowerment in 
Western Power has also been examined in section 8.3.4 above and is consid~;-ec! 
by the researcher to be an important issue for further investigation if'. chapi:er 
nine. 
The reasons for the return to rules administration is unclear, however, 
the evidence from the follow-up interviews suggests that some senior managers 
were using the MLI as an excuse to introduce a more authoritarian approach as 
an instrument to apply further cost controls and performance improvements 
and to improve their own positions. This may be a reflection of a desire for 
minimalist management structures for managing large numbers of contractors 
instead of permanent employees. Such structures would rely heavily on the 
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standardisation of work and rigid procedures underpinned by an 
internationally accepted quality control system in order to be commercially 
viable. By comparison, Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison (2000) and 
Worrall & Cooper (2000, 2001) found that the levels of empowerment for 
managers in the UK had also reduced over the five-year period of their 
research. TIUs was particularly so at the lower levels of management in former 
public utilities. Manag..,rial styles within the former utilities were now 
considered to be more authoritarian, centralised, reactive, secretive and 
vacillating than their public and private sector counterparts. Furthermore, 
Worrall & Cooper (2001) identified what they term huge differences in the 
perceptions and attitudes of senior and junior managers and expressed concern 
that these differences appear to have become wider over the five year period of 
their research (p.111). TI1ey propose that this was because managers at the 
higher levels of the hierarchy, while enjoying increased empowerment 
themselves, were not passing down appropriate authority and empowerment to 
those below them. This could be happening within Western Power, however, 
there was no data to support this hypothesis. It is considered in chapter nine 
for future research. 
Around half of the managers participating in the study thought that 
corporatisation had improved internal networks. This was due to a greater 
focus by managers on intemal and external customers and improved ability to 
meet the expectations of priority stakeholders (section 5.4.7 and table 6.13). 
Those managers who indicated that corporatisation had hindered internal 
networks blamed their increased workload for compelling them to deal 
predominantly with those who would help achieve their business objectives. In 
contrast, there was general agreement tl1at the pursuit of unregulated income 
had increased external networks both within Australia and overseas. Managers 
now had a much broader business base and dealt with a wider range of 
potential clients and customers, so there were now different players in the 
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market and new rules. 
However, not all the managers were enthusiastic about external 
networking. A few expressed concern about the tendency towards an over-
concentration on networking and external relationships in order to increase 
commercial activity. They thought that the pursuit of unregulated income 
could be at the expense of the time and effort that was required of the managers 
to effectively manage staff. However, such thinking is contradicted in the 
literatur,? where both internal and external networking has been reported by 
Sease anc'. Goffee (1989, 90), Dunphy & Griffiths (1998, 156, 160) and McKenna 
(1999, 2W) to be an important component of mentoring which adds new skills 
and learning to the organisation. Because of this, networking has been closely 
linked to· careers and is becoming less organisationally confined due to wider 
markets. The study evidence suggests that, while not all managers had the time 
to be involved with external networking, most considered it would be of benefit 
to them through improved stakeholder relationships (sections 5.4.8 and 7.4). 
For the managers, corporatisation included satisfying the needs of 
priority stakeholders who were business and community groups, 
manufacturers and their representatives, consultants and service providers and 
local government and industry organisations. Furthermore, the study evidence 
suggests increased involvement by senior managers in joint forums, steering 
committees and industry groups in order to identify potential customers, 
partners and alliances, that is, potential stakeholders (sections 5.4.8 and 7.4). 
Whenever the opportunity presented, the senior managers were now to create 
strategic alliances with external business partners and conduct open book 
accounting with vendors. This had not been done prior to corporatisation, 
however, with the partial deregulation of the electricity industry which 
followed some years later and increased competition for customers it was 
necessary to establish closer working relationships with other generators and 
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suppliers of services both in Australia and abroad. Wheeler & Sillanpaa (1997, 
101), McKcnna (1999, 228), Stace & Dunphy (2001, 264), and others have 
reported that increased competition and market globalisation have generally 
been the drivers for corporations to restructure and undertake strategic 
alliances and business partnerships with suppliers. Managers played an 
increasingly important role in these partnerships. Titis was also the case for 
Western Power. 
Managers reported that their remuneration had improved significantly 
since corporatisation because management contracts were now linked to 
performance targets which most managers considered were reasonable and 
achievable. Furthermore, there was general satisfaction with bonuses Umt had 
been paid as part of the performance incentive scheme. However, some 
expressed concern that management contracts were generic and inflexible and 
that it was very difficult to negotiate anything different from the standard 
format. This was despite them having limited ability to negotiate certain 
aspects of their roles, performance targets and levels of authority with their 
senior manager. Some also held concerns about their employment security 
because of a 'sunset clause' in their contracts which gave them no guarantee of 
renewal (section 5.4.8). Nevertheless, there was strong support for the use of 
contracts and the management of performance through TEAM which was seen 
to improve communication and trust between the managers and their 
supervisors. In fact, it was generally thought that this was largely responsible 
for the improved relationships between the managers and their supervisors, 
their peers, and their subordinate staff (table 6.13). This finding is generally 
supported by the literatur,:,. For example, a study of remuneration and reward 
was conducted on managers from the former public utilities in the United 
Kingdom by Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Ja.nilion (2000) where it was reported 
that remuneration and reward had improved significantly for managers after 
the utilities were initially corporatised and later privatised. Similar 
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observations were reported by Duncan & Bollard (1992) for the corporatisation 
and evenhla\ privatisation of New Zealand's public electricity utilities (p.32). 
However, the current study also found that for some managers there had been 
no improvement in remuneration since corporatisation even though there had 
been a significant increase in their workload. This is discussed in section 8.5.3 
which examines workload as a working life issue for managers. 
Safety and employment conditions had also improved since 
corporatisation according to participants in this study. This was due to the 
strong focus that the executive had placed on safety and employee weUare 
which had been promoted as the number-one Leadership Principle (Western 
Pcw.1er Leadership Principles, 1995) and the corporation's number one priority. 
However, it is likely that this would have occurred irrespective of 
corporatisation due to the increased attention by government agencies and 
unions on health and safety matters and the economic and social benefits from 
reducing workplace incidents (Kearney et al., 1998). Other employment 
conditions such as equal opportunity and diversity have occurred as a result of 
legislative requirements (Taylor, Easter, & Hegney, 2001). 
There was some concern over problems with physical working 
conditions, particularly with reduced workspace and open-plan office 
arrangements that had been introduced with the successive restructuring. The 
rationalisation of office space was to reduce accommodation costs. For 
example, a!Umugh Western Power owns the head office building, it apportions 
rent, air-conditioning and lighting costs to each business unit according to the 
amount of floor space used. As a result, the new working arrangements had 
significantly reduced the available work area for the managers, their staff and 
contractors and had resulted in cramped conditions and unnecessary clutter of 
files and furniture (section 5.4.8). Some managers reported that such conditions 
were stressful for them, especially when dealing with staff issues and other 
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private management business in an open office area where they had no privacy 
(section 7.4). However, Graham (1992) supports the open plan office 
arrangement. In his study of the impact of Total Quality Management (TQM) 
on the working life for employees in the UK, Graham argues that office 
accommodation should meet employees' needs of safety, pleasant work 
environment and be supportive of involvement and commitment, and that 
open-plan offices achieve this. Graham also contends that if these conditions 
are met by the organisation, then managers and staff will adapt to them over 
time. 11,e researcher considers this to be an important issue for future study 
and is discussed further in chapter nine. 
For some of the managers, corporatisation had also meant increased 
personal stress which they mostly attributed to more responsibilities and 
greater workload, longer working hours and decreased leisure time (sections 
5.4.8 and 6.2.6). Other stresses included fears over job security, learning new 
skills and the adoption of new performance targets. The evidence further 
suggests that managers' found conducting perfonnance reviews and 
confronting poor performing staff to be stressful because of the lack of 
appropriate people skills (sections 5.4.2 and 7.4). The literature shows that 
personal stress relating to both subjective and objective working conditions 
(Levine et al., 1984) is not confined to managers in the electricity supply 
industry. Managers in general face the same stressors regardless of the 
industry they work in. Toohey (1994) reports stress as a general concept in the 
workplace and considered kry stressors to be organisational change; 
restructuring; redeployment and redundancies; increased responsibilities; 
financial accountability; technological change and performance appraisal 
(Toohey, 1994, 429). Sease & Coffee (1989) have shown that for many managers 
in the UK, private-life issues relating to working long hours along with career 
challenges, low skill levels and the threat to job security were factors whir.h 
increased stress levels and impacted on the quality of working life (Sease & 
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Goffee, 1989, 25). The Western Power situation therefore reflects experiences 
already reported in the UK. The impact of corporatisation on skills, workload 
and leadership are discussed in the following parts of section 8.5. 
8.5.2 Skills 
The skills that the managers acquired through the introduction of 
corporatisation and management reform, and their perceptions of the impact of 
those skill changes have been covered in previous sections of this chapter (8.3.4 
and 8.4.1). 1his part discus~ managers' perceptions of the way in which their 
skill requirements changed as a result of corporatisation .. 
The most significant changes in the managers' skill requirements were 
due to the change of focus from engineering to commercial and technology. 
Highly skilled technical managers were obliged lo be business managers and 
leaders first and engineers last. The evidence shows that a loss of teclmical 
skills was reported for all levels of management and that these were mainly 
replaced through the increas!!d use of contractors (sections 5.4.2 and 7.4 & table 
6.13). These findings of skill conversion and technical downsizing are in 
general agreement with the changes reported to have occurred in the United 
Kingdom by Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison (2000) and Worrall & 
Cooper (2000, 2001). They found that restructuring and organisational change 
had severely undermined the skill base of the former public utility managers. 
Similar to the UK experiences, key technical skills were lost from Western 
Power through the reappointment of teclmkal-managers to the roles of 
commercial managers. Key skills were also lost as a result of senior 
management reducing staff costs through redundancies, delayering and 
downsizing. AB a result, many positions were left vacant or replaced with 
contractors (section 5.4.6 and table 6.3). 
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Western Power managers considered it was in their best interests to 
acquire new skills aligned with business requirements and to actively pursue a 
good commercial outcome for Western Power, which also meant their 
remuneration improved. The new skills therefore had a positive impact on the 
n1anagers' career opportunities despite the fact that the organisational structure 
haJ flattened leaving fewer promotional opportunities. The new skills had 
given the managers greater opportunities for horizontal career development 
and to participate in many different projects within the organisation, and had 
improved their prospects of employment outside Western Power should they 
seek it (sections 5.4.8, 7.4 and tables 6.20 & 6.21). By comparison, the UK 
studies also found that while restructuring and organisational change had 
resulted in remuneration improvements for the former public utility managers, 
it had actually reduced their career opportunities and chances of further 
promotion because of flatter structures and fewer senior positions (Ebadan & 
Winstanley, 1997; Worrall et al., 2000; Worrall & Cooper, 2000, 2001). It is 
probable that the managers in this study viewed their career opportunities 
more favourably than their UK counterparts had because of the wider career 
choices available to them through Western Power remaining vertically 
integrated. For example, Western Power offers careers in engineering, 
technology, business, finance and administration and information teclmology. 
However, the experiences from the UK and this study are similar in that the 
traditional vertical career paths for managers have been significantly reduced. 
The evidence from stage three of tl1is research indicates a decline in 
loyalty and motivation, but it is too early to determine if this is a general trend 
or a result of resistance to the introduction to ML], or other iruiovations. If there 
is a trend toward declining motivation and loyalty then it would be consistent 
with the UK studies by Worrall, Cooper & Campbel!-Jamison (2000) and 
Worrall & Cooper (2000, 2001). They found that managers' loyalty, morale and 
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motivation had significantly reduced over the past five years as a result of 
organisational restructuring. However, this was not evident for Western Power 
in stages one and two of the research. Also, the researcher's own extensive (30 
year) experience within the organisation and a previously unpublished study 
into culture change and its effect on Western Power employees {Lehmann, 
1997) indicates that there has been generally strong loyalty and motivation 
among Western Power managers and staff since corporatisation. Furthermore, 
the high level of participation (85.4%) in and the general reception given lo this 
shldy suggests camaraderie and organisational commitment based on a strong 
and sustained culture change program and common corporate goals which 
were developed during the culture change workshops. Senge (1992) views such 
activity as organisational learning. In discussing the theory of the learning 
organisation, Senge explains that motivation has more to do with a continual 
expansion of an individual's capabilities, rather than just the performance of 
tasks {Senge, 1992, 340). McKenna (1999) takes this idea further and claims that, 
in order to achieve personal mastery, the individual seeks confidence and skills 
and for this needs goals (p.179). Levine et al (1984) explain that working 
conditions can be arranged so that managers will be motivated towards the 
achievement of organisational goals, which in tum will enable them to obtain 
outcomes that they themselves value (p.81). 
Organisations proclaim their goals through mission statements. Western 
Power's mission statement ... lo be tire lendi11g energi; supplier business i11 Australin 
by 1998 (Western Power Internal Publication, 1995) was developed during the 
FOCUS workshops and has been periodically modified to reflect the strategic 
direction tl1at the executive want the organisation to take. For the individual 
manager, their goals are their performance targets and in order to achieve these 
targets the managers have sought the required skills (table 6.21). In return for 
the achievement of performance targets the managers are rewarded, for 
example, through increased remuneration and bonuses. The managers' beliefs 
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that the organisation will reward them for good perfom,ance can therefore be 
explained in the context of organisational loyalty .15 a psychological contract 
with implicit beliefs about reciprocal obligations between employees and 
employers (Brooks & Harfield, 2000, 93). Therefore, the research demonstrates 
the view that motivation and loyalty had increased for Western Power 
managers as a result of corporatisation. 
This section has shown that there are a number of similarities between 
Western Power and UK organisations. Both have experienced significant 
changes to managers' roles, the loss of technical skills and management 
positions and the greater use of contractors, often to replace lost teclmical skills. 
For Western Power managers, this has meant seeking new skills for their new 
roles. Managers' remuneration had improved, but the prospects for promotion 
were significantly reduced in both cases. While career opportunities had 
significantly reduced for managers in UK organisations, Western Power 
managers still had opportunities for horizontal career moves. Finally, 
organisational restructuring had meant significant reductions in loyalty, morale 
and motivation among managers in UK organisations, whereas these had 
actually increased among Western Power managers prior to the ML! in 2000, 
the evidence suggests a possibility that these were in decline since. 
8.5.3 Workload 
This section discusses the evidence relating to how the changes resulting 
from corporatisation have affected managers' workloads. 
Overall, the managers claimed to have experienced moderately increased 
workloads due to increased responsibilities, increased accountability, staff 
shortages, and, in some instances skill shortages. The amount of work they 
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took home had also increased (section 5.4.2 and table 6.23). These findings are 
in general agreement with studies conducted in the United Kingdom into 
organisational change and its effects on managers. Worrall, Cooper & 
Campbell-Jamison (2000), for example, found that m<1I1agers' workloads had 
also increased over the five-year period of the study and that tl1e increases were 
mainly due to increased accountability, additional responsibilities for staff, staff 
shortages and lack of skills. Similar findings had been reporred by Dopson & 
Stewart (1990), Keen & Vickerstaff {1997) in the United Kingdom and in 
Australia by Dunford, Bramble & Littler (1998). 
Managers were concerned over increased working hours as they had a 
detrimental effect on their leisure time and their time with their families, but 
they felt compelled to work extra hours because of their fear of job security. 
They agreed that increased working hours and the corresponding impact on 
their quality of working life was unacceptable (section 7.4). A few even claimed 
that they would seek alternative employment if the situation did not improve. 
These findings were in general agreement with those reported in a five-year 
tracking study by Worrall & Cooper (2001). They found that the majority of the 
managers from former public utilities had reported that they regularly worked 
more than their contract hours and although they didn't want to work these 
extra hours they felt they had to through fear of job security. Furthermore, 
many managers had reported that they were concerned about the adverse 
effects that f.'xtra working hours was having on their health, their well-being, 
their relationships with tl1eir partners and children, and their involvement with 
social and community institutions outside work (p.112). 
There was general agreement that leadership issues and people 
management were most responsible for the increased workload. Managers 
indicated in the follow-up interviews that they now spent time on employee 
issues that had previously been the responsibility of human resource specialists. 
361 
lb.is issue was explored in detail in section 8.3. Increases in managers' 
workloads were generally proportional to the number of staff reporting to 
them. For example, managers were now required to set performance targets, to 
review performance and provide feedback, to manage and review training 
requirements, and to provide counselling for all their staff (section 5.4.2). 
However, the survey data produced conflicting results showing that, except for 
FOCUS and :MIM510, all of the management systems and business strategies 
introduced since corporatisation had moderately decreased managers' 
workloads (table 6.22). 
The probable explanation for this contradiction is that the suivey 
question (table 6.22) asked managers to indicate the impact of new management 
systems and business strategies on their workload over the past five years. 
However, it is likely that not all smvey respondents were involved in the 
introduction of the new management systems to the extent that they would 
have increased their workload. For example, around one-third of the 
respondents were not in a management position at the time Western Power was 
corporatised (table 6.1) and may have joined or moved into management level 
after corporatisation. Furthermore, for many respondents the new systems 
would constitute a large portion of what they actually do or what they lx!lieved 
they are supposed to do, hence they would not necessarily consider this work 
to increase their workload. For example, roles had shifted from engineer.g. 
which few of the new management systems supported, to commercialisjition, 
which all of the management systems supported. Also, the performance targets 
linked to the new systems would make the associated work appear as 'normal' 
rather than as an increase in their workload. Therefore, it is likely that some 
managers may have viewed the management systems as part of their normal 
work and may not have attributed any workload increases to them. Evidence 
from Prowse (1989, 117), Duncan & Bollard (1992, 81) and Hales & Mustapha 
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(2000, 22) also support this view. This literature shows that managers give 
priority to achieving performance targets in order to improve their 
remuneration, and therefore focus mainly on those activities to which the 
targets are linked, seeing them as normal workload rather than additional 
workload. 
The concentration on the achievement of targets that are rewarded is a 
contentious issue. Western Power managers are appointed under contracts for 
which salary increments and bonuses are dependent on performance reviews. 
The study evidence shows that most managers saw this as a good thing and 
focused the majority of their attention on work that was linked to performance 
targets in order to improve their remuneration. However, some work was 
neglected as a result. There were some managers who considered personal 
achievement to be a matter of integrity and saw themselves as giving their best 
performance regardless of targets (section 5.4.8). The literature is both critical 
and supportive of this type of management practice. Considine (1988) criticises 
what he terms the 'managerialist approach' which only rewards managers for 
achieving output targets while failing to identify important issues such as rule 
conformity, error avoidance and attention to detail (p.7). While the evidence 
shows that Western Power rewards managers for achieving output targets, the 
evidence also suggests that increased formalism and proceduralism introduced 
since the MLI had addressed the issues of rule conformity, error avoidance and 
attention to detail identified by Considine (1988). In support of performance 
rewards, Shirley (1999) argues that without suitable incentives, managers will 
not be strongly motivated to achieve performance targets, and penalties for 
poor performance are seldom applied (p.123). Of importance for explaining 
managers' approaches to performance targets in Western Power is Shirley's 
cl~ that managers will use their knowledge of the fim, to negotiate soft 
targ~ts that were easy for them to reach (Shirley, 1999, 125). This also happened 
in Western Power. Managers' had reported they had negotiated targets which 
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were well within their capabilities and easily achieved. In many instances, the 
targets were no more than milestones in their core work. 
8.5.4 Leadership 
This section reports managers' perceptions of leadership as an 
accountability and its impact on their working life. The literature views 
leadership and management as two separate concepts which are interlinked 
and interdependent (McKenna, 1999, 315; Waddell et al., 2004, 536). Managers 
of Western Power were expected to be both managers and leaders, but 
participants in the study agreed tl1at leadership issues had grown in importance 
within Western Power in response to increased government and community 
expectations ru,d increased business competition. 
With the introdu.:tion of the Managerial Leadership Initiative (MLI) in 
2000, managers' roles included new people systems which were meant to help 
tl1em to focus more on leadership issues. One example is the Fair Treatment 
System which is a c:umbination of the Diversity and Equal Opportunity policies 
within the organisation. Other employee issues that managers were now 
responsible for included staff recruitment and retention; staff succession 
planning; staff career planning, I.Taming. coaching and mentoring; staff 
administration; health and safety; and counselling (sections 5.4.2 and 7.4 & table 
6.23). However, managers reported that while the training in the MU 
principles was adequate, it had been left to them to either learn these new roles 
on the job or arrange their own training. The study evidence shows that with 
the increased focus on leadership issues, the managers were also responsible for 
the development of role relationships and role responsibilities between their 
supervisors, peers and staff, and were accountable for those role relationships 
and responsibilities (section 7.4 and table 6.11). Titls resulted in improved 
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productivity and efficiency through staff being more focused, more capable and 
more motivated to do their work with minimal supervision. Therefore, 
managers supported the introduction of a leadership approach and agreed that 
it was needed for business improvement and that there were benefits in it for 
them. For example, improved skills and job security, and remuneration and 
bonuses through the achievement of personal and business unit performance 
targets which were linked to the MU principles. However, the study also 
showed that taking on a leadership role did increase managers' workloads, 
working hours and responsibilities and also forced them to seek new skills 
(sections 5.4.8 and 7.4 & table 6.21). Finally, while managers' leadership skills 
had improved in terms of increased attention to employee matters and role 
relationships, it is too early to determine if they will permanently adopt the MU 
principles, or whether work pressures will force them to discard the MU 
sometime in the future. This is an issue for future research and is discussed in 
chapter nine. 
Similar changes have been reported in the literature by Keen & 
Vickerstaff (1997) who report the extent to which management practice has 
changed as a consequence of the introduction of new rnanagerialism into the 
UK Postal Service. Managers in that organisation were now responsible for 
human resource policies and practices such as providing training, encouraging 
staff to adopt new working practices and implementing performance appraisal 
and pay systems to meet increasingly rigorous performance targets. These are 
the same as the new responsibilities reported for Western Power managers. 
Similarly, Lawler & Heam (1995), Dunford, Bramble & Littler (1998), Hales & 
Mustapha (2000) and others have reported greater leadership roles for 
managers due to a more managerialist approach to management and 
organisational restructuring. Once again the Western Power situation has been 
experienced elsewhere in similar large corporations. 
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8.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter eight has synthesised and discussed the research findings from 
chapters five, six and seven with reference to the analytical framework and 
theory and literature presented in chapters two and three. TI1e study validity 
has been enhanced through this approach and the research data provides a base 
upon which future research may be structured. In most instances U1ere was 
agreement between the findings from the three data sources and the generally 
accepted views reported in the literature. A probable reason for the differences 
between the literature and the findings reported for this study is the 
methodological approach U1e study has taken in reporting managers' 
perceptions and experiences of corporatisation and management reform as it 
applied to them. That is, while the ideology and publicly reported benefits of 
corporatisation of public utilities are well documented, the perceived practical 
benefits and limitations from the perspe<'tive of the working manager are not. 
Consequently, this study has identified important gaps in tl1e literature and 
provided empirical data which doses those gaps and increases the knowledge 
in the field of management policy and practice within the electricity supply 
industry spe<'ifically, and public sector organisations in general. 
This study found that managers below senior level, and other employees 
of Western Power, gained few of the benefits from corporatisation that had 
been reported for their counterparts in other utilities and industries both in 
Australia and overseas. Senior management gained most benefits, because of 
the productivity and efficiency improvements delivered by the efforts of 
managers. Apart from new skills acquisition, which the managers mostly 
arranged for themselves, what benefits they did gain from the corporatisation 
of Western Power were at the discretion of senior management. Most of the 
reported benefits for Western Power managers had come at a cost to them in 
366 
terms of increased workload and stress, longer working hours, and decreased 
job security and leisure time; factors which decreased the perceived quality of 
their working lives. The findings from this chapter inform chapter nine which 
presents the study implications for the electricity industry and management 
policy and practice, and recommendatioll5 for future research in relevant fields 
such as public management and change management. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDA'ITONS 
9.1 JNTRODUCTION 
The study is both different and significant. It addresses the gaps in the 
literature on managerial experiences and practices in an essential industry -
power generation and distribution. It provides insights into what the managers 
think about U1eir personal experiences of corporatisation and management 
reform over an extended implementation period. Managers are defined for the 
purposes of this investigation as those agents who plan, organise, direct and 
control an organisation, branch or business unit on the owners behalf. 
This chapter revisits the research themes and objectives that were set for 
the study in chapter one and reviews the contribution each chapter has made to 
addressing the research questions. It uses the conclusions from the synthesis 
and discussion of the research data and questions in chapter eight to pteser.~ the 
implications of this study for the electricity industry, for manarrement policy 
and pnictice and to provide recommendations for future research. Findings 
include the reassertion of an authoritarian approach to managing. the continued 
prevalence of top down communication, the Joss of key skills through the 
increased use of contractors, and the limited participation of managers in 
strategic planning. 
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Chapter one 
Chapter one introduces the practical and theoretical context in which this 
study was undertaken, highlights the significance of the study, describes the 
case selection and study limitations and presents the study objectives. The 
chapter identifies a wide variety of literature about corporatisation, thr. 
conceptions of which vary in keeping with party political doctrines on the form 
and scope of marketisation within the public sector at state and national level. 
Tiie three tiers of key literature relevant for this study are shown 
diagrammatically in table 9.1. 
Table 9.1. 
TI1ree tiers of literature on public policy, public management and 
corporatisation 
CONTEXT 
High·fovcl idc"Ologic,,1 dt•bate by politid,,ns, 
ocadm,ics ,,nd businc.,;s Writer.; about 
rnrporatis.,tfon and th" n,._,J for it as an 
irc,lTUn1ent for reforming Auslr,1li.t's "le<ctri<:ity 
supply i,,duslry. 
Dm.1<l ac,1dcmk and busines.s pcr>pe<tiws uf 
corporatLs.1tion ,ind mnn,igemc,il reforrn 
including the vit'l\'S of mon.1ger.; in different 
ront,,,t,; and ag,.,.cies including utilitit'S. 
Lin1i1<_od ruport,_,J flndiiigs on spcdfk experier.<L>s 
uf nrganis.1timul change withlrcuttlities 
trans~,i,;,J into U,e working lives, pm<tiws ,1rnl 
o,p,,rit'l1C<°S of manageTS. 
KEY LITGRA 1URE 
(Cautt>gic, 19"';Cunsi,lil1c & Painter, 1997; Dcvcson, 
1997;0ixon & Kouzrnin, 199-l;Dunphy & G1ilhUts, 
1998;Hilm~r, 1993; Hyman, 1995; King & ~foddock, 
1996; Maddock. 1993: Pilkcthlv, 1992: Prowac, 1989; 
QuiggU1 & Spochr, 1998:Sly & WcigolL, 1992; 
Wil~shir~.1937) 
(Duncan & Bol~ird, 1992; Dunford eta I .. 1991!; 
Dunph;• & Griffith_,, 1998; Jones, 1998; Sirnmo,cs & 
Bramble, 1'.l96;Spriggs, 1'l97;SL,co & Dunphy, 1997; 
Sb>warl, 1992; Wis<>,2002; Wood &Jones, 1993) 
(Worrall ~t aL, 2000; Womlll & Cooper, WJO, 2001) 
(U'hn,ann, 200! • w1publlshed thesis). 
These often encompass various forms of deregulation, competition and 
cost efficiency, with corporatisation or a similar appronch, to move key sectors 
of state and national bureaucracies on to a more commercial footing. Also well 
reported is organisational change, management reform and changes to 
managers' roles as a result of corporatisation and similar commercialisation 
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processes. TI1e Australian and inte;11ational literature presented also reports 
the broad academic, government, and business media views of corporatisation 
and associated change management processes drawing on interviews and 
surveys covering managers in different agencies, includirn power utilities. 
However, there is very limited reportage on how operational managers 
experience far reaching change (through corporatisation) over an extended time 
period. Equally, few of these studies offer both a macro and micro level 
perspective in one study. This work combines an essentially ethnographkal 
qualitative and a quantitative approach drawing on interpretist elements to 
provide broad practical insights into 130 managers' views of change of 
management practices over a seven-year period. Specifically, it caphlres their 
voices, opinions and understandings about the rationale for corpor.:.tisation and 
management reform as it presents to them. Those changes which are effective 
and beneficial to managers, the organisation and key stakeholders are identified 
through the exploration of the experiences of the people given the task of 
implementing and promoting change. Finally, the manager's direct experience 
of far reaching, longitudinal changes and reported impacts on their roles and 
working lives provide valuable insights and lessons which can be used to 
inform future public policy and management practice. 
The practical context and importance of this study is highlighted in 
chapter one through a description of Australia's electricity supply industry and 
the management problems which were considered by many academics and 
business writers to be the reasons for its perceived poor performance. The 
electricity supply industry is described as a major contributor to the Australian 
economy. However, chapter one points out that it has been plagued by 
accusations of poor management performance and industry-wide inefficiencies 
resulting in a disproportionately high cost of electricity. As a result electricity 
utility reform has been high on the agenda of national and state governments 
from the early 1980's and throughout the 1990's. Macro and micro economic 
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refonns driven by significant government sponsored reports were considered 
cent.Tai to Australia's efforts to improve its economic position. Underpinning 
this orthodoxy was the call for managerial responsibilities and incentives for 
managers of public utilities to be redefined, so that they are in accord with the 
government's objectives. 
The theoretical basis for this study arises from the debate on micro 
economic reform which engendeted an important shift in discourse from public 
adminiStration to public management. It inlToduced managerialism, as 
management reform described as a flexible, market-based form of public 
management that emphasised goal setting, planning and the measurement of 
results (Bradley & Parker, 2001; Considine & Painter, 1997; Kearney et al., 1998; 
Reynoldson, 1999). The concept of managcrialism as an ideological argument 
for reform and change in public utilities is discussed in detail in chapter three. 
However, chapter one points out that this study is not a detailed pursuit of the 
theories and principles of managerialism, it focuses on the corporatisation 
process in a large power utility which reflected some of the managerialist ideas 
and principles explored in the broader literature. 
Chapter one describes the introduction of managerialism to the whole 
eleclTicity supply industry in Australia in the early 1990's as 'management 
reform' or 'corporate management' through a process known as 
corporatisation. With corporatisation, individual state governments retained 
ownership of their enterprises and operated them under the companies code 
with a board of directors appointed by the government to make policy 
decisions. Critical components of corporatisation and management reform are 
deregulation, competition and commercialisation and in order to achieve these, 
managers have been compelled to restructure their business units and 
introduce changes to their management systems (Dunford et al., 1998; Walker & 
Walker, 2000). The outcome of such change saw managers given the 
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responsibility for inlToducing and implementing broad organisational and 
management system changes, which were previously unfamiliar to the 
electricity utilities and to the managers. Since the initial corporatisation and 
management reform push in the early 1990's, organisational and management 
change has progressed unabated and continues into the twenty-first century. 
The case selection for this study is noted in chapter one as an in-depth 
rather than an industry-wide study which focuses only on managers within 
Western Australia's public electricity utility, Western Power. The choice of 
Western Power as a research site was presented as both meU10dologically 
defensible and practical. Western Power is the third largest state utility of six in 
customer terms and covers the largest geographical area. Western Power was 
typical of the other Australian state utilities and was among the last of 
Australia's state public eleclTicity supply utilities to be corporatised. The 
process was informed through precedents established by its Eastern states 
counterparts which prior to corporatisation had been vertically integrated 
government agencies run along public-sector lines with very similar enabling 
legislation and organisational and reporting structures (Booth, 2000; Harris, 
1991; McCarrey, 1993; Walker & Walker, 2000). The practical rationale for using 
Western Power was given as access, time, distance and cost. Western Power is 
situated on the west coast of Australia and is quite remote from its counterparts 
on the eastern seaboard. Furthermore, the fact that the researcher has worked 
for the study organisation for more than 30 years and was able to cany out 
participant observation, interview staff and access data was posited as strengU1 
for an in-depth study of the managerial experience and corporatisation. 
Chaptef one presents four lines of inquiry which present a new 
perspective on the changing roles and experiences of managers in the 
Australian electricity supply industry. These focus on the roles and quality of 
working life of managers, and particularly the impact of structural and system 
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changes resulting from the broad refonn agenda of corporatisation and 
management change, driven to some degree through an ideological shift by 
governments in United Kingdom, (1980's and 1990's), and Australia and New 
Zealand, (1990's), towards increased commercialisation in the public sector. 
The research questions which have been the focus of U1is study are: 
1. Whnt are 111m111gers' u11derstm1di11gs of the rntio1111/e for the corporntisntim1 of 
Wes/em Austrnlin's public e/ectridti; supply utility? 
2. \!Vlml nre the sig11iftcn11I clumges to 11m1111gers' roles and how lmve tlwse c/11111ges 
impacled 011 tlzeir roles wil/ii11 Western Austrnlia's electricity supply i11dustn; 
as II res11/t of corporntisntiou and 111111111geme11t reform? 
3. \!Vlmt are m111111gers' perceptiol!S of the be11efits for themselves, for tile 
org1mis11tio11, 1111d for kt.'Y Westeru Power slnkelwlders from corporntisation? 
4. \!Vlw/ are 111111mgers' perceptio11s of the impact of corpomtisntio11 111111 
111111111ge111e11t reform on tire quality of tl1dr working life? 
The methodology for obtaining the research data to answer the study 
questions is described in chapter four. Any questions of significance beyond 
the scope of this study are addressed later in this chapter as reconunendations 
for future research. 
Chapter two 
Chapter two provides a confluence of important secondary data drawn 
from Western Power documentation and the researcher's personal experiences 
and observations from both within the study organisation and the electricity 
supply industry in general. It introduces the macro level changes that have 
occurred within each of Australia's State and Territory utilities during U1e 
period 1990 to 2003 and demonstrates the similarities of the changes which each 
utility underwent, but at different times. Chapter two also provides a review of 
the Australian and overseas research which informs this study as well as 
demonstrating the gaps in the literature which this study addresses. Macro and 
micro-level changes that have occurred within Western Power are dealt with in 
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detail to introduce the system changes that managers found themselves 
responsible for. Finally, chapter two introduces the analytical framework 
which defin':,:, the boundaries of the literahlre search in chapter three in terms 
of the rel<>.tionship between the theory driving the public electricity utility 
reform agenda and the consequential changes to the managers' roles and 
working life. It identifies the key lines of inquiry for this study from which the 
research questions are developed. The analytical framework also informs the 
research approach elaborated on in chapter four, the preliminary interview 
questions in chapter five and provides a focus for the data analysis and 
synthesis in later chapters. 
Chapter three 
Chapter three reviews the literature pertaining lo the social and 
ideological considerations underpinning the reform ar,endas of Australia's state 
governments when restruchlring and corporatising their electricity utilities. 
The chapter notes that from the early 1990's, Australia's public electricity 
supply utilities underwent similar structural and management refonns to those 
previously undertaken in electricity utilities in the United Kingdom, the United 
States, New Zealand and elsewhere. Chapter three suggests, however, that 
what is not so well documented are studies into the impact of those significant 
structural and system changes on the roles and working life of managers in 
Australian public electricity utilities. This study addresses these gaps in the 
literature. 
The literahlre described in chapter three embodies broad domains such 
as economics, public policy, management theory and change management in 
order to build an analytical base for a practical understanding of the 
phenomenon of corporatisation and management reform in the Australian 
electricity supply industry generally, and the impact on the role and working 
life of managers specifically. In order to do that chapter three is divided into 
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three important literature themes. The first section identifies the macro issues 
for reforming Australia's public electricity utilities. It examines the arguments 
in the literature that support economic reform of the public sector as a catalyst 
for change within the electricity supply industry. Section one also explores the 
literature pertaining to the ideological debate over managerialism and 
corporatisation which were adopted by both the state and federal government 
as agendas for electricity utility reform. Key components of the reform agendas 
included the issues of ownership, importance, size and structure of utilities, and 
the necessary management reforms to deliver on expectations of productivity 
and e:onomic performance improvements which were seen as precursors to 
competition and deregulation. 
The second part of chapter three identifies the key drivers for 
management reform within Australia's public electricity utilities. It explores 
the theory which describes the social ru1d ideological considerations for 
corporatisalion in terms of organisational ownership and management 
performance; the social responsibility of the corporation and its managers; the 
government and managers as utility maximisers; and the influence of 
stakeholders on the organisation and its managers. Section two also examines 
the literature pertaining to outsourcing and contracting out, financial 
performance, strategic planning, customer focus, and culture change as it .. 
relates to the corporatised utility and those who manage its day-to-day 
operations. 
Finally, the third part of chapter three examines the literature and theo1 y 
relative to the micro level refonns ur,dP~taken by the newly formed 
corporations in an attempt to transform management thinking and performance 
from public sector style management to the new managerialist style. 
Specifically, it reviews the micro policy issues which impact on the role of 
managers, their quality of working life in the electricity supply industry and the 
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benefits to them resulting from corporatisation and management reform. 
Chapter four 
Chapter four describes the research procedures and the methodology to 
be applied for analysing the data. It establishes a research framework which is 
a diagrammatic display of the research method, from data collection and 
analysis, to synthesis of findings and discussion, and presentation of study 
implications and recommendations. The issues of importance for managers 
which were identified in the analytical framework (chapter two) are used in 
chapter four to develop the interview and survey questions. Chapter four notes 
that data gathering for this study consists of three stages. The first stage 
involves both an in-depth review of secondary data relative to the electricity 
supply industry in general and the study site specifically and preliminary open-
ended interviews wi~h 20 managers. The interviews addressed gaps in the 
literature and infonned the questionnaire survey applied in stage two. 
Findings from the preliminary interviews were also triangulated and 
synthesised with findings from the other two research stages in chapter eight. 
Stage two of the data gathering consisls of a pilot survey and a ~ 
questionnaire survey, ~dministered to the whole target population of 130 
managers. The third and final stage of data gathering consists of follow-up 
focused interviews with 16 managers to validate findings and enable further 
exploration and analysis of important themes that emerge from stages one and 
two. 
Chapter five 
Chapter five presents the results and the analysis of the preliminary 
interviews which represents the primary data for stage one of the research. The 
secondary data is provided by chapters two and three. The findings from 
chapter five were used to inform the questionnaire survey and provided data 
for triangulation and synthesis in chapter eight. 
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Chaple~ six 
Chapter six presents the results and the analysis of the questionnaire 
survey which represents stage two of the data gathering. Issues that required 
further investigation informed the questions for the follow-up interviews 
cond1:1cted in stage three of the research. Findings from the questionnaire 
survey were synthesised in chapter eight. 
Chapter seven 
Chapter seven presents the results and analysis of the follow-up 
interviews which represents stage three of the data gathering. The findings 
from the follow-up interviews were triangulated and synthesised in chapter 
~ight with the findings from the previous research stages. 
Chapter eight 
Chapter eight triangulates and synthesises the theory and literahlre 
identified in the analytical framework with managers' perceptions and practices 
in order to make sense of management system change and its impacts on 
managers. The study validity is enhanced through this approach and in most 
instances there is agreement between the findings from the three data sources 
and the generally accepted views reported in the literature. Where there is not 
agreement hoWever, is between the ideological benefits for managers from the 
corporatisation of public utilities reported in the literature, and the practical 
benefits reported in this study. Chapter eight shows that managers and 
employees of Western Power have personally gained few of the benefits from 
corporatisation that have been reported for their counterparts in other utilities 
and industries both in Australia and overseas. In fact, the only significant 
benefit for managers was new skills which improVed their opportunities for 
horizontal career moves, for example, gaining commercial skills enabled 
engineer-managers to seek alternative careers in retail and marketing. But, such 
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moves only exist while Western Power remains a vertically integrated 
organisation. Apart from their new skills, which were often acquired through 
personal initiatives to address competency gaps and do the job effectively, 
benefits obtained by managers were largely at the discretion of senior 
management. It was the senior managers and executive tiers which were 
identified by the respondents as having gained the most from corporatisation 
because of the productivity and efficiency improvements delivered by the 
efforts of the operational managers below them. Moreover, the benefits crune at 
a cost to the managers in terms of increased workload, working hours and 
stress and, decreased job security and leisure time. Differences between the 
dominant ideas in the literahlre and the findings reported for this study can be 
partly attributed to a methodology heavily focused on investigating managers' 
perceptions of corporatisation and management reform as experienced in a day 
to day operational sense. Other studies reviewed concentrated primarily on 
senior and executive management levels - the strata identified in this thesis as 
having most to gain from corporatisation. 
As such, findings from chapter eight are used in this chapter to inform 
the implications for the electricity industry and management policy and 
practice, and recommendations for future research in relevant fields such as 
public management and change management. 
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9.2 ThfPLICATIONS FOR THE ELECTRICTfY INDUSTRY 
The findings from the research data and the study conclusions in chapter 
eight are considered to make an important contTibution towards expanding the 
body of knowledge relating to corporatisation and management reform with 
particular implications for management practice within the electricity industry. 
For example, the study found evidence of the reassertion of an authoritarian 
approach to managing which appeared to contradict the espoused commitment 
to empowerment, performance improvement, and localised management 
accountability (key tenets of managerialism). This served to locate the key 
nexus of power in the senior management strata. Such moves to reduce 
managers' authority, entrepreneurial license and innovative or risk-taking 
behaviour has significant implications for management practice within 
electricity utilities in general. As the study suggests, managers' motivation, 
loyalty and morale are reliant on the psychological contracts (Brooks & 
Harfield, 2000) which define the boundaries of trust and accountability between 
themselves and their supervisors. The majority of managers within electricity 
utilities self identify as committed professionals and as this study revealed, 
view the manager's role as one requiring a high level of integrity when acting in 
the job and as an agent of the organisation. This study considers that low levels 
of empowerment and unnecessary bureaucratic intervention is not an 
appropriate working environment for professionals and will have negative 
long-term consequences for the organisation. For ~xample, managers may 
reluctantly comply with bureaucratic procedures and present for work, but 
contribute little to the organisation through a lack of motivation and low 
morale. Others may leave the organisation, further contributing to the loss of 
important skills that was reported in this study. 
A possible reason for a move toward a more authoritarian approach to 
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managing may be the Western Power executive team's reaction to increasing 
attention by the regulator for the utility to comply with regulatory standards for 
public safety, service and supply. The executive may view strict processes and 
procedures, with limited scope for entrepreneurialism and innovation, as a 
method of ensuring compliance. However, this study considers that such an 
approach will reduce the organisation's responsiveness to problems and could 
see many managers waiting for instructions, rather than implementing 
solutions. The study considers a more applicable method for ensuring that the 
utility meets its social obligations would be through improved training 
methods and appropriate levels of empowerment. This would ensure 
managers' have the necessary skills and authority to perform their expected 
roles. 
Titc study found that with managers' new roles came the need for them 
to acquire new skills. However it was mostly left to managers to either learn 
their new skills on the job or to organise their own training. The study 
recommends that all change programs include an adequate provision for the 
training of managers and their staff to acceptable levels of competency prior to 
the changes being implemented. Furthermore, the training should be regularly 
reviewed throughout the implementation period. 
The communication of change was shown in this study to have 
improved in the years since corporatisation, but it is still essentially top down 
and involves little consultation with levels below senior management. This has 
resulted in confusion and a general lack of interest by managers in some of the 
changes and may have contributed to the lack of role clarity discussed above. 
Therefore, in order to avoid misunderstandings and ensure managers take 
ownership of change, this study proposes that they should be involved at all 
stages of the change. It follows that there is an opportunity for the electricity 
industry to ensure two-way communication is encouraged and culturally 
380 
accepted. Both th-:! managers and the organisation will benefit from knowledge 
sharing. dearer understanding of roles and improved effectiveness and 
efficiency of change programs. 
The loss of key skills and their replacement with contractors has serious 
implications for the study organisation and the electricity industty as a whole. 
The study considers that the reliance on contractors to provide vital expertise 
has the potential to cause serious problems during times of natural or rnan-
made disasters. Contractors will offer services to the highest bidder or those 
with whom they are contractually obliged (McLeod, 1999). This could leave the 
electricity utilities without the necessary skills to recover from disaster in what 
should be the optimum time. Critics of managerialism (Hood & Jackson, 1992) 
have warned of this. This study reiterates that warning and recommends 
caution in the application of the managerialist doctrine of using contractors to 
do work which is considered more suited to the private sector. 
The study questions the rationale of using contractors to do core work 
within the utility while it contracts out its own scarce resources to do work for 
other organisations. This creates a situation where any profits made from such 
activities are used to pay contractors employed to do the work of those 
pursuing the unregulated work. It is proposed that besides the impact of 
unregulated work, there are insufficient skilled resources within the utility to 
meet internal needs forcing it to use contractors to overcome this shortage. This 
study recommends unregulated work should only be pursued using excess 
resources and contractors. It also recommends that in order to reduce internal 
skill shortages and reliance on contractors the organisation should establish 
succession planning with dearly defined career management plans and training 
programs that address specific skill shortages (sections 3.3.5, 5.4.6, 7.4 and 
8.3.4). 
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Finally, the study found that strategic planning was an important 
management system which provided managers with a dear business direction 
and a sense of purpose. Howevtr, the evidence suggests that not all managers 
were involved with it for various reasons, ranging from not wanting to be 
involved to not being asked to be involved. This study recommends that 
strategic planning should directly involve managers at all levels within the 
organisation and participation in it should be an accountability for them. 
-, 
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9.3 IM:PLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE 
This study recognises that a I'flOVe toward a more authoritarian approach 
to managing may be an emerging new management trend in utilities that 
argues in support of the intensification of managerial work through larger 
structures and fewer managers. In addition to the possibilities described 
earlier, this could see managers responsible for increasingly more staff or 
managing large numbers of contractors instead of permanent employees. It is 
possible that if the trend continues and spreads to other utilities and 
organisations, it could have implications for management policy and practice 
and herald new inquiry in terms of how management issues are defined, 
analysed, debated and implemented in the public domain. It could, for 
example, signal a shift in emphasis from a predominantly managerialist style of 
managing which concentrates on accountability for results through measurable 
outcomes, to a more bureaucratic method of managing that emphasises process 
accountability through a reliance on rules, procedures and standards. This 
would be a move b1tck to the previous era before corporatisation. As discussed 
above this may be a response to increased attention by government agencies 
such as Energy Safety and the Environmental Protection Authority for greater 
corporate accountability for issues of public and environmental safety and 
quality of supply. It is also possible that threats of litigation by aggrieved 
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customers has resulted in insurers applying pressure to the executive for 
network performance improvements. However, the author considers that 
moves to a more authoritarian approach to managing is also an outcome of an 
ongoing policy of new public management in Australia maintaining the 
emphasis on cost-cutting, increased efficiency, reductions in management 
numbers and increased use of contractors. TI1erefore, it may not necessarily be 
a change in the application of managerialism as an administrative doctrine for 
public utilities, but rather the desire to intensify managers' effort, while at the 
same time compensating for any lack of management and leadership skills 
through reliance on rigid procedures and the standardisation of work. 
Agency theory, which played an important role in developing the policy 
framework underpinning corporatisation (Boston et al., 1997), views managers 
as utility maximisers who will pursue self-interests ahead of the interests of 
others. This was the case for Western Power, where managers at all levels have 
concentrated on increasing their remuneration and bonuses through the 
achievement of performance targets, which has Jed to other important work 
being neglected. Critics of managel'ialism (Considine, 1988; Mulgan, 1995; 
Yeabnan, 1998) see this over concern with outcomes and the neglecting of how 
they are achieved as a weakness in the model. Supporters of managerialism 
(Boston et al., 1997) argue that such actions have no place in corporatised 
utilities and it is within the power of the principle (owner) to correct such 
problems through contractual arrangements with the managers. However, tl1e 
author considers there is a problem with this thinking when applied to public 
utilities. It is not the owner (government) who directly negotiates performance 
contracts with the managers, it is the executive, who are also motivated to 
maximise remuneration and bonuses. This study shows that problems exist 
with aligning the owner's requirements for the organisation with the objectives 
of the managers' tasked with its day-to-day running. A possible solution may 
lie with the increased application of strategic planning at all levels of 
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milllagement (section 9.2) and the tighter linking of management contracts with 
the administration and outcomes of those plillls. If nothing else, the outcome 
would at least see all milllagers focusing on the same corporate objectives. 
9.4 RECOMl'vfENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Role clarity is an important issue for managers, but attempts to improve 
it within Western Power appears to have had mixed success with only half 
reporting that U1eir roles were clearer now than before corporatisation. It is 
possible that role clarity will improve over time, but the evidence suggests that 
regular restructuring will only cause further confusion and perpetuate the 
problem. This study recommends annual reviews of roles, role relationships 
and accountabilities between senior managers, line managers and key 
stakeholders to identify and correct any gaps in understanding. 
The study recommends further investigation both within Western 
Power, other utilities and industry in general of the trend toward a more 
authoritarian management style and reduced empowerment identified in this 
study and reported for organi,;atior.s in the United Kingdom (Hoggett, 1994; 
Keen & Vickerstaff, 1997; Worrall et al., 2000; Worrall & Cooper, 20GO, 2001). It 
does not appear to have been widely reported in Australian organisations and 
less for public utilities. The return to authoritarian management is (prima fade) 
contrary to the managerialist principles "'lhich underpin management reform of 
Australia's public electricity utilities. Therefore, any moves back to the 
bureaucratic public service management methods is of concern for the study 
organisation and the electricity industry as a whok. Jt puts in jeopardy the 
complex management relationships which exist within organisations such as 
1-!a.lities and is therefore worthy of further attention. 
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Managers' loyalty, morale and motivation has significantly reduced over 
the past five years in the United Kingdom as a result of organisational 
restructuring and increased bureaucracy (Worrall et al., 2000; Worrall & 
Cooper, 2000, 2001). For Western Power, indications are that managers' 
motivation has lessened since 2000, but there is insufficient evidence from this 
study to be certain if this trend will continue. The demotivation may be linked 
to the reported increase in bureaucracy or it may be Jinked to increased 
workload, roles and responsibilities that resulted from the ML!, or all of these. 
It is recommended tl1at furtl1er studies are conducted to determine if this is an 
emerging trend within Australia's utilities and industry in general. If there is a 
trend toward declining motivation and loyalty then there is consistency with 
the UK studies. 
\iVhile, there appears to have been much general literature about stress 
and factors which promote it, there is an opportunity to further explore 
managers' personal perceptions of work space and how it impacts on them 
(sections 5.4.8, 7.4 and 8.5.1). Therefore, this study recommends further 
research within the electricity supply industry specifically, and organisations in 
general, of the connection between open plan office areas and reported 
increased levels of personal stress for managers. It is further recommended that 
the findings of Gralwn (1992), who supports open plan office arrangements 
and believes that managers and staff will adapt to them over time, are tested in 
the context of new and emerging technology and mar.agement pr.ictke within 
tl1e electricity supply industry. 
Finally, this study shows that taking on a more leadership role did 
increase managers' workloads, working hours and responsibilities and forced 
them to seek new skills. However, the study was unable to determine if 
managers will permanently adopt their new leadership roles or whether work 
pressures will see them discard these sometime in the future. This presents an 
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opportunity for future research. Therefore, this study recommends further 
research into the impact of leadership as a management accountability on the 
' 
role of the manager in the electricity supply industry specifically, and industry 
in general. 
9.5 POST SCRIPT 
At the time of this study Western Power was the only remaining state-
owned vertically integrated electricity utility in Australia. Not long after stage 
three of the research was completed (April 2003), tl1e Western Australian state 
government announced plans to disaggregate Western Power into four separate 
corporations; networks, generation, retail, and regional. The legislation to 
enable this was to be introduced into the 2004 sitting of state parliament. 
However, the government abandoned its plans prior to the sitting of parliament 
when it realised it could not get the support it needed in the upper house. No 
doubt disaggregation will re-emerge as an issue for the state government after 
state elections, due around Januaiy 2005. 
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APPENDIX 1 
DEFINmONS OF KEY CONCEPTS 
Commercialisation 
Defined by Dixon and Kouzmin (1994) as the levying of user charges 
reflecting. to varying degrees, the economic cost of providing goods and 
services (p.60). They contend that commercialisation within the public sector at 
all levels of government are becoming common-place. McCarrey (1993) states 
that commercialisation is an administrative reform that embraces all principles 
of corporatisation except the emphasis on competitive neutrality (p.22). Twohill 
(1989) describes commercialisation as an attempt by government to recover 
costs of services or goods (user pays), to reduce losses (e.g. reduce subsidies), or 
increase profits (p.4). Harman (1993) believes that commercialisation is often 
confused in public debate with corporatisation (p.9). He claims that 
co111mercialisatic111 is tlie process of setting clear commercial objectives for public 
e11terp1ise and at t/Je same time e11sun·11g that it is not i11 a privileged position relative to 
its private sector competitors for tire achieve111e11t of its commerdal performance 
indicators (Harman, 1993a, 9). 
Competitive Neutrality 
Competitive neutrality is defined by McCarrey (1993) as the provision of 
a level regulatory playing field for government trading enterprises (GfE's) and 
competing, or potentially completing, private enterprises (p.18). McCarrey 
contends that government trading enterprises experience advantages and 
disadvantages relative to private sector firms. Advantages include, tax 
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exemptions, government guarantees for borrowings and monopoly powers. 
Disadvantages include the provision of community service obligations and lack 
of flexibility within the budgeting system. The aim of competitive neutrality is 
to promote greater accountability and efficiency in the allocation of resources 
(McCarrey, 1993, 18). 
Corporatisation 
Defined by Shirley (1999) as efforts to make state owned enterprises 
(SOE's) operate as if they were private £inns facing a competitive market or, if 
monopolies, efficient regulation. The definition not only includes incorporating 
SOE's under the same commercial laws as private finns, but also placing them 
on a level playing field with private firms by removing barriers to entry, 
subsidies and special privileges. This forces SOE's to compete for finance on an 
equal basis with private firms, and gives state managers virtually the same 
powers and incentives as private managers (Shirley, 1999, 115). Twohill (1989) 
believes that central to any 'definition' is the concept and belief by many that 
private corporations, large privately owned companies, are always more 
efficient than public enterprises or public service departments (p.4). Many 
academic and management writers argue that the public sector should imitate 
the organisational structures, the power relations between boss and workers, 
and the profit motive of the private sector (Deane, 1989; Hilmer, 1993; 
McCarrey, 1993; Pitkethly, 1992; Twohill, 1989). This, Twohill claims, leads to 
public sector enterprises being restructured as one hundred percent 
government owned companies, operating under the companies code and with a 
Board of Directors appointed by the government to make 'policy' decisions 
(Twohill, 1989, 4). Harman (1993) sees the role of the Board of a corporatised 
utility as one of looking after the long-term interests of the state, leaving 
managers responsible for day-to-day operations free of political interference 
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(p.9). Further, the board has direct accountability to Parliament and must table 
annual reports (Harman, 1993a, 9). Corporatisation is discussed further in 
chapter three. 
Deregulation 
Many academic and management writers see deregulation of the 
electricity industry as a process of opening up government owned and 
controlled electric utilities to competition (Deane, 1989; Harman, 1993a; Hilmer, 
1993; Hyman, 1995; Maddock, 1993). They consider it is part of an evolution in 
the energy marketplace and is generally the precursor to privatisation. Eiszele 
(1999) on the other hand contends that deregulation does not necessarily mean 
privatisation, but is central to Australia's efforts to improve its economic 
position. 
Economic Rationalism 
Stace and Dunphy (2001) describe economic rationalism as a philosophy 
that gives priority to economic goals, advocates a market economy and 
relegates social goals to a position of lesser importance, Accordingly, they 
argue, the firm should concentrate on maximising value for its shareholders 
and not be deflected into pursuing a broader range of objectives (Stace & 
Dunphy, 2001, 13). Considine and Painter (1997) argue that economic 
rationalism was introduced to the public sector in an attempt to replace the 
legal and procedural framework of classical Weberian bureaucracy, said to 
emphasise legal rationality and bureaucratic work (p.80). They further argue 
that economic rationalism was used by governments to influence the 
m!lllagement of producer organisations (of capital invesbnent and labour 
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markets) in order to use the output as a form of social and economic 
intetvention (Considine & Painter, 1997, 80). 
FOCUS was an acronym for Focus on Organisational Change 
Understanding and Skills. It was introduced by Focused Change International 
as a cultural change program into Western Power between January 1995 and 
May 1997. It was claimed that the purpose of FOCUS was, To create a core of 
cultural ambasS11dors wlw are people of iufl11ence across the company and will: 
1. Visibly model new leadership and cultural behaviours consistent 
with accomplishment of values, vision/mission and SRA's. 
2. Influence others to demonstrate the same behaviour. 
3. Present a high energy, non segmented, visible example of our 
cross boundary company of the future (Widdis & Davis-Goff, 
1995). 
Managerialism 
Yeatman (1987) describes managerialism as a fusion of economic 
rationalism with the technocratic or insbumental approach to financial 
management. Considine and Painter (1997) claim that managerialism is a term 
given to a flexible, market-based form of public management through the use of 
management techniques and organisational strategies, previously confined to 
the private sector. That is, a change from the bureaucratic, rigid, hierarchical 
form of public administration (p.77). They contend that although num11geri11lism 
is now tire widely used term emploiJed to describe all tire organisational clumges 
achieved in tire public sector siuce 1979, it is neither an elegant 11or an exact descriptio11 
(Considine & Painter, 1997, 2). Considine (1988) claims managerialism elevates 
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economic rationality to primary status in the public sector, and emphasises goal 
setting, planning and measurement of results. He furthet' argues, that 
managerialism as an ideology is committed to four key management concepts: 
the product format, autocratic instrumentalism, systems integration, and 
purposive action (Considine, 1988, 7). Reynoldson (1999) states that corporate 
management is an umbrella term that is often applied to managerialist 
techniques, examples of which include corporate planning. program budgeting, 
devolved management and the measurement of performance.(Reynoldson, 
1999). Managerialism is discussed further in chapter three. 
Privatisation 
Defined by Shirley (1999) as the sale of state owned assets. In the case of 
public electricity utilities, the company is no longer state-owned when 
management control, measured as the right to appoint the managers and board 
of directors, passes to private sharehold~rs (p.115). Thus, privatisation is the 
transfer of public assets, enterprises, seivices and functions to the private sector 
(Nagarajan, 1994, 155; Twohill, 1989, 3). Similarly, Wiltshire (1987) claims that 
privatisation is an all embracing term for several actions, all of which shift 
activity from the so-called public sector to the private sector (p.19). 
Public Sector Reform 
Public sector reform means clear identification of the objectives of public 
sector activity, recognition and understanding of the diversity of clients and 
accountabilities, and development of a range of techniques to suit specific needs 
of particular agencies and activities (Labour Research Centre Inc, 1990, 5). 
Harris (1991), arguing in the context of reforming public electricity utilities, 
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contends that managerial reform, or corporatisation, is a form of management 
change which seeks to improve the performance of public elecbidty utilities by 
creating improved incentives for efficient management and a more neutral 
operating environment between utilities and private sector enterprises (p.53). 
Further, managerial reform includes policies to improve management 
productivity and efficiency by placing utilities on a more commercial footing. 
This involves providing greater autonomy to managers, but making them more 
accountable for their utilities' performance. Harris claims these reforms have 
resulted in the development of corporate strategies and business plans, flatter 
management struchlres, greater delegation of responsibility, establishment of 
performance targets and improved budgetary procedures (Harris, 1991, 26). 
Quality of Working Life 
Walton (1973) claims that in recent years the phrase 'quality of working 
life' has been used with increasing frequency to describe certain environmental 
and humanistic values. These, he claims, have been neglected by indusbialised 
society in favour of technological advancement, industrial productivity, and 
economic growth (p.11). This seems to suggest that different people have 
different perspectives as to what makes for a high quality of working life. The 
OECD defines the quality of working life as the possibility to work 
continuously. The definition is divided into objective work conditions, such as 
pay, hours of work, holidays, physical working conditions, technology, etc; and 
subjective work conditions, such as job satisfaction, attitudes towardS the 
organisation and supervisors (OECD, 1977). This definition is used in this 
study. 
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Roles of managers 
Defining the role of managers, or what managers are supposed to do, is 
not easy according to Burnes (1996). Burnes claims an examination of the role 
of managers will show there is a discrepancy between what the literature says 
managers should do and what managers actually do (Burnes, 1996, 346). 
Mintzberg (1996) defines the manager as a person in charge of an organisation 
or one of its units (p.23). In so doing. he describes the manager as performing a 
set of management functions, or roles, with the person at the centre. This 
approach, claims Mintzberg. provides each manager with a frame of reference 
for interpreting the job in its context. Accordingly, the frame determines the 
activities which a manager concentrates on and schedules time to deal with 
(Mintzberg, 1996, 23). Hales (1986) claims the extent of a managers 
involvement in these activities will depend on the kind of organisation the 
manager works for, the type of job the manager has, and most importantly the 
manager's level in the organisation's hierarchy. Hales and Mustapha (2000) 
take this further, and draw a distinction between managers roles, in terms of 
what they are expected to do, their work activities, what they actually did. 
They claim managerial roles are seen as a construct of the role expectations of 
others and the role perceptions and interpretations of the managers themselves 
(Hales & Mustapha, 2000, 6). 
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APPENDIX 2 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION 1 
11,is section relates to your 1111dersta11di11g of tlte ratio,ur/e for i11trodud11g 
corporatisaH011 mid 111a1rageme11t refom1 witl,ill Westeni Power and t1te bet1efits 
for specific stakeholders. 
1 
2 
3 
3.1 
32 
3.3 
3.4 
35 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
3.9 
3.10 
3.11 
Were you working as a manager or section head when Western Power became 
cor ratised J=ua 1995? Tickonebor. 
Yes No 
01 02 
What i5 the average branch or section s~ you have been head of since January 
1995? Tick one box. 
1srnill 
1
(0- 25 people) 
Cl 
Medium 
(26- 50 
people) 
02 
Large Comments 
(more than 50) 
What do you believe were the four main reasons for introducing 
corpor11tisation and management reform into Western Pmver? Tick 4 boxc5. 
Competition 01 
Competitive Neutrality (creating a level 
°' playing field) 
Deregulation 01 
Productivity/ Efficiency Gains 01 
Increased Returns to Government 01 
Commerdulisation (Business Development) 01 Comments 
Energy Indusl:ry Reform 01 
Improved Financial Accountability 01 
Greater Maru,gerial Autonomy o, 
Organisational Downsizing 01 
Future Privatisation 01 
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' 
How much benefit do you believe the following got from the corporatisation of 
Western Power? 
Tick one bor far eac/1 part of l!iis qr1eslio11. 
No Benefit Very Little Don't Know Some Benefit Significant 
Benefit Benefit 
4.1 Domestic Cl 02 03 04 05 
Customers 
4.2 Commercial DI 02 03 04 05 
Customers 
4.3 Industry Dl 02 03 04 05 
4.4 Unions 01 02 03 04 05 
4.5 Regulators 01 02 03 04 05 
<6 WA State 01 02 03 04 05 
Government 
4.7 Western Power Cl 02 03 04 05 
as a Business 
4.8 Your Branch or Cl 02 03 04 05 
Section 
4.9 Western Power 01 02 03 04 05 
Executive 
4.10 West,,mPower 01 02 0 3 0 4 0 5 
Managers 
4.11 Western Power 0 1 D 2 0 3 04 0 5 
Employe<es 
4,12 Yourself 0 1 02 0 3 0 4 05 
4.13 Supplforsof Dl 02 03 04 C5 
Services to 
Western Power 
4.14 Business 01 02 03 04 05 
Competitors 
5 What do you believe are top management's' three main reasons for ongoing 
management system changes within Wesl:cm Power? Tick 3 of I/re six boxes. 
5.1 Response to Market 0 1 5.4 Following Fads 01 
Changes 
52 Business Advantage 0 1 5.5 Survival of Western Power as a D 1 
{competitive positioning) Vertically Integrated Business 
5.3 Continuouslmprovement O 1 5.6 Political Direction 0 1 
Comments: 
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SECTION 2 
TI1is section relates to tlie cowm1micatio11 of ma11agemet1t system cl11mges witliin 
Westem Power. 
6 How effectively were the following management system changesoommunicated to 
you? Tick one bo:r for each part of 11,is question. 
Totally Largely Don't Largely Totai!y 
Ineffective Ineffective Know Effective Effective 
6.1 FOCUS 01 02 03 
°' 
OS 
6.2 Managerial Leadership 01 02 03 
°' 
OS 
Initiative (MU) 
63 Change Management 01 02 03 
" 
OS 
6.4 Transformation 01 02 03 04 OS 
6.5 Strategic Planning 01 02 03 04 OS 
.. TEAM 01 02 03 
°' °' 
6.2 srnss 01 02 03 
°' 
OS 
6.8 Service Level Agreements D 1 02 03 
°' 
OS 
(SLA's) 
6.9 Shareholder Value 01 02 03 ,. OS 
Adding (SVA) 
6.10 MIMS 01 02 03 
°' 
05 
6.11 Customer Focus 01 02 03 
°' 
05 
6.12 Commercialisation 01 02 03 
°' 
05 
(Business Development) 
6.13 Financial Accountability 01 02 03 
°' 
05 
6.14 New Technology (in 01 02 03 
°' 
OS 
general) 
' 
How dear is your understanding of your role as manager or section head tockoy 
comnared to seven earsa<>o? Tickmwbox. 
Much Less Clear Somewhat No Change 
1:mewhat l~uch Ocarer I Le550ear Clearer 01 02 03 04 OS 
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SECTION 3 
Tliis section relates to your involvement iJJ t11e introduction of new mmmge111e11t 
systeins wit11in Western Power. 
8 To what extent were you involved with the introduction of new management systems 
within Western Power' Tick 011e l,o;r 
Not Involved at Limited Don't Know Involved Highly Involved 
,u Involvement 
C1 
" 
,J3 
°' 
cs 
9 In what ways were you involved with the introduction of new management systems 
within Western Power? Tick 011e l,o;r, 
9.1 Participated in the o 1 
Planning 
9.2 Participated in the o 1 
Implementation 
9.3 Other Please 
specify: ................................... . 
10 How important is It for you to be involved in the planning and implementation of 
new management systems and initiatives within Western Power? Ticko,ie box. 
Unimportant Of Minor Moderately Quite Important Very important 
Importance !mporlant 
01 02 03 04 05 
Comments: 
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SECTION 4 
Tliis sectio11 relates to yo11r perceptions of tlte impactof ne.w ,nanagemrnt systems 011 
yo11r role as ma11ager or sectio111Jead witl1i11 Western Power. 
11 What has been the impact of the following management system changes on your role 
as manager or section head? Tick 01w bo:c for each parl of 1/Jis question. 
Largely ISlightly Neither Slightly Largely 
Negative Negative Negative Positive Positive 
Impact llmpact o, lmpad Impact 
Positive 
Im-ad 
11.1 FOCUS 02 03 05 
112 Managerial Leadership 02 
°' 
04 05 
Initiative {MLI) 
11.3 Change Management 0, 03 04 05·;, 
11.4 Organisational Restructure 02 03 04 05 
(e.g. Trmsformation) 
11.5 Strah!gic Planning 02 03 04 05 
11.6 TEAM 02 03 04 05 
11.7 smss 02 03 04 05 
11, Service Level Agreements 02 03 04 05 
(SLA's) 
11.9 Shareholder Value Adding 02 03 04 05 
(SVA) 
11.10 MIMS 02 03 04 05 
11.11 Customer Focus 02 03 04 05 
11.12 Commercialisation (Business 02 03 04 05 
Development) 
11.13 Financial Accountability 02 03 04 05 
11.14 New Technology (in general) D 1 02 03 04 05 
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12 How important today are the following managellll!Ilt systems in supporting the 
achievement of your performance targets? Tick one bax for eacll pnrl of this q11eslio11. 
Unimportant OfLitt:le Neutral Important v,e; 
Im ""~ lm rtent 121 FOCUS Cl 02 03 04 05 
12.2 Managerial Cl C2 03 04 05 
Leadership Initiative 
(MLij 
12.3 Change Management 01 02 03 04 05 
124 Organisational 01 02 03 04 05 
Resb"ucture (e.g. 
Transformation) 
12.5 Strategic Planning 01 02 03 04 05 
12.6 TEAM 01 02 03 04 05 
127 smss 01 02 03 04 05 
"' 
Seivice Level 01 02 03 04 05 
Agreements (SLA's) 
12.9 Shareholder Value 01 02 03 04 05 
Adding(SVA) 
12.10 MIMS 01 02 03 04 OS 
1211 Customer Focus 01 02 03 04 05 
12.12 Commercialisation 01 02 03 04 05 
(Business 
Development) 
12.13 Financial 01 02 03 04 05 
Accountability 
12.14 New Technology (in 01 02 03 04 05 
general) 
Please comment on tho.e you consider to be important or very important and why? 
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" 
What has been the impact of new management systems and organisational change on 
the following? Tick 01,e box f(JJ' each part of 1/Jis question. 
Largely Slightly Neither Slightly Largely 
Negative Negative Negative Positive Positive 
Impact Im pad o, Impact Impact 
Positive 
Im act 
13.1 Your Internal Nehvorks 01 CZ C3 
" 
05 
13.2 Your External Networks 01 02 03 04 05 
13.3 Your Relationship With 01 01 
" 
C4 05 
Your Supervisor (GM or 
Executive) 
13.4 Your Relationships With 01 01 03 o, 05 
Your Peers 
13.5 Your Relationships With 01 02 03 04 05 
Your Subordinate Staff 
13.6 Your Relationships With 01 02 03 04 05 
Colleagues Outside Work 
13.7 Your Ability to get 01 01 03 04 05 
Subordinate Staff to Meet 
Business Unit Targets. 
13.8 Your Ability to Meet the 01 02 03 04 05 
Expectations of Your 
Priority Stakeholders 
13.9 Ongoing Development of 01 02 03 04 05 
Your Technical Skills 
13.10 Your Ability to Apply 01 02 03 04 05 
Your Tedmical Skills 
13.11 Ongoing Development of 01 02 03 o• 05 
Your Commercial Skills 
13.12 Your Ability to Apply 01 02 03 04 05 
Your Commercial Skills 
Comments: .............................................................................................................. 
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SECTION 5 
T11is part relates to your perceptions of stakeholders and tlie i11fluena t11eiJ may lsave 
on Westen1 Power and your role as a manager or section /1ead. 
14 In your opinion which of the following stakeholders significantly influenced Western 
Power's business plnns and bud gels, prior to and followingcorporatisalion? 
Tick one box for pre-1995 and one box for post-1995 for enc/1 pnrl of this q11eslia,1. 
Significant Influence Significant Influence 
Pre- 1995 Post-1995 
YES INO YES INO 
14.l State Government 01 C2 03 
(Minister) 
14.2 Treasury 01 02 03 04 
140 Office of Energy 01 02 03 04 
14.4 Industry Groups 01 02 03 04 
14.5 Domeslic Customers 01 o, 03 04 
14.6 Commercial Customers 01 02 03 04 
14.7 Compelitors 01 02 03 04 
14.8 Employees 01 02 03 04 
14.9 Contractors 01 02 03 04 
Commenls: 
15 Having the WA Government (Minish!r) as the sole shareholder in Western Power is: 
Tick onc box. 
A Very A Minor Neither a A Minor A Very Significant 
Significant Disadvantage to Disadvantage Advantage to Advantage to 
Disadvantage Western Power or Advantage Western Wesl£mPower 
to Western to Western Power 
Power Power 
01 C2 03 04 05 
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SECilON 6 
171is part relates to yo11r opi11io11 ofl1ow tl1e introd11ctio11 of 11ew msmageme11t systems 
a11d correspo11dittg org1111isatio,111l c1umges llave affected your worki11g life over tl1e 
past seven years. 
16 Since 1995 what influence have changes toyourwork conditions had on your 
performance as a manager or section head? Tick 01Je box 
Largely Slightly Neither Slightly Largely Positive 
Negative Negative Negative or Positive Influence 
Influence Influence Positive Influence 
Influence 
o, 02 03 C4 05 
17 How would you rate your employment with Western Power, in terms of 
remuneration and conditions, for the work you are expected to do? Tick one box for 
eac/1partoflltisq110es0,,·,,,,.~--------------------~ I Very Poor I Poor I No Opinion IGood I Very Good 
17.1 Prior to 01 02 03 04 05 
Corporatisation 
17.2 Currently 01 02 03 04 05 
18 What has been the impadoforgan!sational change on your career opportunities 
within Western Power? Tick one ftox 
Largely Slightly Neither Slightly lmgely Positive 
Negative Im pad Negative Impact Negative or Positive Impact 
Positive Impact 
Impact 
°' 
02 03 04 05 
19 With the introduction of new management systems and organisational changes .•.. 
Tick 011e box for eacli parl of this questiO!I. 
1= INO 
19.1 Do you consider your current skills adequate for what 01 02 
you are expected to do? 
,,, Do you consider you should learn new skills? 01 02 
,,, Have you sought new skills? 01 02 
19.4 Do you consider Western Power should provide 01 02 
training for any skills you may require? 
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20 \.\/hat impact have lhe following management system,; and business strategies had on 
your workload over lhe past seven years? Tick 011e box for eaclr part oftl,is q1JestioJ1. 
,0.1 
20.2 
20.3 
,0.4 
20.5 
20.6 
,0.7 
,O.S 
20.9 
20.10 
20.11 
20.12 
20.13 
20.14 
20.15 
20.16 
FOCUS 
MLl 
MlMS 
Shareholder Value Adding 
(SVA) 
Service Level Agreement 
{SLA's) 
Employee Recruibnent and 
Selection (SIRSS) 
Employee Pcrfonmmce 
Manager,1ent (1EAM:) 
Change:Management 
Benchmarking Business Unit 
Performance 
Marketing and Sales 
Pursuit of Unregufoted Income 
Customer Focus 
Budgets & Financial 
Accountability 
Environmen"1l lssues 
Strategic Planning 
Contract Labour 
largely 
Negative 
Impact 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
20.17 Introduction of New Technology O 1 
20.18 Contracting out of Services 
Slightly 
Negative 
Impact 
02 
01 
01 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
01 
C2 
02 
02 
Neilher Slightly Largely 
Negative Positive Positive 
o, Impact Impact 
Positive 
Im~act 
OS 
03 04 OS 
03 04 OS 
03 o• OS 
03 o, OS 
03 o• OS 
03 04 cs 
03 C4 OS 
03 o, OS 
03 04 OS 
03 o, OS 
03 04 OS 
03 04 OS 
03 04 cs 
03 C4 OS 
03 C4 OS 
03 04 OS 
03 04 OS 
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Z1 How would you rate the following with respect to your personal experience of new 
management systems within Western Power since corporatisation? Tick one bor for 
21.1 
21.2 
21.3 
21.4 
21.5 
21.6 
21.7 
21.B 
21.9 
21.10 
21.11 
21.12 
21.13 
e,u:/1 part of t/tJ', q11es/lor1 
Strongly 
Decreased 
Your Motivation 
Your }ob Satisfaction 
°' 
YourTraining/ 01 
Leaming 
Opportunities 
YourLeisureTime 01 
Your Hours of Work 01 
Your Persona\Stn;ss 01 
at Work 
Amount of Work 01 
You Take Home 
Time You Spend on 01 
Employee Issues 
That Were 
Previously a HR 
Concern 
Your degree of 01 
Accountability as 
Manager or Section 
Head 
Your Empowerment 01 
to take Action and 
Make Decisions 
Without Referring to 
Your Supervisor (GM 
or Executive) 
Time You Spend on 01 
Non Core Activities 
Time You Spend 01 
Coaching and 
Training 
Subordinates 
Time You Spend 
°' Organising and 
Attending Meetings 
Somewhat Neither Somewhat Significantly 
Decreilsed Decreased lrn:reased Increased 
" Increased 
o, 03 
02 03 
°' 
05 
0, 03 04 05 
0, C3 04 05 
02 03 04 05 
0, 03 04 05 
02 03 04 05 
o, C3 
°' 
05 
0, 03 04 05 
02 03 04 05 
0, 03 
°' 
05 
0, 03 04 05 
o, 03 04 05 
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